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Abstract 
 
The global crisis of 2008 challenged the functioning of the financial markets. In the 
aftershock era numerous repercussions were felt throughout the world, resulting from a 
plethora of cross-border and cross-entity interdependencies. An initially systemic banking 
crunch – where cash strapped banks stopped lending, liquidity abruptly dried up, and credit 
conditions deteriorated – metastasized into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area which 
devastated public finances and provoked higher sovereign default risk. Motivated by the 
intensity, the magnitude and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire financial 
system, this thesis presents five essays on applied financial econometrics and financial 
networks which examine, model and investigate: i) systemic risk and the resilience of the 
banking industry via employing financial networks and entropy maximization; ii) the role of 
credit derivatives and the two-way feedback ramification, triggered by government 
interventions, on financial stability; iii) the symptoms of acute liquidity withdrawal in 
emerging markets; iv) a Bayesian three state switching regime approach to price financial 
assets; v) tail risk management with portfolio asymmetries and asset monotonic volatility. 
More precisely, in Chapter three the Maximum Entropy method is employed to 
capture systemic risk, the resilience of the banking system in Europe and the propagation of 
financial contagion in a dynamic financial network framework. As conditions deteriorate, 
three channels (interbank loan, sovereign, asset-backed loan) trigger severe direct and indirect 
losses and cascades of defaults, whilst the dominance of the sovereign credit risk channel 
amplifies, as the primary source of financial contagion in the banking network. Systemic risk 
within the northern euro area banking system is less apparent, while the southern euro area is 
more prone and susceptible to bank failures. By modelling the contagion path the results 
demonstrate that the euro area banking system insists to be markedly vulnerable and 
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conducive to systemic risks, implying that there is a need for additional policies to increase 
the resilience of the sector.  
Moreover, the thesis develops a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression 
(MSBVAR) model in Chapter four to study the two-way feedback hypothesis between credit 
default swaps and the role of government interventions on financial stability. The results 
demonstrate that a rise in sovereign debt due to the countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy 
measures, is perceived by stock markets as a catastrophe on economic growth prospects. 
Interestingly, government interventions in the banking sector deteriorate the credit risk of 
sovereign debt, whilst higher risk premium required by investors for holding riskier 
government bonds depresses the sovereign debt market, and attenuates the collateral value of 
loans, leading to bank retrenchment. The ensuing two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop 
indicates that government interventions do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector.  
Furthermore, the thesis employs several copula functions and the Extreme Value 
theory in Chapter five, to estimate and quantify joint downside risks and the transmission of 
shocks in emerging currencies, evolving from domestic emerging stock markets, liquidity 
(banks’ credit default swaps), credit risk (Volatility Index) and growth (commodity prices) 
channels. The models measure the time-varying shock spillover intensities to ascertain a 
significant increase in cross-asset linkages during periods of high volatility which is over and 
above any expected economic fundamentals, providing strong evidence of asymmetric 
investor induced contagion, triggered by cross asset rebalancing. The critical role of the credit 
crisis is amplified, as the beginning of an important reassessment of emerging market 
currencies which lead to changes in the dependence structure, a revaluation and recalibration 
of their risk characteristics.  
Additionally, the thesis employs a Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) 
model to capture the transmission of shocks from stock, commodity and credit markets to four 
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shipping indices in Chapter six. By estimating the impulse response functions (IRF), the 
model identifies the episodes and documents the existence of three regimes and directional 
spillovers between low, intermediate and high volatility regimes. The estimation results 
obtained using a Gibbs sampler indicate that the S&P 500, the S&P GSCI, Banks’ CDS and 
the VIX behave as channels which transform and spread the risk to the shipping market with 
the propagation of shocks. Interestingly, higher risk premium that is required by investors for 
holding financial assets depresses the shipping market substantially.  
Finally, several copula functions are employed to model tail dependence during 
periods of extreme, asset monotonic volatility and reverse portfolio asymmetry conditions 
between shipping, stock, commodity and credit markets in Chapter seven. The findings reveal 
that shocks in the shipping market coincide with dramatic changes in other markets and 
document the existence of extreme co-movements during severe financial conditions. Lower 
tail dependence exceeds conditional upper tail dependence, indicating that during periods of 
economic turbulence, dependence increases and the crisis spreads in a domino fashion, 
causing asymmetric contagion which advances during market downturns. In the post crisis 
period the level of dependence drops systematically and shipping assets become more 
pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves. According to the estimated results 
accelerated decreases in commodities and prompt variations in volatility, provoke accelerated 
decreases and function as a barometer of shipping market fluctuations.  
The global financial crisis has profoundly shaped modern finance. This thesis 
examines the prominent role of the crisis in financial markets, provides important implications 
for understanding systemic and liquidity risk, for analysing policies designed to mitigate 
financial contagion, and for capturing the fluctuations of emerging currencies and financial 
assets during distress economic conditions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of Thesis 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers, a sprawling global bank, in September 2008 almost 
crashed the global financial system, engendered a plethora of financial defaults, and 
manifested colossal taxpayer-financed bail-outs to bolster and preserve the financial industry 
(Acharya et al. 2014). The ensuing credit crunch turned what was already a nasty plunge into 
the most severe recession since the 1930s (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011; and Aiyar 2012). 
Hence, the financial crisis can be described as having been a "perfect storm": a confluence of 
various conditions that not only triggered financial and economic turbulence but also greatly 
magnified its impact. Massive monetary and fiscal stimulus prevented a catastrophic 
depression, but the ramification remains feeble (Coenen et al. 2012; and Kollmann et al. 
2012).  
Emphatically, in the aftermath of the credit crunch, the effects are still rippling 
through the global economy. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that GDP levels are still 
below their pre-crisis apogee in many developed countries, especially in Europe, where the 
financial crisis perturbed and evolved into the euro sovereign debt crisis (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2014). The financial industry witnesses the wobbles in financial markets as America’s 
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan 
adopt unconventional monetary policy tools to pep up growth (for a brief discussion on 
monetary policy unconventional tools see also Curdia and Wootford 2011; Gertler and Karadi 
2011; and Debola et al. 2013). 
 
1.2 Research Philosophy and Motivation of Thesis 
With half a decade’s hindsight, motivated by the widely accepted observation that the 
financial meltdown had multiple causes, this thesis: i) models systemic risk in banking 
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networks; ii) examines the role of Credit Default Swaps and Government Interventions; iii) 
identifies the role of acute liquidity withdrawal in emerging markets; iv) captures the regime 
dependent behavior of the shipping market; and v) models tail risks and contagion channels 
in financial and shipping assets. 
In the aftershock era, the effects of both interconnectedness and contagion manifested 
themselves while systemic risk emerged as one of the most challenging aspects. The banking 
industry grappled with one overarching challenge; to measure and reduce systemic risk in 
order to improve the resilience of the financial system to adverse shocks and to prevent a 
repetition of the recent crisis, whilst synchronically financial networks emerged as an 
appealing approach to study the way systemic risk propagates. The recent financial turmoil 
has made clear that there is a strong need for sound empirical work in this area, in order to 
enhance regulations that prevent a local crisis from becoming global, and to examine 
vulnerabilities that emerge from network interdependencies in the financial system.  
Following Acemoglou et al. (2015) and Elliott et al. (2014) we measure systemic risk and 
examine the effects of extreme interconnectedness and financial interrelationships by 
constructing a dynamic banking network and employing the maximum entropy approach. 
Financial network theory can be instrumental in capturing risk associated externalities, 
triggered by a financial institution and the corresponding effects for the entire financial 
system. 
Furthermore, an initially systemic banking crisis transformed and metastasized into a 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (see also Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2012; and Acharya 
and Steffen 2015) which devastated public finances and provoked higher sovereign default 
risk. Government interventions to bail-out troubled banks played a critical role for the 
transmission of the crisis (Acharya et al. 2014).  Hence, we introduce a model with a banking 
sector and a sovereign bond market -represented by the credit default swap market- to 
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analyze the desirability of government guarantees for financial stability. Moreover, we test 
the two-way feedback hypothesis (Gennaioli et al. 2014; and Sandleris 2014), to identify if 
government interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer from the banking 
to the public sector.  
In addition, the global financial crisis triggered liquidity shortage and distracted credit 
risk. Severe financial conditions, like the recently experienced credit crunch, play an 
important role in driving economic activity in emerging economies (Akinci 2013). Global 
financial shocks increase uncertainty and fluctuations, and thus, the business climate 
deteriorates causing increased uncertainty for future growth prospects. Motivated by the lack 
of evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals serve as the determinants of co-movements in 
international markets (see also Ang and Chen 2002; and Baur 2012), the thesis examines the 
incremental impact of the credit crunch, and how the recent credit crisis affected the behavior 
of the most liquid emerging currency markets. More concretely, we test the investor-induced 
contagion hypothesis which proposes that uninformed rational investors are not able to 
distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental 
shocks. Thus, when investors suffer a large loss in an investment, they are forced to liquidate 
their positions in the most vulnerable investments (i.e. emerging stock markets, according to 
Ibragimov et al. 2013) triggering cross-market portfolio rebalancing, resembling to investor-
induced contagion (Yuan 2005; Boyer et al. 2006; and Jotikasthira et al. 2012). 
Emphatically, cross-country, cross-asset correlations and comovements rose 
dramatically during the financial turmoil (Bubak et al. 2011). According to the traditional 
portfolio theory, investors can improve the performance of their portfolios by allocating their 
investments into different asset classes (Markowitz, 1952). However, during turbulent 
periods, cross-market co-movements increase rendering traditional theory fruitless. The 
evidence of cross-border volatility spillovers among different asset classes outlines important 
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insights for the existence of unusual fluctuations between developed and emerging, stock and 
foreign exchange markets and is important for investors and risk managers, since the 
presence of risk spillovers among asset classes increases portfolio risk and magnifies the 
volatility of the expected returns (Boyer et al. 2006; Okimoto, 2008; Bekaert et al. 2009 inter 
alia). Therefore, the thesis examines the interaction and the changing patterns of correlation 
between shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets to fill a major gap in the 
literature.  
What these co-movements reflect in asset pricing and risk management terms? A 
further dimension of this thesis is to examine volatility spikes, the existence of any extreme 
value dependence, symmetries and asymmetries in the dependence structure and to 
investigate joint downward/upward dynamics and the contemporaneous dependence entailed 
in the tails for shipping, commodity, and stock markets. No risk management term has 
entered the vernacular of investors as rapidly as “tail risk management” has in the last years. 
The recent credit crunch advanced on elevated volatility, large fluctuations and extreme 
exchange rate variations (i.e. tail risks). Investors pulled capital from assets, even those with 
small levels of perceived risk, and caused values of global assets to plunge. These events 
originate unprecedented losses to risk, portfolio managers and corporations. Moreover, 
measuring tail dependence and extreme co-movements boils down to the estimation of the 
probability of observing very large losses (Straetmans and Candelon, 2013; Dias 2014; 
Tolikas 2014) and thus it helps international investors to manage risks in their portfolio 
(Wang et al. 2013). Indeed, an increase in cross-asset co-movements diminishes rapidly 
diversification opportunities (Ibragimov and Walden 2007; Cremers et al. 2015) and renders 
traditional diversification theory fruitless (Markowitz, 1952; and Solnik, 1974). Thus, this 
thesis also endeavours to model and manage asset tail risk and to promote effective financial 
decision – making investments. 
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It is worth noting that the research philosophy in this thesis is based on a deductive 
reasoning, with a positivism doctrine and follows a “top-down” approach. In particular, 
specific theories are developed and observations are collected to test the hypotheses with 
explicit data leading to new insights for the original theory. Thus, the thesis presents the 
research hypotheses, the collection of the relevant data and then the implementation of the 
appropriate mathematical and econometric techniques. On the contrary, inductiveness is 
employed only in the sense that empirical findings are compared to previous studies and the 
extant literature. 
Additionally, the mathematical and econometric methods employed in this thesis are 
tested for their reliability and their suitability against other methods. Thus, all methods 
employed are checked for their robustness, and the most appealing techniques are presented 
in the studies. In a similar vein, the choosen variables and the relation among them, serve and 
reflect economic and financial theories and arguments developed in the thesis. Specifically, 
the maximum entropy approach echoes symmetric risk theory as the leading method for 
measuring counterparty exposures, the MSVAR approach reflects the changing behavior of 
assets and theories for spillover effects, whilst copula funtions mimic tail risks and contagion 
paths.  
 
1.2.1 Systemic Risk and Financial Network 
On August 9th 2007, BNP Paribas abandoned withdrawals from three investment 
funds because it could not value their asset holdings, and in particular their subprime-
mortgage assets. “The complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US 
securitisation market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their 
quality or credit rating,” was the way the French bank described it in a statement reported that 
day (“Crash Course”, The Economist, Sep. 7, 2013). Consequently, as Longstaff (2010) and 
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Geanakopoulos et al. (2012) investigate, the growing rate of default on home mortgages in 
the U.S. precipitated the financial crisis. These delinquencies, albeit not enormous, became 
the bonanza for some investment banks. Apparently, as the contagion spread throughout the 
financial sector in 2007-08, cash-strapped banks stopped lending, liquidity abruptly dried up, 
and credit conditions deteriorated, thereby miring the rest of the economy.  
BNP Paribas was not the first to reach that conclusion. Bear Stearns, one of many 
banks vanished by the turmoil, abandoned fund redemptions in July 2007. However, the BNP 
news provoked the first wide policy response from central banks to vanishing and 
evaporating liquidity in interbank markets, as the European Central Bank immediately 
conducted a special refinancing operation (Allen et al. 2009). The credit crunch was officially 
on, and so was a financial apocalypse that has since cascade a plethora of defaults in the 
banking sector (Acharya and Skeie 2011), throttled economic growth (Mishkin 2011), 
changed the way finance is regulated (Panageas 2010), raised deep questions about the 
efficacy of markets (Philippon and Schnabl 2013) and threatened the existence of the euro 
(Corsetti et al. 2014).  
In the aftershock era, the effects of both interconnectedness and contagion manifested 
themselves (for a brief discussion on financial contagion see also Kaminski et al. 2003) and 
systemic risk emerged as one of the most challenging aspects (Acemoglou et al. 2014; Elliott 
et al. 2014, inter alia). The banking industry grappled with one overarching challenge; to 
measure and reduce systemic risk (for an insightful discussion on systemic risk see also Allen 
and Gale 2000; Bae et al. 2003; Allen and Carletti 2006; Bartram et al. 2007; and Allen et al. 
2011) in order to improve the resilience of the financial system to adverse shocks and to 
prevent a repetition of the recent crisis.   
The intensity and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire financial 
system, highlights the need to identify, measure and understand the nature and the source of 
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systemic risk in order to improve the underlying risks that banks face, to avert banks’ 
liquidation ex ante and to promote macro-prudential policy tools (for macro-prudential 
policies see also Hanson et al. 2011). Thus, the third chapter of this thesis focuses on the euro 
area banking industry to examine the way systemic risk arises endogenously and how shocks 
in economic and financial channels propagate in the banking sector. We also endeavour to 
answer the following questions: In the presence of a distress situation how the financial 
system performs? Have the new capital rules rendered the European banking industry safer? 
What is the primary source of systemic risk? How financial contagion propagates within the 
Eurozone? These fundamental themes remain unanswered, and hence obtaining the answers 
is critical and at the heart of most of the recent research on systemic risk. 
 
1.2.2 Banking Stability: The Role of Derivatives and Government Interventions 
The genesis of the euro prompted an unprecedented expansion of the financial sector 
within the euro area. However, Europe had its own ingrained imbalances: Southern European 
economies racked up excessive current-account deficits in the first decade of the euro while 
Northern European countries ran offsetting surpluses (Bekaert et al. 2013; Boone and 
Johnson 2014). The imbalances were financed by credit flows from the euro-zone core to the 
overheated housing markets of countries like Spain and Ireland (Arellano and Cocherlakota 
2014). Thus, as documented by Acharya et al. (2012) and Lane (2012) the euro crisis has in 
this respect and to a great extent been a continuation of the financial crisis, as markets have 
agonised over the weaknesses of European banks loaded with bad debts following property 
busts. 
When America’s housing market crashed, a chain reaction exposed fragilities in the 
financial system (for the role of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, see also De Haas and Van 
Horen 2012). Mortgage-backed securities slumped in value, if they could be valued at all. As 
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described by Iyer and Puri (2012), trust, which is the ultimate glue of all financial systems, 
began to dissolve in 2007—a year before Lehman’s bankruptcy—as banks started 
questioning the viability of their counterparties. Liquidity abruptly dried up, and as a 
consequence, Northern Rock a British mortgage lender, was an early casualty in the autumn 
of 2007 (“An unconventional tool”, Financial Times, Oct. 6, 2014). 
Those losses triggered a full-blown financial crisis when financial institutions 
suddenly changed the way they price risky assets and demanded higher interest rates on 
existing and new loans (Woodford 2010; Boyd and Hakenes 2014; Martin et al. 2014). A 
string of failures and near failures of major financial institutions—including Bear Stearns, 
IndyMac Federal Bank, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), Lehman Brothers, American 
International Group (AIG), and Dexia—preserved financial markets on edge. Complex chains 
of debt between counterparties were vulnerable to just one link breaking. Deep recessions and 
big financial rescues led to a surge in government debt (Conesa and Kehoe 2014), raised fears 
about the solvency of various countries in the euro area (Acharya and Steffen 2014), 
culminating in Greece’s sovereign default in 2012. Debt was both a cause and a consequence 
of the crisis, and remains a big reason for its continuance (Iachan and Nenov 2014).  
Financial instruments such as credit-default swaps (in which the seller agrees to 
compensate the buyer if a third party defaults on a loan) that were meant to spread risk turned 
out to concentrate it. Hence, not surprisingly, the Credit Default Swaps market has recently 
received renewed attention from investors, policy makers, regulators and researchers. The 
ensuing sudden credit squeeze and liquidity dry-up induced stock market investors to seek 
protection and insurance against the increased probability of default (Zhang et al. 2009). 
Thus, there are anecdotal evidences that the CDS market reflects developments in both credit 
and stock markets (Jorion and Zhang 2007; and Pan et al. 2008).  
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The direction of the interdependence between stock and credit markets has become a 
bone of contention only recently (Gennaioli et al. 2014; Hilscher et al. 2015). However, 
evidence on whether and, if so, how CDS spreads are informative about stock market returns 
and volatility, remains scant. Hence, the fourth chapter of this thesis fills this chasm by 
studying the two-way feedback effects between sovereign and banking sector’s risks in euro 
area countries, and the regime-dependent interdependence between the euro area Bank Credit 
Default Swaps and Sovereign Credit Default Swaps.  
 
1.2.3 Emerging Currencies and Liquidity Shortage 
Over the last decade, emerging economies have been by far the biggest driver of 
global growth for at least a decade. As a result, emerging markets have been a magnet for 
global investors. Even pension funds and sovereign wealth funds have increased their 
allocations to emerging market assets in order to take advantage of the world’s fastest 
growing economies. Emerging markets, having experienced the “Asian Tigers” crises of 
1997, the Russian Default of 1998, the collapse of the Brazilian Real of 2002, resolved to 
inoculate themselves by refusing to rely on foreign financing (Garcia-Circo et al. 2010; and 
Jeanne 2012). They preserved their exchange rates so as to run current-account surpluses 
(many emerging economies rely heavily on natural resource exports) and built up foreign 
reserves. Such progress nurtured hopes of more to come. But the helpful tailwinds and the 
benign macroeconomic patterns (i.e. interest rates at historical lows, capital flowed freely, 
rapid growth in commodity prices) which made that period exceptional cannot be replicated 
easily (Williamson 2012). Alas, the hopes are now slipping away. 
The financial crisis which began in industrialized countries during 2008 and quickly 
spread to emerging markets, deteriorated the environment for capital flows and triggered 
deep sell offs in emerging economies (Aloui et al. 2011; Akinci 2013, inter alia). The 
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subprime mortgage crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers was followed by a 
synchronised explicit decline in emerging market currencies, over and above what one would 
expect from economic fundamentals. Global financial shocks, like the recently experienced 
credit crunch, play an important role in driving financial activity in emerging economies. 
Nonetheless, the empirical literature is silent about the role and the extent to which global 
financial risk shocks drive fluctuations in emerging countries. Moreover, the role of portfolio 
balance effects in emerging currency markets remains rather controversial and the empirical 
evidence in its support rather indirect. 
Motivated by the lack of evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals serve as the 
determinants of co-movements in international markets (see also Longin and Solnik 2001; 
Ang and Chen 2002; Barberis et al. 2005; Yuan, 2005; and Baur 2012, for informative 
readings), this thesis examines in the fifth chapter, how the recent credit crunch affected the 
behavior of the most liquid emerging currency markets, the importance of external shocks in 
shaping the movement of certain emerging currency markets, and evaluate the role of global 
liquidity shocks, credit risk fluctuations and advances in the commodity markets. As a result, 
this thesis also endeavours to answer the following questions: what is the impact of global 
financial shocks in emerging currencies? How is stability in emerging currencies shaped by 
cross-asset rebalancing? Are there any risk factors which have acted as channels of risk 
transfer on emerging currency markets? Is it possible to model risk spillovers in emerging 
currencies? Is there any structural change in the tail behaviour of the unconditional 
distribution? Is there any extreme value dependence with other financial assets? The thesis 
addresses these essential issues to identify new channels and sources for the transmission of 
shocks across emerging market currencies and to verify how crises are likely to spread across 
emerging market foreign exchanges. 
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1.2.4 Modelling the Behavior of Financial Assets with Bayesian Econometrics 
“My view is that improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the only 
factor, have probably been an important source of the Great Moderation. In particular, I am 
not convinced that the decline in macroeconomic volatility of the past two decades was 
primarily the result of good luck, as some have argued, though I am sure good luck had its 
part to play as well.” (Bernanke 2004). Through this speech, Ben Bernanke, former Federal 
Reserve Board Governor, described a world not of financial crisis and long-term economic 
malaise, but of outstanding stability and superlative monetary policy.  
The “Great Moderation” - years of low inflation and stable growth - fostered 
complacency and risk-taking (Davis and Kahn 2008). The strong demand for raw materials in 
Asia pushed down global interest rates and fostered a surge of debt in what seemed to have 
become a less risky world. Low interest rates created an incentive for financial institutions, 
banks, hedge funds and investors to hunt for riskier assets that offered higher yields (Eisfeldt 
and Rampini 2006; and Guerrieri and Shimer 2014). The low volatility of the Great 
Moderation developed an attitude for more risky investments and increased the temptation to 
finance them through leverage. As described by Berentsen et al. (2012), investors encouraged 
by an excessively low interest rate environment, while the underestimation of risks and the 
subsequent fall in asset prices led to disaster myopia and to the global financial apocalypse. 
The economic recession that accompanied the credit crisis triggered a catastrophic 
blow to demand. In response central banks in the rich world slashed their benchmark interest 
rates close to zero, approaching the zero lower bound. However, growth remained elusive, 
while synchronically the output performance of global economies shifted and altered together 
during the peak of the financial crisis as never before in the recent history (Acharya and 
Merrouche 2012; Berg and Kirschenmann 2014, inter alia) indicating that cross-country, 
cross-asset correlations and comovements rose dramatically during the financial turmoil. The 
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evidence of cross-border volatility spillovers among different asset classes outlines important 
insights for the existence of unusual fluctuations between developed and emerging, stock and 
foreign exchange markets and is important for investors and risk managers, since the 
presence of risk spillovers among asset classes increases portfolio risk and magnifies the 
volatility of the expected returns (see also for informative readings Glosten et al. 1993; Boyer 
et al. 2006; Okimoto, 2008; Bekaert et al. 2009; Albuquerque and Vega, 2009; Bubak et al. 
2011; Ibragimov et al. 2013, Cremers et al. 2015). The sixth chapter of this thesis, examines 
the interaction and the changing patterns of correlation between shipping, financial, 
commodity and credit markets to fill a major gap in the literature. Motivated by the 
fluctuations experienced over the last decade in the shipping market, this chapter endeavours 
to answer the following questions: what is the relationship and the information contained 
between the stock market (S&P 500), the commodity market (S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index), the credit market (iTraxx Senior Financials Index for Banks’ Credit 
Default Swaps and Volatility Index representing changes in credit markets) and the shipping 
market? What drives large fluctuations and the risk characteristics of shipping assets? Do the 
shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets become more integrated during crisis 
periods when compared with tranquil periods?  Which is more prone to spillovers, the Dry 
Bulk or the Tanker market, Capesize (large vessels) or Panamax (medium range) vessels? 
 
1.2.5 Tail Risk Management in Shipping and Financial Assets 
The recent credit crunch advanced on elevated volatility, large fluctuations and 
extreme exchange rate variations (i.e. tail risks). Investors pulled capital from emerging 
countries, even those with small levels of perceived risk, and caused values of stocks and 
domestic currencies to plunge, highlighting how sensitive to fluctuations and changes in 
economic and market conditions, shipping assets are (Eichengreen 2012; and Fujiwara  et al. 
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2013). These events originate unprecedented losses to risk, portfolio managers and 
corporations (Li and Li 2013; and Rocheteau and Wright 2013). Thus, no risk management 
term has entered the vernacular of investors as rapidly as “tail risk management” has in the 
last years. 
One of the industries directly affected by the fluctuations and changes in the world 
economy is the shipping industry. This very old-rooted transport industry accounts for 
approximately 90 percent of global trade by volume due to being the most speedy and 
efficient means for the transportation of goods. More concretely, starting out decades ago as 
the mode to move finished goods and raw materials within short haul, shipping has become 
slowly but steadily an international industry which essentially connects large sectors of the 
economy. Over the last decade, the shipping industry has gone through extreme up- and 
downturns. The recent financial meltdown which began in industrialised countries during 
2008 and quickly spread to emerging markets, deteriorated the environment for capital flows 
and triggered deep sell offs in global economies (Shleifer and Vishny 2011; Alsakka and 
Gwilym, 2012; Semmler and Bernard, 2012).  
Motivated by the impact of the recent crisis, which provoked a rapid decline in world 
trade that has rippled through all segments of the maritime industry, this thesis intends to 
study tail risks and to investigate whether shipping indices exhibit excess correlations and 
dependencies in the tails of the distribution. In particular the seventh chapter of this thesis 
endeavours to answer the following questions: what is the effect of the recent credit crunch 
on the shipping market? What is the dependence formation between shipping and financial, 
commodity and credit markets? Is there any extreme value dependence over and above what 
one would expect from economic fundamentals which assembles to contagion? Is the 
dependence symmetric or asymmetric? By answering these questions, the seventh chapter of 
this thesis investigates the extent to which shocks to stock, commodity and credit markets are 
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transmitted to fluctuations in the shipping market and sheds light into the most recent 
shipping cycle which peaked in 2008 before declining rapidly at the onset of the global 
financial crisis. 
 
1.3 Contribution of Thesis 
Building on the background and motivation in the previous sections, this thesis has the 
following main objectives. 
1.3.1 Systemic Risk and Financial Network 
Motivated by the intensity and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire 
financial system, the first study of this thesis (chapter three) measures and understands the 
nature and the source of systemic risk in order to improve the underlying risks that banks 
face, to avert banks’ liquidation ex ante and to promote macro-prudential policy tools. 
Specifically, the thesis focuses on the euro area banking industry to examine the way 
systemic risk arises endogenously and how shocks in economic and financial channels 
propagate in the banking sector. The thesis addresses these issues drawing on recent 
developments in the studies of systemic risk (Brunnermeier and Pederson 2009, Drehmann 
and Tarasev 2013), contagion channels (Diamond and Rajan 2005; and Caballero and Simsek 
2013) and advances in network theory (Upper and Worms 2004; Gai et al. 2011), by 
proposing a unique interconnected, dynamic and continuous-time model of financial 
networks with complete market structure (i.e. interbank loan market) and two additional 
independent channels of systemic risk (i.e. sovereign credit risk and asset price risk). 
 The thesis contributes and extends several strands of the literature. Firstly, in contrast 
with the existing literature on the modelling of systemic risk (Gai et al. 2011; Mistrulli 2011; 
Castren and Rancan 2014; inter alia), the thesis captures multiple snapshots of the network 
structure and measures more accurately the direct (i.e. the effect of a shock on a specific 
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bank/banking system) and indirect effects (i.e. the effect on a banking system which is 
interconnected with a distress banking sector) of a shock in the banking network. Secondly, 
the results enlighten the nature of systemic risk and provide a new perspective on financial 
contagion and domino effects in the banking sector extending the works of Allen and Carletti 
(2006 and 2013), Gale and Kariv (2007), Ang and Longstaff (2013). Thirdly, the results offer 
new insights on the importance of interconnectedness in the banking network. Specifically, 
the thesis documents that even domestic banks with small financial exposures in a foreign 
banking sector may be severely affected by a systemic shock provoked by same, extending 
the works of Kroszner et al. (2007), Allen et al. (2009), Allen et al. (2011). Finally, the thesis 
identifies a dramatic variation between northern and southern euro area countries in terms of 
their response to systemic risk. More concretely, there is much less systemic risk and the 
speed of contagion is much lower in banks based in northern euro area than in banks based in 
southern euro area, extending the works of Allen and Gale (2004), and Drehmann and 
Tarashev (2013). 
 
1.3.2 Banking Stability: The Role of Derivatives and Government Interventions 
Motivated by recent evidences that the Credit Default Swaps Market reflects 
developments in both credit and stock markets, chapter four complements the work of chapter 
three by examining the two-way feedback effects between sovereign and banking sector’s 
risks in the euro area and models the regime-dependent interdependence between Banks’ 
Credit Default Swaps and Sovereign Credit Default Swaps. The thesis contributes in several 
strands of the literature. Firstly, the thesis employs a Markov Switching Bayesian VAR 
model which sheds light on a significant regime-dependent interdependence between these 
variables, extending the work of Alter and Schüler (2012). Secondly, the results are 
supportive of the feedback hypothesis and document that government interventions in the 
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banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer from the banking to the public sector extending 
the works of Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Sandleris (2014). 
 
1.3.3 Emerging Currencies and Liquidity Shortage 
Corroborating on the work of chapter four, chapter five is motivated by the lack of 
evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals serve as the determinants of co-movements in 
international markets (see also Longin and Solnik 2001; Ang and Chen 2002; Yuan, 2005; 
and Baur 2012, for informative readings). The thesis examines the incremental impact of the 
credit crunch, how the recent credit crisis affected the behavior of the most liquid emerging 
currency markets and the importance of external shocks in shaping the movement of certain 
emerging currencies. The thesis proposes a distinct approach on emerging currency markets 
to determine portfolio balancing effects and new channels for the transmission of shocks on 
emerging market foreign exchanges. Specifically, while there is extensive literature on 
studying comovements between the international equity markets and on modelling the 
dependence structure between exchange rates by using copulas, there is no empirical 
evidence on employing copulas to model the cross-asset dependence with several risk factors 
and the importance that external shocks have in shaping the movement of certain emerging 
currencies. Moreover, by employing several copula functions and extreme value theory the 
thesis tests for structural changes in the tail behavior of the unconditional distribution. The 
thesis measures tail dependence and extreme co-movements and estimates the probability of 
observing very large losses extending the works of the works of Sarno and Schmeling (2014) 
who observe future fundamentals that drive exchange rates and Campbell et al. (2010), who 
identify currency risk-minimising strategies for global bond investors. 
Additionally, the thesis provides novel evidence of asymmetric investor induced 
contagion, triggered by cross asset rebalancing, extending the works of Yuan (2005), Boyer 
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et al., (2006), Carlin et al., (2007), Dungey et al., (2010), Boyer (2011), and Jotikasthira et al., 
(2012) who observe that crisis spreads to other markets and investment funds through the 
liquidity channel. Finally, the results indicate that accelerated decreases and large variations 
in the domestic stock markets, in the growth (i.e. commodities), liquidity (BCDS) and credit 
channels (i.e. VIX) lead to accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in the emerging 
market foreign exchanges. This joint downside risk among these asset classes has not been 
documented in the literature of emerging market exchange rates. The increase in cross-asset 
co-movements diminishes rapidly diversification opportunities. These findings corroborate 
and extend the works of Aloui et al. (2011), Bubak et al. (2011), and Banti et al. (2012). 
 
1.3.4 Modelling the Behavior of Financial Assets with Bayesian Econometrics 
Extending the work of chapter five, chapter six is motivated by the fluctuations 
experienced over the last decade in the shipping market. The thesis examines, for the very 
first time in the literature, directional linkages and the regime-dependent behaviour between 
four shipping indexes extending the works of Jotikasthira et al. (2012), Papapostolou et al. 
(2014) and Kalouptsidi (2014). Furthermore, the thesis builds on and extends Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008) in order to employ a three state Markov Switching VAR to highlight the 
regime dependent behavior of the shipping market and to identify the episodes of shocks and 
spillovers from the financial, commodity and credit markets to the shipping market. Finally, 
the study extends the works of Kavoussanos and Visvikis, 2004; Alizadeh and Nomikos, 
2007; Goulas and Skiadopoulos, 2012) by providing scope for hedging the risks for 
investments in the shipping market. 
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1.3.5 Tail Risk Management in Shipping and Financial Assets 
Chapter seven builds on the work of chapter six, to study one striking feature of the recent 
financial crisis: how an initially asset specific event inflamed rapidly to international assets 
and markets around the globe. Motivated by the impact of the recent crisis, which provoked a 
rapid decline in world trade that has rippled through all segments of the maritime industry, 
the fifth study of this thesis (chapter seven) examines tail risks and investigates whether 
shipping indexes exhibit excess correlations and dependencies in the tails of the distribution, 
extending the works of Bonato et al. (2011), and Papapostolou et al. (2014). Furthermore, the 
thesis investigates the extent to which shocks to stock, commodity and credit markets are 
transmitted to fluctuations in the shipping market and sheds light into the most recent 
shipping cycle which peaked in 2008 before declining rapidly at the onset of the global 
financial crisis, extending the works of Boyer et al. (2006), and Bubak et al. (2011). 
  
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
The organisation of this thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical backgrounds of the following issues: i) systemic 
risk and the network theory; ii) the  two-way feedback hypothesis and the role of derivatives 
in the recent credit crunch; iii) investor-induced contagion hypothesis; iv) the modelling of 
financial assets; v) tail risk management. Additionally, the chapter provides a brief 
description of the relevant literature for the aforementioned themes. Chapter 3 investigates 
systemic risk and how financial contagion propagates within the euro area banking system by 
employing the Maximum Entropy approach, through the study entitled “Transmission 
Channels of Systemic Risk and Contagion in the European Financial Network”. The thesis 
captures multiple snapshots of a dynamic financial network and uses counterfactual 
simulations to propagate shocks emerging from three sources of systemic risk: interbank, 
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asset, and sovereign credit risk markets. As conditions deteriorate, these channels trigger 
severe direct and indirect losses and cascades of defaults, whilst the dominance of the 
sovereign credit risk channel amplifies, as the primary source of financial contagion in the 
financial network. Systemic risk within the northern euro area banking system is less 
apparent, while the southern euro area banking system is more prone and susceptible to bank 
failures provoked by financial contagion. Furthermore, the thesis models the contagion path 
and provides strong evidence that the euro area banking system insists to be severely 
undercapitalized, highly vulnerable and conducive to systemic risk. 
Chapter 4 examines how the credit default swaps market in the euro area becomes an 
important chain in the propagation of shocks through the entire financial system, the two-way 
feedback hypothesis among bank and sovereign credit default swaps and the role of 
government interventions via the study entitled “The Quest for Banking Stability: The Role 
of Government Interventions”. The thesis builds upon a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector 
Autoregression (MSBVAR) model to study how the credit default swaps (CDS) market in the 
euro area becomes an important chain in the propagation of shocks through the entire 
financial system and reports that a rise in sovereign debt due to the countercyclical fiscal 
policy measures, is perceived by stock market investors as a burden on economic growth 
prospects. Furthermore, the thesis documents that government intervention in the banking 
sector deteriorate the credit risk of sovereign debt, while also higher risk premium required 
by investors for holding riskier government bonds depresses the sovereign debt market, it 
impairs balance sheets of the banking sector, and it depresses the collateral value of loans 
leading to bank retrenchment. Consequently, the thesis argues that the ensuing two-way 
banking-fiscal feedback loop suggests that government interventions do not necessarily 
stabilize the banking sector. Interestingly, the prospect of government intervention allow 
banks to be more leveraged and, hence, more vulnerable to a sovereign default. 
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Chapter 5 measures the time-varying shock spillover intensities, estimates and 
quantifies joint downside risks in emerging currencies and documents the developments of 
concurrent extreme shocks, by the study entitled “Tail Risks and Domino Patterns in 
Emerging Currency Markets: The Symptoms of Acute Liquidity Withdrawal”. The thesis 
amplifies the critical role of the credit crisis, as the beginning of an important reassessment of 
emerging market currencies which lead to changes in the dependence structure, a revaluation 
and recalibration of their risk characteristics. By modelling tail risks and dependences we 
detect structural breaks and find patterns consistent with the domino effect.  
Chapter 6 employs a three state Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) 
model to capture the transmission of shocks from stock, commodity and credit markets to 
four shipping indices, through the study entitled “Determinants of Shipping Market 
Fluctuations: A Baeysian Markov Switching Three State Approach”. The thesis employs a 
Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) model to capture the transmission of 
shocks from stock, commodity and credit markets to four shipping indices. The estimated 
impulse response functions (IRF), identify the episodes and document the existence of three 
regimes and directional spillovers between low, intermediate and high volatility regimes. The 
estimation results obtained using a Gibbs sampler indicate that the S&P 500, the S&P GSCI, 
Banks’ Credit Default Swaps and the Volatility Index behave as channels which transform 
risk to the shipping market with the propagation of shocks and spread the risk to the shipping 
market. Moreover, the thesis identifies that higher risk premium that is required by investors 
for holding financial assets depresses the shipping market, and captures volatility spikes and 
propose the use of VIX futures as a hedging proxy instrument and a device to decide on 
investment or divestment timing in the shipping market.  
Chapter 7 employs several copula functions to model conditional dependence and tail 
dependence during periods of extreme volatility and reverse conditions between shipping, 
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stock, commodity and credit markets, via the study entitled “Tail Risks and Contagion in the 
Shipping Market”. The thesis finds that shocks in the shipping market coincide with dramatic 
changes in other markets and document the existence of extreme co-movements during 
severe financial conditions. Lower tail dependence exceeds conditional upper tail 
dependence, indicating that during periods of economic turbulence, dependence increases and 
the crisis spreads in a domino fashion, causing asymmetric contagion which advances during 
market downturns. In the post crisis period the level of dependence drops systematically and 
the shipping market becomes more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves. 
According to the estimated results accelerated decreases in commodities and prompt 
variations in volatility, provoke accelerated decreases and function as a barometer of shipping 
market fluctuations. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the key findings, discusses policy 
implications and limitations of thesis and suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter initially provides a brief summary with the most important aspects of the 
existing literature and then presents briefly the relevant literature for the role of the financial 
turmoil which emerged in 2008, in the following five themes: i) the way the financial crisis 
evolved in a systemic risk crisis and the role of financial networks; ii) advances in the Credit 
Default Swaps market and the role of government interventions in the Eurozone banking 
sector; iii) developments in emerging markets; iv) the changing behavior of the shipping 
market; and v) the way to effectively hedge tail risks shipping and financial assets. 
The financial crisis of 2008 proved that the architecture of the global financial system 
plays a critical role in the transmission of systemic risk. Network analysis has recently 
emerged as an appealing approach to analyse financial contagion and systemic risk. In their 
pioneering work, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Allen and Gale (2000) provide some of the 
first formal models of financial contagion over banking networks. More concretely, they 
employ a theoretical approach with banks’ bilateral exposures in a financial network 
framework, to examine how the banking system responds to contagion. They document that a 
more interconnected architecture enhances the resilience of the system to the insolvency of 
any individual bank. Additionally, they argue that in a more densely interconnected financial 
network, the losses of a distressed bank are divided among more creditors, reducing the 
impact of negative shocks to individual institutions on the rest of the system. On the contrary, 
Gai et al. (2011), Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) reveal that dense 
interconnections may function as a destabilizing force, paving the way to systemic failures. 
The third chapter of this thesis builds on and extends these approaches by modelling systemic 
risk and financial contagion over dynamic multifactor networks. 
The credit crunch of 2008 transmitted rapidly from systemic banking crisis 
transformed to a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Government interventions and 
 23 
 
financial sector bailouts triggered devastating increases in sovereign credit risk (Gennaioli et 
al. 2014). Public finances weakened, and the probability of sovereign risk default intensified. 
As the probability of default increases, investors require higher risk premium on investment 
in sovereign bonds. Higher risk premium depresses the sovereign bond market and impairs 
balance sheets of bond holders, mainly banks (Sandleris 2014). Acharya et al. (2014) 
documented that government interventions led to deterioration in the sovereign’s 
creditworthiness. This notwithstanding, sovereign credit risk also feeds back onto the 
financial sector, leading to a loop between the credit risk of sovereigns and banks. In the 
fourth chapter we examine if such a feedback is indeed present due to the financial sector's 
implicit and explicit guarantees and holdings of sovereign bonds. This two-way feedback 
between financial sector and sovereign credit risks proposed by Acharya et al. (2014) calls 
into question the usually implicit assumption that government resources are vastly deep and 
that the main problem posed by bailouts is moral hazard, the distortion of future financial 
sector incentives. Key in this research is the possibility – empirically unaccounted by the 
existing literature – a financial crisis and the associated government interventions in the 
banking sector to modify the structure of these effects, resembling to the two-way banking-
fiscal feedback loop. 
Global financial shocks increase volatility and fluctuations, and therefore, the 
business climate deteriorates causing increased uncertainty for future growth prospects. 
According to the traditional portfolio theory, investors can improve the performance of their 
portfolios by allocating their investments into different asset classes (Markowitz, 1952). In 
the recently experienced financial crisis, extreme dependence, and comovement among 
financial assets, manifested themselves. Following Yuan (2005), Boyer et al. (2006) and 
Jotikasthira et al. (2012), we test for investor-induced contagion in emerging currencies. As 
these authors argue, uninformed rational investors are not able to distinguish between selling 
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based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks. Thus, when investors 
suffer a large loss in an investment, they are forced to liquidate their positions in other 
investments, triggering cross-market portfolio rebalancing. The thesis builds on and extends 
these approaches to identify how shocks are propagated in emerging market currencies.  
In the aftermath of the financial meltdown of 2008, the seed of investigating and 
understanding the nature of fluctuations and spillover effects among financial assets 
flourished. This was supported by strong indications that cross-country, cross-asset 
correlations and comovements rose dramatically during the financial turmoil. One of the 
industries directly affected by the fluctuations and changes in the world economy is the 
shipping industry. Kavoussanos and Visvikis  (2004), Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), and 
Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012) document that the shipping market is highly risky and 
volatile, since it is subject to a number of uncertainties, ranging from geopolitical shocks and 
the ever-changing world economy to fleet changes and the sensitive market sentiment. These 
studies employ VECM and several linear models to forecast the movement of the shipping 
market in conjunction with spot rates in the dry bulk shipping market. They argue that the 
shipping market is determined through the interaction between supply and demand for sea 
transportation. They also observe that both drift and diffusion aspects are non-linear with 
respect to freight rate levels and document the dangers of forecasting with equilibrium 
correction models in the shipping market. We extend these approaches in the sixth chapter of 
this thesis, building on and extending the Markov Switching Regime model proposed by 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008). 
In a similar vein, chapter seven presents a further dimension of this thesis. 
Specifically, we study tail risks and investigate whether shipping indices exhibit excess 
correlations and dependencies in the tails of the distribution. We build on the traditional asset 
pricing theory, which proposes that the presence of irrational investors in a market with 
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frictions and noise traders, advances to increased correlation and comovements, over and 
above any macroeconomic fundamentals (Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Bekaert et al. 2014 inter 
alia). Similarly, the thesis employs contagion as a metric which increases cross market 
linkages during periods of high volatility and propose that forced sales or “fire sales” in the 
contagion channels (i.e. sfinancial, commodity and credit markets) affect the shipping market 
(similar to Jotikasthira et. al. 2012, for effects of fire sales in emerging markets).  
 
2.1 Systemic Risk and Financial Network  
A. Theoretical Framework 
The global financial crisis of 2008 rendered systemic risk an area of escalated interest 
for researchers, whilst synchronically financial networks emerged as an appealing approach 
to study the way systemic risk propagates (see for example Acemoglou et al. 2014; Elliott et 
al. 2014). Hence, over the last years, studies on credit panics and bank runs departed from the 
traditional risk diversification framework (James 1991) and examined extreme 
interconnectedness (Ongena and Smith 2000; Caballero and Simsek 2013 inter alia) and 
ways to improve the stability of the financial system during turmoil periods (Gorton and 
Huang 2004 and 2006; Diamond and Rajan 2005), through financial interrelationships. A 
network describes a collection of nodes and the links between them, and thus, by using a 
network representation the structure of linkages among financial institutions (i.e. nodes) can 
be modelled and measured. Financial network theory can be instrumental in capturing risk 
associated externalities, triggered by a financial institution and the corresponding effects for 
the entire financial system. Thus, financial networks are employed as a suitable approach to 
study systemic risk, the way the banking system responds to contagion and to promote 
macro-prudential policies by examining network interdependencies.  
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Importantly, the financial network framework exhibits that excessive 
interconnectedness among banks and financial institutions increases systemic risk
1
 and may 
lead to a plethora of bank failures and defaults (see also for informative reading Bae et al. 
2003; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008; Brunnermeier 2008 inter alia). The recent financial 
turmoil has made clear that there is a strong need for sound empirical work in this area, in 
order to enhance regulations that prevent a local crisis from becoming global, and to examine 
vulnerabilities that emerge from network interdependencies in the financial system. However, 
due to limited availability of data, empirical applications are hitherto at an early stage. Thus, 
entropy maximisation which calibrates systemic risk in the network structure has only 
recently served as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures (Furfine 2003; 
Anand et al. 2014). 
B. Systemic risk and financial networks 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 and 2002), and Kaminski and Reinhart (1999) are among 
the first to search for systemic risk in banks, prompted by changes in macroeconomic 
developments. Allen and Gale (2000) employ a theoretical approach with banks’ bilateral 
exposures in a financial network framework, to examine how the banking system responds to 
contagion. They build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where consumers have random 
liquidity preferences, and they find that incomplete networks are more susceptible to 
contagion. Interestingly, Dasgupta (2005) examines how linkages among banks can be a 
source of contagious breakdowns, and finds the way depositors react when they receive a 
negative signal about banks’ fundamentals.  
On the search for optimal financial network the size of each national banking sector 
play a dominant role. Freixas et al. (2000) use interbank credit lines to explore liquidity 
shocks emerged from uncertainty about where consumers will withdraw funds. They find that 
                                                          
1
According to the Bank for International Settlements (1994) systemic risk is the risk that the failure of a 
participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain 
reaction leading to broader difficulties. 
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the stability of the banking system depends emphatically on whether depositors choose to 
consume at the location of a bank that functions as a money center or not. Allen et al. (2009), 
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), and Allen et al. (2011), use bilateral exposures in the 
interbank market to observe that a strongly connected banking network mitigates systemic 
risk by transferring the proportion of losses from one bank’s portfolio to more banks through 
interbank arrangements. In a similar vein, Cocco et al. (2009), documents that interbank 
networks are typically sparse, because interbank activity is based on relationships, while 
Craig and von Peter (2014) identify that smaller banks use a limited set of money center 
banks as intermediaries. 
An additional critical factor for the resilience of the banking network is the degree of 
interconnectedness. Allen and Gale (2004), Leitner (2005), Allen and Carletti (2006) and Gai 
and Kappadia (2010) find that banking systems respond differently in systemic risk due to 
changes on the degree of interconnectedness, idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks in 
the interbank market. In their theoretical approach, these studies account for the nature and 
scale bank-specific shocks, while also allowing asset prices to interact with balance sheets. 
Therefore, they propose central bank interventions to fix the short term interest rate and to 
provide extra liquidity in the market. Mistrulli (2011), and Trapp and Wewel (2013), observe 
not only that the network structures respond differently to the propagation of a shock, but the 
fragility of the system depends on the location in the network of the institution that was 
initially affected. Additionally, the first author simulates specific liquidity shocks in the 
Italian interbank market and observes that a bank default may spread to other banks through 
interbank linkages. 
Several studies build on the network structure proposed by Upper and Worms (2004), 
to propagate shocks within the interbank loan market. Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2011), 
and Hataj and Kok (2013) employ the epidemiology approach to test the resilience of the 
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banking industry to systemic risk. Particularly, they construct dynamic banking networks to 
investigate how the likelihood of the market risk depends on the market conditions and the 
structure of the banking network. They document the key role of banks’ financial linkages 
and observe that the spread of contagion depends on the degree of interconnection among 
banks. Furthermore, they find that contagion propagates within the financial network by 
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. 
The network theory links balance sheets’ claims and obligations into a network 
structure. This form allows researchers to model contagion risk and bank failures triggered by 
the propagation. Similarly, Castren and Rancan (2014) undertake an entropy maximization 
approach on macroeconomic data and bilateral exposures in the interbank market, to identify 
that the effects of systemic shocks depend on the underlying network structure. More 
recently, Acemoglou et al. (2014) and Elliot et al. (2014) explode how a propagation of 
shocks in banking networks and the extent of interbank connectivity increase systemic 
failures due to contagion of counterparty risk.  
It is evident from the existing literature that sovereign credit risk and asset price risk 
are not examined as two important sources of systemic risk. On the contrary, freezes in the 
interbank market dominate the way researchers explore financial contagion in the banking 
sector. Departing from the financial network approach, Duffie and Singleton (1999), and Ang 
and Longstaff (2013) use the sovereign credit risk channel to propagate sovereign – specific 
credit shocks and observe that it causes a cascade of defaults in U.S. and Eurozone 
sovereigns. Additionally, Longstaff (2010), Garratt et al. (2014) and Arentsen et al. (2015) 
study the relationship between reduced collateral values and asset price contagion. They 
identify that defaults in the subprime market spread quickly through the global financial 
system and provide evidence for the critical role of asset backed securities on the 
transmission of the financial crisis. 
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2.2 Banking Stability: The Role of Derivatives and Government Interventions 
A. Theoretical Framework 
The recent financial turmoil has witnessed the largest scale of government interventions in 
the financial sector since the 1920s (Hryckiewicz 2014).  However, government interventions 
proved to be ineffective not only in preventing the financial crisis but also in minimising and 
mitigating its negative effects, requiring governments to implement extraordinary emergency 
measures, from the extension of the coverage and scope of the existing safety net to the 
introduction of new schemes and generalized guarantees. Remarkably, these measures 
entailed large fiscal costs to the point of threatening the solvency of the country and 
undermining the credibility of the guarantees themselves. The thesis introduces a model with 
a banking sector and a sovereign bond market, represented by the credit default swap market 
and analyzes the desirability of government guarantees in a context in which their 
introduction generates a two-way feedback (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011, Alter and Schüler 
2012, Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2013 and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2014) 
between banking and sovereign debt crises. 
A credit default swap (CDS) is currently the most popular credit derivative, and it 
serves as a key indicator for the level of credit risk. In the case of government debt, investors 
use CDSs to express a view about the creditworthiness of a government, and to protect 
themselves in the event of a country default or in the event of debt restructuring. Financial 
markets developed the CDS on government debt as a flexible instrument to hedge and trade 
sovereign credit risk. Although CDSs on government debt are only a fraction of countries’ 
outstanding debt market, their importance has been growing rapidly since 2008, especially in 
advanced economies where the creditworthiness of some of these countries have experienced 
enormous pressure. With the intensified attention, their usage has come under more scrutiny. 
Since November 2009, several “peripheral” euro area countries, including Greece, Ireland, 
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Portugal, Spain and Italy, have faced episodes of heightened turbulence in their sovereign 
debt markets that soared the SCDS spreads (Bolton and Jeanne 2011). Hence, not 
surprisingly, the CDS market has recently received renewed attention from investors, policy 
makers, regulators and researchers. 
 
B. Empirical Framework  
Research into credit default swaps is dominated by the examination of (i) the determinants of 
sovereign credit risk and defaults (Aizenman et al. 2013, Ang and Longstaff 2013 and Beirne 
and Fratzscher 2013), (ii) the adverse effects to the banking sector during sovereign defaults 
(Panageas 2010, Acharya and Rajan 2013), and (iii) the cost of bank bailouts to the 
government (Gorton and Huang 2004; Diamond and Rajan 2005). An emerging body of 
research addresses two-way feedback effects between the risk of default in the banking and 
public sectors (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011, Alter and Schüler 2012, Acharya, Drechsler, and 
Schnabl 2013 and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2014). Key in this research is the possibility – 
empirically unaccounted by the existing literature – a financial crisis and the associated 
government interventions in the banking sector modify the structure of these effects, 
resembling to the two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop. Uncertainty surrounding future 
credit ratings is identified in this study as a catalyst for the aforementioned loop. In this 
regard, the thesis conceptually resembles Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), who ascribe 
financial instability to the role of government interventions. 
 In the extant literature, the focus is on the effects of stock market variables on credit 
market variables (see Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu 2009, Cao, Yu, and Zhong 2010, inter alia). The 
literature is further extended to control for variables characterizing the economic 
environment. For instance, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 
(2013) underline the importance of a common factor (referred to as a ‘crisis factor’), 
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capturing the effects from deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals and growing fiscal 
imbalances, for euro area BCDS and SCDS spreads. While the methodology employed in this 
thesis accounts for information contents of CDS and stock markets, and the stance of a 
business cycle, the thesis also allows stock market returns and volatility to be endogenously 
determined using BCDS and SCDS spreads. This approach is not apparent in the literature. 
The direction of the interdependence between stock and credit markets has become a bone of 
contention only recently (Norden and Weber 2009, Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson 2015). 
Theoretical work on government interventions presents mixed results, hitherto. The 
pivotal argument developed by proponents of government intervention is that regulatory 
actions are necessary to restore confidence in the banking industry and the credit system, by 
supporting the economy to avoid a catastrophic recession (Cordelland and Yenati 2003). 
More importantly, the proponents of regulatory intervention suggest that these actions do not 
deteriorate the banking sector, because regulatory actions assist distressed banks to recover, 
and banks’ restored charter values then discipline the banks’ behavior (Mehran and Thakor 
(2011). In a similar vein, according to Dam and Koetter (2012) strong regulatory actions 
restricting the banking business may also impose discipline on bank management.  
However, a different strand in the literature suggests that these actions are harmful for 
banking sector, because government interventions increase moral hazard due to a decline in 
market discipline and banks’ anticipations of bailouts (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp 
and Vesela, 2004). Additionally, according to Gropp et al. (2011) these actions undermine 
competition in the banking industry, increasing the risk experienced by non-assisted banks. 
Emphatically, there is empirical evidence that regulatory interventions are not effective in 
restoring banks’ financial conditions, because regulators do not have the proper incentives to 
restructure a distressed banks’ balance sheet efficiently (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
Furthermore, Fahri and Tirole (2012) document that systemic regulatory policies lead to a 
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collective moral hazard problem, because government interventions grant banks access to 
cheaper capital, incentivizing them to increase their borrowing and reduce their liquidity. As 
a result, it is ‘‘unwise for some banks to play safely, when all other banks start to gamble’’.  
 
2.3 Emerging Currencies and Liquidity Shortage  
A. Theoretical Framework 
According to the traditional portfolio theory, investors can improve the performance 
of their portfolios by allocating their investments into different asset classes (Markowitz, 
1952). However, during turmoil periods, cross-market co-movements increase rendering 
traditional theory fruitless and advancing to contagion. As described by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), contagion occurs when there is a significant cross-asset or cross-market increase in 
comovement due to a shock. This extreme dependence is the aftermath of forced sales or “fire 
sales” by wealth-constrained investors (Yuan 2005; Boyer et al., 2006; and Jotikasthira et al., 
2012). As these authors argue, uninformed rational investors are not able to distinguish 
between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks. Thus, 
when investors suffer a large loss in an investment, they are forced to liquidate their positions 
in other investments, triggering cross-market portfolio rebalancing. The thesis builds on and 
extends these approaches to identify how shocks are propagated in emerging market 
currencies.  
Severe financial conditions, like the recently experienced credit crunch, play an 
important role in driving economic activity in emerging economies (Akinci 2013). Global 
financial shocks increase uncertainty and fluctuations, and thus, the business climate 
deteriorates causing increased uncertainty for future growth prospects. Following Colin-
Dufresne et al., (2001), Alexander and Kaeck, (2008), and Annaert et al. (2013), the higher 
the uncertainty the higher the volatility, and thus, the Volatility Index can be used as a proxy 
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for business and credit market conditions. During periods of uncertainty, credit markets 
squeeze and liquidity abruptly dries up. Financial institutions suffer unanticipated outflow of 
deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues, and thus the spread in Banks’ Credit 
Default Swaps increases (see also Jorion and Zhang, 2007; and Alexander and Kaeck, 2008; 
for the effects of credit events on credit default swaps). If funding and liquidity problems 
become a commonplace it is likely to have a recessionary effect on investment and 
consumption, and thus lead to lower expectations for growth in emerging markets and 
depress the prices of commodities (see also Arezki et al. 2014 for an overview on 
understanding commodity price fluctuations). Therefore investors shift funds from emerging 
stock markets causing unprecedented declines, resembling to domino effect (see also 
Markwat et al. 2009, who observe that crashes occur from local or regional shocks). All these 
channels described above, are factors that render an emerging market currency vulnerable to 
contagion. 
Contagion refers to the risk that a shock in an asset leads to increased volatility and 
co-movements of other assets (see also Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Boyson et al. 2010; and 
Allen et al. 2012). Indeed, the performance of global emerging market currencies shifted and 
altered contemporaneously during the peak of the financial crisis as never before in the recent 
history (see also Dias 2014; and Tolikas 2014 for informative readings on financial assets 
dramatic losses), providing anecdotal evidence for and resembling to contagion.  
The thesis builds on and extends a growing literature which emphasizes on the role of 
forced sales, liquidity spirals and hoarding, caused by the recent credit crisis, such as how the 
collapse of the subprime market acted as a channel of contagion and transferred risks to the 
stock market, Treasuries and corporate bond yields (Longstaff, 2010). This field has attracted 
the interest of a plethora of investigations. Jorion and Zhang (2006) examine the contagion 
channel between credit default swaps and stock markets. Boyer et al. (2006) propose a model 
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where limits to arbitrage facilitate stock market crises to spread globally through asset 
holdings. Building on this approach, Aloui et al. (2011) examine the contagion effect and 
how cross market linkages increased during the recent global crisis between the US and 
BRIC stock markets. Boyson et al. (2010) and Jotikasthira et al. (2012) find strong evidence 
of contagion across hedge funds and that forced and fire sales in developed market funds 
perform as channels of risk and contagion on emerging market funds.  
 
B. Empirical Framework 
The literature on volatility transmission and contagion literally exploded since the 
thought-provoking studies by Allen and Gale (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003). However, studies that aim at the interaction between foreign 
exchanges and stock markets are less frequent than those covering equity markets. Indeed, 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995, and 2000) identify cross border linkages of emerging stock 
markets. Chen et al. (2002) observe regional emerging stock markets interlinkages and 
spillovers in Latin American stock exchanges and Yang et al. (2006) find evidence of 
integration and co-movements at Central and Eastern European stock Indices. 
Among the first researchers that examine spillovers between the developed U.S. stock 
market and foreign exchanges are Bartov and Bodar (1994), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), 
Bodard and Reding (1999). They find no evidence of volatility spillovers between the foreign 
exchange and the stock market returns. In particular, they observe that the value of dollar is 
negatively related to changes in US stock markets in the long run. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) 
investigate the Japanese and Canadian foreign exchange and stock markets and find no 
evidence of spillovers. On the other hand, Francis et al. (2002), attribute cross-currency 
differences in U.S. and European markets and observed that stock market return differentials 
are positively related to bilateral exchange rates.  
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Kearney and Patton (2000) employ a series of multivariate GARCH models on the 
members of the former European Monetary System (EMS) prior to their complete monetary 
unification and find that less volatile weekly data exhibit a significantly smaller tendency to 
transmit volatility compared to more volatile daily data. Menkhoff et al. (2012) study the 
curry trades and Ning (2010) observes significant symmetric upper and lower tail dependence 
between stock markets and foreign exchanges for the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Japan, and 
France. Ehrmann et al. (2011) study interactions between stock market and foreign exchange 
returns for the US and Eurozone and they find strong evidence of spillovers in the Eurozone 
but little effect from exchange rate changes on US stock market returns. 
In order to overcome departures from normality and to capture the marginal behaviour 
and the dependence structure among the asset classes, without the imposition of any 
assumption in marginal distributions the thesis applies copula functions. The copula theorem 
allows us to decompose the joint distributions into k marginal distributions, which 
characterise the single variables of interest (exchange rate volatility in our case), and a copula 
which describes the dependence between k variables. A copula function connects the 
marginal distributions to restore the joint distribution. In the extant literature, most studies 
observe and model co-movements focusing on stock indices with the use of copulas (Ning 
2010; and Kenourgios et al. 2011) omitting to study foreign exchange volatility. Muller and 
Verschoor (2009) are among the very first to study the recent economic crisis, and identify 
significant falls in asset prices along with large and unexpected movements in foreign 
exchange rates. Garcia and Tsafack (2011) employ an Extreme Value Theory copula in a 
regime-switching model to highlight the joint extreme behavior of international equity and 
bond markets. Bonato et al., (2013) observe that currency-risk spillovers improve the 
forecasting ability of an international equity portfolio. Wang et al. (2013) develop a 
dependence switching copula model to describe the dependence structure between the stock 
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and foreign exchange for six major industrial countries: France, Germany, Italy, Canada, 
Japan and the U.K.. They observe asymmetric tail dependence in a negative correlation 
regime and symmetric dependence in a positive correlation regime.   
While there is extensive literature studying the co-movements between the 
international equity markets and studies on modelling the dependence structure between the 
exchange rates via copulas, there is no literature on using copulas to study the co-movements 
across different asset classes and exchange rates. To address the above mentioned concerns 
Patton (2006) uses normal (Gaussian) copula and the Symmetrised Joe-Clayton (SJC) copula 
to identify that the mark–dollar and yen–dollar exchange rates are more correlated when they 
are depreciating against the dollar than when they are appreciating. Moreover, the author 
observes asymmetries in the upper and lower tail dependences in the pre and post euro 
periods. Building on this approach Busetti and Harvey (2011), observe that a time-invariant 
copula is not appropriate and hence allow the parameters in a copula function to change over 
time. As investors are generally averse to downside risk, a copula should capture both the risk 
of joint downward movements of asset prices, and the diversification opportunities that assets 
offer. Rodriguez (2007) and Kenourgios et al. (2011) among others examine how contagion 
affects stock markets during the period of a financial crisis, while Okimoto (2008) 
investigates the co-movement of stock returns across countries. 
On emerging markets, most of the available research focuses on the interaction and 
linkages between Asia and Central Eastern European markets: Phylaktis and Ravazzolo 
(2005) observe the Asia Pacific Region (Honk Kong, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore and 
Thailand) and find that there is bi-directional relationship and spillovers from the foreign 
exchange to the stock market returns in emerging market. Andreou et al. (2013) employ a 
VAR-GARCH framework and find bi-directional linkages between the stock and foreign 
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exchange markets for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philipines, and Thailand.  
Ulku and Demirci (2012) investigate the joint dynamics between emerging stock 
market and foreign exchange changes for eight European countries (Hungary, Poland, 
Turkey, Czech R., Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Croatia) and the MSCI Europe Index, and 
find that global developed and emerging stock market returns account for a large proportion 
of the comovement between stock markets and currencies. Bubak et al. (2011) study the 
dynamics of volatility transmission between Central European and the EUR/USD foreign 
exchange and report evidence of significant intra-regional volatility spillovers. They also 
observe that each CE currency has a different volatility transmission pattern vis a vis the 
EUR/USD and the EUR/CHF exchange rates, depending on the pre-2008 and the post -2008 
periods. 
 
2.4 Modelling the Behavior of Financial Assets with Bayesian Econometrics 
A. Theoretical Framework 
According to the traditional theory, in a frictionless economy with rational investors, 
comovement in asset prices emerges due to comovement in fundamental values. Hence, stock 
prices in a given industry commove because their earnings are related (see also Salvador et al. 
2014 for the relationship between risk-return tradeoff in a low volatility environment). 
However, with the presence of irrational investors in an economy with frictions, comovement 
in asset prices is delinked from advances in fundamentals, rendering traditional theory 
fruitless and advancing to behavioural theories of interdependences and capital allocation due 
to investor sentiment (see also Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis et al., 2005; and Boyer, 
2011; inter alia), theories that link returns and comovements with market and volatility risk 
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premia (see also Carr and Wu, 2009; Buraschi et al., 2013) and the expectations hypothesis 
(Cox et al., 1981).  
Expanding these approaches, the thesis proposes that a systemic financial crisis -like 
the credit crisis experienced in 2008- gives rise to a business-cycle recession, which 
decreases demand for raw materials and commodities and leads to higher credit risk 
(fundamentals channel hypothesis). Financial institutions suffer unanticipated outflow of 
deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues (i.e. shock in the financial markets) and 
are forced to reduce their lending activity and even to call back existing loans in order to 
deleverage their balance sheets. This raises the probability to default on firms’ and banks’ 
liabilities and increases credit risk. If funding and liquidity problems become a commonplace 
it is likely to have a recessionary effect on investment, consumption, income, and thus lead to 
severe downturns in the shipping market. Therefore, investors shift funds between asset 
classes causing comovement in prices that is not related to fundamentals. 
Furthermore, elevated volatility impairs informational contents of the shipping market 
and further raises uncertainty to shipping market investors (expectations hypothesis). 
Consequently, investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in shipping asset 
classes. When uncertainty - as measured by VIX - increases, shipping assets loose value and 
their yields increase to reflect a higher cost of capital. Because future expected cash flows of 
the shipping market are discounted with a higher discount rate, shipping indices decrease, as 
investors demand higher risk premium to compensate for the increased riskiness (risk 
premium hypothesis).  
B. Empirical Framework 
Comovements among international markets and correlations among assets were first 
examined by Grubel (1968). In his seminal work, the author finds that at some periods 
international stock markets are affected by the same shocks and therefore their tendency to 
 39 
 
comove increases rapidly. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Rigobon (2003a), expand this 
approach formalising that the evidence of changing patterns of correlation is an important 
issue for policy makers, risk managers and investors. The analysis of cross market spillovers 
and shifts in correlation patterns among international markets in a period of turmoil, 
expounds the benefits of portfolio diversification, the risk management techniques, and alters 
the pricing of shipping assets. 
Investors in shipping markets face important and difficult decisions on investment and 
divestment timing because of the complex and volatile nature of the shipping industry 
(Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2007). The shipping market exhibits cyclicality, extreme volatility 
and seasonality, while it is also affected by the international economic environment. Thus, 
Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012), conclude that the shipping market entails a significant 
market risk which requires the development of hedging techniques and motivates the 
implementation of speculative strategies.  
For investors in the shipping market, the essence of spillover relationships implies the 
existence of asymmetrical information and channels which transform risk to the shipping 
market with the propagation of shocks. Thus, it would be a field of interest to evaluate and 
model the level of response, volatility spikes, the transmission of shocks and the regime-
switching behaviour of the Dry Bulk and Tanker markets. Notably, the design of well 
diversified portfolios crucially depends on the comovement among asset classes and the 
effects of shocks. Additionally, policy makers are interested in convergence among financial 
assets to secure the stability and the expansion of the global economy. Thus, the preparation 
of monetary policy is also affected by the propagation of shocks in financial assets, and the 
channels that transfer systemic risk.  
The global financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 triggered an unprecedented deterioration in the world’s major advanced 
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economies and brought about new interest on the investigation of spillovers among asset 
classes (see also Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). For instance, Sirr et al., (2011) employ a VAR-
GARCH framework and find bi-directional linkages between the stock and foreign exchange 
markets. Also, Bekaert et al., (2009), Jotikasthira et al., (2012), Ulku and Demirci (2012), 
Ibragimov et al., (2013) and Cremers et al. (2015) among others, investigate how the recent 
financial crisis was spread, the propagation of shocks, the joint dynamics and the 
comovement between developed stock markets, emerging stock market and foreign exchange 
changes for European countries and the MSCI Europe Index, respectively.  
The shipping market has gone into recession since the outbreak of the world credit 
crunch which had a devastating and serious impact on the financial markets and finally 
dragged down the world economy into recession. Thus, issues related to the risk management 
and the volatility in the shipping market gain increasing attention over the last years but are 
not extensively studied. Kalouptsidi (2014) investigates the nature of fluctuations in world 
bulk shipping and finds that moving from time-varying to constant to no time to build 
reduces ship prices, while the level and volatility of investment increases significantly due to 
the impact of construction time-period lags and their lengthening in periods of high 
investment activity. To the extant literature, most researchers focus on hedging effectiveness, 
patterns of predictability, and other risk management issues related to the shipping derivative 
contracts (Forward Freight Agreements). Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), employ several 
trading strategies to identify the long-run cointegrating relationship between price and 
earnings. They find that the earnings–price ratios significantly out-perform buy and hold 
strategies in the second-hand market for ships and use this relationship as an indicator of 
investment or divestment timing decisions in the dry bulk shipping sector. Tezuka et al., 
(2012), study freight rate risks on shipping forward contracts and employ several VECM and 
random walk models to obtain optimal forward hedge ratios.  
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Also, a number of studies have documented patterns of predictability in forward 
freight rate returns. Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004), investigate the lead–lag relationship in 
returns and volatilities between spot and FFA price series in the Panamax voyage routes and 
find that there is bi-directional lead-lag relationship in the futures market and also that the 
effect of FFA price volatility on spot prices depends on the route through VECM-GARCH 
and Granger causality. Batchelor et al., (2007) employ univariate and bivariate linear models 
(ARIMA and VAR) to analyze the information contained in forward rates and to forecast spot 
and forward rates in the dry bulk shipping market. They also find that the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) does not provide supportive results for the shipping market since 
the underlying asset traded in the Forward Freight Agreement (FFA) market is a service 
rather than a storable commodity, which means that arbitrage between spot and forward 
prices is impossible in shipping. However, from a theoretical point of view the standard cost 
of carry does not hold in the derivatives shipping market, because the underlying asset is not 
tradable. This is called non-storability, a characteristic of shipping freight that leads to an 
enormous gap between the widely-used no-arbitrage pricing theory and shipping freight 
derivative markets.  
Moreover, the thesis compliments the literature with the methodological approach 
used to analyze the movement of the shipping Indexes. In particular, most researchers have 
used VECM and VAR models to analyze the information contained in the movement of the 
shipping indices (Adland and Cullinane, 2006; Lin and Sim, 2013; inter alia). However, 
these studies observe that due to the nonstationary and nonlinear nature of the bulk shipping 
market it is difficult to capture the complex behavior of the index.  
Bakshi et al., (2011) use the growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index to observe the 
predictive ability for a range of stock markets through in-sample and out of sample tests. 
They employ several Morgan Stanley Capital International (M.S.C.I.) total return indices to 
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predict stock return both at the one-month and multi-month horizons with the use of 
overlapping returns. They find that the Baltic Dry Index predicts the return for global stock 
markets, commodities and global economic activity. Moreover, Lin and Sim (2013) 
investigate the existence of a relationship between the BDI, the global trade and income 
levels. They observe that a positive shock in the demand for transport increases the future 
ship capacity and the BDI level. However, a positive shock of ship capacity does not affect 
the demand for transport but decreases the BDI level. They also employ the Error Correction 
Model with Autoregressive Distributed Lags in order to analyze the effect of the 2008 
financial crisis on the Baltic Dry Index (BDI). They observe that there is a cointegrated 
relationship between the BDI and China’s iron ore imports. Finally, Papapostolou et al., 
(2014) employ shipping sentiment proxies that capture market expectations, valuation and 
liquidity and observe that sentiment affects the monthly returns of real (shipping) assets.  
 
2.5 Tail Risk Management in Shipping and Financial Assets 
A. Theoretical Framework 
By contrast to the traditional asset pricing theory, the presence of irrational investors 
in a market with frictions and noise traders, advances to increased correlation and 
comovements which are over and above any macroeconomic fundamentals advancing to 
contagion (see also Bekaert et al. 2005). Similarly, the thesis employs contagion as a metric 
which increases cross market linkages during periods of high volatility and propose that 
forced sales or “fire sales” in the contagion channels (i.e. financial, commodity and credit 
markets) affect the shipping market (similar to Jotikasthira et. al., 2012, for effects of fire 
sales in emerging markets). Following Yuan (2005), uninformed rational investors are not 
able to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on 
fundamental shocks. Thus, large losses in an investment, point to cross-market portfolio 
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rebalancing (see also Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; and Boyer at. al., 2006), and causes cross 
asset depreciation (similar to Kyle and Xiong, 2001 who observe cross country 
depreciations). 
 
B. Empirical Framework 
The recent financial meltdown raised the importance of risk management in the 
shipping industry. According to the maritime economists, shipping cycles are driven by 
combinations of external and internal factors that shape the long-term volatility of the 
shipping industry (Alizadeh, 2013). After the last quarter of 2008, the spectacular surge was 
replaced by the perfect storm in which everything that could go wrong did go wrong, 
culminating in the worst possible catastrophe in the shipping industry. The sinking freight 
rates, the decreased demand for shipping services, the plunging of vessel values, the 
numerous laid up vessels were just some of the consequences of the global economic crisis. 
According to Adland and Cullinane (2006) when freight rates are at low levels, the supply of 
freight is very elastic in the short-run due to an increase in numbers of unemployed vessels 
(i.e. lay-up), and thus ship-owners’ earnings are well below the breakeven point. In the long-
run, as freight rates increase, vessels are removed from lay-out conditions and increase 
steaming speed. The thesis opens a new way and sheds light on the importance of systemic 
risk and contagion between shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets. Systemic risk 
occurs as a consequence of a negative shock which is transmitted to other assets (see also 
Allen and Carletti, 2013).  
Issues related to the shipping indexes and the volatility of the shipping market gain 
increasing attention over the last years but are not extensively studied. Goulielmos and Psifia 
(2009) observe that due to the nonstationary and nonlinear nature of the shipping market it is 
difficult to capture the complex behaviour of the indexes. Investors in shipping markets have 
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always faced important and difficult decisions on investment and divestment timing because 
of the complex and volatile nature of the shipping industry (Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2007, 
and Goulas and Skiadopoulos, 2012). Zeng and Qu (2013) employ a method based on 
empirical mode decomposition to investigate the volatility of the Baltic Dry Index. In 
particular, they use freight prices to capture short-term fluctuations caused by normal market 
activities, the effect of extreme events and the long-term trend. Tezuka et. al. (2012), study 
freight rate risks on shipping forward contracts and employ several VECM and random walk 
models to obtain optimal forward hedge ratios. Bakshi et. al. (2011) use the growth rate of the 
Baltic Dry Index to observe the predictive ability for a range of stock markets through in-
sample and out of sample tests. They employ several Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(M.S.C.I.) total return indices to predict stock return both at the one-month and multi-month 
horizons with the use of overlapping returns. They find that the Baltic Dry Index predicts the 
return for global stock markets, commodities and global economic activity.  
Studies on volatility transmission and contagion literally exploded since the thought-
provoking papers by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Rigobon (2003a). The global financial 
crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered an 
unprecedented deterioration in the world’s major advanced economies. The shipping market 
has gone into recession since the outbreak of the world credit crisis which had a devastating 
and serious impact on the economy and finally dragged down the world economy into 
recession.  However, studies that aim at the interactions in the shipping market are less 
frequent than those covering equity markets, with researchers observing strong implications 
of stock market integration and contagion.  
In particular, Bekaert and Harvey (1995, and 2000) are among the first to identify 
cross border linkages of stock markets. Chen et al. (2002) observe regional emerging stock 
market inter-linkages and spillovers in Latin American stock markets and Yang et al. (2006) 
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observe increased integration and co-movements at Central and Eastern European stock 
markets. Bartov and Bodar (1994), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Bodard and Reding (1999) are 
among the first that examine spillovers between the developed U.S. stock market and foreign 
exchanges. The authors find no evidence of volatility spillovers between the foreign 
exchange and stock market returns. In particular, they observe that the value of dollar is 
negatively related to changes in US stock markets in the long run. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) 
investigate the Japanese and Canadian foreign exchange and stock markets and find lack of 
spillovers. On the other hand, Longin and Solnik (2001), Kyle and Xiong, (2001), Ang and 
Bekaert (2002), Ang and Chen (2002), Bekaert et. al. (2005), Yuan (2005); Boyer et. al. 
(2006), and Jotikasthira et. al. (2012), among others attribute that comovement among market 
returns during market downturns are over and above any economic reasoning, resembling to 
contagion.  
Furthermore, the thesis complements the literature with the methodological approach 
used to analyse the movement of the Shipping Indices. Evidently, most researchers use 
VECM and VAR models to analyse the information contained in the movement of the Baltic 
Dry Index (Beenstock and Vergottis, 1989b; Adland and Cullinane, 2006; Koekebakker et. al. 
2006; Batchelor et. al. 2007). Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011) investigate the term structure 
and time-varying volatility of shipping freight rates and observe that when the freight market 
is in backwardation, volatility is higher compared to periods when the market is in contango. 
Moreover, Lin and Sim (2013) find that the BDI has a cyclical pattern which has been stable 
except for a period after the 2007 crisis, and also observe that there is a relationship between 
the BDI with global trade and income levels. In contrast, the thesis investigates the 
interactions between shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets via employing copula 
functions, and contributes to the existing literature with investigations into the extreme co-
movements and tail risk conditions between these variables and test for both the degree and 
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type of their dependence at extreme levels during extreme financial events, like the recent 
credit crisis.  There is a great deal of research focusing on the co-movements of international 
financial markets but only a limited number of previous studies  apply copulas to model co-
movements and joint dynamics of returns across international financial markets (see also 
Cherubini and Luciano 2002; Patton, 2006; Hu, 2006; Ning, 2010 for informative readings on 
the usefulness of copula functions).  
A copula is a multivariate cumulative distribution function which allows measuring 
the dependence structure of multivariate random variables (Wang et al.  2013). Copulas offer 
financial risk managers a powerful tool to model the dependence between the different 
elements of a portfolio and are preferable to the traditional, correlation-based approach. As 
investors are generally averse to downside risk, a copula function captures both the risk of 
joint downward movements of asset prices, and the diversification opportunities that assets 
offer. Rodriguez (2007) and Kenourgios et al. (2011) among others examine how contagion 
affects stock markets during the period of a financial crisis. Also, Okimoto (2008) 
investigates the co-movement of stock returns across countries. Several articles argue that a 
time-invariant copula is not appropriate and hence allow the parameters in a copula function 
to change over time (Patton, 2006; Harvey, 2010; Busetti and Harvey, 2011). Thus, in order 
to model cross – asset dependence switching the thesis employs time-varying Gaussian, 
Student- t and Symmetrised Joe-Clayton Copula models to investigate interrelationships 
during higher moment periods with excess volatility spikes in order to capture symmetries, 
asymmetries and tail dependences. 
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Chapter 3: Transmission Channels of Systemic Risk and 
Contagion in the European Financial Network 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 was the earthquake 
displaying that the modern financial system was severely fragile. Global financial market 
participants were directly impacted by its default and numerous repercussions were felt 
throughout the world, resulting from a plethora of cross-border and cross-entity 
interdependencies (De Haas et al. 2012; Acharya et al. 2014). The shock was rapidly spread 
in Europe, where by the end of September, euro area governments rescued the Belgian-
French bank Dexia, demonstrating vividly that these interdependencies generate amplified 
responses to shocks and increase the speed of contagion in the financial system (Panageas 
2010; Acharya et al. 2011; Aiyar 2012, inter alia). Thus, in the aftershock era, the effects of 
both interconnectedness and contagion manifested themselves and systemic risk emerged as 
one of the most challenging aspects (Acemoglou et al. 2014; Elliott et al. 2014). The banking 
industry grappled with one overarching challenge; to measure and reduce systemic risk (for a 
definition and discussion on systemic risk and contagion see also Acharya et al. 2012; Liang 
2013; and Allen and Carletti 2013) in order to improve the resilience of the financial system 
to adverse shocks and to prevent a repetition of the recent crisis.   
While the euro area banking system was fundamentally solvent, according to several 
stress tests (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011; European Banking Authority 
2012), the contagion from the Lehman bankruptcy put at risk the stability of the European 
financial system, indicating that systemic risk has been enormously underestimated (Bartram 
et al. 2007; Engle et al. 2014). Synchronically, as contagion fears spread, the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis became apparent, and threatened the integrity of the Eurozone (Lane 
2012; Claeys and Vašíček 2014). Emphatically, a sovereign default could lead to a disastrous 
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financial instability and to an unprecedented failure of the European banking system (see also 
Caballero and Simsek 2013; Gennaioli et al. 2014). 
The intensity and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire financial 
system, highlights the need to identify, measure and understand the nature and the source of 
systemic risk in order to improve the underlying risks that banks face, to avert banks’ 
liquidation ex ante and to promote macro-prudential policy tools (for an extensive review on 
macro-prudential policies see also Hanson et al. 2011). Thus, this thesis focuses on the euro 
area banking industry to examine the way systemic risk arises endogenously, the resilience of 
the Euro area banking system to systemic risk, and how shocks in economic and financial 
channels propagate in the banking sector. We also endeavour to answer the following 
questions: In the presence of a distress situation how the financial system performs? Have the 
new capital rules rendered the European banking industry safer? What is the primary source 
of systemic risk? How financial contagion propagates within the Eurozone? These 
fundamental themes remain unanswered, and hence obtaining the answers is critical and at 
the heart of most of the recent research on systemic risk. 
Motivated by the absence of empirical evidence, we address these issues drawing on 
recent developments in the studies of systemic risk, contagion channels and advances in 
network theory, by constructing a unique interconnected, dynamic and continuous-time 
model of financial networks with complete market structure (i.e. interbank loan market) and 
two additional independent channels of systemic risk (i.e. sovereign credit risk and asset price 
risk ). More precisely, we build on and extend the financial network models developed by 
Gai et al. (2011), Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan (2014) to employ counterfactual 
simulations with entropy maximisation and to propagate shocks across the financial network, 
emerged from three systemic risk channels. Thus, our methodological approach provides two 
novelties. First, the financial network in this thesis consists of a unique set of various sectors 
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which are neglected hitherto by the international literature. Specifically, we analyse the 
complexity of the system in terms of not only the bilateral linkages but also losses and 
cascades of defaults triggered by sovereign credit risk, and asset price risk. Second, in 
contrast with the existing literature, we are able to disentangle the effects of the shock in 
losses generated by the initial shock and losses spread by contagion. More concretely, we are 
able to capture multiple snapshots of the network structure and to measure accurately the 
direct and indirect effects. Consequently, the model allows us to provide novel evidence on 
the type of systemic risk which dominates the financial system and to measure and evaluate: 
i) the effects of shocks on one or more financial institutions (e.g. total losses, solvency and 
bankruptcy events); ii) the transmission mechanism which transfers and provokes the 
negative effects to the rest of the system; and iii) the variations in financial robustness, which 
display the boundaries of the European banking system.  
Interestingly, at first glance we find that a shock in the interbank loan market causes 
the higher amount of losses in the banking network. This notwithstanding, remarkably we 
find that losses generated by the sovereign credit risk channel transmit faster through the 
contagion channel, triggering a cascade of bank failures. This shock can cause banks to stop 
using the interbank market to trade with each other and can also lead banks to liquidate their 
asset holdings in order to meet their short-term funding demands. Hence, the thesis provides 
empirical evidence that the Sovereign Credit Risk channel dominates systemic risks 
amplified in the euro area banking systems and hence, it is the primary source of systemic 
risk. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of reduced collateral values and provide novel 
evidence that asset price contagion can also trigger severe direct losses and defaults in the 
banking system.  
In addition to the above, we provide novel evidence that systemic risk in the euro area 
banking system didn’t meaningfully decrease as it is evident that shocks in the three 
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independent channels -interbank market, sovereign credit risk, asset price risk- trigger 
domino effects in the banking system. Likewise, we document a dramatic variation between 
northern and southern euro area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. More 
concretely, there is much less systemic risk and the speed of contagion is much lower in 
banks based in the northern euro area than in banks based in the southern euro area. 
Furthermore, we find that the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the 
size and the degree of exposure of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. 
Particularly, the more exposed domestic banks are to the foreign banking systems, the greater 
are the systemic risks and the spillover effects from foreign financial shocks to the domestic 
banking sector. Finally, the results imply that the European banking industry amid the post-
crisis deleverage, recapitalisation and the new regulatory rules, continues to be markedly 
vulnerable and conducive to systemic risks and financial contagion.  
The thesis contributes and extends three strands of the literature. First, there is a 
recently growing literature on the construction of financial networks with mathematical 
models. Kroszner (2007), and Allen and Carletti (2013), document that the size of the 
financial network plays an important role on the propagation of systemic risk. We update 
their work and offer novel evidence that there are marked differences in the dynamic 
responses to systemic-risk related events across national banking systems, indicating that the 
network structure is time-variant. Allen et al. (2011) observe that full risk diversification is 
not optimal in the banking industry, while Battiston et al. (2012) find that the financial 
system can be more resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification. In a similar vein, 
we document that even domestic banks with small financial exposures in a foreign banking 
sector may be severely affected by a systemic shock provoked by same.  
Second, our thesis offers new insights on the critical role of endogenous complexity, 
betweenness, closeness and the importance of interconnectedness in the banking network. 
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Leitner (2005), Gai et al. (2011), Billio et al. (2012), Castren and Rancan (2014), and Elliott 
et al. (2014) develop network models on monotonicity and identify the importance of 
complexity and concentration in the financial system. We extend their work demonstrating 
that the same shock would cause different losses in the banking network if emerged at 
different points in time. Importantly, we find that the propagated and the final losses differ 
substantially across the national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size, and 
the degree of interconnectedness across national banking systems. More concretely, the final 
losses appear to be lower in the post-crisis era, which may be due to cyclicality (i.e. 
deleverage, recapitalisation, new regulatory framework), but the risk of contagion remains 
substantially immense. Furthermore, we shed light on the debate for the suitability of the 
maximum entropy method on financial networks (Mistrulli 2011). Precisely, we employ 
several robustness checks by using the actual bilateral exposures in the four largest financial 
systems (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and compare the results with those obtained via 
the Maximum Entropy approach. On the empirical level, the findings indicate that Entropy 
Maximization neither over- nor under-estimates the bilateral exposures, while also this 
method is an appealing approach to calibrate losses generated by systemic shocks, and to 
measure the severity of financial contagion.  
Third, the thesis relates to the vast literature on macro-prudential policies, the nature 
of systemic risk, and the spread of contagion in the banking industry developed by Allen and 
Gale (2004), Allen et al. (2009), Co-Pierre (2013), Drehmann and Tarashev (2013), Ang and 
Longstaff (2013), among others. For instance, Allen and Gale (2004), and Allen et al. (2009) 
examine how shocks propagate through a financial network, based on interbank lending and 
model excessive price volatility. Co-Pierre (2013) compares systemic risk caused by 
contagion with the risk triggered by common shocks whilst Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) 
measure the systemic importance of interconnected banks. Ang and Longstaff (2013) study 
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the nature of systemic sovereign credit risk and observe that it is strongly related to financial 
market variables.  
To our knowledge this is the first study to explicitly compare different sources of 
systemic risk in the euro area banking industry. We provide novel evidence for the effects a 
negative shock generates by three independent systemic risk channels and document that 
contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. The results enlighten the nature of 
systemic risk and provide a new perspective on financial contagion and domino effects in the 
banking sector. We also show that the sovereign credit risk channel is the dominant systemic 
risk and causes a plethora of defaults in the banking system. Importantly, we observe that a 
repetition of the recent financial crisis is apparent in the euro area banking system, implying 
that existing developments on macro-prudential policies fail to mitigate meaningfully the 
degree of systemic risk in the banking industry. In a similar vein, our results shed new light 
on the asset and liability management of banks. Specifically, the three systemic risk channels 
facilitate and improve the understanding of how systemic risk arises, thus providing with the 
optimal structure of both assets and liabilities, rendering the banking industry more resilient 
to systemic risk. Finally, these results have important implications for understanding systemic 
risk and for analysing policies designed to mitigate financial contagion in the euro area. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
We collect our dataset on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 2005 till the fourth 
quarter of 2013 for sixteen Eurozone countries
2
. We obtain it from three sources: the Bank 
for International Settlements for the cross border quarterly exposures in the interbank market, 
the total banking exposures to each foreign country and the actual exposures in Sovereign 
                                                          
2
 Our sample consists of the following euro area countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), and Spain (ES). 
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Debt and asset-backed loans. The dataset includes the specific instrument breakdowns and 
information on the identity of the counterparties (i.e. financing exposures) at the sector level. 
For instance, we have information for the exposure of Austrian banks not just in French 
Sovereign debt, and asset-backed loans to companies based in France, but also for loans in 
French banks via the interbank market. The flow of funds provides a record of the financial 
transactions of assets and liabilities. The information is interpreted according to the specific 
instrument categories for each institutional sector. For instance, we collect data for non-
financial corporations; for banks (monetary financing institutions); for insurance companies; 
for other financial intermediaries; for exposures and investment in government bonds; and for 
asset-backed loans in households and corporateions. The financial balance sheets are valued 
at market prices, at each point in time. 
 Also, we collect data from the European Central Banks’ sectoral balance sheets (flow 
of funds) for the local bilateral banking exposures.  The dataset refer to all kinds of interbank 
assets except shares. Finally, we obtain data from Bankscope on Tier 1 capital and Total 
Assets for 170 Eurozone based banks. Particularly, the sample includes the biggest banks 
from each country, based on their total assets as reported by the end of each fiscal year (see 
also Appendix A for more details). To construct the sample we distinguish each bank 
according to size, market-based activities and the cross-section lending exposures. We 
exclude financial institutions that disappear -due to merger, default, or bail in- before the end 
of our sample period in December 2013. We also exclude non-bank financial institutions and 
focus on deposit-taking banks (such as commercial banks). The sample includes the biggest 
banks from each country, based on their total assets as reported by the end of each fiscal year 
(see also Appendix A for more details). This sample allows distinguishing the banking 
systems. 
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3.2.2 The Network Structure 
The thesis explores the consequences from a propagation of shocks in the banking 
network in two steps. First, we construct the financial network based on the banks’ actual 
exposures in the interbank loan market, the sovereign debt (i.e. sovereign credit risk) and 
asset backed loans (i.e. asset price risk). We then propagate endogenous shocks commenced 
by the three channels described previously and measure the effects (i.e. losses) in the banking 
system. The losses are distributed into two components: the losses incurred by the initial 
shock and the losses resulting from the contagion process in order to measure the speed of the 
contagion. 
The structure of the network is constructed by bank balance sheet interconnections 
(nodes in the interbank network), actual bilateral exposures and banks’ exposures to 
sovereign debt and asset backed loans. For any missing information in the interbank bilateral 
exposures, we employ the entropy maximisation method with the complementary use of the 
RAS algorithm which provides the advantage of minimizing any lost information in the 
priors. In particular, the financial network is generated based on the following three steps: 
First, we consider a Eurozone based economy with n financial intermediaries (i.e. banks). 
These are initially linked with each other based on the actual and simulated exposures in the 
local interbank market, and thus create a two-way interrelationship which is important for the 
spread of shocks within the network and for the analysis of the contagion path. Particularly, a 
bank is allowed to lend money to another bank and simultaneously the same bank may 
borrow money from a third bank. Using this structure for our network, we achieve to measure 
the potential benefits of diversification and to distinguish between losses incurred by risk 
sharing and losses incurred by risk spreading through the financial network. Consequently, 
we have the first systemic risk channel - “local interbank loan market”- represented in Figure 
 55 
 
3.1, also called a “node” in the network structure (see also Newman 2002; and Gai et al. 2011 
for informative reading on network structures). 
 
Figure 3.1. Network Structure. 
The graph presents the network structure for the Interbank Loan Market cross-banking exposures. The nodes are 
the Banking Sectors (i.e. BS) for each euro area country. The links are the actual exposures from the Bank of 
International Settlements statistics and the different strength of the arrows and the links represents the different 
volumes (sizes) and the difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages. The domestic 
interbank exposures are estimated with the maximum entropy method.  
 
Then, we create two additional systemic risk sources (or nodes) the “sovereign credit 
risk”, and the “asset price risk” channels. The first contains banks’ actual exposures in 
Sovereign Debt, and the second deals with banks’ actual exposures in asset-backed loans. 
Our sample contains 16 countries, and thus corresponds to 48 nodes. Finally, we use the 
cross-border exposures to link and interconnect every local banking system. The shocks are 
propagated by each channel independently. All banks are allowed to fail one at a time, if the 
amount of the losses is greater than lenders’ reported tier-1 capital (i.e. capital + reserves). 
Every bank has to meet interbank liabilities and therefore, losses incurred by a shock in a 
channel (e.g. the asset loan risk channel) can be recovered by liquidating other projects (e.g. 
the Sovereign Debt assets). Consequently, systemic shocks in one channel may trigger fire 
sales, and hence losses in other channels (see also Figure 3.2).   
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Figure 3.2. Network channels. 
The graph depicts the network structure for the Asset-backed Loans (AL) and Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR) 
exposures. The nodes reflect actual exposures of each national banking sector. Each line represents the country 
from which the shock emerges. The strength of each link and each arrow exhibits the different volumes and the 
difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages. 
 
As a result, we model the direct and the indirect effects from a systemic shock. For 
instance, assume that there is a bank based in country θ with interlinkages with a bank based 
in country ψ. During severe financial conditions, the bank in one country will be affected by 
the shock to a bank in another country. Moreover, the effects of the shock can also be spread 
via banks in a third banking system. Thus, the interdependence in the banking system over 
the network indicates that when a bank is under distress situation, may provoke a plethora of 
collapses throughout the financial network (see also Appendix B for the contagion path). 
Thus, similar to Shin (2008) and Castren and Rancan (2014) we construct an accounting 
framework of the financial system as a network of interlinked balance sheets where one 
sector’s assets are another’s liabilities. 
 
3.2.3 Estimation  
Since, we have different types of nodes, our financial network is defined as 
heterogenous. In order to estimate bank-to-bank exposures in the financial network, we 
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employ the maximum entropy approach, which assumes that banks spread their lending as 
evenly as possible. Following Castren and Rancan (2014), two nodes   and   are connected 
through edges, labelled with    , where: 
     , when there is a relationship; and 
     , when there is no relationship. 
Similarly, the link which connects two nodes is defined as xij. The links are directed, so that 
  is not symmetric (i.e. xij ≠ xji). The strength of the link depends on the size and the degree 
of interconnection. In Appendix C we analyse the positions (i.e. degree, weight, centrality, 
betweenness, closeness) of the individual nodes in relation to the overall network, and 
provide the analytical structure of the financial network.  
The bankings’ sectors financial exposures to each other can be represented by an      
matrix   where each element     is a bilateral exposure from sector   to sector  . This implies 
that an element     is an asset of sector   viz-a-viz sector   and naturally is also a liability of 
sector   towards sector  .   
       (1) 
Thus a sector’s total assets are given by the sum of its row, the marginal    above 
given by formula (2) below:  
   ∑    
 
   
         (2) 
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By the same rationale a sector’s total liabilities are given by the marginal    as in 
formula (3) below: 
   ∑    
 
   
         
 
(3) 
We do not have information for the element     but we do have the column and row 
marginal from the euro area accounts collected from the European Central Bank. From these 
we want to extract a set of     consistent with the row and column totals and also a set that is 
the most possible, given the values of the vectors    and   . However, without any further 
assumptions about     we cannot estimate the result analytically for N>2 since N
2
 – 2N 
unknowns have to be estimated.  If we make a further assumption that the data are 
consolidated, that is a sector does not borrow or lend to itself, the main diagonal (    for   
 ) becomes zero and we can interpret the   ’s and   ’s as realisations of the marginal 
distributions       and f(  ), and the x’s as their joint distribution,         . If       and f(  ) 
are independent, then            . According to the information theory (Jaynes, 1957), this 
gives us the matrix   . Now we have       unknowns and the problem cannot be 
estimated analytically for      . 
        (4) 
Standardising we can interpret the vectors    and    as the marginal distributions 
       and       while the    ’s are their joint distribution         . Then if       and       
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are independent it follows that            (see also Upper and Worms 2004 for further 
reading). In information theory terms, this amounts to maximising the entropy of the matrix 
 . This independence assumption is consistent with each sector’s assets and liabilities being 
spread equally over the other sectors based on their total assets and liabilities.  
Of course independence is not always a good predictor of reality. There could be 
economic or political reasons why some sectors in some countries might be more exposed to 
some others. However by constructing the network of exposures with the independence 
assumption we are biasing it against contagion which would be more likely to manifest if 
some sectors were over-exposed to another infected sector. Thus if we observe significant 
contagion effects in our model we are more likely to view them in reality.  
In order to solve for the    ’s we have to minimise the cross entropy of  
  with 
respect to a matrix with elements            for     and       for     . 
 
      
            such that     and              (5) 
where  refers to a Hadamard (element-wise) division;   and    are      vectors that are 
obtained by column-stacking the off-diagonal elements of matrices   and    , such that all 
elements of   are strictly greater than zero;   is a              selection matrix, 
containing zeros and ones;   is an   dimensional column vector that row sums of the 
matrix  , and   is an   dimensional row vector that contains column sums of matrix  . 
Because the objective function is strictly concave, we will get unique solution by solving (5) 
iteratively via using the RAS algorithm.  
The RAS is an Iterative Proportional Fitting algorithm which adjusts an initial matrix 
X with row sums    and column sums    to a new matrix  
  that satisfies a new set of given 
row sums   and   such that    ̂    ̂ , where  ̂ and  ̂ are diagonal matrices with positive 
entries on the main diagonal. We employ it in order to achieve consistency derived from any 
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missing or incomplete information between the entries in our matrix and the pre-specified 
row and column totals. Specifically, we have no information for actual bilateral exposures in 
the interbank loan market for some countries, and hence the actual linages are created 
through the RAS algorithm to guide us to a desired direction by excluding non-existent links. 
As a result, by using RAS round-by-round according to the sizes of the balance sheet linkages 
we reach a matrix where column sums and row sums are equal. Notably, the adjustments of 
the entries of the matrix are kept as close as possible to their initial values (i.e. bi-
proportional), in order to preserve the structure of the matrix as much as possible. Hence, in 
order to estimate the bilateral exposures with the use of RAS in the new matrix X*, we 
minimise the cross-entropy between the matrix X* and the matrix X in equation, so that 
interbank exposures are as close as possible between the two matrices: 
    ̂  ∑ ∑   
 
    
 ̂  
    
              (6) 
s.t. ∑  ̂     
 
    and ∑  ̂     
 
    
for:  ̂           and also:  ̂           
 
3.3 Empirical Findings 
We simulate quarter-by-quarter three negative shocks emerged from: i) the Sovereign 
Credit Risk channel (or SCR), ii) the Interbank loan channel (or IB), and iii) the Asset Loan 
channel (or AL). We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each 
bank has to deduct losses triggered by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. 
Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply a deduction in the banking sector’s 
assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital inevitable. We set a 
10% shock derived from each channel and in the first step we measure the local (national) 
magnitude of the shocks. In our analysis, we are interested in examining losses and the 
contagion path occurred by the shock propagation, and thus we do not model any government 
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or central bank interventions which require exogenous responses and might follow different 
rules. For instance, governments may decide to bail-out troubled banks, to force mergers 
between distress and healthy banks or to provide liquidity and funding through an asset 
purchase program with the intervention of central banks.  
We then proceed on to measure the spread of the shock originated from the banks’ 
domestic exposures, the banking systems most affected by the various shocks and hence the 
expected losses caused by the spread of the shocks across the euro area banking network. 
Hence, similar to Furfine (2003), Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Gai et al. (2011) our measure 
of systemic risk is the expected loss that the contagion channel imposes on a banking system. 
Finally, by assuming that banks cannot raise capital to compensate for the losses suffered 
from the shocks, we examine the resilience of the euro area banking sector, the way financial 
contagion propagates in the cross-border financial network, the speed of contagion and the 
ability of a local banking system to transmit cross-border systemic risks.    
 
3.3.1 Shocks in the national banking systems  
The sovereign credit risk channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of 
government bonds decreases by 10%. This shock is then propagated through the local 
banking network. Consequently, we exhibit to measure the interplay of financial 
interdependence among national banks and the financial acceleration in the development of 
systemic risk. Table 3.1 displays the impact (i.e. final losses) of a 10% shock over discrete 
periods of time, separately for each national banking sector. Notably, the impact of the shock 
is time-variant and also, changes widely across the national banking systems. This may be 
due to cyclicality (i.e. post-crisis deleverage process, recapitalisation, new regulatory 
framework), or the difference on the size and the banking structure of each economy. For 
instance, a 10% shock (i.e. decline in the price) to the Austrian Government Bonds causes 
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€3.37 bn. losses to the Austrian banking sector, during the pre-crisis period. The losses 
increase during the crisis period (€4.08 bn.) and decrease in the post-crisis period (€ 3.33 
bn.). This pattern characterises all national banking systems within our sample, implying that 
in the post-crisis era, banks reduced their exposures in sovereign debt holdings. Interestingly, 
in northern euro area countries, the majority of the losses are registered in the German 
banking system, while for southern euro area countries they are apparent in the French 
banking system. This is not entirely surprising given the size of banking sectors in these 
countries.  
Figure 3.3 depicts the expected losses caused over time from a shock in the German 
and French sovereign debt accordingly. The results also indicate that a shock in the SCR 
channel triggers higher losses in the southern euro area, possibly due to the magnitude and 
the size of the Italian and Spanish sovereign debts (please see also Figure 3.4). It is worth 
noting that an intervention from a central bank could be at any point when the losses are propagated 
and can be through many ways. For instance, German banks can use their capital buffers to 
control a proportion of the losses. In this case the central bank will need to intervene with 
€3bn. in order to absorb the losses propagated by the shock in the German network. 
Similarly, a central bank intervention for the French banking system would cost €4.8 bn. for 
the post-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 
Table 3.1 Shock in the Sovereign Credit Risk Channel. 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        3.377 -        4.089 -        3.336 
Belgium -        3.128 -        3.788 -        3.090 
Estonia -        0.025 -        0.031 -        0.025 
Finland -        1.504 -        1.821 -        1.485 
Germany -      29.201 -      31.880 -      26.003 
Ireland -        1.615 -        1.956 -        1.596 
Latvia -        0.087 -        0.105 -        0.086 
Luxembourg -        0.050 -        0.060 -        0.049 
Slovakia -        0.412 -        0.498 -        0.407 
Southern Euro Area 
   France -      32.354 -      35.247 -      27.820 
Greece -        3.086 -        3.847 -        3.036 
Italy -      23.217 -      28.944 -      22.845 
Malta -        0.107 -        0.133 -        0.105 
Portugal -        2.485 -        3.098 -        2.445 
Spain -      14.447 -      18.011 -      14.215 
Slovenia -        0.299 -        0.363 -        0.296 
Note: Impact of a 10% shock in the Sovereign Credit Risk Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in 
the national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 
till 2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to 
reflect the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Panel A -Losses in German Banks   Panel B - Losses in the French Banking Sector 
                                     
 
 
Figure 3.3. German and French Banking Systems. 
The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% negative shock in 
their Sovereign Debt Markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-
quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
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Losses in the Italian Banking Sector   Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
                                                
Figure 3.4. Losses in Italian and Spahinsh Banks. 
The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in their 
Sovereign Debt markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-
quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
 
The interbank lending channel simulates a scenario wherein 10% of the total value of 
interbank loans will not be paid back. This shock is then propagated through the national 
banking networks. At first glance, Table 3.2 shows that expected losses triggered by the 
shock on interbank loans for the local banks exceed the expected losses driven by the SCR 
channel, implying that the interbank lending channel (IB) is systematically more important 
for the banking industry. Notably, the total expected losses decrease in the post-crisis period, 
as a result of the ensuing process of bank deleveraging. Furthermore, the final losses vary 
substantially across national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size of each 
interbank market. Figure 3.5 summarises the expected losses registered for the French (€ 
63.57 bn. in the post-crisis era) and the German (€35.04 bn. in the post-crisis era) banking 
systems. Notably, a central bank intervention will cost €30.5bn. for the French and €12bn. for 
the German banking networks respectively, for the post-crisis period. Similar to the results 
obtained from the shock in the sovereign debt market, the Italian (€23.24 bn.) and the Spanish 
(€22.56 bn.) banking sectors are affected the most compared with the rest of the countries 
incorporated in our sample (see also Figure 3.6). The study explores the consequences from a 
propagation of shocks in the banking network in two steps. First, we construct the financial 
network based on the banks’ actual exposures in the interbank loan market, the sovereign 
debt (i.e. sovereign credit risk) and asset backed loans (i.e. asset price risk). We then 
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propagate endogenous shocks commenced by the three channels described previously and 
measure the effects (i.e. losses) in the banking system. The losses are distributed into two 
components: the losses incurred by the initial shock and the losses resulting from the 
contagion process in order to measure the speed of the contagion. 
We simulate quarter-by-quarter three negative shocks emerged from: i) the Sovereign 
Credit Risk channel (or SCR), ii) the Interbank loan channel (or IB), and iii) the Asset Loan 
channel (or AL). We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each 
bank has to deduct losses triggered by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. 
Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply a deduction in the banking sector’s 
assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital inevitable. We set a 
10% shock derived from each channel and in the first step we measure the local (national) 
magnitude of the shocks. Notably, there exists a certain threshold (30%) for the loss rate at 
which the shock spreads across the whole euro area banking industry, thus affecting all banks 
through contagion. In our analysis, we are interested in examining losses and the contagion 
path occurred by the shock propagation, and thus we do not model any government or central 
bank interventions which require exogenous responses and might follow different rules. For 
instance, governments may decide to bail-out troubled banks, to force mergers between 
distress and healthy banks or to provide liquidity and funding through an asset purchase 
program with the intervention of central banks.  
We then proceed on to measure the spread of the shock originated from the banks’ domestic 
exposures, the banking systems most affected by the various shocks and hence the expected 
losses caused by the spread of the shocks across the euro area banking network. 
The simulations are employed quarter-by-quarter between the first quarter of 2005 and the 
fourth quarter of 2013. Specifically, we consider sixteen Eurozone based countries, each with 
an economic system formed by N banks. We consider a credit cycle which lasts for four dates 
 66 
 
(t = 0, 1, 2, 3). At the initial date (i.e. t = 0), each bank i holds sufficient capital that it can 
either lend it to other banks via the interbank loan channel (  
  ) and/or invest in Government 
Bonds (  
  ) via the Sovereign Credit Risk channel, and/or invest in asset-backed loans (  
  ) 
via the Asset Loan Risk channel. All projects described above, provide a sufficient profit if 
held to maturity, i.e. at t = 3. However, the bank has the choice to liquidate its project (fully 
or partially) at t = 2, but will only recover a fraction of the project’s full value.  
We propagate shocks triggered by each channel independently at time t  = 1. Then, we 
measure the losses realised for banks emanated from the shocks in each channel. Every bank 
has to meet interbank liabilities (  
  ) and thus, losses incurred by a shock in a channel (e.g. 
the asset loan risk channel   
  ) can be recovered by liquidating other projects (e.g. the 
Sovereign Debt holdings    
  ), at time t = 2.  Consequently, systemic shocks in one channel 
may trigger fire sales, and hence losses in other channels. Thus, our approach allows us to 
distinguish between losses incurred by the propagation of a shock and losses incurred by 
contagion and the spread of systemic risk.  
As a result, if there is a shock in the interbank loan channel, a bank i is solvent when: 
       
        
        
     
   CR      (7) 
where σ is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have suffered losses from the 
shock,     is the resale price of the Sovereign Bond,    is the resale price of the asset-
backed loan, and CR is the bank’s tier-1 capital. Moreover, the values of     and     are 
always less than one in the event of asset sales, since there are fire sales with the propagation 
of the shock in order  a bank to meet its liabilities. 
As a result, when        
  , a bank has to liquidate other projects in order to be 
solvent: 
  
            
            
  
  
    for   
    .       (8) 
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where      
     
     
      is the bank’s capital buffer which can be used in order to 
meet its liabilities.  
All banks are allowed to fail one at a time, if the amount of the losses is greater than 
lenders’ reported tier-1 capital (i.e. capital + reserves). Finally, we calculate the losses 
triggered in other banking systems from the initial shock. Notably, in this study we are 
interested in examining the effects of systemic risks in the euro area banking network and the 
resilience of the banking system. Thus, our financial network does not allow for a role of the 
central bank or for any government interventions in providing liquidity or rescue packages to 
the distressed banks which require exogenous responses and might follow different rules.  
Thus, a bank is insolvent in our financial network when: 
  
            
            
  
  
    for   
    .      (9) 
Contagion occurs in the network system when either a bank is insolvent (equation (9)) 
or when fire sales - triggered by the propagation of a shock – are spread to other banks. 
Therefore, the likelihood of contagion corresponds and is directly linked to the size of the 
bank, the size of losses, the degree of interconnectedness and the size of the capital buffer. 
The same relationship holds when the shock is propagated through the Asset Loan 
Channel. However, a shock propagated within the Sovereign Debt channel implies that the 
interbank loan and the asset backed securities markets are illiquid, because sovereign debt 
represents economic performance and credit conditions for a country and thus a priori 
liquidity will freeze in the interbank market while synchronically the price of collaterals will 
be severely harmed. Hence, amid to the direct interlinkages and obligations, the possibility of 
indirect financial contagion increases significantly when the shocks are triggered by the 
sovereign debt risk channel, such that equation (9) becomes:  
  
  
  
    for   
            (10) 
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Table 3.2. Losses in the Interbank Loan Market. 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        8.762 -        9.566 -        7.803 
Belgium -        6.518 -        7.116 -        5.804 
Estonia -        0.193 -        0.211 -        0.172 
Finland -        4.787 -        5.227 -        4.263 
Germany -        39.36 -        42.97 -      35.047 
Ireland -        9.918 -      10.828 -        8.832 
Latvia -        0.203 -        0.221 -        0.180 
Luxembourg -        3.357 -        3.665 -        2.989 
Slovakia -        0.384 -        0.419 -        0.342 
Southern Euro Area 
   France -      73.933 -      80.545 -      63.571 
Greece -        2.350 -        2.560 -        2.020 
Italy -      27.035 -      29.453 -      23.246 
Malta -        0.775 -        0.844 -        0.666 
Portugal -        4.052 -        4.415 -        3.484 
Spain -      26.245 -      28.592 -      22.567 
Slovenia -        0.336 -        0.366 -        0.288 
Note: Impact of a 10% shock in the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits the losses of a shock in the 
national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect 
the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Losses in the German Banking Sector  Losses in the French Banking Sector  
                             
Figure 3.5. Losses in German and French Banks. 
The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in their 
national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.   
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Losses in the Italian Banking Sector                               Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector
                                       
Figure 3.6. Losses in Italian and Spanish Banks. 
The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in their 
national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.    
 
Furthermore, Table 3.3 presents the expected losses after the propagation of a shock 
in the Asset Loan channel (AL), independently for each national banking system. More 
concretely, the asset loan channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of the collateral of 
the asset-backed loans declines by 10%. The expected losses propagated through the AL 
channel exceed the losses propagated by the SCR channel, but are lower than the losses 
propagated by the IB channel. For instance, the total amount of losses for France is €40.22 
bn. in the post-crisis era and for Germany is €27.24 bn. (sees also Figure 3.7). Consequently, 
the results demonstrate that total expected losses decline in the post crisis era, confirming that 
banks reduced their exposure to asset-backed loans. Interestingly, a central bank intervention 
will cost €27bn. for the French and €3bn. for the German banking networks respectively. 
Figure 3.8 depicts that the same relationship holds for the effects of a shock in the Asset Loan 
channel for the Italian and the Spanish banking systems. Additionally, we find that each 
national banking system responds differently to systemic-risk related events (see also Figure 
3.9). Particularly, the smaller is the banking sector, the lesser are the expected losses. From 
the three systemic risk channels, the interbank loan market constitutes the most important 
source of losses to the euro area banks. Moreover, we find that the same shock would cause 
different losses in the national banking sectors if emerged at different points in time. 
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Interestingly, the results imply that euro area banks have strengthened their capital positions 
in the post-crisis era amid ongoing deleveraging. 
Table 3.3 Shock in the Asset-Backed Loan Channel. 
 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        5.331 -        5.820 -        4.747 
Belgium -        7.531 -        8.222 -        6.706 
Estonia -        0.180 -        0.197 -        0.160 
Finland -        3.435 -        3.750 -        3.059 
Germany -        30.59 -        33.40 -      27.241 
Ireland -      10.975 -      11.982 -        9.773 
Latvia -        0.130 -        0.141 -        0.115 
Luxembourg -      10.698 -      11.679 -        9.526 
Slovakia -        0.319 -        0.348 -        0.284 
Southern Euro Area 
   France -      46.784 -      50.967 -      40.227 
Greece -        1.367 -        1.490 -        1.176 
Italy -      16.545 -      18.025 -      14.226 
Malta -        0.305 -        0.332 -        0.262 
Portugal -        2.733 -        2.978 -        2.350 
Spain -      15.677 -      17.078 -      13.479 
Slovenia -        0.256 -        0.279 -        0.220 
Note: Impact of a 10% shock in the Asset-Backed Loan Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in the 
national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect 
the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Losses in the German Banking Sector  Losses in the French Banking Sector 
                                  
Figure 3.7. Losses in German and French Banks. 
The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in the 
German and French Asset-Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-
quarter from 2005 till 2013.   
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Losses in the Italian Banking Sector         Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
                                      
Figure 3.8. Losses in Italian and Spanish Banks. 
The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in the Asset-
Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013.   
 
PANEL A      PANEL B   
 
Figure 3.9. Total Losses. 
Total losses emerged in national banking systems from 10% negative shocks in three systemic risk channel. 
Panel A presents losses triggered in the Northern Euro Area banking sectors and Panel B exhibits losses caused 
in the Southern Euro Area banking sectors. The amounts are in EUR billions. 
 
3.3.2 Propagation of Shocks in the cross-border financial network 
 Next, we quantify the effects of shocks in the cross-border financial network, in order 
to examine the extent to which local banking systems transmit the losses to the European 
banking sector. Particularly, we examine how a national shock propagates and spreads within 
the euro are banking network. Table 3.4 depicts total losses in the banking systems from a 
10% shock in the three systemic risk channels of Germany (Panel A) and France (Panel B), 
the two largest economies in the euro area. Interestingly, the results imply that the interbank 
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market causes the higher expected losses when compared with the Sovereign Credit Risk and 
the Asset Loan channels. Additionally, the final losses vary substantially across the banking 
systems. Specifically, French banks suffer the wider losses due the size of its banking sector 
and due to large interconnectedness with the German financial system. Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that a 10% shock in the German systemic risk channels generates higher losses 
for the euro area banking sectors compared with a similar shock in the French channels. 
Thus, the German banking system is identified as systematically more important than the 
French banking system. The differences in the final losses are explained by the large 
differences on the size of the national banking sectors and on the degree of 
interconnectedness.  
Table 3.4. Final Losses in the Euro Area banking network triggered by Germany.   
Panel A.  
Germany SCR IB AL 
France -    0.564 -    3.209 -    2.049 
Italy -    0.404 -    2.298 -    1.467 
Spain -    0.134 -    0.759 -    0.485 
Belgium -    0.029 -    0.162 -    0.104 
Austria -    0.130 -    0.736 -    0.470 
Greece -    0.007 -    0.042 -    0.027 
Finland -    0.015 -    0.086 -    0.055 
Portugal -    0.009 -    0.051 -    0.032 
Ireland -    0.010 -    0.058 -    0.037 
Slovakia -    0.036 -    0.203 -    0.130 
Slovenia -    0.043 -    0.243 -    0.155 
Luxembourg -    0.032 -    0.184 -    0.117 
Latvia -    0.062 -    0.353 -    0.225 
Estonia -    0.064 -    0.361 -    0.231 
Malta -    0.121 -    0.686 -    0.438 
Total Losses -    1.660 -    9.433 -    6.023 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three German Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank 
loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
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Table 3.4 Final Losses in the Euro Area banking network originated by France.  
Panel B. 
France SCR IB AL 
Germany -0.202 -2.491 -1.352 
Italy -0.041 -0.501 -0.272 
Spain -    0.043 -    0.532 -    0.289 
Belgium -    0.028 -    0.351 -    0.190 
Austria -    0.029 -    0.352 -    0.191 
Greece -    0.003 -    0.036 -    0.019 
Finland -    0.008 -    0.096 -    0.052 
Portugal -    0.009 -    0.112 -    0.061 
Ireland -    0.012 -    0.143 -    0.078 
Slovakia -    0.018 -    0.218 -    0.118 
Slovenia -    0.021 -    0.260 -    0.141 
Luxembourg -    0.016 -    0.197 -    0.107 
Latvia -    0.031 -    0.378 -    0.205 
Estonia -    0.031 -    0.387 -    0.210 
Malta -    0.060 -    0.735 -    0.399 
Total Losses -    0.551 -    6.789 -    3.686 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three French Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Accordingly, the results in Table 3.5 suggest that a shock in the Italian economic 
system (Panel A) triggers wider losses in the euro area banking sector compared with a shock 
in the Spanish financial system (Panel B). Hence, the Italian financial system is 
systematically more important than the Spanish banking system for the euro area. The results 
indicate that a shock emerging from a given banking sector does not have the same impact 
than a shock propagating from some other banking sector. Furthermore, the results 
demonstrate that each of the systemic risk channels has a different impact on every local 
banking system and that the interbank risk channel generates the wider losses in the euro area 
banking network. 
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Table 3.5 Euro area banking network final losses caused by a shock in Italy.   
Panel A  
Italy SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.301 -    1.536 -    0.689 
France -    1.116 -    5.692 -    2.554 
Spain -    0.081 -    0.411 -    0.184 
Belgium -    0.027 -    0.136 -    0.061 
Austria -    0.057 -    0.292 -    0.131 
Greece -    0.020 -    0.103 -    0.046 
Finland -    0.045 -    0.229 -    0.103 
Portugal -    0.013 -    0.068 -    0.031 
Ireland -    0.009 -    0.045 -    0.020 
Slovakia -    0.024 -    0.124 -    0.055 
Slovenia -    0.029 -    0.148 -    0.066 
Luxembourg -    0.022 -    0.111 -    0.050 
Latvia -    0.042 -    0.214 -    0.096 
Estonia -    0.043 -    0.219 -    0.098 
Malta -    0.082 -    0.416 -    0.187 
Total Losses -    1.911 -    9.743 -    4.372 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Table 3.5 Euro area banking network final losses emerged from Spain. 
Panel B  
Spain SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.118 -    1.431 -    0.721 
France -    0.162 -    1.975 -    0.996 
Italy -    0.019 -    0.236 -    0.119 
Belgium -    0.012 -    0.145 -    0.073 
Austria -    0.009 -    0.104 -    0.053 
Greece -    0.007 -    0.087 -    0.044 
Finland -    0.016 -    0.191 -    0.096 
Portugal -    0.021 -    0.261 -    0.132 
Ireland -    0.005 -    0.061 -    0.031 
Slovakia -    0.008 -    0.102 -    0.051 
Slovenia -    0.010 -    0.122 -    0.061 
Luxembourg -    0.008 -    0.092 -    0.046 
Latvia -    0.015 -    0.177 -    0.089 
Estonia -    0.015 -    0.181 -    0.091 
Malta -    0.028 -    0.344 -    0.173 
Total Losses -    0.453 -    5.510 -    2.778 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
Interestingly, a shock in a smaller banking system, like the Greek and the Portuguese 
(Table 3.6), originate a small amount of losses in the euro area banking systems. This can be 
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explained to a great extent by the small size of their banking sectors and hence the small 
degree of interconnectedness with other European banking sectors. Consequently, we observe 
that the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the size and the degree of 
exposure of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. This result is in line with 
Kamber and Theonissen (2013) who observe that the more exposed domestic banks are to the 
foreign economy, the greater are the spillovers from foreign financial shocks to the home 
economy. As a result, each local banking system develops different propagation dynamics in 
the banking network, due to the differences in the financial structure (i.e. different magnitude 
of bilateral exposures and different size of sovereign debt and asset backed loans). Finally, 
we observe that final losses are time-variant, since the same shock propagated at different 
points in time diverse results. This can be explained by the changes in the network structure 
triggered by changes in the degree of interconnectedness in the euro area banking sectors.  
Table 3.6 Euro area banking network final losses triggered by Portugal. 
Panel A  
Portugal SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.018 -    0.188 -    0.118 
France -    0.018 -    0.193 -    0.121 
Italy -    0.002 -    0.020 -    0.012 
Spain -    0.059 -    0.630 -    0.396 
Belgium -    0.005 -    0.050 -    0.031 
Austria -    0.003 -    0.028 -    0.018 
Greece -    0.003 -    0.030 -    0.019 
Finland -    0.006 -    0.065 -    0.041 
Ireland -    0.006 -    0.065 -    0.040 
Slovakia -    0.003 -    0.035 -    0.022 
Slovenia -    0.004 -    0.041 -    0.026 
Luxembourg -    0.003 -    0.031 -    0.020 
Latvia -    0.006 -    0.060 -    0.038 
Estonia -    0.006 -    0.061 -    0.038 
Malta -    0.011 -    0.117 -    0.073 
Total Losses -    0.151 -    1.613 -    1.013 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Portuguese Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank 
loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
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Table 3.6 Euro area banking network final losses triggered by Greece. 
Panel B  
Greece SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.002 -    0.070 -    0.037 
France -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Italy -    0.000 -    0.010 -    0.005 
Spain -    0.001 -    0.021 -    0.011 
Belgium -    0.001 -    0.019 -    0.010 
Austria -    0.001 -    0.028 -    0.014 
Finland -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Portugal -    0.001 -    0.018 -    0.010 
Ireland -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Slovakia -    0.000 -    0.013 -    0.007 
Slovenia -    0.001 -    0.016 -    0.008 
Luxembourg -    0.000 -    0.012 -    0.006 
Latvia -    0.001 -    0.023 -    0.012 
Estonia -    0.001 -    0.023 -    0.012 
Malta -    0.001 -    0.044 -    0.023 
Total Losses -    0.012 -    0.372 -    0.194 
Note: Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Greek Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
 
 
3.3.3 The path and speed of contagion within the European banking network 
 In this section we analyse how systemic shocks originated in a national banking 
system, spread in the euro area banking network resembling to financial contagion. In 
particular, by using 170 banks from 16 euro area countries, we measure the speed and the 
path of cross-country financial contagion within the Eurozone. The simulation test is for a 
10% propagation of shocks in the three independent contagion channels, a scenario which is 
reasonable under severe financial conditions. Consequently, this approach allows us to 
capture the effect of variations in financial robustness from one bank to the others, rather than 
focusing exclusively on default events and bankruptcies.  
Table 3.7 presents the results for a shock in the SCR channel and shows: i) the 
number of banks that default due to the shock and ii) the number of banks whose default 
cause at least one bank failure by contagion. The evidence indicates that financial contagion 
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is highly possible to occur in the euro area banking system.  Moreover, we observe that the 
spread of the shock depends on the size of the bank that fails at the initial stage. More 
precisely, shocks in the German and French banking systems cause the wider failures. This 
can be explained by the size of their national banking sectors and from the large number of 
small banks which creates a cascade of defaults due to their interconnectedness. Thus, 
interestingly we find that contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. This result is in 
line with Mistrulli (2011). Notably, there exists a certain threshold (30%) for the loss rate at 
which the shock spreads across the whole euro area banking industry, thus affecting all banks 
through contagion. 
Table 3.7 Bank defaults and contagion by a shock in SCR channel. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses                         Banks failing by Contagion  
 Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 2 0 4 1 
Belgium 2 0 4 1 
Estonia 1 0 4 1 
Finland 2 0 4 1 
France 10 0 19 2 
Germany 21 0 29 1 
Greece 1 1 4 4 
Ireland 2 0 5 1 
Italy 2 0 3 1 
Latvia 2 2 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 4 0 8 2 
Slovakia 3 0 5 1 
Slovenia 1 0 4 3 
Spain 2 0 6 1 
Bank defaults caused by the Sovereign Credit Risk channel. The table presents bank-failures generated by a 
10% negative shock at the Sovereign Credit Risk channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure 
from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for 
each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
 
Table 3.8 depicts the effects from a 10% shock that propagates through the Asset 
Loan channel. The results imply that the defaulted banks are lessen indicating that the SCR is 
the dominant systemic risk channel and the most systematically important for the spread of 
contagion in the euro area banking systems. 
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Table 3.8 Bank defaults and contagion caused by the AL channel. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion  
 Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 0 1 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 
Finland 1 0 1 0 
France 2 0 6 0 
Germany 3 0 9 0 
Greece 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 1 1 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 1 0 0 0 
Slovakia 1 0 0 0 
Slovenia 1 0 1 0 
Spain 1 0 2 0 
Bank defaults prompted by the Asset-backed Loan channel. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 10% 
negative shock at the Asset-backed Loan channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from the 
propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each banking 
system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
 
Table 3.9 shows the effects from a 10% shock in the Interbank lending channel (IB). 
The results demonstrate that the number of defaulted banks is higher when compared with the 
AL channel, but less than the number of banks that fail due to a shock in the SCR channel. 
Thus, a closer look at the contagion path reveals that the SCR channel is the most 
systematically important source to spread contagion within the euro area financial network. 
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Table 3.9 Bank defaults and contagion caused by the IB channel. 
     COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion  
 Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 1 0 3 1 
Belgium 2 0 4 1 
Estonia 1 0 4 1 
Finland 1 0 2 0 
France 6 0 11 0 
Germany 13 0 17 0 
Greece 1 1 1 1 
Ireland 1 0 2 0 
Italy 1 0 2 0 
Latvia 2 2 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 2 0 6 0 
Slovakia 1 0 3 0 
Slovenia 1 0 4 3 
Spain 1 0 3 0 
Bank defaults provoked by the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 10% 
negative shock at the Interbank Loan Market channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from 
the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each 
banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
 
The findings presented in this section, demonstrate vividly that the change in the 
financial stability of a bank is affected at any point in time by the financial stability of the 
counterparties. Additionally, the results imply that if some banks default, this can trigger a 
cascade of defaults resembling to financial contagion. Consequently, the default of a bank 
decreases the value of the assets of each bank in the financial network down to the point 
where the value of assets becomes smaller than the value of liabilities. Thus, the bank 
defaults and spreads the crisis to other interconnected banks. These results complement the 
work of Gai et al. (2011) who observe that when risk sharing is maximised among 
counterparties, the default threshold hold the critical role for the spread of the shock. 
 Table 3.10 presents the results on how a default within the domestic banking system 
propagates in an international financial network. The most systematically important country 
is Germany and thus, we focus on the effects caused by a 10% shock in their interbank 
market. The results obtained are based on the assumption that banks cannot react to the shock 
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by raising capital while also governments and central banks cannot intervene at any stage. 
Indeed, whilst liquidity abruptly dries up when the financial system is under a distress 
situation, (see also Longstaff 2010), central banks and governments need a sufficient amount 
of time to decide on the appropriate actions. 
Notably, we observe that a shock generated in the German banking network may 
cause severe losses and defaults in the euro area banking system. Also, we find that a bank in 
a foreign country may not be financially linked with German banks, but it is possible to suffer 
from losses or even defaults to its banking sector due to financial contagion. This result is 
driven by the systemic importance of the German banking sector which lends to the 
periphery, and thus makes contagion effects more apparent. Moreover, the degree of losses 
varies substantially across national banking systems depending on the size and the degree of 
their interconnectedness. Thus, the speed at which losses are absorbed by the banking 
networks varies across countries. Consequently, we document that the spread of a shock 
depends on the systemic importance of a banking system, and the impact of a shock of a 
given magnitude strongly depends on its initial location. Thus, the probability of default does 
not decrease monotonically with diversification in the interbank loan market, a result which 
corroborates the work of Allen et al. (2011). Interestingly, the propagation of a shock 
generated by other banking systems causes less contagious failures in the financial network, 
resembling to a non-monotonic connectivity of contagion, similar to Gai and Kapadia (2010). 
Albeit, we observe that even small banking systems (e.g. Greece and Portugal) have the 
ability to transmit distress in stronger banking sectors. As a result, the smaller is the banking 
sector, the lesser are the expected losses and the cross-country contagion effects. These 
results are in line with the works of Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas et al. (2000) who find 
that complete markets are not necessarily less conductive to contagion than incomplete 
markets.  
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In addition, from Table 3.10 we observe that there are marked differences in the 
dynamic responses across the national banking systems. Specifically, southern euro area 
banks react more strongly than northern euro area banks. This implies that southern euro area 
banks are more prone to financial contagion and more susceptible to systemic risks. 
Moreover, we find that as conditions deteriorate in the euro area banking system, the degree 
of interconnectedness in the financial network increases the possibility of a domino effect. 
Shocks generated in the German banking system create large losses in the financial network, 
and thus the domino effect is more apparent. This result corroborates and extends the 
theoretical work on endogenous complexity and the model of financial crises proposed by 
Cavallero and Simsek (2013). Finally, the propagation effects reveal that albeit the new 
regulatory framework and the deleveraging process, the risk of financial contagion has not 
substantially decreased.  
 
Table 3.10. Cross-border bank defaults and contagion. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion  
 Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 3 0 5 1 
Belgium 4 1 4 1 
Estonia 2 0 4 1 
Finland 2 0 4 1 
France 14 0 21 3 
Greece 4 0 7 2 
Ireland 3 1 3 1 
Italy 2 2 2 2 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 6 0 9 3 
Portugal 5 1 5 1 
Slovakia 4 3 4 3 
Slovenia 6 1 7 2 
Spain 3 0 5 1 
Note: Cross-border Euro Area bank defaults provoked by a 10% negative shock in the German Interbank Loan 
Market. The table displays bank-failures in the Euro Area, generated by a 10% negative shock at the German 
Interbank Loan Market and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from the propagation of financial 
contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each banking system, while most of 
the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
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3.4 Robustness Check 
The main finding of our thesis is that by employing the Maximum Entropy approach 
we capture three systemic risk channels which transform risk in the euro area financial 
network. In order to check the sensitivity of our findings we use the actual bilateral exposures 
in the four largest banking systems (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) to compare the results 
with those obtained with Maximum Entropy. This comparison is important, since it sheds 
light on the reliability of the maximum entropy approach for assessing the interbank market 
vulnerability to financial contagion. Following Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan 
(2014), the comparison between Maximum Entropy and observed interbank patterns can be 
interpreted as the theoretical comparison proposed by Allen and Gale (2000) between 
complete and incomplete markets. 
 Figure 3.10 presents the results with the Maximum Entropy method and the results 
obtained with the actual bilateral exposures for the German and French banking networks. 
We observe that both (estimated and actual) lines are fairly closed to each other, implying 
that the Maximum Entropy approach neither over- nor under-estimates the bilateral 
exposures. Indeed, the black line which represents the Maximum Entropy approach
3
 of 
bilateral exposures produces very similar results with the actual exposures, implying that the 
Maximum Entropy approach is a suitable way to calibrate losses generated by systemic 
shocks.  
  PANEL A     PANEL B   
 
Figure 3.10. Robustness check for the German and French markets. 
                                                          
3
 The Maximum Entropy matrix of bilateral exposures contains the assumption that for each bank total interbank 
liabilities and total interbank assets are equal. 
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Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral Exposures 
(actual line) from a 5% negative shock in the German (Panel A) and the French (Panel B) Banking Systems. The 
results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
 
Similar results are obtained for Figure 3.11 which depicts the Spanish and Italian 
banking systems. Specifically, the differences between the observed and the estimated values 
are fairly closed. Notably, the black line represents cross-country exposures in the interbank 
market, estimated with the use of RAS algorithm. On the other hand, the grey line represents 
cross-country exposures in the interbank market, estimated with actual bilateral exposures 
with data constructed by the balance sheet items. 
 
 
  PANEL A     PANEL B   
 
Figure 3.11. Robustness checks for the Italian and Spanish markets. 
Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral Exposures 
(actual line) from a 10% negative shock in the Italian (Panel A) and the Spanish (Panel B) Banking Systems. 
The results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
 
Moreover, we use the actual values to propagate shocks in the euro area interbank, 
sovereign and loan markets, and we observe that the estimated losses within the banking 
networks are quite similar to the estimated losses of the financial network computed with the 
Maximum Entropy approach. In contrast to Mistrulli (2011) and in line with the work of 
Castren and Rancan (2014), this result asserts that the Maximum Entropy method does not 
underestimate the extent of the shock propagation.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
This thesis models systemic risk by employing the Maximum Entropy approach for 
the euro area banking industry. We construct a unique interconnected, dynamic and 
continuous-time financial network and employ counterfactual simulations to propagate 
systemic shocks. In contrast to the existing literature, we use three independent channels of 
systemic risk: the interbank loan market, the sovereign credit risk market and the asset loan 
market, and provide novel evidence on the effects of shocks on financial institutions, the 
speed of contagion, the way shocks propagate and how euro area banks respond under severe 
financial conditions. 
In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the findings have important 
implications for understanding systemic risk and for analysing policies designed to mitigate 
financial contagion in the euro area. Specifically, at first glance the empirical results reveal 
that a shock in the interbank loan market triggers the highest expected losses in the banking 
systems. However, by modelling the contagion path the findings reveal that a shock in the 
sovereign credit risk channel transmits faster through the banking network and leads to a 
cascade of defaults. Thus, we conclude that the sovereign credit risk channel dominates 
systemic risks amplified in the euro area financial network. Additionally, we document that 
the propagated losses vary across the national banking sectors depending on their sizes and 
interconnectiveness, while also there is a dramatic variation across northern and southern 
euro area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. In particular, the speed of 
contagion and the expected bank failures are markedly more prominent in southern euro area 
banking systems. 
Moreover, by modelling the contagion path we observe that losses vary over time due 
to the post-crisis deleverage and to changes in the degree of interconnections among 
European banks. Interestingly, the findings reveal that the cross-border transmission of 
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systemic shocks - and consequently the speed of contagion - depends on the size of the 
national banking sector, the initial location of the generated shock and the degree of 
interconnectedness. Finally, it is evident from the results that the European banking system 
remains highly vulnerable and conducive to financial contagion, implying that the new 
capital rules have not substantially reduced systemic risks, and hence, there is a need for 
additional policies in order to increase the resilience of the sector.  
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Chapter 4: The Quest for Banking Stability in the Euro Area: 
The Role of Government Interventions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis that followed the default of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 highlighted the threat of collapse of financial institutions, alarmed the authorities, 
prompted large-scale state-funded rescue packages in the euro area countries
4
, and led to an 
astonishing increase in banks’ credit default swaps (BCDS)5 positions. In the first place, 
those state-funded bank bailouts triggered an unprecedented deterioration in public finances 
of the world’s major advanced economies in a peacetime period (Hryckiewicz 2014).6 In the 
second place, shrinking public finances led to fiscal imbalances in the euro area, and had 
been reflected in growing sovereign credit default swap (SCDS) spreads.
7
  
Initially, one could argue that the credit risk was simply transferred, through bailouts, 
from the banking to the public sector. However, only temporary improvement in the levels of 
perceived credit risk in the banking sector could be witnessed after bank bailouts. Indeed, by 
the first quarter of 2009, BCDS contracts were traded again at par with SCDS contracts. 
Since November 2009, several “peripheral” euro area countries, including Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy, have faced episodes of heightened turbulence in their sovereign 
debt markets that soared the SCDS spreads (Bolton and Jeanne 2011). Hence, not 
                                                          
4
 The threat of total collapse of large financial institutions provoked large-scale rescue packages, announced by 
euro area governments in September 2008 in an attempt to increase the resilience of the banking sector. 
(Attinasi, Checherita-Westphal, and Nickel 2009, Petrovic and Tutsch 2009, Veronesi and Zingales 2010, 
Calice, Chen, and Williams 2013, Phillipon and Schnabl 2013) 
5
 A credit default swap (CDS) is currently the most popular credit derivative, and it serves as a key indicator for 
the level of credit risk (for a more detailed information on credit default swaps, see Appendix E). It can be used 
by investors for hedging and speculation. 
6
 From 2007 to 2011, the government debt ratio as a percentage of GDP increased in all euro area countries. The 
increase in the debt ratio was documented to range from 9.3 percentage points (Cyprus) to 62.3% percentage 
points (Ireland) (Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012). 
7
 In the case of government debt, investors use CDSs to express a view about the creditworthiness of a 
government, and to protect themselves in the event of a country default or in the event of debt restructuring. 
Financial markets developed the CDS on government debt as a flexible instrument to hedge and trade sovereign 
credit risk. Although CDSs on government debt are only a fraction of countries’ outstanding debt market, their 
importance has been growing rapidly since 2008, especially in advanced economies where the creditworthiness 
of some of these countries have experienced enormous pressure. With the intensified attention, their usage has 
come under more scrutiny. 
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surprisingly, the CDS market has recently received renewed attention from investors, policy 
makers, regulators and researchers. The ensuing sudden credit squeeze and liquidity dry-up 
induced stock market investors to seek protection and insurance against the increased 
probability of default. Thus, there are anecdotal evidences that the CDS reflects 
developments in both credit and stock markets.  
In particular, research into credit default swaps is dominated by the examination of (i) 
the determinants of sovereign credit risk and defaults (Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak 
2013, Ang and Longstaff 2013 and Beirne and Fratzscher 2013), (ii) the adverse effects to the 
banking sector during sovereign defaults (Panageas 2010, Acharya and Rajan 2013), and (iii) 
the cost of bank bailouts to the government (Gorton and Huang 2004; Diamond and Rajan 
2005). An emerging body of research addresses two-way feedback effects between the risk of 
default in the banking and public sectors (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011, Alter and Schüler 2012, 
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2013 and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2014). Key in this 
research is the possibility – so far empirically unaccounted for by the existing literature – that 
financial crises and government interventions in the banking sector can alter the structure of 
such effects thus aggravating the two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop. Uncertainty 
surrounding future credit ratings is identified in this research as a catalyst for the 
aforementioned loop. In this regard, this thesis conceptually resembles Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002), who ascribe financial instability to the role of government interventions.  
In an attempt to fill this void, our research builds upon the following objectives. First, 
we aim to study the regime-dependent interdependence between the euro area BCDS and 
SCDS spreads. In particular, we focus on the two-way feedback effects between sovereign 
and banking sector’s risks in euro area countries. We build on and extend Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008), who document evidence of pronounced regime-dependent behavior in the 
CDS market. This methodology conveniently allows testing for the theoretical effects of 
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sovereign defaults on the domestic private (banking and non-banking) sector derived by 
Sandleris (2014), and it complements the empirical effects on the domestic banking sector, 
documented by Correa et al. (2013). 
Our second aim is to achieve a better understanding of regime-dependent relation 
between stock and credit markets. In this light, the literature mainly focuses on the effects of 
stock market variables on credit market variables (see Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu 2009, Cao, Yu, 
and Zhong 2010, inter alia). The literature is further extended to control for variables 
characterizing the economic environment. For instance, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and 
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2013) underline the importance of a common factor 
(referred to as a ‘crisis factor’), capturing the effects from deteriorating macroeconomic 
fundamentals and growing fiscal imbalances, for euro area BCDS and SCDS spreads. While 
our methodology accounts for information contents of CDS and stock markets, and the stance 
of a business cycle, we also allow stock market returns and volatility to be endogenously 
determined using BCDS and SCDS spreads. To the best of our knowledge this approach is 
not apparent in the literature. The direction of the interdependence between stock and credit 
markets has become a bone of contention only recently (Norden and Weber 2009, Hilscher, 
Pollet, and Wilson 2015). However, evidence on whether and, if so, how CDS spreads are 
informative about stock market returns and volatility, remains scant.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is fivefold. First, our research contributes to the 
literature that studies the effects of large-scale rescue packages provided by euro area 
governments to their national banking sectors. We capture the relation between BCDS and 
SCDS spreads by means of a Markov Switching Bayesian VAR model which sheds light on a 
significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. This is the first 
comprehensive study to exhibit the number of regimes (   based on the notion that the 
dynamic relation between the BCDS and SCDS spreads may be (i) different before and after 
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the subprime-mortgage crisis period (i.e., July 2007), and (ii) different in periods clustered 
around the various credit events after the subprime mortgage crisis – such as the contagious 
effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers – and in periods where those contagious effects 
became apparent.   
The study employs Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) to capture the 
response of the BCDS and SCDS to a shock, and provides novel evidence that large-scale 
rescue packages do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS 
spreads. More concretely, the impulse response is clearly positive and significant, and it 
markedly varies across the regimes. In the low volatility regime the response is smallest in 
magnitude, whereas in the high-volatility regime the response has the largest magnitude. The 
results reveal that an unexpected change in BCDS spread has a positive effect on the SCDS 
spreads, indicating that a rise in BCDS spread signals increasing sovereign default risk. 
Moreover, a rise on the SCDS spreads triggers an elevated increase in BCDS spread, 
implying that government interventions in the banking sector, deteriorate sovereign risk 
default conditions. Therefore, our results are supportive of the hypothesis that government 
interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer from the banking to the public 
sector, complementing Alter and Schüler (2012). In addition, these results sppourt the 
feedback hypothesis
8
, while also are in line and corroborate the work of Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) and Sandleris (2014), who document that the expectation of support from national 
governments allows banks to be more leveraged (i.e. risk –taking incentive), and therefore 
more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.  
Second, we contribute to the literature which studies the relation between credit 
market and stock market variables. According to Sandleris (2014), this relation builds upon 
two intertwined channels through which a sovereign default affects stock markets. First, a 
                                                          
8
 The feedback hypothesis implies that higher risk premium required by investors for holding government bonds 
depresses the sovereign bond market, it impairs balance sheets of the banking sector, and it depresses the 
collateral value of loans.  
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sovereign default can trigger a contraction in the credit market (credit channel). Second, in 
the event of a sovereign default, a decrease in investments affects negatively firms’ net worth 
and makes collateral constraints more stringent (investment channel). The interaction and 
synchronicity between these two channels makes it important to incorporate stock market 
variables in our work. In particular, we find that an unexpected positive change to BCDS and 
SCDS spreads causes an increase in investors’ expectations of stock market volatility, as 
measured by the change in the VSTOXX volatility index, and advances to a decrease in the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. These findings resonate well with empirical evidence on the 
effects of changes in sovereign credit ratings on financial instability (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler 2002) and stock market returns (Brooks et al. 2004, Correa et al. 2014).
9
 
Third, we complement the literature that studies the determinants of BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. Whereas most of this literature uses single-equation models to evaluate the 
determinants of CDS (Alexander and Kaeck 2008), our research is based on a multiple-
equation model. More specifically, we use a state-of-art Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector 
Autoregression (MSBVAR) model that (i) relaxes the assumption maintained in previous 
research that stock market variables are exogenous in determining CDS spreads and (ii) 
allows to compute regime-dependent impulse response functions, as in Erhmann, Ellison, and 
Valla (2003). Another methodological novelty is the use of a Gibbs sampler to estimate the 
MSBVAR, which can be thought of a stochastic version of the expectations maximization 
algorithm commonly used to estimate Markov-switching models. 
Fourth, our research extends previous research in terms of the data sample and the 
number of regimes. Specifically, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) use a Markov-switching model 
                                                          
9
 If bank bailouts contribute to instability of financial markets, and sovereign credit rating downgrades have a 
larger effect on bank equity returns for those banks that are more likely to receive support from their 
governments, then investors will be willing to buy bank equity only if it’s valuation is sufficiently low in 
periods marked by heightened volatility. Admittedly, changes in sovereign credit ratings can simultaneous 
influence both the CDS market and the stock market, thus generating a co-movement between SCDS spreads, 
stock market returns and volatility.  
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to identify two regimes, and their sample period spans three years of daily data, from 06/2004 
through 06/2007. By contrast, we use daily data from 03/2005 to 06/2013. Moreover, a low 
volatility regime, identified by our MSBVAR model, encompasses the entire sample period 
used in Alexander and Kaeck (2008). In addition, by means of smoothed regime probabilities, 
we also identify an intermediate volatility regime that started in July 2007 (and coincided 
with the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States), and a high volatility 
regime that prevailed in the aftermath of extensive government interventions in September 
2008.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature that studies contagion.
10
 The effects of 
unexpected changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the 
EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, 
reflecting an increased incidence of contagion across financial markets.
11
 Our research 
complements Jorion and Zhang (2007) who examine contagion channels between CDS and 
stock markets. 
 
4.2 The Hypotheses 
In this section, we formulate the hypotheses used in our research. The hypotheses 
build upon a relation among BCDS and SCDS spreads, the EUROSTOXX stock market 
index and the volatility index VSTOXX in low, intermediate and high volatility regimes of 
the CDS market. Our research identifies three regimes in the credit default swap market (see 
Section 4.5). These are low volatility, intermediate volatility and high volatility regimes. 
Before the subprime mortgage crisis (i.e., before July 2007), the CDS market experienced the 
                                                          
10
 Contagion occurs when there is a significant cross-asset or cross-market increase in co-movement due to a 
shock to one asset or market, over and above one would expect based on macroeconomic fundamentals (Boyer, 
Kumagai, and Yuan 2006). We use first and second principal components on fixed-for-floating euro interest rate 
swaps as exogenous variables to proxy for macroeconomic fundamentals. 
11
 Following Yuan (2005) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012), uninformed rational investors are 
not able to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks. Thus, 
when investors suffer a large loss, they are forced to liquidate their positions in other investments, triggering 
cross-market portfolio rebalancing. 
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low-volatility regime, with both BCDS and SCDS spreads showing a tendency to decrease. 
The intermediate volatility regime commenced in July 2007, when HSBC announced large 
subprime-mortgage related losses (Eichengreen et al. 2012). The high-volatility regime was 
triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), when financial contagion 
spilled over from the United States to European countries (Calice, Chen, and Williams 2013), 
and when euro are governments provided large-scale rescue packages to their national 
banking sectors. In the high-volatility regime, BCDS and SCDS spreads experienced an 
unprecedented hike that was followed again by a relatively calmer intermediate-volatility 
period with some tendency for the high-volatility state to recur during the sovereign debt 
crisis that commenced in the late 2009 in a number of peripheral euro area countries. These 
developments are depicted in Panel A of Figure 4.1. 
 
Panel A 
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Panel B 
 
Figure 4.1. Developments in Credit Default Swap and Stock Markets 
 
Note: Figure 4.1 depicts variation over time in the CDS market (Panel A) and in the stock market (Panel B). 
Panel B shows variation over time in levels (upper graph) and in changes (lower graph). The EUROSTOXX 
stock market index is on the left scale, and the VSTOXX volatility index is on the right scale. 
 
4.2.1 The Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis 
Following Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolff (2010), and Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 
(2013), a systemic banking crisis gives rise to a business-cycle recession, which weakens 
public finances and leads to a higher default risk of sovereign bonds, as sovereign distress 
develops. Financial institutions that suffer unanticipated outflow of deposits and experience 
funding and liquidity issues in the wholesale market are forced to reduce their lending 
activity and even to call back existing loans in order to deleverage their balance sheets. This 
raises the probability to default on banks’ liabilities and is associated with an increase in 
BCDS spread. If funding and liquidity problems become a commonplace in the banking 
sector, money supply will decrease as less credit will becomes available in the economy. 
Thus, a systemic banking crisis is likely to have a recessionary effect on investment, 
consumption, income, and adverse effects on public finances. As a result, sovereign credit 
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default risk will increase (see also Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2012). We are now in a position 
to formulate the first part of the Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1.1. A positive change in banks’ credit default swap spread is followed by a 
positive change in sovereign credit default spread, irrespective of the sovereign credit default 
market regime. 
The hypothesis is also supported by the existence of implicit government guarantees to the 
banking sector. Also, we formulate a second part of this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1.2.  In a more volatile credit default swap market regime, changes in the credit 
risk of banks have a stronger effect on the sovereign credit risk than in a less volatile regime. 
Following a systemic banking crisis, uncertainty about future economic prospects 
grows rapidly, driving lower the sovereign creditworthiness (i.e. SCDS spread increases 
reflecting higher credit risk), and thus, the CDS market enters a more volatile regime. To 
alleviate perceptions of systemic risk in the banking sector, the government intervenes by 
acquiring partly or fully the nearly-collapsed banks and re-capitalizes them. As the 
government effectively increases its share of non-performing assets, public finances 
deteriorate and consequently the bank’s credit risk is transferred to the public sector. 
(Attinasi, Checherita-Westphal, and Nickel 2009). In a higher volatility regime, markets 
penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly than in a less volatile regime, notably before the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers (Von Hagen, Schuknechet, and Wolswijk 2011). Unlike Alter 
and Schüler (2012) who research into individual countries’ experiences, we maintain that the 
private-to-public transfer of credit risk is also characteristic at the level of the euro area. We 
expect that a positive change in both the level and the volatility of BCDS spread will be 
followed by a positive change in the level of SCDS spread. 
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4.2.2 The Balance-Sheet Hypothesis 
Following Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2013), the weakening of public finances 
increases the probability of default on sovereign debt. As the probability of default increases, 
investors will require higher risk premium on investment in sovereign bonds. Higher risk 
premium depresses the sovereign bond market and impairs balance sheets of bond holders, 
mainly banks. 
Hypothesis 2.1. A positive change in SCDS spread is followed by a positive change in BCDS 
spread. 
In the extant literature, most researchers identify that government interventions 
mitigate the consequences of a systemic banking crisis, since credit risk is transferred to the 
public sector (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Dieckman and Plank 2012). Therefore, following this 
argument, BCDS spread should decrease. Notwithstanding, this argument has received only a 
weak empirical support. Indeed, after large-scale rescue packages were provided by euro area 
governments to their national banking sectors in October 2008, BCDS spread temporarily 
decreased, only to recuperate to its previous level soon thereafter. However, the mechanism 
used to transfer risk from the banking sector to the sovereign issuers was constrained by the 
credibility of government contingent liabilities to the banking sector (Alter and Schüler 
2012). Hence, we can now formulate the second part of this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.2. The response of BCDS spread to changes in SCDS spread is greater in a 
more volatile CDS market regime as opposed to a less volatile regime. 
12
 
In accordance with Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Athanasoglu, Daniilidis, and 
Delis (2014), who underscore the pro-cyclicality of sovereign debt rating and of the banking 
sector, respectively, an increase in the credit risk on sovereign debt will lead to a greater 
increase in the banking sector’s credit risk through a reduction in the value of banks’ assets 
                                                          
12
 Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2013) assert that a shock to the sovereign’s credit risk should impact the 
financial sector’s credit risk through three channels: (a) on-going bailout payments and subsidies, (b) direct 
holdings of sovereign debt and (c) explicit and implicit government guarantees. 
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and bank retrenchment in a more volatile CDS market regime. Historically, episodes of 
sovereign defaults that occurred in emerging market economies, notably in Ecuador and 
Russia, led to large losses in their national banking sectors (IMF 2002). In developed 
economies, stronger financial institutions amplify the adverse effects of sovereign defaults on 
financial intermediation by allowing domestic banks to boost leverage (Gennaioli, Martin, 
and Rossi 2014 and Sandleris 2014). 
 
4.2.3 The Expected Volatility Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3.1.  Positive changes in the CDS spreads are followed by positive changes in the 
VSTOXX volatility index. 
Unobservable firm’s asset volatility can be approximated reasonably well by the 
VSTOXX volatility index. An increase in the BCDS spreads generates greater uncertainty to 
firms and may delay investment decisions. Stock market investors may decide to rebalance 
their portfolios of assets, and thus increasing exposure to stocks that are less dependent on 
bank lending Additionally, the downgrading of sovereign bonds – that contributes to higher 
SCDS spread – can raise the cost of borrowing for governments. As a result, governments 
may offset the adverse budget effect of higher cost of borrowing through levying taxes on 
firms. The ensuing reduction in firms’ future stream of profits is conducive to financial 
instability (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002). Furthermore, an unfavourable change in 
sovereign rating that reflects an increase in the sovereign credit risk (Afonso, Furceri, and 
Gomes 2012) can aggravate financial instability (Afonso, Gomes, and Taamouti 2014). 
Hypothesis 3.2. The response of firm value volatility is greater in a more volatile credit 
default swap market regime as opposed to a less volatile regime. 
Elevated volatility impairs informational contents of the credit default swap market 
and further raises uncertainty to firms and thus to stock market investors. Consequently, 
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investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in stocks of companies that are 
heavily exposed to bank lending. Alternatively, the uncertainty surrounding future credit 
rating of sovereign bonds may exasperate expected firm value volatility. This hypothesis is 
supported by Calice and Ioannidis (2012) who document that the volatility of a bank’s equity 
value is substantially higher when the CDS market is in a volatile regime. 
 
4.2.4 The Risk Premium Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 4.1. Positive changes in the CDS spreads are followed by negative changes in the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. 
An increase in both BCDS and SCDS spreads signals economic hardship 
(Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012). When the BCDS spread increases, banks’ bonds lose 
value and their yields increase to reflect higher cost of capital. As a result, future expected 
bank cash flows are discounted with a higher discount rate, while simultaneously the stock 
price decreases, as investors demand higher risk premium to compensate for the increased 
riskiness of the bank. Higher cost of capital is then transmitted to non-financial companies 
that rely on bank lending to finance their investment projects. With higher cost of capital, 
some investment projects become unprofitable and thus are discarded by the company. This 
places a constraint on the company’s growth prospects, justifying a stock price decrease. 
Overall, an increase in the BCDS spread is followed by a decrease in the EUROSTOXX 
stock index. Similar to Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) – who 
underline the importance of credit risk in the pricing of equities – Hypothesis 4.1 assumes 
that investors become increasingly concerned about the fiscal implications of the global 
financial crisis driving SCDS spread higher. Consistent with this hypothesis, Calice and 
Ioannidis (2012) find that bank returns of large complex financial institutions respond 
negatively to a positive shock to CDS spreads. 
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Hypothesis 4.2. When the CDS market enters a more volatile regime, the magnitude of the 
response of the EUROSTOXX stock index is greater than in a less volatile regime. 
In accordance with Hypothesis 4.2, Norden and Weber (2004) find that (i) the CDS 
market is more sensitive to the stock market than bond market and (ii) the magnitude of this 
sensitivity is negatively related to a firm’s average credit quality. Furthermore, downgrades 
of sovereign bonds can also manifest in stronger cross-security contagion effects on stock 
market returns during financial crises (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002) and on bank stock 
returns for those banks that investors expect to receive stronger government support (Correa 
et al. 2014). 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 The Model 
We employ a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model 
to study the regime-varying relation between BCDS and SCDS spreads. The MSBVAR 
model can be specified as 
                                                ,   (1) 
where    is an N-dimensional vector of dependent variables,     is an N-dimensional vector 
of constants in regime          ,    is a K-dimensional vector of exogenous variables,       
and     are (N x N) and (K x N) matrices of coefficients in regime   , respectively, and    is 
an N-dimensional vector of normally distributed structural disturbances uncorrelated at all 
leads and lags, where          . The variance of each structural disturbance is normalized 
to unity. We assume that all parameters may switch among   regimes. The reduced-form 
disturbances are the structural disturbances pre-multiplied by a regime-dependent matrix    . 
Consequently, the variance and covariance matrix of       is also regime-dependent, as 
indicated in the following equation: 
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       (     )                          (2) 
The regime    is assumed to follow a hidden S-state Markov-chain. The probability of being 
in regime   conditional on the current regime   is assumed constant. The conditional 
probabilities that span the   regimes are given by the following probability transition matrix 
 : 
  (
       
   
       
),         (3) 
Where                    and ∑    
 
      for all         . 
For        , denote    {       }. More compactly, Equation (1) can be written as 
                                   (4) 
Where          refers to the normal probability distribution function with mean    and 
covariance matrix    in regime  . The overall log-likelihood function               can be 
obtained by 
                ∑                   
 
   ,       (5) 
where 
                ∑                    
 
                          (6) 
where is                      is the probability density function of    conditional to 
regime  , and  
                    ∑                                    
 
        
.  (7) 
Details on the Bayesian updating procedure are available in Appendix F.  
 
4.3.2 The Estimation Method 
The optimization of Equation (5) may be performed by means of a suitable extension 
of an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 22) 
and Krolzig (1997) or by means of a Bayesian estimation algorithm (see also Waggoner and 
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Zha 2003, Sims and Zha 2004, Sims and Zha 2006, Sims, Waggoner and Zha 2008, inter 
alia). In this research, we use a Bayesian inference based on a Gibbs sampler that belongs to 
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) family of algorithms. The Gibbs sampler is a 
recursive Monte Carlo simulation method that requires only knowledge of the full conditional 
posterior density of the parameters of interest. An advantage of a Bayesian estimator is that it 
takes into account the whole distribution available from Bayesian sampling, whereas an EM 
algorithm can only return a single point from the distribution. Thus, the Gibbs sampler can be 
viewed as a stochastic version of the EM algorithm. A detailed description of the Gibbs 
sampler is available in the Appendix F.  
Bayesian econometrics (i.e. inference) allows informative priors so that prior 
knowledge and results can be used to inform the current model. With Bayesian inference, we 
avoid problems with model identification by manipulating prior distributions. Thus, it is the 
most suitable technique to employ for statistical regions of flat density. Moreover, an 
important assumption in Bayesian inference is that the data is fixed, and parameters are 
random. Therefore, with Bayesian econometrics we do not depart from reality. An additional 
advantage with the use of Bayesian econometrics is that it estimates the full probability 
model and contains a decision theoretic foundation, allowing our research to reach a sound 
solution.  
Emphatically, Bayesian inference includes uncertainty in the probability model, 
yielding more realistic suggestions. This approach also obeys the likelihood principle, whilst 
MLE, GMM, and GEE violates the likelihood principle. Also, Bayesian inference uses prior 
distributions, and hence more information is used and 95% probability intervals of posterior 
distributions. Additionally, this approach via MCMC algorithm allows building and 
estimating more complicated models. According to Kapetanios et al. (2012) “The Bayesian 
approach is found to work appropriately when dealing with complex datasets… It delivers the 
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answer to the right question in the sense that Bayesian inference provides answers conditional 
on the observed data and not based on the distribution of estimators or test statistics over 
imaginary samples not observed”. 
 
4.3.3 The Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
The Choleski decomposition is typically used in the literature to orthogonalize the 
reduced-form variance and covariance matrix    given in Equation (2).
13
 Because this 
approach is not invariant to the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VAR, Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) propose an alternative approach that does not have this shortcoming, based 
on the so-called generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
show that for a non-diagonal variance and covariance matrix, the orthogonalized and the 
generalized impulse responses coincide only in the case of the impulse responses of the 
random disturbances to the first equation of the VAR. Against this background, we use the 
generalized impulse response analysis. 
The contemporaneous and lagged response of the endogenous variable can be 
measured by means of the regime-dependent GIRFs. In practice, vectors of the regime-
dependent impulse-responses can be derived by combining the parameter estimates of the 
unrestricted MSBVAR with the estimate of the regime-dependent variance and covariance 
matrix   . Let’s first assume that in period 0, a shock hits the     endogenous variable. Then, 
the contemporaneous response vector measures the impact effect of the     random 
disturbance on the endogenous variables in period 0. A one standard deviation shock to the 
    endogenous variable can be denoted as a vector of zeros except for the nth element, 
which is unity, i.e.,                   . Pre-multiplying this vector by the estimate of the 
                                                          
13
 The Choleski decomposition provides an indirect estimate of the lower triangular matrix   . Underlying the 
triangular factorization is the identification scheme proposed by Sims (1980), who suggests obtaining a unique 
triangular factorization of the residuals of a reduced-form VAR model by imposing a specific ordering of the 
endogenous variables of the VAR model. 
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regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix  ̂  yields the contemporaneous response 
vector. A one-step-ahead response vector can be obtained by solving forward for the 
endogenous variables in Equation (1). It measures the impact effect of the     random 
disturbance (that occurred in period 0) on the endogenous variables in period 1. Analytically, 
the contemporaneous and  -step-ahead response vectors are given in Equations (8) and (9), 
respectively:   
 ̂           
   ⁄  ̂                         (8) 
 ̂           
   ⁄ ∑    
      ̂   
   {   }
   ,                       (9) 
It should be noted that Equations (8) and (9) depict net GIRFs, i.e., they assume that 
there are no further random disturbances in subsequent periods. However, because the BCDS 
and the SCDS spreads, the VSTOXX volatility index and the EUROSTOXX stock market 
index feature a slowly moving component and thus follow a high memory process, which is 
likely to be non-stationary, we transform the endogenous variables in first differences. To 
measure the responses of the endogenous variables in levels, accumulated GIRFs are utilized, 
which can be obtained by adding up net GIRFs. It is evident that the contemporaneous 
accumulated response vector can be still measured by Equation (8). The  -step-ahead 
accumulated response vector is given by Equation (10): 
 ̃      ∑  ̂     
 
   ,                                              (10) 
The long-run response accumulated response is obtain as  ̃           ̃      . Then, the 
long-run differential effect of     random disturbance on    endogenous variable in regime  
    relative to regime   is given by 
  ̃     
   ̃     
   ̃   
         ̃       
         ̃     
                                                (11) 
Equation (11) allows testing if the long-run impulse response of     endogenous 
variable to     random disturbance is significantly different across regimes   through  . An 
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advantage of focusing on the long-run GIRF is that its standard error becomes irrelevant, and 
statistical inference relies merely upon the value of the GIRF, rather than on an the ratio of its 
value to the standard error, which driven by an arbitrarily chosen number of periods after the 
shock. Building upon the hypotheses outlined in Section 2, the magnitude of the impulse-
response is greater in a more volatile regime.
14
 Therefore, we have: 
      ̃     
    against       ̃     
                    (12) 
 
4.4 Data 
In the empirical analysis, we use daily data on banks’ (iTraxx Senior Financials) and 
sovereign (iTraxx Sovereign Western Europe) CDS spreads, EUROSTOXX stock market 
index and VSTOXX volatility index, and the fixed-for-floating euro interest rate swaps for 
maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. The data are retrieved from Thomson Datastream. The 
sample period spans 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013, containing a total of 2154 daily observations. 
Most iTraxx CDS indices are traded for maturities of 3, 5, 7 and 10 years, with the 5 year 
maturity being the most liquid, and thus employed in this research. The iTraxx CDS indices 
are spread based indices and are quoted in the market in spread terms. The spread equates to 
an upfront price given the fixed deal spread (coupon) for the swaps. This price is essentially 
the upfront value of entering into a CDS index contract. In addition to the BCDS and SCDS 
spreads, we also use the EUROSTOXX stock market index and the VSTOXX volatility 
index. Credit spreads (Fama and French 1989), default probabilities and recovery rates 
(Altman et al. 2005, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec 2006, Pesaran et al. 2006), and 
investors’ risk aversion (Annaert et al. 2013) tends to vary over the business cycle. Therefore, 
the business cycle should affect credit spreads through two channels: (i) the business-cycle 
                                                          
14
 It should be nevertheless noted that MCMC standard errors, estimated by means of the Gibbs sampler, make it 
possible to test the null hypothesis in Equation (12) at the 95% confidence level by graphically inspecting the 
position of the GIRF and the 2-standard error confidence bands. The estimated GIRF are presented and analysed 
in Section 4.3. 
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vulnerability of default risk and (ii) time-varying investors’ risk aversion that is incorporated 
in the risk premium of investment (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001). We follow 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Annaert et al. (2013) by including a 
market wide stock index return as a control variable for the business climate. The 
EUROSTOXX stock index is a broad index that represents large, mid and small capitalisation 
companies of 12 euro zone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
The VSTOXX volatility index is based on EUROSTOXX real-time option prices and 
is designed to reflect the market expectations from near-term up to long-term volatility. It is 
thought to represent market uncertainty of the economic prospects (Annaert et al. 2013) and 
time-varying investors’ risk aversion (Pan and Singleton 2008). Alternatively, it may also 
represent market strains that limit capital mobility across different market segments and thus 
sustain temporarily high risk premia (Annaert et el. 2013). Following Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008) and Annaert et al. (2013), we use the VSTOXX volatility index to measure market-
wide volatility expectations. 
Finally, fixed-for-floating euro interest rate swaps capture the risk free interest rate 
and expectations of the future risk free interest rate. Higher risk free interest rate will 
incentivize investors to invest in risk free assets, thereby decreasing the share of risky assets 
in their portfolio and decreasing the credit risk. In the risk neutral world, the risk free interest 
rate constitutes the drift (Merton 1974). Hence, an increase in the risk free interest rate drives 
up the risk neutral drift and decreases the probability of default. Following Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008), we calculate the first and second principal components on the fixed-for-
floating euro interest rate swaps for maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. The first principal 
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component captures the level of the risk-free interest rate, whereas the second component 
(“slope”) represents expectations of future movements in the risk free interest rate.15    
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 4.1 summarises descriptive statistics of the variables in 
levels (in first differences). Over the sample period, the mean of the BCDS spread (106.87 
basis points) was greater than the mean of the SCDS spread (91.79 basis points) reflecting a 
greater credit default risk of the European banking sector. BCDS also was more volatile than 
SCDS, as witnessed by the range of variation of the data (the difference between the 
minimum and maximum values) and by the standard deviation. BCDS deviates from the 
mean on average by 81.99 basis points, whereas SCDS deviates by only 49.58 basis points. 
The two measures of credit default risk are also positively skewed and leptokurtic. The 
resulting distributions are non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic. The change in the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive mean, suggesting that 
expectations of stock market volatility were increasing over the sample period. It underwent 
significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicated by the range of variation in the 
standard deviation. The latter indicates that the change in the VSTOXX volatility index 
deviated from the mean on average by 1.93 index points. The change in the volatility index is 
also positively skewed and highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values. 
Daily percentage stock returns were negative during the sample period (-0.0032% in daily 
percentage). Stock returns were highly volatile, as suggested by the range of variation and the 
standard deviation. The latter shows that stock returns deviated from the mean on average by 
1.42%. Consistent with empirical evidence on skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively 
skewed and leptokurtic, suggesting that big negative events in the European stock market are 
                                                          
15
 Moreover, the slope of the term structure conveys valuable information about the business cycle stance 
(Estrella and Mishkin 1997). Specifically, a high slope anticipates an increase in future economic activity (Fama 
1984, Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991). It should also be noted that the use of the level and slope interest-rate 
swaps is consistent with the literature advocating that co-movement between banks’ and sovereign issuers’ CDS 
premia may be driven by a common set of unobserved factors, probably reflecting changing macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Acharya, Dreschsler, and Schnabl 2013). 
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more likely than big positive events and that the density of returns is greater the closer returns 
are to the sample median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal. The 
fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps have positive means ranging from 2.25% (1-year 
maturity) to 3.76% (20-year maturity). Thus, longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to have 
a higher rate than shorter maturity interest rate swaps. The converse is true for the range of 
variation and the standard deviation. Longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to be less 
volatile. Shorter maturity (up to 4 years) swaps are positively skewed, whereas longer 
maturity swaps are negatively skewed. Interest rate swaps are leptokurtic and non-normally 
distributed for all maturities. 
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TABLE 4.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel A. Variables in levels 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 106.8703 101.3290 353.0000 7.0000 81.9862 0.5518 2.5016 131.5949 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 91.7861 97.0300 215.9170 20.0940 49.5823 0.2272 2.0670 96.6516 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 24.7843 22.575 87.51 11.720 10.176 1.7307 7.2344 2684.62 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 296.161 276.90 442.9 169.39 64.489 0.5963 2.3358 167.2398 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 2.2545 1.7735 5.4790 0.1280 1.5541 0.4263 1.7779 199.2768 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 2.4926 2.1700 5.5130 0.3090 1.3919 0.2957 1.8584 148.3588 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 2.6351 2.4090 5.4450 0.4020 1.3142 0.1369 1.9218 111.0691 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 2.7796 2.6290 5.3610 0.5530 1.2373 0.0020 2.0013 89.5122 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 2.9166 2.8300 5.2810 0.7230 1.1627 -0.1050 2.0812 79.7167 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 3.0423 3.0125 5.2130 0.8880 1.0966 -0.1918 2.1502 78.0304 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 3.1545 3.1665 5.1650 1.0480 1.0415 -0.2608 2.2033 81.3919 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 3.2530 3.2945 5.1390 1.2000 0.9969 -0.3118 2.2377 87.0514 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 3.3397 3.3960 5.1260 1.3420 0.9612 -0.3492 2.2579 93.1922 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 3.4173 3.4875 5.1210 1.4670 0.9316 -0.3786 2.2721 99.0034 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 3.5496 3.6460 5.1330 1.6790 0.8850 -0.4275 2.2968 109.9771 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 3.6832 3.8150 5.1410 1.8310 0.8443 -0.4794 2.3053 125.8313 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 3.7614 3.9125 5.1150 1.8430 0.8284 -0.5225 2.2783 144.7544 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 3.7473 3.8925 5.0850 1.8130 0.8265 -0.4750 2.1892 139.9947 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 3.7082 3.8485 5.0690 1.7760 0.8281 -0.4024 2.0810 133.9404 0.0000 
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Panel B. Variables in first differences 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 0.0752 0.0000 52.4410 -63.1400 6.0316 -0.3859 17.0517 17775.6 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 0.0403 0.0000 22.8400 -39.4700 3.9713 -0.3527 12.8779 8801.83 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 0.0049 -0.0650 22.6400 -13.9800 1.9308 1.7316 27.5295 55078.9 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 -0.0032 0.0210 9.9621 -8.2498 1.4179 -0.0517 8.8382 3060.06 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2860 -0.2150 0.0333 0.0892 13.5738 10037.4 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.3280 -0.2820 0.0415 0.1286 8.8275 3053.84 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2910 -0.2950 0.0441 0.0841 7.2539 1626.62 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2290 -0.2640 0.0438 0.0602 5.9112 761.943 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2450 -0.2350 0.0437 0.0506 5.1904 431.506 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2770 -0.2040 0.0431 0.0726 5.1932 433.600 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3090 -0.1750 0.0428 0.1043 5.6372 628.111 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3330 -0.1880 0.0428 0.1184 6.2777 969.232 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3570 -0.2120 0.0430 0.1367 7.0433 1473.95 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3790 -0.2350 0.0434 0.1450 7.8730 2138.80 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.4390 -0.2970 0.0443 0.2401 10.5165 5091.32 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5060 -0.3560 0.0460 0.3823 14.4166 11750.3 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5610 -0.3620 0.0485 0.5185 17.2527 18328.2 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5960 -0.3440 0.0502 0.5622 18.7527 22384.7 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.6320 -0.3460 0.0522 0.5681 20.2324 26767.5 0.0000 
Note: This table summarizes descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic, and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of the European banks’ credit default swap spread (BCDS, measured in basis points), the European 
sovereign credit default swap spread (SCDS, measured in basis points), the VSTOXX volatility index (VSTOXX, measured in index points), the EUROSTOXX stock index 
(STOXX, measured in percentage points), and the fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps (“you pay me a floating 3-month LIBOR interest rate, I pay you a fixed interest rate”) 
for maturities from 1 to 30 years (IRS_M, where “_M” denotes maturity, measured in annualized percentage points). The interest rate swaps are used to compute the first 
(“level”) and the second (“slope”) principal components. Panel A summarizes descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables measured in levels. Panel B summarizes 
descriptive statistics of the variables in first differences (STOXX is measured in percentage change). The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 
2154 daily observations. 
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Table 4.2 in Appendix D summarizes results for the unit root tests. We used four 
different unit root tests – the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) 
test – to test for a unit root in the data.16In particular, Table 4.2 provides overwhelming 
evidence that the EUROSTOXX stock index, SCDS spread and interest rate swaps for 
maturities higher than 2 years have a unit root. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
for the BCDS spread and SLOPE if the ZA test is used. Further, the VSTOXX volatility 
index is identified as difference-stationary only if the KPSS test is used. In general, result of 
the unit root tests support the use of variables in first differences in the MSBVAR models. 
Because interest rate swaps for most maturities have a unit root, we run a principal 
component analysis on the series in first differences. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the coefficients of pairwise correlations between among the 
endogenous and exogenous variables in first differences. With regard to the endogenous 
variables, elevated positive correlations among the BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the 
VSTOXX volatility index obtain. The EUROSTOXX volatility index is negatively correlated 
with the other endogenous variables. With regard to the correlations between endogenous and 
exogenous variables, the BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index 
(EUROSTOXX stock index) show a moderate negative (positive) association with interest 
rate swaps of different maturities. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 The choice of the tests is based on the fact that (i) the ADF and PP tests are classical parametric and semi-
parametric unit root tests, respectively; (ii) the ADF, PP and ZA tests hypothesize a unit root as a null 
hypothesis, whereas the KPSS test hypothesizes no unit root as a null hypothesis and hence aims at 
complementing the classical unit root tests; and (iii) unlike the other three tests, the ZA tests allows for the 
possibility of a break in the series that may contaminate the power of the classical unit root tests. 
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TABLE 4.3 
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION 
Variables BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS 1.0000 0.8227 0.4730 -0.5944 
SCDS 0.8227 1.0000 0.5860 -0.6898 
VSTOXX 0.4730 0.5860 1.0000 -0.7978 
STOXX -0.5944 -0.6898 -0.7978 1.0000 
IRS_1 -0.1263 -0.1623 -0.1660 0.1382 
IRS_2 -0.1987 -0.2444 -0.2059 0.2114 
IRS_3 -0.2242 -0.2671 -0.2234 0.2370 
IRS_4 -0.2395 -0.2741 -0.2251 0.2460 
IRS_5 -0.2510 -0.2789 -0.2255 0.2517 
IRS_6 -0.2602 -0.2799 -0.2255 0.2530 
IRS_7 -0.2698 -0.2808 -0.2255 0.2529 
IRS_8 -0.2755 -0.2791 -0.2241 0.2511 
IRS_9 -0.2787 -0.2765 -0.2223 0.2482 
IRS_10 -0.2806 -0.2740 -0.2201 0.2449 
IRS_12 -0.2820 -0.2710 -0.2171 0.2373 
IRS_15 -0.2805 -0.2666 -0.2159 0.2286 
IRS_20 -0.2724 -0.2576 -0.2145 0.2190 
IRS_25 -0.2687 -0.2539 -0.2113 0.2133 
IRS_30 -0.2651 -0.2502 -0.2083 0.2088 
Note: This table summarizes the Pearson coefficients among the dependent and exogenous variables. All 
variables are in first difference (EUROSTOXX stock market index is in percentage change). The sample period 
is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. 
 
4.5 Empirical Findings 
4.5.1 Markov Regimes 
Key to the MSBVAR model is the identification of switching regimes, governed by a 
stochastic, unobserved regime variable   . The regimes are associated with different 
conditional distributions of the BCDS and the SCDS spreads, the change in the VSTOXX 
volatility index and returns on the EUROSTOXX stock market index driven by   . The 
regime-dependent parameter matrix    is estimated using the Gibbs sampler, and the 
probability of each regime (and thus the length of each regime) is endogenously determined. 
However, the number of regimes   is based on the notion that the dynamic relation between 
the BCDS and SCDS spreads may be (i) different before and after the subprime-mortgage 
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crisis period (i.e., July 2007), and (ii) different in periods clustered around the various credit 
events after the subprime mortgage crisis – such as the contagious effects of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers – and in periods where those contagious effects deteriorated. Therefore, a 
parsimonious model that assumes two regimes may fail to distinguish between periods 
wherein bond investments were highly risky, characterized by uncertainty and volatility, and 
periods wherein the riskiness of bond investments were perceived as less critical
17
. Thus, 
assuming two regimes only, it is possible to omit a portion of relevant information from our 
empirical analysis and hence the model will become overly restrictive.  
Moreover, a model with 2 regimes is likely to lead to misspecification issues when the 
true number of regimes is in fact higher. Furthermore, our choice for the number of Markov 
regimes is further supported by Chib’s (1995) method and the method of bridge sampling, 
proposed by Meng and Wong (1996) and extended by Frühwirth-Schnatter (2004). We 
employ 5000 MCMC draws from a posterior density to compute the marginal log-likelihood 
values that used to select among various models differing in the number of regimes of the 
hidden latent variable. Results of Chib’s (1995) and Meng and Wong (1996) methods for four 
Markov regimes for the four dependent variables are summarized in Table 4.4. From this 
table, we observe that the marginal log-likelihood values increase substantially from one to 
three regimes but then decrease in regime four for all dependent variables. Both Chib’s and 
the bridge-sampling methods suggest that a model with three Markov regimes fits the data 
best.
18
  
 
                                                          
17
 The choice of the number of regimes has been fiercely debated in the literature. A standard approach is to use 
2 regimes (e.g., high and low volatility regimes in financial markets), based on economic rather than on 
statistical principle. However, it is not uncommon to rely upon a more complex three-regime MSBVAR. An 
example is Artis, Krolzig, and Toro (2004) who identify three regimes (recessions, moderate-growth periods and 
high-growth periods) in the post-war US business cycle. 
18
 While our main analysis is based on a MSBVAR that assumes the presence of three regimes, we also estimate 
a MSBVAR with two regimes.The results of the 2-regime MSBVAR model are not presented but are briefly 
discussed in Section 4.5.  
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TABLE 4.4 
MARGINAL LOG-LIKELIHOOD 
Variables 
Regimes 
(cols), 
Methods 
(rows) 
1 2 3 4 
BCDS BS -959.37 -928.41 -904.80 -912.55 
Chib -959.11 -927.98 -903.51 -910.02 
SCDS BS -984.70 -971.56 -953.39 -959.67 
Chib -984.52 -971.07 -952.44 -957.29 
STOXX BS -989.32 -981.24 -972.99 -975.92 
Chib -989.10 -980.65 -972.13 -973.21 
VSTOXX BS -884.09 -879.53 -862.44 -866.63 
Chib -883.86 -878.97 -861.80 -864.07 
Note: This table summarizes the marginal log-likelihood values for bridge sampling (Meng and Wong 1996) 
and Chib’s (1995) methods that are used to select among various models differing in the number of Markov 
regimes. The number of regimes is given in columns. The highest marginal log-likelihood value that is 
highlighted in bold. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily 
observations. 
 
We use a MSBVAR model of order 1 to estimate the relation between the BCDS and 
SCDS spreads, returns on the EUROSTOXX stock index and the change in the VSTOXX 
volatility index. The vector of exogenous variables comprises the first (“level”) and second 
(“slope”) principal components on the fixed-for-floating Euro interest rate swaps for different 
maturities (from 1 year to 30 years). All parameters are allowed to change across the regimes. 
The variance and covariance matrix is also regime-dependent. The smooth-estimated regime 
probabilities are depicted in Panels A – C of Figure 4.2.  
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Panel A 
 
 Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
Figure 4.2. Regimes in the Credit Default Swap Market 
 
Note: Figure 4.2 identifies the Markov regimes (states), estimated using the MSBVAR model. Panel A depicts 
the low volatility regime. Panel B depicts the intermediate volatility regime. Panel C depicts the high volatility 
regime. Figure 4.2 also shows the developments in the CDS and stock markets during the three regimes. Regime 
probabilities are given by the smoothed estimates (in solid red line). A regime is defined as a region (or 
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polygon) with the highest smoothed probability, i.e.,     
                         (grey polygon). 
Regime 1 prevailed from the beginning of the sample (March 2005) till July 2007. In July 2007, the CDS 
market switched from regime 1 to regime 2. Regime 2 dominated the remainder of the sample and was only 
occasionally interrupted by regime 3, when the BCDS and SCDS spreads showed an accelerated increase and 
decrease with a turning point in the middle.  
 
A regime is defined as a region (or polygon) with the highest smoothed probability, i.e. 
    
                                          (13) 
The estimation results reported in Figure 2 suggest that regime 1 prevailed from the 
beginning of the sample (March 2005) till July 2007 that marked the beginning of the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis. Since the BCDS and SCDS spreads featured a slowly moving 
component with a negative tendency, regime 1 can be viewed as a low volatility regime. In 
July 2007, the CDS market switched from regime 1 to regime 2. This regime can be viewed 
as a collection of sub-periods where the BCDS and SCDS spreads were more volatile than in 
regime 1, but less abrupt than in regime 3. Regime 2 dominated the rest of the sample period 
that started in July 2007 and was only occasionally interrupted by regime 3, when the BCDS 
and SCDS spreads showed an accelerated increase and decrease with a turning point in the 
middle of regime. Thus, regimes 2 and 3 can be denoted as intermediate volatility and high 
volatility regimes, respectively. 
 
4.5.2 Gibbs Sampler Diagnostics 
We also undertake a diagnostic analysis that involves necessary checks if the 
generated posterior sample is drawn from a stationary distribution. Specifically, we evaluate 
the convergence of the MCMC simulation by means of the convergence diagnostic (CD) test 
statistic, proposed by Geweke (1992). This test statistic measures the equality of the means of 
the first and last part of a Markov chain. Consider the mean of   ̅    ⁄ ∑   
 
    of sequence 
of         draws of a certain parameter   , where   denotes the size of the posterior 
sample. Following Koop (2003, Chapter 4), we divide the sequence   into three pieces,  
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          (first piece),             (second piece) and            (third piece), 
and we discard the second piece. 
19
 
If the samples are drawn from a stationary distribution, then the means calculated 
from the first ( ̅ ) and third ( ̅ ) segments should not be statistically different, and the 
corresponding test statistic has an asymptotically standard normal distribution: 
   
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
 
       ,                    (14) 
where     
  and     
  are the numerical standard errors squared.
20
 We calculate the test 
statistic for all the parameters of the model. Our samples have passed the convergence (at the 
5% significance level) for nearly all parameters.
21
 Results of the CD test are summarized in 
Table 4.5 in Appendix D. 
 
4.5.3 Endogenous Variables 
The main findings are summarized by means of the GIRF (Pesaran and Shin 1998). 
The GIRFs for the four shocks are depicted in Panels A – D of Figure 4.3 in Appendix D. 
Panel A (B, C, D) presents the response of the four endogenous variables to a shock to the 
BCDS spread (SCDS spread, return on the EUROSTOXX stock index, change in the 
VSTOXX volatility index) in the three regimes. The GIRFs are analyzed in terms of the long-
run differential pairwise effects across the three regime, outlined in Section 4.3.3. Panel A 
suggests that an unexpected change in the BCDS spread has a positive effect on the BCDS 
                                                          
19
 According to Koop (2003, Chapter 4), the size of the first and third pieces is constrained by     ⁄      and 
           , respectively. 
20
 The Gibbs sampler can be used to estimate the mean of a generic function      . Geweke’s method builds 
upon the assumption that the nature of the MCMC process and the function       imply the existence of a 
spectral density       for   draws of the function   with no discontinuities at frequency 0 (Cowles and Carlin 
1996). Then, for the estimator of  [     ],  ̅ , the asymptotic variance is       ⁄ , referred by Geweke to as 
the numerical standard error squared,     . 
21
 The mean absolute value of the CD statistic is 0.8354 (at 5% significance level, the critical value is ±1.96), 
and there are only 6 parameters (out if 123) that do not pass the convergence test. 
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and the SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. On the other hand, it exerts a 
negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. 
These results indicate that a rise in BCDS spread signals increasing credit risk in the 
banking sector. As euro area governments extend guarantees to their national banking sectors, 
a positive effect on the SCDS spread is expected. Indeed, as the credit risk in the euro area 
banking sector increases, government liability increases. In line with our expectations, the 
impulse response is clearly positive and significant, and it significantly varies across the 
regimes. In the low volatility regime the response is smallest in magnitude, whereas in the 
high-volatility regime the response has the largest magnitude. Consistent with Alter and 
Schüler (2012, Hypothesis 2(a)), after government interventions, changes in the banking 
sector’s credit risk affect the sovereign credit risk more strongly than before, as governments 
take over liabilities of the banking sector. Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolff (2010) argue that 
sovereign credit risk may be affected by the banking sector by two channels. The first 
channel refers to the probability that the government can recapitalize banks with public 
money if they run into financial difficulties. The second channel, identified by Adrian and 
Shin (2009), underscores the importance of financial intermediaries’ balance sheet 
adjustments for aggregate liquidity and financial stability for the government’s fiscal 
position, public revenue and spending.  
Second, a change in BCDS spread also causes a positive and permanent effect on the 
level of the BCDS spread. Although the autoregressive component in the equation for BCDS 
spread is not justified on theoretical grounds, it captures the share of variation in the change 
of BCDS spread that is not explained by the other predetermined and exogenous variables in 
the VAR.
22
 Third, the impulse response of the VSTOXX volatility index is positive, and it 
                                                          
22
 The autoregressive component is empirically motivated by Byström (2005, 2006), who finds that iTraxx 
Europe indices feature a significant autocorrelation in their spread. 
 117 
 
increases with positive changes in the banking sector’s credit risk.23 This allows us to 
consider the VSTOXX volatility index as a proxy to capture spikes in volatility. Similar to 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), our results imply that unobservable firm’s asset volatility can 
be approximated well by the VSTOXX volatility index. Indeed, an increase in BCDS spread 
generates greater uncertainty and volatility spikes to the stock market and may delay 
investment decisions. As a result, stock market investors may decide to rebalance their 
portfolios of assets by increasing exposure to stocks of non-financial companies that are less 
affected by increasing banks’ credit risk. 
Fourth, the impulse response of the EUROSTOXX stock index is negative and 
significant. Indeed, as an increase in BCDS spread generates greater uncertainty to firms, the 
risk premium required by stock market investors increases. Thus, investors require lower 
valuations in order to invest in portfolio of stocks. Therefore, the impulse response of the 
EUROSTOXX stock index has the expected negative sign. The impulse response also has a 
regime-dependent pattern, wherein the response in the high volatility regime is greater than 
the response in the low and intermediate volatility regimes. This also suggests that when 
credit risk amplifies and uncertainty increases, stock market investors become increasingly 
more vulnerable to news about the banking sector’s credit standards. 
To sum up, Panel A of Figure 4.3 in Appendix D is supportive of Hypotheses 1, 3 and 
4. An unanticipated change in BCDS spread has a direct effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads 
and the VSTOXX volatility index, and it has an inverse effect on the EUROSTOXX stock 
index. Crucially, an unanticipated change in BCDS spread has always a stronger effect in a 
more volatile regime than in a less volatile regime. 
Panel B of Figure 4.3 suggests that an unanticipated change in the SCDS spread has a 
positive effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. It exerts a 
                                                          
23
 The impulse response is significant in the intermediate and high volatility regimes. The VSTOXX volatility 
index is based on the current value of stock options. It can be thought of as a forward-looking measure of stock 
market volatility and measures uncertainty of stock market investments. 
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negative influence on the EUROSTOXX stock index. An increase in SCDS spread signals 
greater perceived risk of sovereign bonds. The impulse response of BCDS spread is positive, 
significant and regime dependent. The effect of a change in SCDS spread is relatively smaller 
in the low volatility regime, but its magnitude grows in the intermediate volatility regime. 
Finally, the magnitude of the effect amplifies in the high volatility regime, which mainly 
clusters in the period spanning from October 2008 – March 2009. Specifically, the period 
around October 2008 is marked by various important credit events in the euro area that 
triggered the introduction of government rescue packages. Following government 
interventions in 2008, BCDS spread initially decreased but then they recovered, as the 
mechanism used to transfer credit risk from the banking sector to sovereign issuers was 
constrained by the credibility of government contingent liabilities to the banking sector. This 
result is supported by Alter and Schüler (2012) who argue that “due to changes in the 
composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets… the government CDS spreads 
have increased importance in the price discovery mechanism of the banks’ CDS series”. 
Second, we corroborate the works of Byström (2005, 2006) by identifying that an 
unanticipated change in the SCDS spread also has a positive and permanent effect on the 
level of SCDS spread. The sign and significance of the impulse response function of SCDS 
spread can be justified on empirical grounds, since the change in SCDS spread features a 
positive and significant autocorrelation. The impulse response is smaller in magnitude in a 
lower volatility regime than in a higher volatility regime. 
Third, the impulse response of the VSTOXX volatility index is positive and 
significant, and it shows a regime-dependent pattern. An increase in SCDS spread leads to an 
increase in the aggregate risk in the economy. Particularly, the euro area governments’ fiscal 
position was weakened by the introduction of large-scale financial rescue packages for their 
national banking sectors. This depressed the governments’ fiscal position and a gap between 
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public spending and revenues (Archaya, Dreschsler, and Schnabl 2013) As a result, 
uncertainty among stock market investors soared. Fourth, the impulse response of returns on 
the EUROSTOXX stock index is negative and significant, and varies across the three 
regimes. This result is intuitively in line with Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012), who find 
that euro area returns on non-financial and financial companies become increasingly 
(negatively) dependent upon the Greek SCDS spread in the period following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. A rise in sovereign debt due to the countercyclical fiscal policy measures, 
is perceived by stock market investors as a burden on economic growth prospects. Slower 
economic growth and future expected increase in tax rates hurt corporate profits and lead to a 
decrease in stock market returns. To summarize, Panel B of Figure 4.3 is supportive of the 
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. An unanticipated change in SCDS spread has a direct effect on BCDS 
and SCDS spreads and the VSTOXX volatility index, and it has an inverse effect on the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. An unanticipated change in the SCDS spread has always a 
stronger effect in a more volatile regime than in a less volatile regime. 
Panel C of Figure 4.3 suggests that an unanticipated change in the VSTOXX volatility 
index has a positive effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. It 
exerts a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. We find that an increase in the 
VSTOXX volatility index leads to a significant increase in BCDS and SCDS spreads. This 
effect is always larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. This argument is in line 
with Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who find that higher firm value volatility is more likely to 
hit a default barrier than lower firm value volatility. Second, we also document that an 
unanticipated change in the VSTOXX volatility index leads to a direct permanent change in 
the index level. This effect is larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. Third, as 
expected, higher firm value volatility feeds into higher risk premium that is required by stock 
market investors. In a higher volatility regime this effect is larger in magnitude, depressing 
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further stock market returns. This explains a negative impulse response of the EUROSTOXX 
stock index. 
Panel D of Figure 4.3 indicates that an unanticipated change in the EUROSTOXX 
stock index has a negative effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility 
index. In particular, we observe that when a firm’s value depreciates, the probability of 
default will increase as the firm may not be able to honor its credit commitments. On the one 
hand, this increases firm’s value volatility that is represented by a change in the VSTOXX 
volatility index. On the other hand, this may increase loan default rates in the economy as the 
leveraged firm may not be able to repay its loans. This impairs the performance of banks and 
spills over to the CDS market. As a result, when the decrease in firm’s value becomes 
widespread, BCDS and SCDS spreads increase. These results are consonant to some extent 
with Alexander and Kaeck (2008) who document that a change in a firm’s value has an 
inverse effect on CDS spreads. 
 
4.5.4 Exogenous Variables 
The impulse-response functions can be used to evaluate the effects of shocks to 
endogenous variables only. However, they do not capture the effects of the first and second 
principal components that are used as exogenous variables in our research. To evaluate the 
above theoretical underpinnings, the estimated effects of the first and second principal 
components in Panel A of Table 4.6 in Appendix D can be analyzed.  
The first (second) principle component can be interpreted as the “level” (“slope”) of a 
risk-free interest rate. An increase in the risk-free interest rate renders risk-free assets (e.g. 
government bonds) more attractive and, therefore, banks will rebalance their portfolios of 
assets selling off risky investments and buying safer government bonds. As a result, BCDS 
spread will increase. This predicts a negative association between the first principal 
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component and BCDS spread. Because the scenario involving government interventions in 
healthy banks can be ruled out, we would also expect a negative association between SCDS 
spread and the first principal component.  
Regarding the second principal component, higher term structure incentivizes banks 
to invest in longer-term government securities and, hence, decreases BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. In this respect, our results endorse Alexander and Kaeck (2008). The first principal 
component is negative and significant implying that interest rate changes inversely influence 
BCDS and SCDS spreads. Furthermore, the second principal component should have a 
negative association with BCDS and SCDS spreads but there is no significant evidence to 
support this assertion. 
 
4.5.5 Robustness Checks 
Our main findings are supported by several robustness checks. First, following 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), we replace the first and the second principal components with 
the 5-year interest rate swap (“LEVEL”) and difference between 10 and 2 year interest rate 
swaps (“SLOPE”), respectively. Panel D of Table 4.6 in Appendix D indicates that the effects 
of the alternative measures of interest rate level and slope are qualitatively similar to the 
effects of the first and second principal components. In particular, we find that the 5-year 
interest rate swap has in general a negative and significant effect on BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. Our results also suggest that the alternative measure of slope in general does not 
appear to influence significantly the BCDS and SCDS spreads.
24
 
                                                          
24
 Due to the presence of a unit root, the 5-year interest rate swap is used in first differences. The difference 
between the 10-year and 2-year interest rate swaps is stationary (features a unit root) according to the Zivot-
Andrews (ADF, KPSS and PP) test. In Panel D of Table 4.5, the slope is measured in levels. As a robustness 
check, we also estimated our MSBVAR models with a slope measured in first differences. Results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using the measures of level and slope. The results using the measure of 
slope in first differences are not reported, but are available from the author upon request. 
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Second, we replace the EUROSTOXX stock index by the EUROSTOXX 50 index in 
our MSBVAR model. The EUROSTOXX 50 is Europe’s leading Blue-Chip index that 
represents 50 leading super-sector stocks in the euro area. In analogy with our results 
obtained using a broader EUROSTOXX stock index, the regime-dependent GIRFs indicate 
that the an unexpected change in the BCDS, SCDS spreads and in the VSTOXX volatility 
index has always a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX 50 stock index. Furthermore, the 
response of the EUROSTOXX 50 stock index is always greater in magnitude in a more 
volatile regime. 
Third, motivated by Correa et al. (2014) and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014), 
who investigate the effects of sovereign defaults on bank credit and bank stock returns, we 
substitute the EUROSTOXX stock index with the EUROSTOXX BANKS index comprising 
30 largest banking sector’s stocks. This exercise corroborates the results obtained using 
broader and more diversified stock market indices in the euro area. 
Fourth, we estimate a MSBVAR model of order 4 (MSBVAR(4)). This lag length is 
selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) on a linear VAR. The results obtained 
using the MSBVAR(4) are qualitatively similar to the MSBVAR(1). Fifth, we estimate the 
MSBVAR model with 2 regimes. This model implies that a low volatility regime (regime 1) 
dominated in the sample sub-period before July 2007, and a high volatility regime (regime 2) 
dominated thereafter. The results obtained from this model are qualitatively similar to the 
results obtained using the MSBVAR model with 3 regimes. The 2-regime MSBVAR shows 
that the effects of shocks to the credit default swap market and the stock market are always 
greater (in absolute value) in the high volatility regime than in the low volatility regime. This 
finding is further corroborated by the 2-regime MSBVAR estimated on weekly data. 
Fifth, since the VSTOXX volatility index shows some tendency to revert to the mean 
we also estimate a 3-regime VAR, with the VSTOXX volatility index measured in levels. 
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The effects of shocks to the BCDS and SCDS spreads, EUROSTOXX stock index and 
VSTOXX volatility index resemble those reported in Figure 4.3 and described in Section 
4.5.3. A shock to the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive effect on the BCDS and SCDS 
spreads, the VSTOXX volatility index, and it has a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX 
stock market index. Moreover, this effect is greater in a more volatile regime. The detailed 
results obtained for our second through sixth robustness checks are not reported but are 
available from the author upon request. 
 
4.6 Policy Implications 
Our results have interesting policy implications. First, the transition from low to 
higher volatility regimes after 2007 indicates that the euro area switched from a period of low 
sovereign credit risk to that of unprecedented risk disintegration, because the economic crisis 
affected disproportionally the ‘periphery’ economies, compared to the ‘core’ German 
economy, as directly implied by widening CDS spreads. Our results suggest that CDS 
spreads’ elevated volatility induces higher investment uncertainty and, hence, companies 
prefer to postpone their investment projects. In turn, this deteriorates GDP growth and 
exacerbates CDS spreads, as witnessed by a negative relation between GDP growth and 
SCDS spreads (for informative reading, see also IMF Global Stability Report 2013, Chapter 
2).  
Second, our results show that shocks to the sovereign credit risk provoke a regime-
dependent positive response of banks’ credit risk. This finding addresses the extensively 
documented banking sector’s pro-cyclicality (for a recent review, see Athanasoglou, 
Daniilidis, and Delis 2014). The pro-cyclicality phenomenon can be ameliorated by macro-
prudential policies involving counter-cyclical buffers (i.e., counter-cyclical reserve 
requirements, leverage and dynamic provisioning) and, notably, caps on debt-to-income and 
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loan-to-value ratios (for a complete macro-prudential policy toolkit, see Claessens, Ghosh, 
and Mihet 2013). 
Third, the increase in BCDS spreads and the subsequent decision of euro area 
governments to bail out troubled banks, triggered an unprecedented increase in SCDS 
spreads. This decision resulted in greater fiscal deterioration of euro area countries and thus 
in greater sovereign credit risk (IMF 2013). Also, the differential response of SCDS spreads 
across the three regimes may not be explained by fundamental factors but, rather, by 
persistent waves of optimism and pessimism of investors and financial contagion (Aizenman, 
Hutchison, and Jinjarak 2013, Beirne and Fratzscher 2013). On the other side, increasing 
sovereign credit risk affected negatively the banking sector for two reasons: first, due to the 
‘balance sheet effect’ (banks hold a considerable share of government bonds) and second, an 
increase in sovereign credit risk leads to a decreasing ability of the state to bail out banks in 
the future. Also, credit rating agencies take into account not only a bank’s standalone credit 
profile but also the prospect of government support in times of financial distress. Therefore, 
EU policy makers should consider alternatives to the bail-out policy so as to offset the risk 
transmission from the banking sector to the public sector and vice versa. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This research examines the regime-dependent interdependence between euro area 
banks’ and sovereign credit default swap (BCDS and SCDS, respectively) spreads, stock and 
credit markets via using a state-of-art MSBVAR model. The model sheds light on a 
significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. Specifically, our 
results indicate that government interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk 
transfer from the banking to the public sector. Furthermore, the results assert the feedback 
hypothesis, while also imply that the expectation of support from national governments 
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allows banks to be more leveraged, making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. 
Therefore, this thesis provides novel evidence that large-scale rescue packages do not 
necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS spreads. 
In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the empirical results provide 
strong evidence that an unexpected positive change to BCDS and SCDS spreads causes an 
increase in investors’ expectations of stock market volatility, as measured by the change in 
the VSTOXX volatility index, and advances to a decrease in the EUROSTOXX stock index. 
In particular, we document a significant rise in co-movement in the post-bailout period 
between BCDS and SCDS and the VSTOXX volatility index. These findings resonate well 
with empirical evidence on the effects of changes in sovereign credit ratings on financial 
instability and stock market returns. Moreover, we find that the effects of unexpected changes 
to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX 
stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, reflecting an 
increased incidence of contagion across financial markets. Thus, our research provides also 
scope for hedging strategies for investments in the Euro Area credit default swap market. Our 
results imply that stock market variables, such as the VSTOXX volatility index and the 
EUROSTOXX stock market index futures can be used to hedge against undesired 
developments in the BCDS and SCDS spreads.  
Furthermore, we document that since July 2007, the CDS market switched from low 
risk regime (regime 1) to mainly intermediate risk regime (regime 2) and occasionally to high 
risk regime (regime 3). Second, an unanticipated increase in stock market volatility leads to 
increasing bank CDS spreads and increasing sovereign CDS spreads. Third, index price level 
decreases, lead to increasing equity market volatility, increasing sovereign CDS spreads, 
increasing bank CDS spreads and direct effect on the contemporaneous level of index price 
level. Finally, shock effects accelerated during, mainly, intermediate risk regime (regime 2) 
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and high risk regime (regime 3). The higher the volatility regime the stronger is the effect. 
Thus, our research corroborates Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2013), who document two-
way effects between banking sector and sovereign credit risks. Nevertheless, we additionally 
find that the two-way effects are stronger in a more volatile regime.  
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Chapter 5: Tail Risks & Domino Patterns in Emerging Currency 
Markets: The Symptoms of Acute Liquidity Withdrawal 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, emerging markets have been a magnet for global investors. Even 
pension funds and sovereign wealth funds have increased their allocations to emerging 
market assets in order to take advantage of the world’s fastest growing economies. However, 
the financial crisis which began in industrialized countries during 2008 and quickly spread to 
emerging markets, deteriorated the environment for capital flows and triggered deep sell offs 
in emerging economies (see also Aloui et al. 2011; Samarakoon, 2011; Alsakka and Gwilym, 
2012; Eichengreen et al. 2012; Semmler and Bernard, 2012 inter alia). The subprime 
mortgage crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers was followed by a synchronised explicit 
decline in emerging market currencies, over and above what one would expect from 
economic fundamentals. 
 Motivated by the lack of evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals serve as the 
determinants of co-movements in international markets (see also Longin and Solnik 2001; 
Ang and Chen 2002; Yuan, 2005; and Baur 2012, for informative readings), we examine how 
the recent credit crisis affected the behavior of the most liquid emerging currency markets 
and the importance of external shocks in shaping the movement of certain emerging currency 
markets. To assess the incremental impact of the credit crunch we split our sample in three 
sub-periods: before, during and after the financial turmoil. As a result, we are able to test for 
structural changes in the tail behavior of the unconditional distribution. Additionally, in order 
to generate a plausible counterfactual, we allow for other factors that may have played a 
crucial role in the behavior of emerging currencies and hence, in driving cross asset 
allocation. Specifically, we also evaluate the role of global liquidity shocks, credit risk 
fluctuations and advances in the commodity markets.  
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Allowing for the influence of these factors we also endeavour to answer the following 
questions: what is the impact of global financial shocks in emerging currencies? how is 
stability in emerging currencies shaped by cross-asset rebalancing? Are there any risk factors 
which have acted as channels of risk transfer on emerging currency markets? Is it possible to 
model risk spillovers in emerging currencies? Is there any structural change in the tail 
behaviour of the unconditional distribution? Is there any extreme value dependence with 
other financial assets? We address these essential issues to identify new channels and sources 
for the transmission of shocks across emerging market currencies and to verify how crises are 
likely to spread across emerging market foreign exchanges. Global financial shocks, like the 
recently experienced credit crunch, play an important role in driving financial activity in 
emerging economies. Nonetheless, the empirical literature is silent about the role and the 
extent to which global financial risk shocks drive fluctuations in emerging countries. 
Moreover, the role of portfolio balance effects in emerging currency markets remains rather 
controversial and the empirical evidence in its support rather indirect. 
This research employs a distinct approach on emerging currency markets to determine 
portfolio balancing effects and new channels for the transmission of shocks on emerging 
market foreign exchanges. While there is extensive literature on studying comovements 
between the international equity markets and on modelling the dependence structure between 
exchange rates by using copulas, there is no literature on employing copulas to model the 
cross-asset dependence with several risk factors and the importance that external shocks have 
in shaping the movement of certain emerging currencies. We use the five most liquid and 
rapidly developed emerging markets (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico and South Africa)
25
. 
These emerging economies constitute the epitome of -and benefited the most from- the 
                                                          
25
Our initial sample incorporates Turkey, South Korea, Eastern European, and Latin American Countries. In 
most cases, we identify a non-stationary process in the data, and thus a stochastic model with a drift and a 
noise/trend driving terms will provide a better explanation for the movement of these emerging currencies. Also, 
China, the most liquid and rapidly developed emerging market was excluded from our final sample due to the 
peg of its national currency with the U.S. Dollar.  
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macroeconomic tailwinds that boosted growth in 2003 – 2008 period, fuelled by declining 
interest rates in the developed worlds, the commodity supercycle of rising prices and higher 
commodity investments. We then construct four channels of risk transfer on emerging market 
currencies. In particular, we suggest that regardless of the macroeconomic fundamentals, 
investors substantially compose and alter their investments in emerging currency markets in 
response to shocks experienced in the following four channels: developments in credit risk, 
growth and the information contained in domestic stock markets. Thus, emerging market 
foreign exchanges are mainly determined by changes in these channels, which are over and 
above what one would expect from economic fundamentals, resembling to portfolio balance 
effects and investor-induced contagion. The credit risk channel is characterized by changes in 
the iTraxx Senior Financial Index (i.e. the spread of Banks’ Credit Default Swaps), while also 
it is associated with changes on the Volatility Index. Stock markets are represented by the 
most representative domestic stock indexes, while the growth channel is interpreted by 
developments on the commodities (i.e. S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index).  
We call these variables cross-asset rebalancing and contagion channels, that is, 
variables which can amplify shocks and lead to instability and whose extreme adverse 
realisations are associated with a slump of emerging market foreign exchanges. If there is a 
significant increase in cross-asset and cross-market linkages and co-movements during the 
crisis period, then we can infer that developments in these currencies are driven and 
determined by changes in these channels. Otherwise, the movements of these currencies are 
mainly driven by developments on macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Additionally, we attempt to ascertain what these co-movements reflect in asset pricing 
and risk management terms. In particular, a further dimension to our research is to examine 
volatility spikes, the existence of any extreme value dependence, symmetries and 
asymmetries in the dependence structure and to investigate joint downward/upward dynamics 
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and the contemporaneous dependence entailed in the tails. The recent credit crunch advanced 
on elevated volatility, large fluctuations and extreme exchange rate variations (i.e. tail risks). 
Investors pulled capital from emerging countries, even those with small levels of perceived 
risk, and caused values of stocks and domestic currencies to plunge, highlighting how 
sensitive to fluctuations and changes in economic and market conditions, emerging markets 
are. These events originate unprecedented losses to risk, portfolio managers and corporations. 
As Campbell et al. (2010) document, currencies play a crucial role in risk-minimising a 
diversified investment portfolio.  
Moreover, measuring tail dependence and extreme co-movements boils down to the 
estimation of the probability of observing very large losses (Straetmans and Candelon, 2013; 
Dias 2014; Tolikas 2014) and thus it helps international investors to manage risks in their 
portfolio (Wang et al. 2013). Indeed, an increase in cross-asset co-movements diminishes 
rapidly diversification opportunities (Ibragimov and Walden, 2007) and renders traditional 
diversification theory fruitless (Markowitz, 1952; and Solnik, 1974). Thus, no risk 
management term has entered the vernacular of investors as rapidly as “tail risk 
management” has in the last years. As Ibragimov et al. (2013) observes, emerging country 
foreign exchanges are even more pronounced to external financial shocks than their 
developed counterparts and respond to external frequencies in a nonlinear way. 
Consequently, modelling and managing emerging market foreign exchange risk is a 
challenging and important issue in the financial decision – making process.  
To address these fundamental issues empirically, the methodology we use in this 
thesos differs in a fundamental way from most of the methods used in the literature in 
analysing dependence and co-movements between exchange rates and other sets of risk 
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factors. In particular, we employ and compare several copula functions
26
 with different 
dependence structures (i.e. Gaussian, Student – t, and Joe-Clayton) to capture the risk in a 
large set of risk factors, to model and examine conditional and tail dependence between 
emerging market exchange rates, domestic stock markets, commodities (S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index), and credit channels (Volatility Index
27
 and Banks Credit Default 
Swaps)
28
. We split our sample into three sub-groups (before, during and after the financial 
crisis) to assess whether the crisis led to significant changes in the structural cross-asset 
transmission of shocks to emerging currencies, the dependence structure and in the likelihood 
of large variations in emerging market exchange rates.  
Thus, the findings of our research are of importance for policy makers, asset 
managers, risk managers, investors and contribute in various ways in the existing literature. 
First, we find that in periods of crisis several financial assets experience synchronically 
dramatic losses. We find that emerging currency movements are the result from the 
interaction received by global liquidity and credit risk shocks and hence, we provide strong 
evidence of increased co-movements and extreme tail dependence during the crisis period. 
The significance of the tail dependence implies that these asset classes tend to experience 
concurrent extreme shocks. This finding has important risk and asset pricing implications, 
since risk measures which omit fatness of tails lead to serious underestimation of downside 
risk. Furthermore, left tail dependence indicates the potential of simultaneous large losses and 
allows investors to measure the probability of the extreme losses. The presence of risk 
                                                          
26
We also employ Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to capture downside tail risks in these currencies (built in a 
portfolio structure) and their interaction with other risk factors. The ability of EVT to fit the fat tailed returns’ 
distribution was poor (the p-value was low). As discussed by Tolikas (2014), it is possible EVT to provide a bad 
fit for the whole interval, “due to the changing nature of the distribution of the extremes which implies that a 
single distribution is unlikely to provide a good fit”. Results are not presented for dimensionality reasons. 
27
The Volatility Index (VIX) represents changes in credit market conditions similar and is used as a proxy for 
developments in credit risk, similar to the suggestions made by by Alexander and Kaeck, 2008, and Annaert et 
al. 2013. Similarly, according to Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), BCDS 
represent a good proxy for credit risk conditions. 
28
We also use the 3 month Libor rate as a proxy for credit risk similar to Florakis et al. (2014), however BCDS 
and ViX provide a better fit for the dependence structure with emerging currencies and hence we analyse the 
findings from this index in this research.  
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spillovers among asset classes increases portfolio risk and magnifies the volatility of the 
expected returns in emerging market currencies. Hence, we compliment the works of Sarno 
and Schmeling (2014) who observe future fundamentals that drive exchange rates and 
Campbell et al. (2010), who identify currency risk-minimising strategies for global bond 
investors. 
Second, our findings imply that accelerated decreases and large variations in the 
domestic stock markets, in the growth (i.e. commodities), and credit channels (i.e. BCDS and 
VIX) lead to accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in the emerging market foreign 
exchanges. This joint downside risk among these asset classes has not been documented in 
the literature of emerging market exchange rates. The increase in cross-asset co-movements 
diminishes rapidly diversification opportunities. Moreover, we observe that dependence 
remains significant but weaker after the financial crisis and that emerging market exchange 
rates become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward moves. 
This finding indicates statistically decreases in the tail indices and structural breaks to these 
exchange rates due to the recent financial crisis that correspond to the increase in the 
likelihood of large fluctuations. As a result, on the post crisis period, emerging market 
foreign exchanges are more susceptible to financial crisis and speculative attacks. The 
increased likelihood of extreme joint losses suggests a higher than normal Value at Risk. 
These findings corroborate and extend the works of Aloui et al., (2011), Bubak et al., (2011), 
Sirr et al., (2011), Banti et al., (2012), Ulku and Demirci (2012), Tsai (2012), and Andreou et 
al., (2013), who investigate spillovers and the dependence structure between emerging 
currencies and stock markets. 
Third, we document a significant increase in cross-asset linkages during periods of 
high volatility which is over and above any economic fundamental. Thus, we provide 
empirical evidence that large adverse shocks in the four channels described above, spill over 
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to emerging market currencies triggered by cross-asset rebalancing, advancing to investor-
induced contagion. Our explicit distinction between the four contagion channels and our 
modelling for the evolution of these crashes sheds new light on the propagation of large 
negative cross-asset returns, corroborating and complementing the works of Yuan (2005), 
Boyer et al., (2006), Carlin et al., (2007), Dungey et al., (2010), Boyer (2011), and 
Jotikasthira et al., (2012), who observe that crisis spreads to other markets and investment 
funds through the liquidity channel. In addition, tail dependence and investor-induced 
contagion is a source of systemic risk and thus, we complement the works of Allen and 
Carletti (2013) and Liang (2013) who distinguish shocks in order to outline elements of 
systemic risk and to identify risks to global financial stability.  
Fourth, we extend the works of Wang et al., (2013), Ibragimov et al., (2013), and 
Rossi and De Magistris (2013) who study tail risks and document asymmetric dependencies 
in emerging market currencies through liquidity channels. Interestingly, we observe the 
existence of significant dependence and partial comovement but asymmetric tail dependence 
for the pre- crisis, the crisis and the post- crisis periods, implying that there is asymmetry in 
upward moves for all emerging currencies considered, pointing to asymmetric contagion. 
These findings also, affect the pricing of emerging market currencies complimenting the 
work of Susmel (2001) who studies tail dependence pricing for safety – first investors. Fifth, 
we find that the local contagion channels spread the crisis in a domino fashion in the 
emerging market currencies, corroborating the work of Markwat et al., (2009) who observe 
domino effects among international stock markets.  
Sixth, the post-crisis asymmetric dependence between emerging currencies and the 
leading commodity index indicates that there is a structural shift in the behaviour of emerging 
currencies. Regularly, in the post-crisis period we expect a symmetric upward swing. 
However, we find that the structure of these emerging currencies altered by the credit crunch, 
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implying significant changes in the structural transmission of shocks to emerging currencies. 
As a result, the credit crunch played a critical role for the reassessment of emerging market 
currencies which lead to a revaluation and a recalibration of their risk characteristics. Thus, 
less liquidity in the developed world affects severely emerging markets, leaving them to 
compete for scarce resources by offering cheaper currencies and more attractive asset 
valuations. This finding corroborates the work of Gravelle et al., (2006) who study currency 
and bond markets to identify changes in the structural transmission of shocks across 
countries. 
In addition, we complement the existing literature on modelling dependencies and 
spillovers
29
 with the use of copula functions. While there is extensive literature studying the 
co-movements between the international equity markets via copulas
30
, there is no literature 
on using copulas to study the co-movements across markets of different asset types and risk 
factors. Additionally, we fill a gap in the literature since commodity, credit channels’ 
interactions with emerging market foreign exchanges have not been investigated in 
international literature prior. Our research is closely related with the works of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Yuan (2005), Boyer et al., (2006), Carlin et al., (2007), Dungey et al., (2010), 
Boyer (2011), and Jotikasthira et al., (2012), who verify that market frictions break the link 
between asset price movements and economic fundamentals and accordingly, investors are 
not able to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on 
fundamental shocks. We complement their work via proposing four contagion channels 
whose extreme adverse realisations spillover to emerging market foreign exchanges. 
Particularly, Yang (2005) and Boyer et al., (2006) provide empirical evidence that 
market crashes are spread globally through asset holdings and wealth constraints of 
                                                          
29
See e.g. Bubak et al., (2011), Sirr et al., (2011), Banti et al., (2012), Ahmad et al., (2012), Ulku and Demirci 
(2012), Tsai (2012), and Andreou et al., (2013). 
30
See also Ning (2010), Aloui et al., (2011), Kenourgios et al., (2011), Wang et al., (2013), and Aloui et al., 
(2013), for informative readings. 
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international investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), link asset market crashes with liquidity 
channels. We extend their work by observing four contagion channels whose extreme adverse 
realisations spillover to emerging currency markets. Jotikasthira et al. (2012) observe that 
uninformed investors suffering losses in an investment are “forced” to liquidate their 
positions, resembling to “fire sales”. We extend their work by providing strong evidence of 
asymmetric contagion which is caused by wealth constraints. 
Furthermore, our research is related to the works of Wang et al., (2013), Ibragimov et 
al., (2013), Rossi and De Magistris (2013), Straetman and Candelon (2013), who observe tail 
risks in equity and foreign exchange markets. These author document the existence of 
asymmetric dependence and highlight that emerging country exchange rates are more 
pronouncedly heavy tailed. We extend their works in emerging market foreign exchanges by 
identifying their relationship with several asset classes and risk factors. We also improve the 
understanding of risks in emerging currencies by providing novel evidence that accelerated 
decreases in commodity prices and in the spread of Banks’ Credit Default Swaps (BCDS) and 
prompt variations in volatility (VIX), provoke accelerated decreases and function as a 
barometer of emerging market currency fluctuations. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 The advantages of using copula functions 
In this research, we use the time-varying nature of the copula functions to examine the 
structural dependence between emerging currencies, emerging stock markets, commodities, 
the iTraxx Senior Financial Index (Banks’ Credit Default Swaps or BCDS) and the Volatility 
Index. A copula is a multivariate cumulative distribution function whose marginal 
distributions are uniform on the interval [0,1]. Copulas are suitable to describe interrelations 
and to model dependence of several random variables. As described by Harvey (2010), 
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copulas separate the marginal behaviour of variables from the dependence structure through 
the use of distribution functions. Thus, copula functions are more appropriate to adequately 
capture fat tails and higher moments. The advantages of using copulas are multi-fold. A 
copula is a function that connects the marginal distributions to restore the joint distribution 
and is very flexible in modelling dependence. By using copulas we are able to isolate the 
dependence structure from the marginal distributions. Consequently, copulas can be applied 
with any marginal distributions, and the marginal can be different from each other. Also, 
various copulas represent different dependence structure between variables. Following Aloui 
et al. (2011), copulas allow to separately model the marginal behavior and the dependence 
structure. This property gives us more options in model specification and estimation. 
Furthermore, the copula function can directly model the tail dependence (see also Patton 
2006). As described by Ning (2010) it is a succinct and exact representation of the 
dependencies between underlying variables, irrespective of their marginal distributions. More 
concretely, a copula function allows controlling for the marginals, to filter out marginal 
inequalities and influences in the dependence measure. As a result, the dependence measures 
based on a copula function are marginal free. Hence, one of the key properties of copulas is 
that they are invariant under increasing and continuous transformations. Moreover, the copula 
can easily model the asymmetric dependence by specifying different copulas. Another useful 
dependence measure defined by copulas is the tail dependence, which measures the 
probability that both variables are in their lower or upper joint tails. 
In contrast, copulas contain a subset of the information contained in the joint 
distribution, and hence it is not an appropriate method for pricing assets off the joint 
distribution. Moreover, copula functions do not provide dynamic consistency and a 
theoretical framework for any particular dependence structure. Hence, the dependence is 
manipulated into the model at the final stage rather than growing dynamically and in a 
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continuous-time. As a result, copulas are essentially and critically “one-period” rather than 
“multi-period” models.  
A thorough review of copulas may be found in Patton and Sheppard (2009). 
Methodologically, we begin with capturing the linear measures of rank dependence with 
Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ. Due to the drawbacks of linear measures, we then model the 
margins of the return series by fitting the appropriate ARMA-GARCH specifications to the 
actual data set and extract the standardised residuals, similar to Patton (2006), Kenourgios et 
al. (2011), and Aloui et al. (2011), in order to capture dependences and tail risks with three 
copula functions. 
 
5.2.2 The Hypotheses 
Following Acharya et al. (2011), a systemic financial crisis gives rise to a business-
cycle recession, which weakens public finances and leads to a higher default risk (i.e. spreads 
in Banks’ Credit Default Swaps accelerate31). Financial institutions that suffer unanticipated 
outflow of deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues in a wholesale market are 
forced to reduce their lending activity. If funding and liquidity problems become a 
commonplace in the banking sector, money supply will decrease as less credit will become 
available in the economy. Thus, liquidity abruptly dries up and credit risk soars (see also 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) for informative readings on the role of credit default swaps for 
portfolio rebalancing and contagion). This is likely to have a recessionary effect on 
investment, consumption, income, and thus leads to severe downturns in the commodity 
prices (see also Arezki et al. (2014) for informative readings on commodity price 
                                                          
31
Periods of higher (lower) global financial risk are typically associated with higher (lower) borrowing spreads 
and hence credit default swaps’ prices tend to soar (decrease). See also Akinci (2013) for informative reading on 
this relationship.  
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fluctuations
32
). Under these conditions, investors withdraw capital from risky investments 
and increase their exposures in safe assets such as government bonds issued by developed 
countries in a flight to quality. This signals net capital outflows in the emerging stock markets 
and point to a higher financial risk for investments in emerging countries. Thus, we formulate 
our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1 (Existence of contagion channels): Due to global shocks in liquidity, credit and 
growth constraints and in emerging stock markets, there is a significant cross-asset increase 
in the comovement and the dependence with emerging currencies, resembling to contagion.  
Uninformed rational investors are not able to distinguish between selling based on 
liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks. Thus, when investors suffer a large 
loss in an investment, they are forced to liquidate their positions in the most vulnerable 
investments (i.e. emerging stock markets, according to Ibragimov et al. 2013) triggering 
cross-market portfolio rebalancing (see also Yuan 2005; Boyer et al.,, 2006; and Jotikasthira 
et al.,, 2012, for informative readings on forced sales and investor-induced contagion). Based 
on these we formulate our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 (Investor – Induced Hypothesis and Asymmetric Contagion): The documented 
increase in the dependence (hypothesis 1) is triggered by cross-asset rebalancing, which is 
consistent with investor induced contagion. If the crisis spreads through cross-asset 
rebalances, then dependence should be asymmetrically higher during market downturns than 
in market upturns, pointing also to asymmetric contagion. 
 Local crashes and shocks in liquidity, credit and demand constraints spillover to 
emerging market currencies and thus evolve into global crashes, resembling to a domino 
pattern (see also Markwat et al., 2009). Based on this rationale we identify if emerging 
currency market contagion occurs as a domino effect.  
                                                          
32
Higher financial risk leads to lower economic activity, and thus lower demand for commodities (i.e. prices 
tend to decline).  
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Hypothesis 3 (Domino Effect Hypothesis): Shocks in the contagion channels evolve into 
global crashes and significantly increase the probability of more severe crashes, resembling 
to a domino effect.  
Emerging market currencies have been among the worst performing assets over the 
last years. The Indian Rupee and the Brazilian Real have underperformed the US dollar by 
about 20%, similarly the Russian Ruble, the Mexican Peso and the South African Rand 
dropped over 10%. In line with these downdrafts, realized and implied volatility in emerging 
currencies doubled. Thus, we are searching if this is a cyclical downturn or a structural shift 
in the risk characteristics of these assets, based on Gravelle et al. (2006):  
Hypothesis 4 (Structural Shift in Risk Determinants): If the structure of the simultaneous 
transmission of shocks to any pair of currencies is fundamentally altered by the crisis (i.e. 
post-crisis dependence is not the same with pre-crisis dependence), then there is a permanent 
change in the structural transmission of shocks to emerging market currencies, which implies 
a fundamental shift in their risk characteristics.  
 To formally test these implications, we employ copula functions to describe the 
distribution, tail coefficients and the dependence structure between the foreign exchange 
market, the financial market (local stock indices), the growth channel (the commodity 
market, represented by the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index), and the credit channel 
represented by the Volatility Index
33
 and Banks’ Credit Default Swaps. To address the 
relative importance of each component, we decompose co-movements to separate out the 
effects on the emerging markets exchange rates movements.  
 
 
 
                                                          
33
An increase in the Volatility Index indicates an increase in uncertainty and is associated with an increase in 
credit risk. Thus, following Colin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Alexander and Kaeck (2008), and Annaert et al. 
(2013), we use the VIX as a proxy for business and credit market conditions. 
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5.2.3 Marginal distributions 
According to the copula theorem for a joint distribution function, the marginal 
distributions and the dependence structure can be separated as described by Patton (2006):  
                                     (           )       or    (1) 
                                                                            (2) 
The central result in copula theory states that any continuous N-dimensional cumulative 
distribution function   , evaluated at point            
    can be represented as: 
                               (3) 
where   is a copula function and           are the margins.  
Copulas are very flexible in analysing co-movement and modelling dependence. 
Various copulas represent different dependence structure between variables, a property which 
provide us with more options in model specification and estimation.  
Formally, a two – dimensional copula is a function   [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  such that 
(i)                      is grounded), 
(ii)          and           (consistent with margins) 
(iii) for any            [   ]with                   
                                      (2-increasing) 
Copulas are more informative measures of dependence between many variables than 
linear correlation, since they provide us with the degree and the structure of the dependence 
among financial assets. The copula function can directly model the tail dependence, while 
linear correlation does not provide information about it and for the symmetrical property of 
the co-movement. Hence, any copula function has a lower and an upper bound,    and   , 
which are known as the minimum and the maximum copula, respectively. For any point 
(     [   ]  [   ] the copula must lie in the interval as follows: 
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As with standard distribution functions, copulas have associated densities which exist 
in the interior domain (Patton 2006) as given by: 
           
        
    
      (4) 
The above permits the canonical representation of a bivariate density        as the product 
of the copula density and the density functions of the margins as given by: 
                                              (           )              (5) 
Equation (5) indicates how the product of two marginal distributions will fail to properly 
measure the joint distribution of two asset prices unless they are in fact independent. The 
dependence information captured by the copula density,  (           )  is normalised to 
unity and shows that copula functions are an alternative dependence measure that is reliable 
when correlation is not.  
Based on the work of Bollerslev (1986), Nelson (1991), and Patton (2006), we 
estimate the dependence described above, with a AR(k)-t-GARCH(p,q) model which detects 
conditional heteroscedastic errors. The AR-GARCH offers the advantage to deal with thick 
tails and volatility clustering. We use the AR-GARCH in our case to de-trend our data set 
Thus, the daily return is expressed as: 
                ,    ~iid(0,1) 
  
         
       
 ,         (6) 
where    denotes the conditional mean and   
  is the conditional variance with parameter 
restrictions ω > 0, α >0, β >0, and α+β >1. In order to verify that the marginal distributions 
are not normal, we employ the Jarque-Berra normality tests for each asset return. The order 
of the autoregressive terms is specified at a maximum of 10. Hence, given a time series   , 
the GARCH (1,1) model is described as: 
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          (7) 
where     is an iid random variable with zero mean and variance of one.    
  is the conditional 
variable of return series at time t, with the same restrictions as noted in equation (6). 
As noted by Kenourgios et al. (2011) and Aloui et al. (2011) copula functions can be 
used to characterise the dependence in the tails of the distribution. Upper and lower tail 
dependence coefficients can be used to measure and capture booms and crashes.  
We assume that the variables of interest in our model are X and Y with marginal distribution 
functions F and G. Thus the coefficient of lower tail dependence    is represented as: 
             [   
              ]       (8) 
which quantifies the probability of observing a lower Y assuming that X is lower itself.  
Similarly, the coefficient for the upper tail dependence    is defined by: 
             [   
              ]       (9)    
Thus, symmetry occurs when the lower tail dependence equals the upper tail dependence 
coefficient, otherwise there is asymmetry. 
The Gaussian copula symmetry occurs when     . 
As a result, the Gaussian normal copula can be expressed as: 
         ( 
            )  ∫ ∫
 
  √    
     
          
       
 
      
  
    
      
  
       (10) 
where     is the standard bivariate normal distribution with linear correlation coefficient θ 
restricted to the interval (-1,+1), and Φ represents the univariate standard normal distribution 
function. 
 Similarly, the Student-t copula can be defined as: 
       ∫ ∫
 
  √    
      
          
       
  
   
 
  
     
  
    
  
     
  
                                 (11) 
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where   
  (u) denotes the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
univariate Student-t distribution with u degrees of freedom. 
In the extant literature, it is well documented that the co-movement between assets 
usually have positive lower dependence (i.e. left tail dependence) depending on the strength 
of the volatility chasing effect. Hence, to capture the above dependence switching, this thesis 
follows Chen et al., (2009) and employs the flexible Joe-Clayton copula:  
       ⃓ 
           {[        ]   [        ]    }           (12) 
where              
   
                      
   
and                                                                                                                     (13) 
From equations (12) and (13) the Joe-Clayton copula has two parameters,          , which 
are measures of tail dependence. Following Patton (2006), the Joe-Clayton copula symmetry 
occurs when       . 
Moreover, in order to compare the copula models we use the goodness of fit test 
based on a comparison of the distance between the estimated and the empirical copulas 
(Genest et al. 2009). Therefore: 
   √                  (14) 
The test statistic considered is based on Cramer-Von Mises criterion which indicates that 
large values of the statistic    lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the copula C 
belongs to a class   . In particular, the Cramer-Von Mises criterion can be defined as: 
   ∫     
               (15) 
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5.2.4 Estimation method 
In order to estimate the parameters of the copula, we use the Inference for the Margins 
approach which is modified appropriately for the use of this research. This approach imposes 
optimality criteria on the functions in the estimating equations rather than the estimators 
obtained from them.  Thus, we define that the copula C has the dependence parameter as (θ) 
and the marginal parameters as (α1,α2,.... αd). Hence, the estimators  ̂ 
   of the parameter αi are 
evaluated from the log-likelihood Li of each margin in equations (8) – (12), so that: 
  ̂ 
                  . Consequently, ( ̂ 
     ̂ 
       ̂ 
     is defined to be the MLE 
of the model parameters under conditions of independence. In the second step, the estimator 
 ̂   of the copula parameter     is computed by maximizing the copula likelihood 
contribution, (i.e.     with the marginal parameters    in the likelihood function replaced by 
the first-stage estimators:  ̂ 
    :  ̂   =              ̂ 
     ̂ 
       ̂ 
      . Thus, the 
two-stage IFM estimator  ̂ 
     ̂ 
       ̂ 
     ̂     solves:  
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
  
  
                                                           (16) 
Similar to the MLE, the IMF estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal under regular 
conditions. Patton (2006) and Ning (2010) propose the IMF method as often more efficient 
than the ML. They also argue that the IMF approach is more appropriate for models which 
involve a large number of parameters, similar to our approach. 
 
5.3 Data description and descriptive statistics 
Our data set employed from Bloomberg and Datastream and consist of five emerging 
market foreign exchanges vis-à-vis the U.S. Dollar: the Brazilian Real (BRE), the Russian 
Ruble (RUB), the Indian Rupee (INR), the Mexican Peso (MXN), and the South African 
Rand (ZAR). Also, we use data for the following five stock markets: Bovespa (Brazil), RTS 
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(Russia), BSE Sensex (India), IPC (Mexico), and the Johannesburg Top 40 Index (South 
Africa, henceforth JSE Top 40). In addition, we use the following indices: (i) the S&P 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P GSCI); (ii) iTraxx Senior Financials Index (Banks’ 
Credit Default Swaps); and (iii) the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility 
Index (VIX) as a proxy of the business and credit climate. For our empirical analyses, we use 
a dataset of daily closing prices. The sample period is daily from March, 21, 2005 till June, 
22, 2013 and excludes bank holidays. The nominal exchange rates are expressed as the 
number of units of national currency per US dollar. Also, all indexes are in U.S. dollars.  
Figure 5.1 presents the movement of the emerging currencies from 2005 to 2013. The 
base currency is the U.S. Dollar and the area below zero represents an appreciation for the 
emerging currency (or depreciation of the U.S. Dollar against the emerging currency), while 
the area above zero represents devaluation of the emerging currency against the U.S. Dollar. 
 
Figure 5.1. Performance of Emerging Market Currencies versus the U.S. Dollar 
 Table 5.1 in Appendix G depicts the summary statistics with the tests for normality. 
Over the sample period, the mean of the emerging currencies is negative (i.e. Brazilian Real: 
-0.0002) or fairly closed to zero, reflecting greater risk. Moreover, all emerging currencies 
are leptokurtic implying that the distribution departs from symmetry. These currencies 
experienced significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicated by the range of 
variation in the standard deviation.  
Emerging Currencies vis-a-vis the USD
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 Stock and commodity (S&P GSCI) returns were less volatile, as suggested by the 
range of variation and the standard deviation. Indeed, daily percentage stock and commodity 
returns were positive during the sample period. Consistent with empirical evidence on 
skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively skewed and leptokurtic, suggesting that big 
negative events in the stock and commodity markets are more likely than big positive events. 
Furthermore, the density of returns is greater, since most observations are to the sample 
median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal.  
Changes in the volatility index VIX and in the Banks’ Credit Default Swap spreads 
have a positive mean, suggesting that the expectations of market volatility and the spread of 
the BCDS were increasing over the sample period. Also, they underwent significant 
fluctuations over the sample period, as indicated by the range of variation in the standard 
deviation. The change in the volatility index and in the BCDS are also positively skewed and 
highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results  
In order to compare the impact of the crisis on emerging market foreign exchanges, 
and to detect time-variation and structural breaks, we analyse dependence and tail 
dependence separately for the period from March 2005 to August 2007 (Pre-crisis Period), 
for the period from August 2007 to September 2009 (Crisis Period), and for the period from 
September 2009 to June 2013 (Post-crisis Period). We follow the assumption made by Ozkan 
and Unsal (2012), that the global financial turmoil started in August 2007 and we find that 
the underlying return and volatility series behave differently across these three sample 
periods.  
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5.4.1 Linear correlations 
We start by interpreting the results of the rank correlation coefficients as applied to 
the emerging market foreign exchanges. Our estimation results are displayed in Table 5.2. 
We observe that for the overall sample period the Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s ro statistics 
are positive, implying positive dependence between emerging market foreign exchanges, 
domestic stock market indices and the growth channel (S&P GSCI commodity index). This 
finding indicates that the probability of concordance is significantly higher than the 
probability of discordance. Additionally, our findings imply that the Brazilian Real and the 
Russian Ruble appear to be particularly susceptible to changes in the growth channel, 
indicating that the response of these currencies is significantly quicker to changes and 
fluctuations in commodity prices. In particular, for the Brazilian Real and the Russian Ruble, 
the strongest dependence is observed with the S&P GSCI. Positive dependence indicates that 
the booming demand for commodities has underpinned these currencies. Contrarily, the 
Indian Rupee, the Mexican Peso and the South African Rand are more susceptible to changes 
in the domestic stock markets, than with changes in the growth channel. 
During the crisis period, the results suggest a strong and sudden increase in the cross-
asset synchronization of fluctuations and volatilities. The dependence structure changes and 
increases substantially - Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ rise to higher levels for all considered 
pairs-, implying that shocks in the domestic stock markets and the growth channel lead to 
increased crash likelihood in emerging currencies. For instance, during the crisis period the 
dependence between the Brazilian Real and the growth channels increases to 0.136 for the 
Kendall’s τ and 0.171 for the Spearman’s ρ respectively. This finding indicates that these 
currencies display a significant reversal, following shocks to financial and commodity 
markets.  
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Adversely, in the post crisis period the dependence structure weakens- Kendall’s τ and 
Spearman’s ρ decrease for all considered pairs-, reflecting a structural break or a regime shift 
that divides the behaviour of the emerging currencies. Notably, in the post-crisis period 
emerging currencies share stronger comovement with the domestic stock markets, while in 
the crisis and the pre-crisis period they share a stronger comovement with the growth channel 
(i.e. S&P GSCI). 
On the other hand, the results reveal a very different picture for the dependence 
between emerging currencies, the Volatility Index and the Banks’ Credit Default Swaps. In 
particular, for the overall sample, both Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s ro statistics are negative 
between emerging market foreign exchanges and the Volatility Index, and Banks’ Credit 
Default Swaps, implying that there is no co-movement. By contrast, during the crisis period 
the dependence becomes positive indicating that during high volatility periods, where 
uncertainty increases, liquidity abruptly dries up and credit markets squeeze, changes in the 
Volatility Index and in the spread of Banks’ Credit Default Swaps are followed by changes in 
emerging market currencies. Indeed, during the financial crisis the Volatility index and 
BCDS increased substantially while fluctuations soared in emerging market currencies. This 
relationship also indicates that the Volatility Index and the spread of the BCDS, function as a 
barometer of emerging currency movements and can be used as a hedging proxy for 
investments in emerging market currencies during volatile periods.  
The results for the post-crisis period suggest that emerging market exchange rates 
become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward moves. This 
finding indicates statistically decreases in the tail indices and structural breaks to these 
exchange rates due to the recent financial crisis that correspond to the increase in the 
likelihood of large fluctuations. As a result, on the post crisis period, emerging market 
foreign exchanges are more susceptible to financial crisis and speculative attacks. The 
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increased likelihood of extreme joint losses suggests a higher than normal Value at Risk. The 
above results are intuitively in line to some extent with the findings of Bubak et al. (2011), 
Sirr et al. (2011), Ulku and Demirci (2012), Aloui et al. (2011 and 2013), and Andreou et al. 
(2013), who document directional spillovers between financial assets (i.e. stock and foreign 
exchange markets).  
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    Table 5.2  
    Correlation estimates of exchange rates and the four contagion channels.  
 Variables Overall Sample Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Post Crisis Period 
  Kendall-τ Spearman-ρ Kendall -τ Spearman-ρ Kendall-τ Spearman-ρ Kendall-τ Spearman-ρ 
Brazilian Bovespa 0.102 0.114 0.071 0.076 0.127 0.155 0.090 0.096 
Real S&P GSCI 0.104 0.119 0.073 0.088 0.136 0.171 0.087 0.094 
 VIX -0.052 -0.043 -0.109 -0.101 0.072 0.094 0.014 0.019 
 BCDS -0.079 -0.060 -0.121 -0.113 0.065 0.082 0.009 0.016 
Russian RTS 0.129 0.166 0.103 0.117 0.201 0.274 0.083 0.098 
Ruble S&P GSCI 0.165 0.179 0.127 0.154 0.214 0.303 0.079 0.087 
 VIX -0.135 -0.110 -0.262 -0.227 0.078 0.094 0.011 0.015 
 BCDS -0.146 -0.129 -0.274 -0.250 0.061 0.079 0.002 0.004 
Indian BSE Sensex 0.134 0.168 0.121 0.135 0.217 0.311 0.059 0.072 
Rupee S&P GSCI 0.097 0.139 0.089 0.126 0.185 0.214 0.041 0.060 
 VIX -0.142 -0.127 -0.268 -0.231 0.086 0.105 0.008 0.012 
 BCDS -0.157 -0.163 -0.270 -0.246 0.062 0.090 0.002 0.005 
Mexican IPC 0.154 0.186 0.127 0.135 0.239 0.336 0.114 0.128 
Peso S&P GSCI 0.070 0.084 0.071 0.080 0.159 0.203 0.039 0.050 
 VIX -0.117 -0.102 -0.146 -0.131 0.058 0.074 0.003 0.005 
 BCDS -0.121 -0.109 -0.152 -0.140 0.052 0.071 -0.005 -0.001 
South JSE Top 40 0.148 0.173 0.125 0.139 0.237 0.276 0.142 0.159 
African S&P GSCI 0.072 0.089 0.051 0.063 0.119 0.138 0.067 0.082 
Rand VIX -0.131 -0.116 -0.197 -0.142 0.074 0.091 0.002 0.003 
 BCDS -0.137 -0.122 -0.176 -0.138 0.060 0.073 0.004 0.007 
    Note: This table summarizes Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ rank correlation estimates for each exchange rate return pair. The sample is divided in four periods, the overall  
    period and three sub-periods, in order to show the effects of the recent credit crunch. Positive significance implies co-movements and dependence. All variables are  
    expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Table 5.3 in Appendix G reports the estimated AR(k)-t-GARCH(p,q) model for each 
asset return series. We experiment on AR and GARCH terms of up to 2 lags and we find that 
the asset returns experience a short memory with a significant AR (2). Also, GARCH (2,2) is 
capable to capture the conditional heteroscedasticity. The p-values of the Jarque-Bera test are 
less than 0.0001 indicating that there is not normality. Furthermore, the degrees of freedom of 
the t distribution are all small, ranging from 2 to 7, implying that the error terms are not 
normal and indicating the existence of contemporaneous extreme co-movements and tail 
dependences in emerging market currencies. Furthermore, the significance of the degrees of 
freedom suggests that the Gaussian copula is not sufficient in modelling the dependence 
between the four contagion channels and the emerging currencies. 
 
 
5.4.2 Copula dependence 
We report the estimation results of the dependence parameters for each pair of 
emerging market currency in Table 5.4 and Figures 5.2 and 5.4. The copula parameter 
estimates are significant for all emerging market currencies, when the Gaussian, Student – t 
and Joe-Clayton copulas are applied. The pairwise dependences are significantly positive for 
the domestic stock markets and the growth channel. Thus, positive (or negative) changes in 
stock market and commodity returns are followed by positive (or negative) changes in the 
emerging market currencies. Again, the growth channel shares the strongest dependence with 
the Brazilian Real and the Russian Ruble, while the domestic stock markets have the 
strongest co-movement with the Indian Rupee, the Mexican Peso and the South African 
Rand. By contrast, as expected, there is a negative dependence structure between emerging 
currencies, the changes in the Volatility Index and the changes in the Banks’ Credit Default 
Swaps.  
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Table 5.4  
Estimates of copula dependence parameters, overall sample. 
 Variables Gaussian 
Standard 
Error 
Student-t 
Standard 
Error 
Joe-
Clayton 
Standard 
Error 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.223 0.020* 0.229 0.019* 0.256 0.022* 
 S&P GSCI 0.232 0.020* 0.240 0.021* 0.270 0.024* 
 VIX -0.006 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
 
Russian Ruble 
BCDS 
RTS 
-0.005 
0.192 
0.010 
0.017 
-0.002 
0.196 
0.010 
0.017 
-0.002 
0.247 
0.010 
0.021* 
 S&P GSCI 0.214 0.020* 0.203 0.018 0.263 0.023* 
 VIX -0.007 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
 
Indian Rupee 
BCDS 
BSE Sensex 
-0.006 
0.211 
0.010 
0.020* 
-0.004 
0.215 
0.010 
0.019* 
-0.003 
0.251 
0.010 
0.022* 
 S&P GSCI 0.127 0.012 0.199 0.017 0.228 0.019* 
 VIX -0.008 0.010 -0.006 0.010 -0.006 0.010 
 
Mexican Peso 
BCDS 
IPC 
-0.008 
0.263 
0.010 
0.023* 
-0.005 
0.270 
0.010 
0.024* 
-0.004 
0.273 
0.010 
0.024* 
 S&P GSCI 0.140 0.013 0.148 0.013 0.216 0.019* 
 VIX -0.009 0.010 -0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.010 
 BCDS -0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.010 
South African JSE Top 40 0.239 0.021* 0.242 0.022* 0.282 0.025* 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.222 0.019* 0.227 0.019* 0.237 0.020* 
 VIX -0.006 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.004 0.010 
 BCDS -0.008 0.010 -0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.010 
Note: This table presents the estimated copula dependence parameters for the Gaussian, Student-t and Joe-Clayton copula functions for  
the overall sample period. The symbol* indicates significance of coefficients at the 5% level. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar  
terms and are defined in Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Figure 5.2. Copula Functions Observations for the overall sample period. 
 
Gaussian Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI.     Student –t Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI.    Joe-Clayton Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI. 
 
Figure 5.4. Copula Densities for the overall sample period. 
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During the financial meltdown, the results reported in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 
suggest strong and sudden increases in the cross market synchronization, consistent with the 
notion of contagion. This verifies that, given an extreme negative value in the four variables, 
there is a significantly positive probability to observe increased fluctuations and high 
volatility in emerging currencies at the same period. Indeed, the dependence during the crisis 
period increases substantially for all considered emerging market currencies, supporting 
hypothesis 1. Consequently, the dynamics of volatility transmission is not structurally stable 
and constant over time. During severe financial conditions dependence increases, shocks and 
fluctuations in the domestic stock markets, commodity, credit and liquidity variables perform 
as contagion channels whose extreme adverse realisations are associated with a slump of the 
emerging market currencies. This finding sheds new light on the propagation of large 
negative cross-asset returns. Furthermore, the presence of risk spillovers among asset classes 
increases portfolio risk and magnifies the volatility of the expected returns in emerging 
market currencies. 
Since the relations between the variables and the crash probabilities are stronger in 
times of turmoil, this can be interpreted as excessive dependence. Thus, we observe extreme 
value dependence over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals, 
pointing to contagion. Fluctuations and elevated volatility strengthens informational contents 
of the contagion channels and raises uncertainty. Consequently, investors demand higher risk 
premium in order to invest in the emerging market currencies, triggering deep sell offs. The 
increase in cross-asset co-movements diminishes rapidly diversification opportunities and 
renders traditional portfolio theory fruitless. These results are intuitively in line with Kodres 
and Pritsker (2002), Yuan (2005), Boyer at. al. (2006), and Jotikasthira et al., (2012), who 
provide empirical evidence for contagion among asset holdings. 
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After finding empirical evidence in support of the contagion hypothesis, we 
investigate how the financial crisis was spread through the four contagion channels which 
represent asset holdings of investors. Table 5.5 and Figures 5.3 and 5.5 show that the tail 
dependence when these markets are booming (upper and right tail) is not the same as that 
when markets are crashing (lower and left tail). Consequently, since lower tail dependence 
increases, co-movements increase under severe financial conditions causing asymmetry 
between upper and lower tails. These findings support the investor-induced contagion (i.e. 
hypothesis 2) which is sourced by cross-asset rebalancing and assumes asymmetric tail 
dependence and asymmetric contagion during high volatility periods. These results 
corroborate the works of Longin and Solnik (2001), Kyle and Xiong, (2001), Ang and Chen 
(2002), and Boyer at. al., (2006) who document asymmetric investor induced contagion, 
which is stronger during market downturns for international financial markets.  
In addition, the results imply that accelerated decreases in the stock market, in the 
growth channel (commodity index) and large variations in credit (i.e. Volatility Index) and 
liquidity (BCDS) markets lead to accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in 
emerging market foreign exchanges. During the crisis period the stronger relationship is 
observed with the Volatility Index. This finding confirms that the Volatility Index captures 
fluctuations and adverse behaviour of the emerging market currencies and thus its derivative 
(i.e. Volatility Futures Index) can be used as a hedging proxy, complimenting the works of 
Ning (2010), and Campbell et al. (2010) who study the dependence structure in the foreign 
exchange markets and global currency hedging strategies, respectively.  
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Table  5.5  
Estimates of copula dependence parameters, crisis period (08/2007 – 09/2009). 
 Variables Gaussian 
Standard 
Error 
Student-t 
Standard 
Error 
Joe-
Clayton 
Standard 
Error 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.227 0.020* 0.253 0.022* 0.311 0.030* 
 S&P GSCI 0.241 0.021* 0.267 0.023* 0.320 0.031* 
 VIX 0.222 0.020* 0.227 0.020* 0.317 0.030* 
 BCDS 0.218 0.019* 0.221 0.020* 0.293 0.027* 
Russian Ruble RTS 0.219 0.019* 0.229 0.020* 0.314 0.030* 
 S&P GSCI 0.223 0.020* 0.238 0.020* 0.328 0.031* 
 VIX 0.218 0.019* 0.226 0.020* 0.327 0.031* 
 BCDS 0.216 0.019* 0.224 0.010* 0.259 0.022* 
Indian Rupee BSE Sensex 0.224 0.020* 0.231 0.020* 0.308 0.029* 
 S&P GSCI 0.219 0.019* 0.226 0.020* 0.281 0.026* 
 VIX 0.237 0.020* 0.244 0.021* 0.295 0.027* 
 BCDS 0.218 0.019* 0.222 0.020* 0.247 0.021* 
Mexican Peso IPC 0.278 0.024* 0.302 0.028* 0.293 0.028* 
 S&P GSCI 0.246 0.021* 0.247 0.021* 0.275 0.026* 
 VIX 0.280 0.020* 0.309 0.029* 0.304 0.029* 
 BCDS 0.218 0.019* 0.226 0.020* 0.260 0.023* 
South African JSE Top 40 0.250 0.022* 0.295 0.028* 0.342 0.033* 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.234 0.020* 0.242 0.021* 0.256 0.022* 
 VIX 0.243 0.021* 0.266 0.023* 0.305 0.029* 
 BCDS 0.221 0.019* 0.232 0.020* 0.249 0.021* 
 Note: This table presents the estimated copula dependence parameters for the Gaussian, Student-t and Joe-Clayton copula functions for  
the crisis period. The symbol * indicates significance of coefficients at the 5% level. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms  
and are defined in Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Figure 5.3. Copula Functions Observations for the crisis period. 
Gaussian Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI.    Student –t Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI.   Joe-Clayton Copula Densities, BRE/S&P GSCI. 
 
Figure 5.5. Copula Densities for the crisis period. 
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5.4.3 Goodness of fit test 
Following Genest et al. (2009) we compare the distance of the goodness-of-fit test to 
select the most appropriate copula function. For this test, the null hypothesis states that the 
estimated copula provides the best fit to the data for the p-values that are higher than the 
conventional significance level (equations 14 and 15). The results presented in Table 5.6 and 
Figure 6 show that for all considered pairs, the Joe-Clayton Copula yields the smallest 
distance for the conducted goodness-of-fit test, indicating that the Gaussian and the t- copulas 
are not sufficient in modelling the tail dependence. The t- Copula provides an approximation 
which is much better than the normal copula, but still underestimates the tail of losses 
considered. As described above, the Joe-Clayton copula distribution allows for heavy-tails 
(i.e. high frequency of heavy losses) which help to overcome the “normality” assumption of 
the Gaussian copula which underestimates the probability of large losses. Moreover, the 
model assumes asymmetric tail dependence in the distribution, implying that upper and lower 
tail dependence is not equal supporting hypothesis 2. These results are in line with the 
findings of Patton (2006), Aloui et al. (2013), and Wang et al. (2013) who employed copula 
functions to examine dependence between international stocks and currencies.  
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Table 5.6  
Distance between empirical and estimated copulas. 
 Variables Gaussian P-Value Student-t P-Value Joe - Clayton P-Value 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.031 0.035 
 S&P GSCI 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.028 0.033 
 VIX 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.041 0.040 
 BCDS 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.042 0.041 
Russian Ruble RTS 0.044 0.043 0.040 0.039 0.033 0.036 
 S&P GSCI 0.045 0.044 0.040 0.039 0.034 0.037 
 VIX 0.048 0.047 0.042 0.041 0.036 0.038 
 BCDS 0.049 0.047 0.043 0.042 0.037 0.039 
Indian Rupee BSE Sensex 0.050 0.049 0.042 0.041 0.032 0.035 
 S&P GSCI 0.052 0.051* 0.048 0.047 0.036 0.038 
 VIX 0.052 0.051* 0.047 0.045 0.035 0.038 
 BCDS 0.054 0.052* 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.047 
Mexican Peso IPC 0.040 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.017 0.024 
 S&P GSCI 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.044 
 VIX 0.048 0.047 0.039 0.040 0.021 0.027 
 BCDS 0.053 0.052* 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.042 
South African JSE Top 40 0.040 0.038 0.031 0.035 0.014 0.023 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.053 0.051* 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.049 
 VIX 0.050 0.049 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.045 
 BCDS 0.055 0.054* 0.052 0.051* 0.050 0.049 
Note: This table presents the distance between the empirical and the estimated copulas according to Cramer-Von Mises statistic. The  
symbol * indicates the rejection of the copula model at the 5% level. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in  
Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Figure 5.6 Comparison between Symmetrised Joe-Claytonn (red line) and t- Copula 
(green line) for the model that fits best the data (blue line). 
 
5.4.4 The domino pattern 
As discussed in the previous sections, shocks in the commodity prices, large 
variations in Banks’ Credit Default Swaps and in the Volatility Index significantly increase 
the comovement and spillover to emerging market currencies. Indeed, the significance of the 
crash variables suggests that currencies depreciated heavily, following the developments of 
these variables. This is consistent with the notion of the domino pattern, supporting 
hypothesis 3 (see also Markwat et al., 2009 for informative readings). Particularly, a domino 
effect exists when past occurrences of local crashes evolve via regional crashes into global 
crashes. Furthermore, on the post crisis period emerging market foreign exchanges become 
more pronouncedly heavy-tailed (i.e. lλ is higher compared with the pre-crisis period) in 
downward moves, increasing the likelihood for more explicit currency crashes. This result is 
also consistent with the domino effect which is present when past occurrences of local 
crashes increase the probability of more severe crashes.  
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5.4.5 How the credit crunch altered the structural transmission of emerging 
currencies 
To capture upper and lower tail risks, we compute the tail dependence coefficients 
implied by the Joe-Clayton Copula which provides the ability to better capture the fat tails. 
As discussed in the methodology section, λl (λu) quantify the dependence structure between 
the four contagion variables and emerging currencies, when they are in extremely small 
(large) values. It is evident from Table 5.7 in Appendix G that the dependence structure is 
significant, indicating that shocks (booms) in the contagion channels spillover to the 
emerging market currencies. Furthermore, the results imply that the structure of the 
dependence is asymmetric, i.e. lower tail and upper tail dependence is not exactly equal λl ≠ 
λu. Under symmetry, this difference would be equal or fairly closed to zero. Comparing the 
dependence before and after the financial meltdown, the Joe-Clayton copula results suggest 
that in the pre and post crisis period the corresponding appreciation is not experienced with 
the similar magnitude, given that emerging currencies were depreciated heavily during the 
recent credit crisis. Indeed, in the post-crisis period, the smooth of the upper tail dependence 
(λu) drops systematically, rendering dynamics of conditional dependence, and the dependence 
between structures asymmetric, consistent with asymmetric investor induced contagion and 
supporting the argument that the credit crisis caused a structural shift in the transmission of 
shocks in these currencies (i.e. hypothesis 4). This finding compliments the work of Gravelle 
et al., (2006) who study currency and bond markets to identify changes in the structural 
transmission of shocks across countries. Notably, with respect to the difference between the 
pre-and post-crisis periods, spillovers seem to attenuate in the long-term during the post-crisis 
period. This finding affects the pricing of emerging market currencies in the post-crisis period 
for safety-first investors, since risk-averse investors favour investments with low dependence 
which hedge portfolio risks. 
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Moreover, the empirical results reported in Table 5.7 in Appendix G document 
significant and symmetric lower tail dependence during the financial crisis, indicating an 
increased likelihood of extreme joint losses. Indeed, λl is between 0.48 and 0.51 for all 
considered emerging currencies. This result, also confirms that the four contagion variables 
are more dependent with emerging currencies at the time of crashing than booming. These 
findings have important risk and asset pricing implications, since left tail dependence 
indicates the potential of simultaneous large losses and higher probability of extreme co-
movements and contagion. Tail dependence implies higher than normal joint risk, a tendency 
to experience concurrent extreme shocks, and thus, higher than normal Value-at-Risk. 
Furthermore, the existence of joint tail risk alters the pricing of the emerging currencies over 
time. These results extend the works of Wang et al., (2013) and Ibragimov et al., (2013) who 
study tail dependencies for emerging market foreign exchanges.  
Interestingly, the results suggest that the relevance of information flow from the four 
contagion variables might have changed suddenly during the financial meltdown. Indeed, 
with respect to the difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods, lower tail dependence 
increases substantially, implying that shocks in the four contagion channels lead to increased 
crash likelihood in the emerging market currencies. Hence, compared to the period before the 
crisis, uncertainty has been transmitted in a disproportionate way across the emerging market 
foreign exchanges (hypothesis 4). Additionally, this implies that emerging market currencies 
become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward moves. 
Furthermore, this finding indicates a structural break due to the recent financial crisis that 
corresponds to the increase in the likelihood of large fluctuations, resembling to a domino 
effect. As described by Markwat et al., (2009), a domino effect is present when past 
occurrences of local crashes evolve via regional crashes into global crashes. As a result, on 
the post crisis period, emerging market foreign exchanges are more susceptible to financial 
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crisis and speculative attacks. We hence conclude that the Joe-Clayton copula function is able 
to explain the shifts in emerging market currency movements during the credit crisis. 
 
5.4.6 Economic implications: The symptoms of acute liquidity withdrawal 
In the previous sections we described how the dependence structure of the emerging 
market currencies changes from the pre-crisis to the crisis and then to the post-crisis period. 
We document strong and sudden increase in cross-asset synchronization, consistent with the 
notion of investor induced contagion which is sourced by cross-asset rebalancing. These 
findings imply that emerging currencies display a significant reversal, following shocks to 
financial, commodity, liquidity and credit channels. The increase in cross-asset dependence 
diminishes rapidly diversification opportunities and renders traditional portfolio theory 
fruitless. Furthermore, the presence of risk spillovers among these asset classes, increases 
portfolio risk and magnifies the volatility of the expected returns in emerging market 
currencies.  
In the post-crisis period we observe the existence of a structural shift in the 
transmission of shocks that divides the behaviour of these currencies.  Emerging market 
exchange rates become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward 
moves. As a result, on the post crisis period, emerging currencies are more susceptible to 
financial crisis and speculative attacks. These findings affect the pricing of emerging market 
currencies in the post-crisis period for safety-first investors, since risk-averse investors favour 
investments with low dependence which hedge portfolio risks. Emerging currencies benefited 
the most from the macroeconomic tailwinds that boosted growth in the pre-crisis period. 
However, it is evident that the credit crunch was the catalyst for the change in the structure of 
the transmission of shocks to emerging currencies and more concretely played a critical role 
for the reassessment of emerging market currencies which lead to a revaluation and a 
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recalibration of their risk characteristics, indicating that this multi-year underperformance in 
emerging assets is not a cyclical downturn. Thus, less liquidity in the developed world affects 
severely emerging markets, leaving them to compete for scarce resources by offering cheaper 
currencies and more attractive asset valuations.  
 
5.5 Robustness checks 
In order to check the sensitivity of our results, we employ an alternative GARCH 
model and the bivariate hit and joint hit tests proposed by Patton (2006) and Ning (2010). 
These tests approve the suitability of our proposed approach for modelling the relationships 
between emerging market currencies, local stock markets, growth, liquidity and credit 
channels. In particular: (i) we employ a non-linear extension of GARCH, the Exponential 
GARCH (2,2) model proposed by Nelson (1991) and (ii) we divide the support of the copula 
into seven regions, so that regions one and two represent the lower and upper joint 10% tails 
for each variable and measure the probability of all variables. Regions three and four 
correspond to moderately large up and down days. Region five denote days where the 
exchange rates were in the middle 50% of their distributions. Regions six and seven 
correspond to the extremely asymmetric days. Additionally, we perform a joint hit test which 
represents the regions that are not covered by regions one to seven.  
 
5.5.1 Alternative GARCH approach 
The EGARCH model reveals and is suitable for testing asymmetries, volatility 
clustering and leptokurtosis. Indeed, we employ the skewed generalised Student-t EGARCH 
distribution to capture the skewness effects in our sample. This checking procedure is 
important as it allows us to confirm the suitability of our proposed approach for modelling 
the relationships between emerging market currencies and the four contagion channels.  
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Table 5.8 presents the results for the dependence coefficients with respect to the 
EGARCH (2,2) model. For the overall sample period we observe that there is significant 
positive dependence and comovement with the domestic stock markets and the growth 
channel supporting our proposed approach. Again, the strongest relationship for the Brazilian 
Real and the Russian Ruble is observed between the emerging currencies and the growth 
channel (i.e. commodity index), implying that developments in the commodity prices lead the 
movement of these currencies. By contrast, the Indian Rupee, the Mexican Peso, and the 
South African Rand have the strongest dependence with the domestic stock markets. Positive 
dependence indicates that a change in the contagion channels is followed by a significant 
change in the emerging currencies.  
However, the pattern of comovement over the crisis period differs from the whole 
sample. Consistent with our initial results, during the crisis period the dependence increases 
substantially, implying that negative shocks in the stock market and the commodity index 
have a stronger effect on the currencies. The strongest relationship during the crisis period 
stands with the Volatility Index. Hence, during high volatility periods, where uncertainty 
increases and credit markets squeeze, changes in the Volatility Index are followed by changes 
in the emerging currencies.   
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        Table 5.8  
        Estimates of Copula Dependence Coefficients with EGARCH specification. 
 Variables 
EGARCH – overall period EGARCH – crisis period 
Student – t Copula Joe-Clayton Copula Student – t Copula Joe-Clayton Copula 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.143* 0.167* 0.159* 0.186* 
 S&P GSCI 0.152* 0.189* 0.203* 0.238* 
 VIX -0.005 -0.002 0.205* 0.243* 
 BCDS -0.011 -0.009 0.118* 0.125* 
Russian RTS 0.124* 0.131* 0.170* 0.192* 
Ruble S&P GSCI 0.146* 0.173 0.202* 0.245* 
 VIX -0.007 -0.005 0.206* 0.248* 
 BCDS -0.010 -0.009 0.124* 0.146* 
Indian Rupee BSE 0.138* 0.159 0.153* 0.180* 
 S&P GSCI 0.120* 0.126* 0.138* 0.155* 
 VIX -0.007 -0.003 0.162* 0.189* 
 BCDS -0.009 -0.008 0.126* 0.132* 
Mexican Peso IPC 0.157* 0.184* 0.196* 0.243* 
 S&P GSCI 0.113* 0.117* 0.128* 0.135* 
 VIX -0.013 -0.008 0.201* 0.284* 
 BCDS -0.017 -0.015 0.120* 0.122* 
South African JSE Top 40 0.161* 0.193* 0.219* 0.256* 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.118* 0.124* 0.135* 0.141* 
 VIX -0.013 -0.010 0.220* 0.267* 
 BCDS -0.029 -0.018 0.112* 0.116* 
     Note: This table presents the estimated Student-t and Joe-Clayton dependence coefficients using the alternative EGARCH  specification. * indicates significance 
     at the 5% level. The sample is divided in two categories: overall and crisis period in order to provide a better description for the effects of the credit crunch. All  
     variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations
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5.5.2 Hit test 
In order to evaluate the copula models we employ the hit tests, as proposed by Patton 
(2006). The results in Table 5.9 verify if the models are well-specified in all regions 
simultaneously (i.e. joint hit test). The p-values are higher than 0.05 implying that the models 
are well-specified. We also employed the following tests
34
: (i) if the models are well 
specified in the joint lower and upper 10% regions; (ii) if the models are well specified in 
moderately up and down days; (iii) if the models are well specified when all exchange rates 
are in the middle 50% of their distributions; (iv) if the models are well specified during 
extremely asymmetric days. The results suggest that the Joe-Clayton copula is the most 
appropriate model to capture fluctuations and volatility spikes in emerging market currencies. 
Indeed, the p – value is higher than 0.05 for all considered currencies in all regions. By 
contrast, the Gaussian and t-Copulas are rejected by the hit test is some regions, for some 
currency pairs. We use five regions: the lower 10% tail, the interval from the 10th to the 25th 
quantile, the interval from the 25th to the 75th quantile, the interval from the 75th to the 90th 
quantile, and the upper 10% tail. These regions represent economically interesting subsets of 
the support—the upper and lower tails are notoriously difficult to fit, and so checking for 
correct specification there is important, whereas the middle 50% of the support contains the 
“average” observations. We use as regressors a constant, to check that the model implies the 
correct proportion of hits, and three variables that count the number of hits in that region, and 
the corresponding region of the other variable, in the last 1, 5, and 10 days, to check that the 
model dynamics are correctly specified. The    functions are set to simple linear functions of 
the parameters and the regressors:   (      )        . 
 
 
                                                          
34
More results for all hit tests are available upon request by the author. 
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Table 5.9 
Hit Test. 
 Variables 
Overall period Crisis period 
Gaussian 
copula 
t-copula Joe-Clayton Copula 
Gaussian 
copula 
t-copula 
Joe-Clayton 
Copula 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.0830 0.2528 0.3593 0.1434 0.2859 0.3750 
 S&P GSCI 0.0872 0.2930 0.4580 0.1683 0.3657 0.4116 
 VIX 0.0532 0.0766 0.1023 0.1095 0.3503 0.4059 
 BCDS 0.0511 0.0604 0.0938 0.0857 0.1594 0.1993 
Russian RTS 0.0923 0.3550 0.5076 0.1684 0.4039 0.5285 
Ruble S&P GSCI 0.0980 0.3879 0.5892 0.1958 0.4768 0.6020 
 VIX 0.0529 0.0720 0.1031 0.0909 0.3059 0.5003 
 BCDS 0.0508 0.0624 0.7553 0.0753 0.1108 0.1387 
Indian Rupee BSE 0.0821 0.3081 0.5020 0.1395 0.5391 0.6188 
 S&P GSCI 0.0804 0.3005 0.3756 0.1108 0.3886 0.4205 
 VIX 0.0523 0.0671 0.8990 0.9536 0.5049 0.6009 
 BCDS 0.0511 0.0603 0.7014 0.7422 0.1052 0.1305 
Mexican Peso IPC 0.1420 0.4412 0.6520 0.1953 0.6952 0.8536 
 S&P GSCI 0.0528 0.1582 0.2057 0.1004 0.2209 0.2995 
 VIX 0.0746 0.2540 0.3588 0.1582 0.3958 0.5098 
 BCDS 0.0503 0.0627 0.0890 0.0829 0.1053 0.1759 
South African JSE Top 40 0.1552 0.7399 0.8009 0.2040 0.8938 0.9953 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.0842 0.2427 0.3005 0.1105 0.2774 0.3590 
 VIX 0.0506 0.6360 0.8523 0.1302 0.2039 0.5663 
 BCDS 0.0501 0.5104 0.5949 0.08472 0.1053 0.1884 
Note: This Table presents the p-values of the joint hit test. The sample is divided in two categories: overall and crisis period in order to provide a better description for the 
effects of the credit crunch. A number over 0.05implies that the model is well – specified in the region. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in 
Appendix H. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
 171 
 
 
5.6 How shocks are propagated in the emerging currency markets  
As discussed by Liang (2013) and Allen and Carletti (2013), the recent financial 
meltdown demonstrates vividly that there are many channels through which seemingly small 
losses, spillover and transfer risk on the broader financial system. Building on and extending 
this approach, we identify four key contagion variables which can amplify shocks and lead to 
instability and whose extreme adverse realisations are associated with a slump of emerging 
market foreign exchanges. These variables represent liquidity, credit, growth constraints and 
the local emerging markets. Under severe financial conditions, funding and liquidity 
problems become a commonplace in the banking sector, increasing the spread on the Banks’ 
Credit Default Swaps. Money supply decreases as less credit is available in the economy. 
Thus, liquidity abruptly dries up, credit risk soars leading to increased uncertainty and 
fluctuations in the markets, and thus the Volatility Index accelerates. This is likely to have a 
recessionary effect on investment, consumption, income, and thus leads to severe downturns 
in the commodity prices (i.e. the growth channel). As a result, investors withdraw capital 
from risky investments and increase their exposures in safe assets such as government bonds 
issued by developed countries, in a flight to quality. This signals net capital outflows in the 
emerging stock markets and point to a decrease in the creditworthiness of government bonds 
issued by an emerging country. Consequently, when liquidity dries up, default probabilities 
accelerate, credit risk intensifies, growth expectations deteriorate, emerging stock markets 
crash and hence, shocks in these variables spillover and transfer risks to emerging market 
currencies.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
In this research, we model and examine conditional and tail dependences for the most 
rapidly developed emerging market foreign exchanges. We use four alternative measures to 
investigate the transmission mechanism and explore how shocks propagate emerging 
currencies. In contrast to the majority of the existing empirical literature we employ 
Gaussian, Joe-Clayton and t-Copula functions in order to identify spillovers across markets of 
different types. We also analyse the extent to which shocks in stock, commodity, liquidity 
and credit channels are transmitted to fluctuations in emerging currencies. In response to the 
questions raised in the introduction, the empirical results provide strong evidence that cross-
asset linkages during periods of high volatility are over and above any economic 
fundamentals. We capture synchronically the behaviour of emerging currencies and the 
interactions with other assets and risk factors. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that large 
adverse shocks in the four channels described above, spill over to emerging market 
currencies, resembling to investor induced contagion and supporting the hypothesis that the 
recent credit crisis was spread through these contagion channels and cross-asset portfolio 
constraints. Our explicit distinction between the four contagion channels and our modelling 
for the evolution of these crashes sheds new light on the propagation of large negative cross-
asset returns.  
Furthermore, we find that during the crisis period, there is a significant genuine 
increase in the cross-asset asymmetric synchronisation and the dependence with emerging 
currencies, advancing to asymmetric contagion. Additionally, we observe that past 
occurrences of local crashes evolve via regional crashes into global crashes, indicating that 
the crisis was spread in a domino fashion into emerging market currencies. Our empirical 
results document that during the financial crisis dependence among assets increased 
significantly, resembling to extreme tail dependence. The dependence in the extremes is 
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generated by the idiosyncratic contagion channels, which are the outcome of several shocks 
and wealth constraints. The significance of the tail dependence implies that these asset classes 
tend to experience concurrent extreme shocks. Moreover, we observe that accelerated 
decreases and large variations in the domestic stock markets, in the growth (i.e. commodities) 
and credit channels (i.e. VIX and BCDS) lead to accelerated decreases and increased 
fluctuations in the emerging market foreign exchanges. Finally, we document that in the post-
crisis period, emerging market foreign exchanges are more susceptible to financial crises and 
speculative attacks, implying the existence of a structural shift in the transmission of shocks 
that divides the behaviour of these currencies. The importance that external shocks and 
liquidity hoarding have in shaping the movement of these emerging currencies is amplified 
and shows that the symptoms of liquidity withdrawal in the developed markets lead to a 
revaluation and a recalibration of the risk characteristics of emerging currencies. 
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Chapter 6: Determinants of Shipping Market Fluctuations: A 
Baeysian Markov Switching Three State Approach 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the financial meltdown of 2008, the seed of investigating and 
understanding the nature of fluctuations and spillover effects among financial assets 
flourished. This was supported by strong indications that cross-country, cross-asset 
correlations and comovements rose dramatically during the financial turmoil. For instance, 
the output performance of global economies shifted and altered together during the peak of 
the financial crisis as never before in the recent history (Acharya and Merrouche 2012; Abiad 
et al., 2013; Berg and Kirschenmann 2014, inter alia). Additionally, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers was followed by an explicit decline in several asset classes simultaneously. In a 
similar vein, Kalouptsidi (2014) deals with the shipping market by quantifying the impact of 
time to build and demand uncertainties on bulk shipping investments. This research models 
and investigates fluctuations which soared and became exceptionally apparent in the financial 
market as well as in shipping assets during the credit crisis and their reactions with several 
risk factors.  
The evidence of cross-border volatility spillovers among different asset classes 
outlines important insights for the transmission channels and the existence of unusual 
fluctuations between developed and emerging, stock and foreign exchange markets (see also 
for informative readings Glosten et al. 1993; Bae et al. 2003; Yuan et al. 2005; Boyer et al. 
2006; Okimoto, 2008; Bekaert et al. 2009; Albuquerque and Vega, 2009; Bubak et al. 2011; 
Ibragimov et al. 2013). Examining the interaction and the changing patterns of correlation 
between shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets fills a major gap in the literature 
and is important for investors and risk managers, since the presence of risk spillovers among 
asset classes increases portfolio risk and magnifies the volatility of the expected returns.  
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Over the last decade, the shipping industry has emerged as a critical component for 
global economic advances, as a crucial element for understanding economic developments 
and as an asset class which offers a variety of investment benefits at both micro and global 
macro levels (for informative reading see also Kilian 2009, Kilian and Park 2009, and 
Kalouptsidi 2014, inter alia). As several studies observe, shipping cycles are driven by 
combinations of external and internal factors that shape the long-term volatility of the 
shipping industry (Kavoussanos and Visvikis, 2004; Adland and Cullinane, 2006). Indeed, 
the demand for maritime transportation is derived primarily from the needs of industrial 
processes, therefore conjectures and depressions in the shipping sector are typically 
motivated by the industrial cycles and the global economic situation. Moreover, the supply of 
shipping is relatively inelastic since it is impossible to build up new ships to meet a rapid 
increase in demand or to scale down capacity if demand decreases due to economic shocks. 
However, due to the nonstationary and nonlinear nature of price series and the complexity of 
influencing factors, it is difficult to analyze volatility spikes and variations in the shipping 
market (Batchelor et al., 2007; Goulas and Skiadopoulos 2012).  
Motivated by the fluctuations experienced over the last decade in the shipping market, 
this research endeavours to answer the following questions: what is the relationship and the 
information contained between the stock market (S&P 500), the commodity market (S&P 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index), the credit market (iTraxx Senior Financials Index for 
Banks’ Credit Default Swaps35 and Volatility Index36 representing changes in credit markets) 
and the shipping market? What drives large fluctuations and the risk characteristics of the 
shipping assets? Do the shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets become more 
                                                          
35
According to Jorion and Zhang (2007) and to Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Credit Default Swaps drive the 
movements in credit spreads and provide an indicator for the credit health of a firm. Similarly, we employ 
Banks’ Credit Default Swaps spreads as a driver for the credit conditions (e.g. funding). 
36
The Volatility Index is an implied volatility index based on options on the S&P 500 stock Index and is used as 
a proxy to evaluate credit market risk, similar to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) 
who use the VIX and the VStoxx as the best available substitute for their data set, respectively. 
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integrated during crisis periods when compared with tranquil periods?  Which is more prone 
to spillovers, the Dry Bulk or the Tanker market, Capesize (large vessels) or Panamax 
(medium range) vessels? 
In particular, we examine, for the very first time in the literature, directional linkages 
and the regime-dependent behaviour between four indices, the Baltic Dry Index, the Baltic 
Panamax Index, the Baltic Capesize Index, the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index and four financial 
assets, the S&P 500 Index, the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, the Banks’ Credit 
Default Swaps Index and the Volatility Index. In this light, the literature mainly focuses on 
the effects of global trade, ship type, fleet size, the forward freight market and stock market 
variables (see Kavoussanos and Nomikos, 1999; Haigh, 2000; Kavoussanos and Visvikis 
2004, Tezuka et al., 2012; Lin and Sim, 2013, and Kalouptsidi 2014 inter alia). Our research 
highlights the regime dependent behavior of the shipping market and identifies the episodes 
of shocks and spillovers from the financial, commodity and credit markets to the shipping 
market, contrary to Bakshi et al., (2011) who study cyclical properties of the annual growth 
of the Baltic Dry Index and its forecasting ability on other financial assets.  
We use a novel multiple equation approach which builds on and extends Alexander 
and Kaeck (2008). In particular, our MSVAR methodology accounts for informational 
contents of the financial, commodity and credit markets, and the stance of a business cycle 
and relaxes the assumption maintained in previous research that stock and credit market 
variables are exogenous. We test for the correct number of regimes and find that by 
employing a three-state MS VAR approach the shipping indices switched from low risk 
regime (regime 1, July 2007) to mainly intermediate risk regime (regime 2) and occasionally 
to high risk regime (regime 3).  Our findings indicate that propagation of shocks in the S&P 
500 stock index leads to decreasing the shipping indexes, increasing credit market volatility 
and decreasing the commodity market. An unanticipated increase in credit market volatility 
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leads to decreasing the shipping indexes, the financial and the commodity markets. 
Propagation of shocks in the commodity market, leads to increasing credit market volatility, 
and decreasing shipping indexes and stock markets. Finally, we observe that shock effects 
accelerated during, mainly, intermediate risk regime (regime 2) and high risk regime (regime 
3). As a result, the higher the volatility regime the stronger is the effect.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is three-fold. First, we complement the 
literature that studies the determinants of the shipping market. Whereas most of the existing 
literature uses single-equation models to evaluate the determinants of the Dry Bulk 
(Kavoussanos and Visvikis, 2004; Tezuka et al. 2012; Lin and Sim, 2013; Kalouptsidi 2014; 
and Papapostolou et al. 2014) and Tanker markets (Adland and Cullinane, 2006), our 
research is based on a multiple-equation model. In particular, we use a Markov-switching 
Bayesian vector autoregression (MSVAR) model that (i) relaxes the assumption maintained 
in financial research that stock market variables are exogenous in determining the movement 
of other asset classes; and that (ii) allows to compute regime-dependent impulse response 
functions, similar to Erhmann et al. (2003). An additional methodological novelty is that we 
use a Gibbs sampler to estimate the MSVAR, which can be thought of a stochastic version of 
the expectations maximization algorithm commonly used to estimate Markov-switching 
models. Moreover, our three-regime approach extends Alexander and Kaeck (2008) who 
employ a two state Markov-switching model to identify two regimes for the Credit Default 
Swaps market. Our research employs means of smoothed regime probabilities, to introduce 
and identify an intermediate volatility regime that started in July 2007 (and coincided with 
the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States), and a high volatility 
regime that prevailed in the aftermath of extensive government interventions in September 
2008.   
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Second, we fill a gap via studying the effects of the credit crisis on the shipping 
market, identifying novel evidence of new channels for the transmission of shocks across 
international markets and thus, extending Bakshi et al. (2011), and Jotikasthira et al. (2012). 
The MSVAR model we use sheds light on significant regime dependences between stock, 
commodity, credit markets and the shipping indexes during the financial turmoil. 
Specifically, our results are supportive of the hypothesis that the financial turbulence started 
in 2008 led to a risk transfer from the financial assets to the shipping industry, and in 
particular to the shipping sector, documenting the existence of spillovers. During market 
tranquil periods (regime states one and two) the commodity market affects severely the 
shipping market.  However, during turmoil periods (regime state three) the credit squeeze and 
the increased uncertainty for global economic growth, distress the shipping market 
immensely.  Additionally, we observe that spillovers are more prominent over turmoil or 
crisis periods. Notably, the effects are always stronger in a more volatile regime. 
Third, we complement the literature that studies risk management in the shipping 
market via providing scope for hedging the risks for investments in the shipping market (see 
also Kavoussanos and Visvikis, 2004; Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2007; Batchelor et al., 2007; 
Goulas and Skiadopoulos, 2012; Tezuka et al., 2012). Specifically, we find that changes in 
financial, commodity and credit markets are more quickly incorporated into the Dry Bulk 
market than in the Tanker market. Furthermore, we observe that the Dry Bulk market is more 
volatile and thus more vulnerable to downside risks than the Tanker market. Also, changes in 
these financial assets are more quickly incorporated into the category of vessels of higher 
tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) than vessels of medium range tonnage (i.e. Panamax vessels). 
Moreover, the Baltic Capesize Index is more volatile and more vulnerable to downside risks 
compared with the Baltic Panamax Index. Thus, as a proactive risk management measure, a 
company may opt to charter-rate vessels on long term bareboat charters or may choose to 
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diversify their fleet in terms of type of vessel and tonnage. In addition, our results are also 
supportive of the hypothesis that higher risk premium that is required by investors for holding 
financial assets depresses the shipping market.  Finally, we observe that the Volatility Index 
captures to a great extent fluctuations and extreme variations in the shipping indices and thus, 
its derivative (i.e. Volatility Futures Index) can be used as a hedging proxy instrument during 
turbulent periods in the shipping market. 
 
6.2. The Hypotheses 
The hypotheses build upon a relation among the the Baltic Dry Index, the Baltic 
Panamax Index, the Baltic Capesize Index and the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, the S&P 500 
stock market index, the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P G.S.C.I.), the iTraxx 
Senior Financials Index
37
, and the Volatility Index
38
 (V.I.X.) in low, intermediate and high 
volatility regimes. Our research identifies three regimes in the shipping market. These are 
low volatility, intermediate volatility and high volatility regimes. Before the subprime 
mortgage crisis (i.e., before July 2007), the shipping market experienced low-volatility 
regime, with the shipping indexes moving upward. The intermediate volatility regime 
commenced in July 2007, when HSBC announced large subprime-mortgage related losses 
(Eichengreen et al. 2012). The high-volatility regime was triggered by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (September 2008), with financial contagion spilling from the United States 
to European countries, and with large-scale government intervention in the European banking 
sector. During the high-volatility regime, the shipping indices experienced an unprecedented 
drawdown that was followed again by a relatively calmer intermediate-volatility period with 
                                                          
37An increase (decrease) in the iTraxx Senior Financials Index represents an increase in Banks’ Credit Default 
Swap spreads and indicates an increase (decrease) in financial and credit risk and a deterioration (improvement) 
in markets’ credit condition (see also Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). 
38
An increase in the Volatility Index indicates an increase in uncertainty and is associated with an increase in 
credit risk (Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). Following Annaert et al. (2013). Volatility Indices can be used as a 
good proxy to capture business and credit climate.  
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some tendency for the high-volatility state to recur during the sovereign debt crisis in a 
number of peripheral Euro Area countries that commenced in the late 2009. These 
developments are described in Figure 6.1. 
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PANEL B 
 
 
 
PANEL C 
 
Figure 6.1 – Developments in Shipping, Credit and Stock Markets 
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Note. Figure 6.1 depicts daily movements of shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets and exhibits the 
variation over time in the Shipping Indexes – PANEL A (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic 
Capesize Index, Baltic Dirty Tanker Index), the financial market (S&P 500 stock Index), the commodity market 
(S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) in PANEL B and the credit market (Volatility Index) in PANEL C.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis).  Following Gerlach et al. (2010), 
and Acharya et al. (2013), a systemic financial crisis gives rise to a business-cycle recession, 
which weakens public finances and leads to a higher default risk. Financial institutions that 
suffer unanticipated outflow of deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues in a 
wholesale market are forced to reduce their lending activity and even to call back existing 
loans in order to deleverage their balance sheets. This raises the probability to default on 
banks’ liabilities. If funding and liquidity problems become a commonplace in the banking 
sector, money supply will decrease as less credit will become available in the economy. Thus, 
a systemic banking crisis is likely to have a recessionary effect on investment, consumption, 
income, and thus leads to severe downturns the shipping market. The first part of this 
hypothesis predicts that a negative change in the stock market (i.e. S&P 500 stock index) is 
followed by a negative change in the shipping Indexes (Hypothesis 1a).  
Accordingly, we formulate a second part of this hypothesis. In a more volatile stock 
market regime, changes in the risk have a stronger effect on the shipping market -as 
measured by the risk for holding shipping assets- than in a less volatile regime (Hypothesis 
1b). Following a systemic financial crisis, uncertainty about the global economy increases, as 
the stock market enters a more volatile regime. In a higher volatility regime, the shipping 
market deteriorates more strongly than in a less volatile regime, notably before the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers.  
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Hypothesis 2 (Commodity Market). A decrease in the commodity market (i.e. S&P GSCI) 
indicates that an investment in commodities is now less desirable and demand for 
commodities decreases (see also Arezki et al. 2014, for informative readings on commodity 
price fluctuations). A decline in the demand for commodities and consequently a fall in their 
prices, indicates less commodity transportation and as a result less expected revenues for 
shipping companies. Thus, negative changes in the commodity market (S&P G.S.C.I.) are 
followed by negative changes in the shipping market (Hypothesis 2a).  
Accordingly, in a more volatile commodity market regime, changes in the risk have a 
stronger effect on the shipping market -as measured by the risk for holding shipping assets- 
than in a less volatile regime (Hypothesis 2b). 
Hypothesis 3 (Expected Volatility & Risk Premium Hypothesis). Positive changes in the 
Credit Channel (i.e. iTraxx Senior Financials Index) and in the Volatility Index (V.I.X.) are 
followed by negative changes in the shipping market (Hypothesis 3a). As the credit crisis 
intensifies, uncertainty for the future prospects of the economy deteriorate. Fluctuations and 
elevated volatility strengthens informational contents of stock, commodity and credit markets 
and raises uncertainty further. Consequently, the credit market freezes (i.e. the  iTraxx Senior 
Financials which represents the price of Banks’ Credit Default Swaps increases), and the 
business climate worsens (unobservable firm’s asset volatility can be approximated 
reasonably well by the Volatility Index, similar to Alexander and Kaeck, 2008, and Annaert, 
2013). An increase in the VIX generates greater uncertainty to firms and may delay 
investment decisions. Thus, investors may decide to rebalance their portfolios of assets 
decreasing exposure to shipping assets.  
Additionally, in a more volatile regime of the credit market (i.e. an increase in VIX), 
the magnitude of the response of the Shipping market is greater than in a less volatile regime 
(Hypothesis 3b). Elevated volatility impairs informational contents of the shipping market 
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and further raises uncertainty to shipping market investors. Consequently, investors will 
demand higher risk premium in order to invest in shipping asset classes. When uncertainty - 
as measured by VIX - increases, shipping assets loose value and their yields increase to 
reflect a higher cost of capital. Because future expected cash flows of the shipping market are 
discounted with a higher discount rate, the shipping indexes decrease, as investors demand 
higher risk premium to compensate for the increased riskiness. With higher cost of capital 
some investment projects become unprofitable and thus are discarded by maritime 
companies. This places a constraint on growth prospects, justifying a decrease in the shipping 
market.  
 
6.3. Methodology 
6.3.1. Linear Regression and Markov Switching VAR Model 
First we estimate the following linear regression model for the shipping indexes: 
                                                          (1) 
where         denotes the lagged change in the Shipping Index,    is the return of the S&P 
500 Index,    is the return of the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index,     is the change 
in the Volatility Index,     is the change in Banks’ CDS and       denotes the jth interest rate 
principal component.  
In order to capture non-linear relationships, we employ a Markov-switching vector 
autoregression (MSVAR) model to investigate the regime-varying relation for the shipping 
indexes. The MSVAR model can be specified as: 
   {
                                   if      
 
                                if      
},   (2) 
 186 
 
where    is an N-dimensional vector of dependent variables,    is an N-dimensional vector of 
constants in regime     ,    is a K-dimensional vector of exogenous variables,     and    
are (N x N) and (K x N) matrices of coefficients in regime  , respectively, and    is an N-
dimensional vector of normally distributed structural disturbances uncorrelated at all leads 
and lags. The variance of each structural disturbance is normalized to unity. We assume that 
all parameters may switch among  regimes.  
It is widely accepted that various economic and financial series exhibit time varying 
behavior. For instance, Andreou and Ghysels (2002) find evidence for shifts in various 
volatility series during economic crisis. The MSVAR model provides a flexible and 
parsimonious specification that allows for time varying behavior in the VAR parameters. In 
particular, the MSVAR of equation (2) can be written as 
                                                .    (3) 
A key aspect of the specification shown above is that the state variable    does not 
need be specified. The variable    is a latent variable that may convey informational contents 
of the financial, commodity and credit markets, and the stance of a business cycle.  
Therefore, the MSVAR provides a parsimonious specification that can accommodate changes 
in the structural relationship between various volatility series, when the economic 
environment changes.  
The reduced-form disturbances are the structural disturbances pre-multiplied by a regime-
dependent matrix    . Consequently, the variance and covariance matrix of       is also 
regime-dependent, as indicated in the following equation: 
       (     )          
                (4) 
The regime    is assumed to follow a hidden m-state Markov-chain (for informative 
reading see also Smith and Summers, 2005; Balke and Wohar, 2009; and Song, 2014). The 
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probability of being in regime   conditional on the current regime   is assumed exogenous 
and constant (i.e. assets shift among different regimes over time, see also Hamilton 1990). 
The conditional probabilities that span the   regimes are given by the following probability 
transition matrix  : 
  (
       
   
       
),         (5) 
Where                     and ∑    
 
      for all        . 
More compactly, Equation (2) can be written as 
         [         ]         (6) 
The overall log-likelihood function         Φ  can be obtained by 
             Φ  ∑     (                  Φ)
 
   ,      (7) 
where 
             Φ  ∑                   Φ 
 
                     Φ   (8) 
with      (           ),  
                  Φ  
 
      ⁄     
   ⁄    {
 (         )
 
  
  (         )
 
},         and (9) 
                  Φ  ∑                                    Φ 
 
        
     (10) 
The probability                     Φ  can be updated recursively. The updating 
procedure involves the following computation: 
              Φ  
                 Φ                 Φ 
∑                  Φ 
 
                   Φ 
              (11) 
Denoting  
                       Φ        ,               (12) 
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and collecting      in vector    (               ), Equation (9) can be written as  
          
         
                     (13) 
After a sufficient number of iterations a Markov chain reaches an ergodic distribution   ,  
where the expected regime is independent from the initial condition, and which satisfies  
                            (14) 
 
6.3.2. Estimation Method 
The optimization of Equation (6) may be performed by a suitable extension of an 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described by means of a Bayesian estimation 
algorithm (see also for informative readings Waggoner and Zha 2003; Sims and Zha 2006; 
and Sims et al. 2008).  In particular, we use a Bayesian inference based on a Gibbs sampler 
that belongs to the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) family of algorithms. The Bayesian 
estimator is more suitable in our case, since it takes advantage of the whole distribution that 
is available from Bayesian sampling (see also Ryden et al. 1998; Tsionas 2002 and 2006; and 
Song 2014 inter alia), whereas an EM algorithm can only return a single point from the 
distribution. Hence, the Gibbs sampler can be viewed as a stochastic version of the EM 
algorithm, and as a powerful tool for posterior simulation (please see also Appendix L for 
informative details). 
The specification of our MSVAR mainly concerns the identification of switching 
regimes, governed by a stochastic, unobserved regime variable   . The regimes are 
associated with different conditional distributions of the shipping indices, the returns on the 
commodity market index S&P GSCI, the change in the iTraxx Senior Financials Index and 
the volatility index VIX, and returns on the S&P 500 stock market index that are driven by 
  . The number of regimes   is not exogenously determined but is based on the observation 
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of variation over time by employing the Gibbs sampler and on the account of the various 
relevant events that took place in our sample period. We estimate the regime-dependent 
parameter matrix Φ  by using the Gibbs sampler. The probability of each regime (and thus 
the length of each regime) and the number of regimes   is based on the notion that the 
dynamic relation between the shipping indexes and the variables may be: i) different in the 
period before and after the July 2007 subprime-mortgage crisis; (ii) different in the period 
before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008); and iii) different in 
periods where the effect of these events diminished. 
As a result, a parsimonious model that assumes two regimes may fail to capture all the 
available information and may be inadequate to distinguish the highly risky and moderately 
risky periods. Thus, assuming only two regimes
39
 it is possible to omit critical information 
incorporated in our sample and thus, to obtain misleading results when the true number of 
regimes is higher
40
.  
 
6.3.3 Estimating the Impulse Response Functions 
We employ the Cholesky decomposition
41
 to orthogonalize the reduced-form variance 
and covariance matrix    given in Equation (4). The Cholesky decomposition provides an 
                                                          
39
In the relevant literature, the choice of the number of regimes has been intensely debated. The most common 
approach is to use 2 regimes, based on economic rather than on statistical principles. However, it is not 
uncommon to expect that a more complex three-regime MSVAR is more suitable for the dataset (see also 
Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado 2010). Thus, as a robustness check we employ the Chib (1996) and Bawens et al. 
(2010, and 2014) methods, to test for the number of possible regimes for the shipping indexes.  
40
The MSVAR model with 2 regimes implies that a low volatility regime dominated in the sample sub-period 
before July 2007, and a high volatility regime dominated thereafter. They are qualitatively similar to the results 
obtained using the MSVAR model with 3 regimes, but omit any information for the sub-periods (i.e. medium 
volatility regime). The results obtained assuming two regimes are available from the author upon request. 
41
The Cholesky decomposition implies that an innovation in a higher-ordered endogenous variable exerts a 
contemporaneous effect on a lower-ordered variable. In contrast, an innovation in a lower-ordered endogenous 
variable cannot exert a contemporaneous effect on a higher-ordered endogenous variable. On the contrary, an 
innovation in a lower-ordered endogenous variable may only exert a lagged effect on a higher-ordered 
endogenous variable. 
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indirect estimate of the lower triangular matrix   42. We follow Pesaran and Shim (1998) 
who employ the generalized impulse response analysis and show that for a non-diagonal 
variance and covariance matrix, the orthogonalized and the generalized impulse responses 
coincide only in the case of the impulse responses of the random disturbances to the first 
equation of the VAR.  
Thus, we measure the contemporaneous and lagged response of the endogenous 
variable as means of the regime-dependent impulse-response functions (IRF). The vectors of 
the regime-dependent impulse-responses can be derived by combining the parameter 
estimates of the unrestricted MSVAR with the estimate of the regime-dependent variance and 
covariance matrix   . Firstly, we assume that a shock hits the     endogenous variable 
occurs in period 0. Then, the contemporaneous response vector measures the impact effect of 
the     random disturbance on the endogenous variables in period 0. A one standard 
deviation shock to the     endogenous variable can be denoted as a vector of zeros except for 
the nth element, which is unity, i.e.,                   . Hence, pre-multiplying this 
vector by the estimate of the regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix  ̂  yields the 
contemporaneous response vector. Additionally, it is possible to obtain the one-step-ahead 
response vector by solving forward for the endogenous variables in Equation (2), in order to 
measure the impact effect of the     random disturbance (that occurred in period 0) on the 
endogenous variables in period 1. Analytically, the contemporaneous and  -step-ahead 
response vectors are given in Equations (15) and (16), respectively:   
 ̂           
   ⁄
 ̂                       (15) 
 ̂           
   ⁄ ∑    
     
 ̂   
   {   }
   ,                     (16) 
                                                          
42
We follow the identification scheme proposed by Sims (1980) who imposes a specific order of the endogenous 
variables in order to obtain a unique triangular factorization of the residuals of a VAR model.  
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Notably, Equations (15) and (16) assume that there are no further random 
disturbances in subsequent periods (i.e. depict net impulse responses). However, the shipping 
indices, the S&P GSCI, the iTraxx Senior Financials Index, the Volatility index and the S&P 
500 stock market index feature a slowly moving component and thus follow a high memory 
process, which is likely to be non-stationary, and hence we transform the endogenous 
variables in first differences. We use accumulated impulse responses by adding the net 
impulse responses, in order to measure the responses of the endogenous variables in levels. 
Accordingly, the contemporaneous accumulated response vector can be still measured by 
Equation (15), with the  -step-ahead accumulated response vector to be:  
 ̃      ∑  ̂     
 
   ,                                              (17) 
 
6.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Using the Bloomberg, Datastream and Clarksons databases we collected daily data 
observations for the Baltic Dry Index (B.D.I.), the Baltic Panamax Index (B.P.I.), the Baltic 
Capesize Index (B.C.I.), the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index (B.D.T.I.), the S&P 500 stock market 
index, the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P G.S.C.I.), the iTraxx Senior 
Financials Index (Banks’ Credit Default Swaps or BCDS), the Volatility Index (V.I.X.) and 
the fixed-for-floating U.S. Libor interest rate swaps for maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years 
from 21
st
 March 2005 till 22
nd
 June 2013
43
. The fixed-for-floating U.S. Libor interest rate 
swaps capture the risk free interest rate and expectations of the future risk free interest rate. 
Higher risk free interest rate incentivizes rational investors to invest in risk free assets, 
thereby decreasing the share of risky assets in their portfolio and thus, the associated credit 
risk. In the risk neutral world, the risk free interest rate constitutes the drift (Merton 1974). 
Hence, an increase in the risk free interest rate drives up the risk neutral drift and decreases 
                                                          
43
Appendix K presents a short description of the variables used in this research. 
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the probability of default. In this thesis, we calculate the first and second principal 
components on the fixed-for-floating U.S. Libor interest rate swaps for maturities ranging 
from 1 to 30 years. The first principal component captures the level of the risk-free interest 
rate, whereas the second component (“slope”) represents expectations of future movements in 
the risk free interest rate. Moreover, the slope of the term structure conveys valuable 
information about the business cycle stance (Fama, 1984; Duffie et al. 2000; Collin-Dufresne 
et al. 2001). Specifically, a high slope anticipates an increase in future economic activity 
(Fama 1984, Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991). 
We present summary statistics in Table 6.1 in Appendix J (standard deviation, 
skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-value associated to the 
Jarque-Bera test statistic). Over the sample period, the mean of the shipping indices is 
negative (i.e. BDI - 1.4649 basis points) reflecting greater risk for investments in the shipping 
market. The biggest risk is observed for the Baltic Capesize Index (-1.8871) and the less risk 
for the Tanker market (-0.4853). Moreover, all shipping indexes are negatively skewed (BDI: 
-1.072, BPI: -0.459, BCI: -2.008, BDTI: -1610) and highly leptokurtic (BDI: 16.309, BPI: 
9.973, BCI: 37.623, BDTI: 36.779) implying that the distribution departs from symmetry. 
The resulting distribution is non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera 
test statistic. The shipping market experienced significant fluctuations over the sample 
period, as indicated by the range of variation in the standard deviation. The latter indicates 
that the change in the BDI deviated from the mean on average by 2551 index points, in the 
BPI by 2507 index points, in the BCI by 3775 index points and in the tanker market by 405 
basis points.  
Stock (S&P 500) and commodity (S&P GSCI) returns were less volatile, as suggested 
by the range of variation and the standard deviation. Daily percentage stock and commodity 
returns were positive during the sample period (S&P: +0.2251%, S&P GSCI: +0.0001%). 
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Consistent with empirical evidence on skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively skewed 
and leptokurtic, suggesting that big negative events in the stock and commodity markets are 
more likely than big positive events and that the density of returns is greater the closer returns 
are to the sample median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal.  
Over the sample period, the mean of the BCDS spread (106.87 basis points) reflects 
an increasing credit default risk of the banking sector. BCDS also was very volatile, as 
witnessed by the range of variation of the data (the difference between the minimum and 
maximum values) and by the standard deviation. BCDS deviates from the mean on average 
by 81.99 basis points and is also positively skewed and leptokurtic. The resulting 
distributions are non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. 
The change in the volatility index VIX has a positive mean, indicating that the 
expectations of market volatility increased substantially over the sample period. Also, the 
range of the variation in the standard deviation implies that the index experienced several 
fluctuations over the particular period. This finding suggests that the change in the VIX 
deviated from the mean on average by 1.97 index points. The change in the volatility index is 
also positively skewed and highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values.  
The fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps have positive means ranging from 2.22% (1-
year maturity) to 3.79% (20-year maturity). Thus, longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to 
have a higher rate than shorter maturity interest rate swaps. The converse is true for the range 
of variation and the standard deviation. Longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to be less 
volatile. Shorter maturity (up to 4 years) swaps are positively skewed, whereas longer 
maturity swaps are negatively skewed. Interest rate swaps are leptokurtic and non-normally 
distributed for all maturities. 
In Table 6.2 in Appendix J we present the results for the unit root tests. We employ 
four different unit tests – the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Kwiatkowski-
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Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) 
test – to test for a unit root in the data. The results provide overwhelming evidence that the 
S&P 500 stock index, the S&P GSCI, and interest rate swaps for maturities higher than 2 
years have a unit root. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for the slope when using 
the Zivot Andrews unit root test. Moreover, the volatility index, VIX, is identified as 
difference-stationary only when we employ the KPSS test. In general, the results of the unit 
root tests support the use of variables in first differences in the MSVAR models
44
. Since, the 
interest rate swaps for most maturities have a unit root, we run a principal component 
analysis on the series in first differences. 
 
6.5 Empirical Findings 
6.5.1. Linear Regression Estimates 
We start by interpreting the results of the linear regression model (equation 1), 
reported in Table 6.3. We observe that for all considered shipping indexes the coefficient is 
positive between the shipping, the stock and the commodity markets and negative with the 
credit markets (i.e. iTraxx Senior Financials Index and the Volatility Index). The negative 
association with the credit indices indicates that higher volatility and the deterioration of 
credit conditions will be followed by a decrease in the shipping market while lower volatility 
and an improvement of credit market conditions will be followed by an increase. Moreover, 
there is statistical significance with all coefficients except for the slope of the yield curve (i.e. 
Principal Component 2). According to theory, the second principal component represents the 
slope of the yield curve. An increase in the slope of the yield curve implies that economic 
conditions are improving (i.e. economic expansion) and thus should be followed by an 
                                                          
44
The volatility index, ViX, shows a tendency to revert to the mean, and thus, we also used this variable in levels 
in our MSVAR model. The effects of the propagation of shocks to the shipping indices, the S&P 500 stock 
index, the S&P GSCI, the BCDS and on the ViX volatility index in levels resemble those reported in Figures 6.2 
and 6.3. 
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increase in the shipping indexes. However, the negative association and the corresponding t-
statistics in parentheses imply that there is no significant evidence to support this assertion. 
This may be explained from the post crisis behaviour of the shipping indexes, when the 
market deteriorated further while the slope of the yield curve increased upwards.  
On the other hand, the first principal component is significant (positive association) 
implying that interest rate changes influence the movement of the shipping indexes. The 
results for the Baltic Dry Index are stronger than those of the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, 
indicating that changes in stock, commodity and credit markets are more quickly 
incorporated into the Dry Bulk market than in the Tanker market. Indeed, the significance 
between the BDI and the structural variables are: 11 with the financial market (S&P 500, i.e. 
St), 13 with the commodity market (S&P GSCI, i.e. Gt), and -0.1 with the iTraxx Senior 
Financials Index and -0.2 with the Volatility Index, (i.e. Vt).  On the other hand, the 
significance between the BDTI and the structural variables are: 10 with the financial market, 
10 with the commodity market, -0.2 with the BCDS -0.3 with the VIX. Additionally, the 
results for the Baltic Capesize Index are stronger than those of the Baltic Panamax Index, 
implying that changes in financial, commodity and credit markets are more quickly 
incorporated into the category of vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) than 
vessels of medium range tonnage (i.e. Panamax vessels). Thus, as a pro-active risk 
management measure, a company may opt to charter-out vessels on long-term bareboat 
charters which offer the least risk as the company is not responsible for any expenses or 
liabilities, such as maintenance, associated with operating the vessel. Alternatively, a 
shipping company may choose to diversify their fleet in terms of type of vessel, tonnage, etc.. 
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Table 6.3.  
Linear Regression Model  
Constant 
Shipping 
Indext-1 
 St  Gt ΔVt ΔCt PC1 PC2  R
2
  AIC  SC 
Baltic Dry Index 
-0.0179 
(-0.7630) 
0.3782 
11.7036 
(3.5633) 
13.5072 
(3.6290) 
-0.2135 
(-1.9849) 
-0.1784    
(-1.6630) 
0.5233 
(0.3381) 
-0.4130 
(-3.4735) 
0.3382 1.3004 1.3577 
Baltic Panamax Index 
-0.0167 
(-0.7851) 
0.3770 
10.3829 
(3.4032) 
12.8095 
(3.7455) 
-0.2042 
(-1.9476) 
-0.1408    
(-1.6155) 
0.3551 
(0.3188) 
-0.4663 
(-3.0072) 
0.2935 1.1056 1.1187 
Baltic Capesize Index 
-0.0186 
(-0.7411) 
0.3816 
15.3794 
(3.8344) 
18.1216 
(4.3372) 
-0.4168 
(-2.9926) 
-0.3941    
(-1.7224) 
0.6638 
(0.3251) 
-0.4002 
(-3.7059) 
0.3402 2.0007 2.5442 
Baltic Dirty Tanker Index 
-0.0158 
(-0.8113) 
0.3538 
10.0071 
(2.9856) 
10.9473 
(3.290) 
-0.3648 
(-2.0027) 
-0.2005    
(-1.6813) 
0.3187 
(0.3114) 
-0.4721 
(-2.8002) 
0.2654 1.1003 1.1108 
Note. Results of regressing daily changes in the Shipping Indexes (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic Capesize Index, Baltic Dirty Tanker Index) on theoretical 
determinants – the financial market S&P 500 Index (St), the commodity market S&P GSCI Index (Gt), the credit market measured by the Volatility Index (ΔVt), the level of 
the fixed for floating interest rate swap (PC1) and the slope of the yield curve of the fixed for floating interest rate swap (PC2) - . Regression coefficients and corresponding 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Most of the variation that is not explained by the Linear Regression Model may be 
due to a common factor and thus, in Table 6.4 we present a principal component analysis on 
the residuals for the shipping indices. We use the first difference of swap rates, so that PC1 
and PC2 are stationary themselves and can be directly used in our regression without using 
first differences. The results indicate that 62.5% of the variation is explained by the first 
principal component, implying that a systemic factor influences the residuals. According to 
theory, as described by Longstaff and Schwart (1995), and Collin-Dufrense et al. (2001), the 
static effect of a higher spot rate (Principal Component 1) is to increase the risk neutral drift 
of the firm value process. An increase in the firm value implies economic expansion, inter 
alia. Thus, in our case we expect a higher spot rate to increase the value of shipping 
companies and consequently in the shipping indices. Thus, the relationship between changes 
in the shipping market and the spot rate is expected to be positive.  
On the contrary, the eigenvalues for the second principal component (eigenvector 2) 
have a negative sign with the shipping indices, indicating that there is a missing systematic 
factor that affects them. According to theory, as explained by Duffie and Singleton (1997), 
the slope is one of the most important factors driving the term structure of interest rates and 
thus an increase in the slope of the Treasury (yield) curve increases the expected future short 
rate. Following the above argument, an increase in the slope of the yield curve (Principal 
Component 2) indicates additional increases in the risk neutral drift of the firm value process, 
and thus represents enlarged expectations for economic expansion which leads to an increase 
in the value of shipping companies and consequently in the shipping indices. Thus, the 
relationship between changes in the shipping market and changes in the slop of the yield 
curve is expected to be positive. 
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Table 6.4.  
Principal Components Analysis 
 
Eigenvector 1 Eigenvector 2 
Eigenvector 1 Eigenvector 2 
λmax λtrace λmax λtrace 
Cumulative Probability 0.6250 0.6934 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Baltic Dry Index 0.2261 -0.5035 96.53 129.47 53.02 94.71 
Baltic Panamax Index 0.2214 -0.4987 81.77 122.95 40.08 75.66 
Baltic Capesize Index 0.2270 -0.5182 98.69 140.26 62.84 119.30 
Baltic DirtyTanker Index 0.2211 -0.4933 78.04 103.51 29.57 65.53 
Note. This Table presents cumulative probability, the eigenvectors belonging to the two largest eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the residuals of regression (1). λmax 
and λtrace tests of the correlation matrix of the residuals of regression (1) are also reported. The first Eigenvector (principal component one) is significant (positive association) 
implying that interest rate changes influence the movement of the Shipping Indexes .The negative association for the second Eigenvector (principal component two) imply 
that there is no significant evidence to support this assertion. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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These results are intuitively in line with Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Collin-
Dufrense et al. (2011), who find the same effect for credit default swap spreads and single-
name bond spreads respectively. Indeed, the size of the eigenvalues, the λmax and the λtrace 
statistics are not sufficiently large enough. Consequently, in order to take into account 
departures from normality and non – linear relationships we employ a non-linear MS VAR 
model (equation 2).  
 
6.5.2. Estimated Markov Regimes 
We use a Markov-Switching vector autoregression model of order 1 to estimate the 
relation between the Shipping Indexes, returns on the S&P 500 stock market index, returns on 
the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and the change in BCDS and in the Volatility 
Index. We use a Gibbs sampler as a Bayesian technique to estimate the MSVAR
45
. The 
vector of exogenous variables comprises the first (“level”) and second (“slope”) principal 
components (PC1 and PC2) on the fixed-for-floating Euro interest rate swaps for different 
maturities (from 1 year to 30 years). The MSVAR model is estimated assuming three Markov 
regimes while all parameters are allowed to change across the three regimes. The variance 
and covariance matrix is also regime-dependent. The three regimes are depicted in Panels A – 
C of Figure 6.2 in Appendix J. 
Smooth-estimated regime probabilities are depicted in Figure 6.2. A regime is defined 
as a region (or polygon) where the smooth regime probability takes on value greater than 0.5. 
The estimation results suggest that the regime 1 prevailed from the beginning of the sample 
(March 2005) till July 2007 that marked the beginning of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. 
Because the Shipping Indexes featured a slowly moving component with a positive tendency, 
regime 1 can be denoted as a low volatility regime. In July 2007, the shipping market 
                                                          
45
For robustness, we also estimated the MSVAR of order 4 (MSVAR(4)). This lag length is selected by the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) on a linear VAR. The results obtained using the MSVAR(4) are 
qualitatively similar. 
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switched from regime 1 to regime 2. This regime can be viewed as a collection of sub-periods 
where the Shipping Indexes were more volatile than in regime 1, but less abrupt than in 
regime 3. Regime 2 dominated the rest of the sample period that started in July 2007 and was 
only occasionally interrupted by regime 3, when the Shipping Indexes experienced an 
accelerated decrease and never returned to their pre-crisis levels. This points to a structural 
break, caused due to the credit crisis. In particular, the spread of the financial meltdown to the 
shipping market caused a permanent effect and changed its relationship with stock, 
commodity and credit markets. Thus, regimes 2 and 3 can be denoted as intermediate and 
high volatility regimes. 
Table 6.5 presents the coefficient estimates for the three regime states. For all 
considered Shipping Indexes the third regime is the most volatile, while the second regime is 
more volatile than the first regime. In particular, the average annual change of the S&P 500 
Index, moves the Baltic Dry Index by 20.13 basis points in regime three (high volatility) 
compared with 16.47 basis points in regime two (intermediate volatility) and 13.83 basis 
points in regime one (low volatility). In addition, when the Shipping Indexes are in regimes 
one and two, the commodity index (S&P GSCI) affects their annual movements the most 
compared with the financial (S&P 500) and the credit (iTraxx Senior Financials Index and 
VIX) markets. This can be justified by the mere fact that shipping facilitates commodity 
transportation and hence any change in the commodity prices causes volatility fluctuations to 
the shipping indices. However, when the shipping indexes are in regime three, we observe 
that the credit squeeze and the increased uncertainty for the global economic growth distress 
the shipping market the most. Indeed, in regime three the BCDS and the Volatility Index 
affects the annual movement of the Shipping Indexes the most compared with stock and 
commodity markets.  
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Table 6.5. Estimation Results for MS-VAR 
Estimated Effects of Endogenous Variables 
State Low  Volatility State  Middle Volatility State High Volatility State 
Dependent variables (in 
columns), explanatory 
variables (in rows) 
BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI 
S&P 500 
0.0297   
13.8362 
0.0280   
13.6642 
0.0302   
15.0052 
0.0237   
7.3682 
0.0406  
16.4728 
0.0289  
15.4237 
0.0424   
16.8339 
0.0267   
9.3726 
0.0482   
20.1324 
0.0327   
19.7040 
0.0492   
20.7081 
0.0298   
12.0482 
VIX 
-0.0223   
11.1643 
-0.0211   
10.2149 
-0.0262   
11.6279 
-0.0200   
4.5592 
-0.0293   
14.7326 
-0.0303   
14.0263 
-0.0283   
14.9937 
-0.0299   
7.0028 
-0.0373   
22.5524 
-0.0353   
21.6643 
-0.0399   
22.9522 
-0.0358   
13.8347 
S&P GSCI 
0.0327 
14.0655 
0.0282   
13.8834 
0.0330 
15.1772 
0.0266   
7.8327 
0.0427   
16.5362 
0.0392   
15.7388 
0.0463   
16.8726 
0.0268   
9.9387 
0.0473   
20.0094 
0.0398   
19.8846 
0.0492   
20.7062 
0.0298   
12.0500 
BCDS 
-0.0019 
8.2352 
0.0146 
6.9853 
-0.0032 
8.9438 
0.0273 
5.9424 
-0.0135 
10.3110 
-0.0044 
9.0047 
-0.0288 
11.4839 
-0.0061 
8.9490 
-0.0285 
21.8592 
-0.0103 
20.4239 
-0.0316 
22.0526 
-0.0119 
13.0492 
Note. This Table summarizes the estimated effects of the exogenous variables in the Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) model. The Shipping Indexes are in 
first log-difference, the volatility index is in first log-difference, the BCDS is in first log-difference, the stock market index is in first log-difference, the S&P GSCI is in the 
first log-difference. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Furthermore, the results presented in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.5 imply that the Dry Bulk 
market (BDI, BPI, and BCI) is more volatile and the response is significantly quicker to 
changes in other markets when compared with the Tanker market (BDTI), indicating that the 
Dry Bulk market is more vulnerable to downside risks from the Tanker market. Moreover, we 
find that the response is significantly quicker for vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. Baltic 
Capesize Index) compared with vessels of lower tonnage (i.e. Baltic Panamax Index). This 
finding also indicates that the Baltic Capesize Index is more volatile and vulnerable to 
downside risks compared with the Baltic Panamax Index.  
 
6.5.3 Diagnostic Analysis 
A critical element for the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is how to 
determine the sample and to estimate characteristics of the distribution of interest. This is 
especially obtained in the field of Bayesian analysis, which requires the evaluation of 
complex and often high-dimensional integrals in order to obtain posterior distributions for the 
unobserved quantities of interest in the model. Thus, we also undertake a diagnostic analysis 
that involves necessary checks for the generated posterior sample. Specifically, we search if 
the posterior is drawn from a stationary distribution. The most suitable approach to evaluate 
the convergence of the MCMC simulation is by means of the convergence diagnostic (CD) 
test statistic, as proposed by Geweke (1992). This test measures the equality of the means of 
the first and last part of a Markov chain. We consider the mean of   ̅    ⁄ ∑   
 
    of 
sequence of         draws of some parameter   , where   denotes the size of the posterior 
sample. Following Koop (2003), we divide the sequence   into three pieces,            
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(first piece),             (second piece) and            (third piece), and we 
discard the second piece
46
.  
 If our samples are drawn from a stationary distribution, then the means calculated 
from the first ( ̅ ) and third ( ̅ ) segments should not be statistically different, and hence the 
corresponding test statistic has an asymptotically standard normal distribution: 
   
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
 
       ,                    (18) 
where     
  and     
  are the numerical standard errors squared
47
.  
 
The test statistic has been calculated for all the parameters of the model
48
. Our samples have 
passed the convergence (at the 5% significance level) for nearly all the parameters
49
. 
 
6.5.4 Analysis of the Endogenous Variables 
Our main findings are summarized by means of the generalized impulse-response 
function (GIRF) (Pesaran and Shin, 1998) in Panels A – F of Figure 6.3 in Appendix J. The 
figures depict the response of the four shipping indexes (BDI, BPI, BCI, BDTI) to stock 
market (return on the S&P 500 stock market index), commodity market (return on S&P 
GSCI), and credit market (change in the iTraxx Senior Financials Index and in the Volatility 
Index) in all three regimes. 
                                                          
46
According to Koop (2003), the size of the first and third pieces is constrained by     ⁄      and         
   , respectively. 
47
Similarly, Gibbs sampler is used to estimate the mean of a generic function      .  Geweke’s approach build 
upon the assumption that the nature of the MCMC process and the function       imply the existence of a 
spectral density       for   draws of the function   with no discontinuities at frequency 0 (Cowles and Carlin 
1996). Then, for the estimator of  [     ],  ̅ , the asymptotic variance is       ⁄ , referred by Geweke to as 
the numerical standard error squared,     . 
48
Due to the problem of high dimensionality, the detailed results are not reported, but are available from author 
upon request. 
49
The mean absolute value of the CD statistic is 0.72, and there are only 2 parameters (out of 123) that do not 
pass the convergence test. Results of the CD test are available upon request by the author. 
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Panel A implies that an unexpected change in the stock market (S&P 500) has a 
positive effect on the shipping indices. As the regime path changes and volatility increases 
(i.e. from regime one to regime two and then to regime three) the movement of the financial 
market causes a stronger effect to the shipping indexes.  As the financial market enters a 
turbulent period and the S&P 500 Index decreases, the value of companies, the economic 
growth and the future earnings decline too. This damages the performance of shipping 
companies and hence, spills over to the shipping indices. In line with our expectations, the 
impulse response is clearly positive and it significantly varies across the regimes. In the low 
financial risk and low-volatility regime the response is the smallest in magnitude, whereas in 
the high financial risk and high-volatility regime the response has the largest magnitude. In 
line with the Hypothesis 1A, changes in the financial sector and increased fluctuations affect 
the risk for holding shipping assets more strongly than before.  
A shock in the S&P 500 signals deterioration in the demand for raw materials 
affecting the S&P GSCI, as depicted by Figure 6.3, Panel B. In line with our expectations, the 
impulse response is clearly positive and it significantly varies across the regimes. In the low 
financial risk and low-volatility regime the response is the smallest in magnitude, whereas in 
the high financial risk and high-volatility regime the response magnifies. Furthermore, from 
Panel B we observe that the stock market has a negative relationship (negative impulse 
response function) with the BCDS and the Volatility Index, indicating that an increase in the 
S&P 500 causes decreases in the Volatility Index and vice versa.  
To sum up, Panel A and B of Figure 6.3 in Appendix J is supportive of the 
Hypotheses 1A, and 1B. An unanticipated change in the S&P 500 spills over to the Shipping 
Market and affects the commodity market, while it has an inverse effect on the Credit 
Indexes. Importantly, in a more volatile regime, an unanticipated change in the S&P 500 has 
always a stronger effect compared with a less volatile regime. 
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Panel C of Figure 6.3 Appendix J suggests that an unanticipated change in the S&P 
GSCI has a positive effect on the shipping indices supporting hypothesis 2A. First, a decrease 
in the S&P GSCI indicates that an investment in commodities is now less desirable and 
demand for commodities decreases. A decline in the demand for commodities and 
consequently a fall in their prices, indicates less commodity transportation and as a result less 
expected revenues for shipping companies. Thus, shocks in the commodity prices deteriorate 
and increase the fluctuations of the shipping indices.  
The impulse response of the shipping market –represented by the Baltic Dry Index- is 
positive and significant. The effect of a change in the S&P GSCI is relatively small in the low 
risk state (regime 1) and becomes larger in the intermediate risk period (regime 2). Finally, 
the effect is larger in the high risk state (regime 3), supporting hypothesis 2B. Regime three 
mainly clusters in the period spanning October 2008 – March 2009. Specifically, this period 
is marked by various important events, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
introduction of government rescue packages. Following the collapse of the credit market, the 
commodity market enters a period of turbulence and global economic activity deteriorates. 
The shipping market responds to this signal positively with enormous decreases in the Baltic 
Dry and Tanker Indexes. Thus, the commodity market acted as a mechanism which spills 
over and transfers the risk from the commodity to the maritime sector.  
Furthermore, from Figure 6.3, Panel D in Appendix J we observe that an 
unanticipated change in the S&P GSCI has a positive and regime dependent effect on the 
stock (S&P 500) market. The sign and significance of the impulse response function of the 
S&P 500 can be justified on empirical grounds, as the change in the S&P GSCI features a fall 
in demand for raw materials due to the fall in economic and financial activity. We also 
observe that the impulse response is smaller in magnitude in a lower volatility regime than in 
a higher volatility regime. Also, the impulse response of the iTraxx Senior Financials Index 
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(i.e. BCDS) and the Volatility Index is negative and significant, and varies across the three 
regimes.  
Panel E of Figure 6.3 in Appendix J suggests that an unanticipated change in the 
Volatility Index has a negative effect on the shipping indexes, supporting hypothesis 3A. In 
particular, first we find that an unexpected change in the credit market (VIX and BCDS) has 
a negative effect (i.e. negative impulse response function) on the shipping indices, implying 
that a positive shock (i.e. an increase) in the VIX and the iTraxx Senior Financials Index 
causes rapid declines in the maritime sector. As the regime path changes and volatility 
increases (i.e. from regime one to regime two and then to regime three) the effect on the 
shipping indexes becomes stronger. Thus, the effect is greater in a higher regime. Encouraged 
by a low-interest rate environment the shipping market expanded strongly during market 
tranquil periods – prior to the financial meltdown-. The credit crunch, which began in 2008 
by the US sub-prime mortgage market and was followed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
led rapidly to catastrophic losses in the banking sector. In the midst of this chaotic 
environment, liquidity pulled away abruptly, the interbank market collapsed and 
consequently the credit market slumped. These results are consistent with Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008) who find that changes in the volatility index, VSTOXX have in general a larger 
effect where the residual volatility is greater than when it is smaller. They also argue that 
higher firm value volatility is more likely to hit a default barrier than lower firm value 
volatility. 
Additionally, we observe that a lagged change in the volatility index leads to a direct 
permanent change in the shipping indices. This effect is greater in a higher credit risk 
environment (i.e. regime state three) and points to a structural break taking place in the 
Shipping market, supporting hypothesis 3B. Third, elevated volatility impairs informational 
contents of the shipping market and further raises uncertainty to maritime investors. These 
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results corroborate Kalouptsidi (2014) who finds that construction lags and their lengthening 
in periods of high investment activity causes fluctuations in bulk shipping. Consequently, 
investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in shipping asset classes. When 
uncertainty - as measured by VIX - increases, shipping assets loose value and their yields 
increase to reflect a higher cost of capital. Because future expected cash flows of the shipping 
market are discounted with a higher discount rate, the Shipping Indexes decrease, as investors 
demand higher risk premium to compensate for the increased riskiness. With higher cost of 
capital some investment projects become unprofitable and thus are discarded by shipping 
companies. Thus, higher volatility in the Shipping market feeds into higher risk premium that 
is required by investors. In a higher regime this effect is larger, depressing further the 
shipping market returns. Consequently, the Volatility Index can be used as a hedging proxy 
instrument and a device to decide on investment or divestment timing in the Shipping market.  
Furthermore, from Figure 6.3 Panel F in Appendix J we observe that a shock in the 
credit market has a negative and regime dependent effect on the financial (S&P 500) and 
commodity (S&P GSCI) markets. The sign and significance of the impulse response function 
can be justified on empirical grounds, as a slump in the credit market signals a reduction in 
economic activity and hence a decrease in future earnings and commodity prices. We also 
observe that the impulse response is smaller in magnitude in a lower volatility regime than in 
a higher volatility regime.  
 
6.5.5. Analysis of the Exogenous Variables 
Table 6.6 in Appendix J presents the effects of the first and second principal 
components. Similar to Collin-Dufrense et al. (2001), the first principle component points the 
level of a risk-free interest rate. Thus, an increase in the risk-free interest rate increases the 
attractiveness of riskless assets (e.g. Treasury Bills) and therefore, investors are expected to 
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rebalance their portfolios by buying safer and selling riskier assets. Thus, we expect a 
negative and significant relationship with the shipping market (i.e. shipping indices will 
decrease). The second principal component can be interpreted as the slope of a risk-free 
interest rate, which means expectations for the movement of the interest rates in the future. In 
this case, a decreasing slope is usually associated with an increase in the investors’ risk 
appetite, and thus the relationship with the shipping indexes is expected to be again negative 
and significant. However, we do not find sufficient evidence to support this theory in our 
sample.  
 
6.6  Discussion 
6.6.1 What drives the risk characteristics of the Shipping Market? 
During market tranquil periods, (before the subprime mortgage crisis), the shipping 
market experienced low-volatility regime. The global economic expansion, and the 
corresponding expectation for increased revenues (represented in our study by the S&P 500 
Index), the strong demand for commodities (represented by the S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index) and the corresponding expectation for increased transportation and the 
credit expansion (represented by the iTraxx Senior Financials Index and the Volatility 
Futures Index) which facilitated ship financing, advanced the shipping indexes to move 
upward and the shipping market to expand strongly.  
The intermediate volatility regime commenced in July 2007, when HSBC announced 
large subprime-mortgage related losses (Eichengreen et al. 2012), while the high-volatility 
regime was triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008). Following the 
collapse of the credit market, the financial and the commodity markets enter a period of 
turbulence, and global economic activity deteriorates. In the high volatility regime, these 
markets served as a major source of risk and acted as channels that amplify and transmit 
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shocks to the shipping market. Thus, in the high-volatility regime, the BDI experienced an 
unprecedented drawdown that was followed again by a relatively calmer intermediate-
volatility period with some tendency for the high-volatility state to recur shortly after the 
beginning of the Sovereign debt crisis in Europe, when Standard & Poor’s downgraded the 
rating of Greece’s –the forth larger shipping services exporter in the world- debt to junk bond 
status. 
6.7 Robustness Checks 
The main finding of our research includes the identification of new channels which 
transfer risks to the shipping market. We use three regime states via a Gibbs sampling 
algorithm and we find that volatility spillovers are more prominent over turmoil or crises 
episodes (i.e. regime 3). In this section we address the robustness of our novel evidence. In 
particular, we replace the first and second principal components with the 5-year swap rate 
and the difference between 10 and 2 year swap rates, respectively. Moreover, we adopt 
Chib’s (1996) and Bawens’ et al. (2010, and 2014) methods, to employ a particle Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo Simulation approach, and to test for the number of possible regimes for 
the shipping indexes (see also Ryden et al. 1998). In particular, we attempt to maximize the 
marginal likelihood in our Bayesian inference model. As noted by Flury and Shephard 
(2011), this approach is suitable for conducting inference in non-linear state space model (i.e. 
equation 2), where we have proposed a Gibbs sampling algorithm with the state variables 
sampled individually for Bayesian inference.  
 
6.7.1 Tests for Equal Determinants and Principal Components with different horizons 
First, we test whether the influences of shipping indexes determinants are stable over 
time whilst still allowing their volatility to follow a Markov switching process. The Wald 
tests reported in Table 6.7, Panel A allow us to better assess the significance of differences in 
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the coefficients. The results indicate very strong evidence of switching in all three regimes 
for the considered variables, with p-values between 0.01 and 0.02 for all considered shipping 
indices.  
Moreover in Table 6.7, Panel B we present the results for switching with only one of 
the market variables. The p-values provide strong evidence that the hypothesis of no 
switching between the market variables and the shipping indices can be rejected (p-values 
again < 0.05). Thus, these tests confirm the regime-dependent behaviour of the shipping 
market. Consequently, in order to capture asymmetries and the tails of the distribution the 
non-linear Markov-Switching VAR approach provides a much better representation. 
Furthermore, we replace the first and second principal components with the 5-year 
interest rate swap (“LEVEL”) and difference between 10 and 2 year interest rate swaps 
(“SLOPE”), respectively. The effects of the alternative measures of interest rate level and 
slope are qualitatively similar to the effects of the first and second principal components. In 
particular, we find that the 5-year interest rate swap has in general a negative and significant 
effect on the shipping indices. In addition, the results presented in Table 6.8 imply that the 
alternative measure of slope does not influence significantly the shipping indices.  
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Table 6.7. Panel A. Test for Equal Determinants in the Regimes 
H0: no switching 
among variables LR Statistic p-value 
Wald 
statistic p-value 
BDI 17.538 0.001 17.584 0.000 
BPI 14.946 0.001 16.899 0.000 
BCI 17.804 0.001 17.753 0.000 
BDTI 13.420 0.002 16.291 0.000 
 
 
Panel B. Test for Equal Determinants in Stock, Commodity, and Volatility return coefficients 
 
H0: no switching in S&P 500 H0: no switching in S&P GSCI H0: no switching in VIX 
LR 
Statistic 
p-value 
Wald 
statistic 
p-value 
LR 
Statistic 
p-value 
Wald 
statistic 
p-value 
LR 
Statistic 
p-value 
Wald 
statistic 
p-value 
BDI 12.028 0.001 14.029 0.000 13.780 0.001 17.029 0.000 13.992 0.001 17.920 0.000 
BPI 11.379 0.001 13.323 0.001 12.664 0.001 15.066 0.000 12.808 0.001 16.127 0.000 
BCI 12.993 0.001 15.021 0.000 14.758 0.000 17.772 0.000 15.114 0.000 20.133 0.000 
BDTI 10.806 0.002 13.009 0.001 11.882 0.002 14.810 0.000 12.103 0.001 15.201 0.000 
Note: Panel A presents results of LR and Wald tests for equality and corresponding p-values of all coefficients in the three regimes. The low p-values reported in the Table 
indicate that the shipping indices switch in all three regimes. Panel B presents results of LR and Wald tests for equality of Stock, Commodity and Volatility Indices. The low 
p-values confirm the regime dependent behaviour of the shipping indices. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations.
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Table 6.8. Estimation Results for MS-VAR 
Estimated Effects of Exogenous Variables (PC1= EUROIRS_5, PC2 = EUROIRS_10 – EUROIRS_2_) 
State Low  Volatility State Middle Volatility State High Volatility State 
Dependent 
variables (in 
columns), 
explanatory 
variables (in 
rows) 
BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI 
     -1.2637 -0.7436 -3.1426 -0.2520 -24.7433 -21.0552 -25.0840 -0.4783 -61.5508 -42.0891 -63.9749 -0.9338 
     0.01146 0.03956 0.01008 0.04872 0.0064 0.0028 0.09588 0.01326 -0.0168 -0.0227 -0.0094 -0.0006 
This Table summarizes the estimated effects of the exogenous variables in the Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) model. LEVEL and SLOPE are the 5-year 
interest rate swap, and the difference between 10-year and 2-year interest rate swaps. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily 
observations
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6.7.2 Chib’s Tests 
Additionally, we search for the appropriate number of possible regimes - since more 
than three regime switches can in principle occur - allowing the regime to grow exponentially 
with time t, and thus, creating robust dependence between the state variables. We employ the 
posterior MCMC approach, again with a limit of 2.000 observations in order to compute the 
marginal log-likelihood values
50
 with the conditional variance depending only in past shocks  
A high value of the log-likelihood (i.e. closer to zero) indicates better fitting. In Table 6.9, we 
present the results estimated by bridge sampling (BS) as proposed by Meng and Wong (1996) 
and Chib’s (1996) method, for the maritime indices. Chib’s approach is in the context of 
MCMC chains produced by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The method is based on the 
Gibbs output and is especially suitable for mixture models. 
As proposed by Chib (1996), the marginal log likelihood can also be computed as:  
      
             
     
           
 
where P  and θ  can be any admissible value but is typically chosen to be a high density 
point like the mode, mean or median of the posterior distribution. The prior is easily 
computed and the likelihood   (  | 
    ) is computed by the SMC algorithm as in the 
previous subsection. The differences between bridge sampling and Chib’s method are very 
small. Similarly, the alteration between the marginal log-likelihood values increase 
substantially from one to three regimes but decrease in regime four for all considered pairs. 
The increased value in regime four implies that the three regimes model fits the data best.  
 
 
 
                                                          
50
The Marginal likelihood can be computed in Markov Switching models similar to Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994). 
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         Table 6.9. Marginal Log-Likelihood values for 2000 simulations 
Regimes 1 2 3 4 
BDI     
BS -832.05 -821.18 -809.55 -826.95 
Chib -831.94 -820.52 -808.61 -825.07 
BPI     
BS -926.47 -914.02 -906.31 -909.54 
Chib -926.30 -913.81 -905.24 -908.28 
BCI     
BS -825.06 -817.94 -809.31 -813.89 
Chib -824.97 -817.53 -808.29 -812.11 
BDTI     
BS -931.44 -922.61 -918.47 -922.05 
Chib -931.16 -921.06 -917.51 -921.03 
Note. Results for Bridge Sampling and Chib’s method for the marginal likelihood values. The marginal  
likelihood value increases substantially from one to three regimes and decreases beyond the correct 
number of regimes. The shortest the distance between the two tests indicates that we obtain the correct 
estimate with high probability. In italics the second best model with two regimes. The sample period is 
22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
Simultaneously, in the third regime the difference takes the largest value, imposing 
that the three regime model is correctly selected (see the values in bold in the table). The 
second best model, with a decrease in the marginal log-likelihood values is the Markov 
Switching model with two regimes (see the values in italics in the table). It is noted that the 
higher log-likelihood value (which is closer to zero) is observed for the three regimes in the 
Baltic Capesize Index, implying that the posterior model provides support to our three state 
MS VAR model. The same relationship holds for all shipping indexes.   
In Table 6.10 we present detailed results with the difference between the maximum 
and minimum for the marginal log-likelihood estimators. For all considered indices the 
difference is at a maximum in the third regime, confirming that the three regime model is the 
most appropriate to capture fluctuations in the Shipping market. For instance, for the Baltic 
Dry Index, for the single regime model the lower persistence is -832.11 and -831.19 for the 
bridge sampling and the Chib’s model, respectively. On the other hand, the maximum 
persistence is -832.02 and -831.07 for the bridge sampling and the Chib’s model, 
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respectively. The difference between the maximum and minimum marginal likelihood is 0.09 
and 0.12, implying that captures unconditional variance jumps in the shipping indices with a 
persistence which is lower than 0.12. 
On the contrary, for the three-regime model the difference between the maximum and 
minimum marginal likelihood is 0.50 and 0.33 for the BS and Chib’s estimators, respectively, 
indicating higher ability to capture unconditional variance jumps in the data -with a 
persistence of about 0.50-  and confirming that the three regime model fits the data best. The 
unpalatable implication is that the change in the pattern of the shipping indexes takes effect in 
three stages (at t1, t2, t3).  Also, this change is a deterministic event that would have been able 
to predict with certainty from the movements of the financial, commodity and credit market 
that produced the change.  
   Table 6.10. Minima and Maxima of Log-Likelihood Estimates 
Regimes 1 2 3 
BDI    
BS-min -832.11 -821.22 -809.58 
BS-max -832.02 -821.12 -809.03 
Chib-min -831.19 -820.56 -808.78 
Chib–max -831.07 -820.36 -808.45 
BPI    
BS-min -926.51 -914.08 -906.33 
BS-max -926.41 -914.01 -906.18 
Chib-min -926.58 -913.88 -905.27 
Chib–max -925.47 -913.59 -904.89 
BCI    
BS-min -825.14 -817.99 -809.35 
BS-max -825.01 -817.91 -809.19 
Chib-min -824.98 -817.69 -808.40 
Chib–max -824.44 -817.30 -807.87 
BDTI    
BS-min -931.53 -922.67 -918.49 
BS-max -931.42 -922.58 -918.24 
Chib-min -931.63 -921.13 -917.62 
Chib–max -931.11 -921.03 -916.88 
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 Note. Results for the difference between the minimum and maximum marginal likelihood vale  
 for Bridge Sampling and Chib’s method. The shortest distance indicates the most appropriate the 
 number of regimes. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 
 daily observations. 
 
Consequently, our conclusion is that the Markov-Switching vector autoregression 
model with three regimes (low volatility, intermediate volatility, high volatility) is the 
optimal model. It behaves well and captures information asymmetries providing a much 
better representation than the two or single-regime and the linear regression model.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This thesis models spillover relationships and examines risk characteristics and the 
regime dependent, regime switching behaviour between four shipping indexes, stock, 
commodity and credit markets via using a novel Markov-switching vector auto-regression 
(MSVAR) model. First, we find that since July 2007, the shipping market switched from low 
risk regime to mainly intermediate risk regime and occasionally to high risk regime. Second, 
our findings document the existence of spillover effects where the stock, credit and 
commodity markets serve as a major source of risk to the shipping market. Additionally, we 
observe that volatility spillovers are more prominent over turmoil periods, since shock effects 
accelerated mainly during intermediate (regime 2) and high risk regimes (regime 3). The 
higher the volatility regime the stronger is the effect. During market tranquil periods the 
commodity market affects the shipping market the most.  Moreover, we identify that the 
shipping industry experienced a structural break in 2008, shifting its relationship with other 
asset classes. Thus, during turmoil periods (regime state three) the credit squeeze and the 
increased uncertainty for global economic growth distress the shipping market the most. 
Furthermore, we find that the Dry Bulk market responds faster to changes in financial, 
commodity and credit markets than the Tanker market, while the Dry Bulk market is also 
more volatile and thus vulnerable to downside risks. We also observe that changes in 
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financial, commodity and credit markets are incorporated faster into the category of vessels 
of higher tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) than vessels of medium range tonnage (i.e. Panamax 
vessels). Moreover, the Baltic Capesize Index is more volatile and vulnerable to downside 
risks compared with the Baltic Panamax Index. In addition, our results are also supportive of 
the hypothesis that higher risk premium that is required by investors for holding financial 
assets depresses the shipping market.   
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this research 
have interesting policy implications. First, the transition from low to higher volatility regime, 
changes the cyclicality of the shipping market. The existence of spillovers, changes the 
design of a well-diversified portfolio, the expected revenues and the asset pricing. Likewise, 
elevated volatility feeds into higher uncertainty of investment and hence, investors prefer to 
postpone their investment projects in the shipping market driving higher the risk premium 
that is required for holding shipping assets. Thus, as a proactive risk management measure, 
we observe that the Volatility Futures Index can be used as a hedging proxy during turbulent 
periods in the shipping market. Furthermore, a company may opt to charter-rate vessels on 
long term bareboat charters or may choose to diversify their fleet in terms of type of vessel 
and tonnage. 
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Chapter 7: Contagion and Tail Risk Management in the Shipping 
Market 
 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the industries directly affected by the fluctuations and changes in the world 
economy is the shipping industry. This very old-rooted transport industry accounts for 
approximately 90 percent of global trade by volume due to being the most speedy and 
efficient means for the transportation of goods. Albeit, starting out decades ago as the mode 
to move finished goods and raw materials within short haul, shipping has become slowly but 
steadily an international industry which essentially connects large sectors of the economy. 
Veenstra and Ludemaz (2006), Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012), and Zeng and Qu (2013) 
describe the maritime business as the most globalised among all industries. Indeed, the 
internationalization of business and the mere fact that the sources of raw materials are 
frequently situated on different parts of the globe than the places of intense industrial 
production and/or final places of consumption, has rendered shipping a necessary vehicle but 
also what proved to be a dynamic factor for an astounding growth of trade and a 
commensurate rise of living standards.  
The Dry Bulk market, which deals with the transportation of iron ore, coal, grain, 
agricultural and steel products among others, and the Tanker market, which is associated 
mainly with energy commodities, constitute the major components of the world shipping 
industry. Due to these characteristics, developments in the shipping market are strongly 
affected with the growth of international trade. Kavoussanos and Visvikis  (2004), Alizadeh 
and Nomikos (2007), Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012), Alizadeh (2013) and Zeng and Qu 
(2013) observe, the shipping market is highly risky and volatile, since it is subject to a 
number of uncertainties, ranging from geopolitical shocks and the ever-changing world 
economy to fleet changes and the sensitive market sentiment. 
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Over the last decade, the shipping industry has gone through extreme up- and 
downturns. The recent financial meltdown which began in industrialised countries during 
2008 and quickly spread to emerging markets, deteriorated the environment for capital flows 
and triggered deep sell offs in global economies (see also Alsakka and Gwilym, 2012; 
Semmler and Bernard, 2012). Investors pulled capital from countries, even those with small 
levels of perceived risk and caused the shipping industry, commodities and global stock 
markets to plunge. Historically, global recessions are followed or supplemented by major 
falls in the shipping indexes such as the dramatic drop of the Baltic Dry Index in 2008-2009 
when the index fell by 94%. This situation left very few ship owners unaffected when even 
those who chartered out on long-term contracts faced counterparty defaults or charter rate 
renegotiations.  
One striking feature of the recent financial crisis is how an initially asset specific 
event inflamed rapidly to international assets and markets around the globe. Motivated by the 
impact of the recent crisis, which provoked a rapid decline in world trade that has rippled 
through all segments of the maritime industry, we intend to answer the following questions: 
what is the effect of the recent credit crunch on the shipping market? What is the dependence 
formation between shipping and financial, commodity and credit markets? Is there any 
extreme value dependence over and above what one would expect from economic 
fundamentals which assembles to contagion? Is the dependence symmetric or asymmetric? 
By answering these questions, this thesis investigates the extent to which shocks to stock, 
commodity and credit markets are transmitted to fluctuations in the shipping market and 
sheds light into the most recent shipping cycle which peaked in 2008 before declining rapidly 
at the onset of the global financial crisis.  
A further dimension to our analysis is to study tail risks and to investigate whether 
shipping indices exhibit excess correlations and dependencies in the tails of the distribution. 
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Thus, we split our results into three sub-groups (i.e. before, during and after the financial 
crisis) to assess whether the crisis led to significant changes in the dependence structure and 
to the likelihood of large variations in the shipping market. In this light, we fill a gap in the 
literature which mainly concerns the effects of stock market variables on the shipping market 
(Bakshi et. al.; 2011, Zeng and Qu 2013) and the transmission of shocks among international 
stock markets and exchange rate interactions (see also Boyer et. al., 2006; Bubak et al., 2011; 
Sirr et al., 2011; Jotikasthira et. al., 2012; Ulku and Demirci, 2012; Andreou et al., 2013; 
Bonato et. al., 2013; Ibragimov et al., 2013; Wang et. al., 2013).  
Moreover, the methodology we use in this research differs in a fundamental way from 
most of the methods used in the literature in analysing dependence and comovements in the 
shipping market. In particular, we employ and compare several copula functions with 
different dependence structures (i.e. Gaussian, Student – t, and Symmetrised Joe-Clayton) in 
order to model and examine conditional dependence and tail dependence between the Dry 
Bulk Market (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic Capesize Index), the Tanker 
Market (Baltic Dirty Tanker Index), the financial market (S&P 500 stock Index), 
commodities (S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) and credit markets (iTraxx Senior 
Financials Index for Banks’ Credit Default Swaps51 and Volatility Index52 representing 
changes in credit markets similar to Alexander and Kaeck, 2008).  
While there is extensive literature studying comovements between the international 
equity markets and literature on investigating the behaviour of the shipping market 
(Beenstock and Vergottis, 1989b; Adland and Cullinane, 2006; Koekebakker et. al., 2006; 
Batchelor et. al., 2007; Papapostolou et al., 2014), there is no research evidence on using 
copulas to study the comovements in the shipping market and across markets of different 
                                                          
51
 According to Jorion and Zhang (2007) and to Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Credit Default Swaps spreads drive the movements in credit 
spreads and provide an indicator for the credit health of a firm. Similarly, we employ Banks’ Credit Default Swaps spreads as a driver for 
the credit conditions (e.g. funding). 
52
 The Volatility Index is an implied volatility index based on options on the S&P 500 stock Index and is used as a proxy to evaluate credit 
market risk, similar to Collin-Dufresne et. al. (2001) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) who use the VIX and the VStoxx as the best available 
substitute for their data set, respectively. 
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asset types. Hence, we fill an additional gap in the literature since commodity and credit 
market interactions with the shipping market have not been investigated prior. 
In particular, we find evidence of significant and symmetric lower tail dependence 
during the financial crisis, implying that the interactions of financial, commodity and credit 
markets determine the systemic risks that drive the shipping crisis. This finding has important 
risk and asset pricing implications, since left tail dependence indicates the potential of 
simultaneous large losses. Moreover, this finding implies that accelerated decreases in the 
financial markets, in the commodity index and large variations in credit markets lead to 
accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in the shipping market. We also find that the 
Dry Bulk market is more volatile and more vulnerable to downside risks from the Tanker 
market and the category of vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) are more volatile 
and susceptible to downside risks than vessels of medium range tonnage (i.e. Panamax 
vessels). The significance of the tail dependence implies that stock, commodity, credit 
markets and the shipping market tend to experience concurrent extreme shocks. This joint 
downside risk has not been documented in the literature previously.  
We find that the comovement becomes stronger during the crisis period, consistent 
with contagion between asset prices when compared with tranquil periods. This result is in 
line to some extent, with Kyle and Xiong (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Bekaert 
(2002), Ang and Chen (2002), Yuan (2005), and Boyer et. al., (2006), who observe that 
correlations among market returns are especially large during market downturns, indicating 
that contagion may be asymmetric. Furthermore, spillovers during the financial meltdown 
can be attributed to the channel running from stock, commodity and credit markets shocks to 
the shipping market. This finding allows investors to measure the probability of simultaneous 
extreme losses. 
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Moreover, we observe that dependence remains significant but weaker after the 
financial crisis and the shipping market becomes more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in 
downward moves than in upward moves. This finding indicates statistically significant 
decreases in the tail indices and structural breaks due to the recent financial crisis that 
correspond to the increase in the likelihood of large fluctuations. As a result, on the post crisis 
period, the shipping market is more susceptible to financial crisis and to speculative attacks. 
The increased likelihood of extreme joint losses suggests a higher than normal Value at Risk. 
On the other hand, we find that there exists significant co-movement and asymmetric 
tail dependence for the pre- crisis period, implying that there is asymmetry in upward moves 
between shipping, financial, commodity and credit indices. These findings also affect the 
pricing of assets. For instance, tail dependence is extremely important for safety – first 
investors as discussed by Susmel (2001). In addition, tail dependence is a measure of 
systematic risk during severe financial conditions as discussed by Allen and Carletti (2013). 
Finally, this research improves the understanding of risks in the shipping market in two ways: 
i) via identifying that accelerated decreases in commodities and prompt variations in 
volatility, provoke accelerated decreases and function as a barometer of shipping market 
fluctuations; ii) via proposing the VIX as a proxy for hedging risk exposures in the shipping 
market. 
This research complements the existing literature through the following ways. Firstly, 
we contribute to the literature that studies the determinants of the shipping market, 
represented in our study by the Baltic Dry Index, the Baltic Panamax Index, the Baltic 
Capesize Index and the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index. While most of this literature uses single-
equation models to evaluate the determinants of the shipping market (Beenstock and 
Vergottis, 1989b; Adland and Cullinane, 2006; Batchelor et. al., 2007; Bakshi et. al.; 2011, 
Zeng and Qu 2013), our research is based on time-varying Gaussian, Student-t and 
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Symmetrised Joe-Clayton Copula Functions. To the best of our knowledge this approach is 
not apparent in the literature. Algorithmic estimations of our models document the existence 
of asymmetric conditional dependence structure for the Shipping Indexes. Moreover, we 
observe that Student-t copula provides the best fit and captures fluctuations in the Shipping 
market. Expanding Chan-Lau (2011), the models help us to study nonlinearities, fat tail 
behaviour, volatility persistence with qualitative and quantitative repercussions of short-term 
and long-term volatility components characterising the shipping market on the evolution of 
three other asset classes.   
Secondly, our research extends previous research on the financial crisis and 
contributes to the literature that studies the effects of the financial crises on the shipping 
market  (Bakshi et. al., 2011, Zeng and Qu 2013) and spillover effects among international 
financial assets (see also Bubak et al., 2011; Sirr et al., 2011; Ulku and Demirci, 2012; Aloui 
et al., 2013; Andreou et al., 2013; Ibragimov et al., 2013; Wang et. al., 2013, among others) 
via studying the dependence structure and linkages in the shipping (B.D.I., B.P.I., B.C.I., 
B.D.T.I.), financial (S&P 500), commodity (S&P GSCI) and credit (Banks’ Credit Default 
Swaps & VIX) markets during severe financial conditions. Our results show that fluctuations 
in the Shipping Indexes commove over time with other financial assets and that during 
periods of shocks and slumps in the financial markets there is a contagion effect to the 
shipping market. 
Thirdly, we provide empirical evidence that large adverse shocks to stock, commodity 
and credit markets are associated with a significant increase in the probability of shipping 
market, resembling to contagion. We call these variables, contagion channel variables, that is, 
variables whose extreme adverse realisations are associated with a slump of shipping indices. 
To our knowledge, this is the first research to test for and document the existence of shipping 
market contagion. We define contagion in this study as a significant increase in cross-market 
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linkages during periods of high volatility which is over and above what one would expect 
from economic fundamentals, similar to other works in this literature (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; 
Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Bekaert et. al., 2005; Yuan, 2005; Boyer et. al., 2006; Jotikasthira 
et. al., 2012, among others). 
Finally, our research provides scope for hedging strategies for investments in the 
shipping market complimenting the works of Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), Goulas and 
Skiadopoulos (2012), and Tezuka et. al. (2012). The demand for maritime transport is derived 
primarily from the needs of industrial processes, therefore conjectures and depressions in the 
shipping sector are motivated by the credit cycles and the global economic situation. These 
cycles are hardly predictable, and many shipping companies are forced to leave the business 
in times of recession. We show that, in periods characterised by increased uncertainty the 
daily movement of the shipping market can be captured by the Student-t copula which can 
also be used as a hedge proxy with decisions that involve more than one risky asset in the 
shipping market. 
To sum up, our study is related to Beenstock and Vergottis (1989b), Adland and 
Cullinane (2006), Batchelor et. al., (2007), and Zeng and Qu (2013), among others, who 
employ VECM and several linear models to forecast the movement of the shipping market 
and spot rates in the dry bulk shipping market. They argue that the shipping market is 
determined through the interaction between supply and demand for sea transportation. They 
also observe that both drift and diffusion aspects are non-linear with respect to freight rate 
levels and document the dangers of forecasting with equilibrium correction models in the 
shipping market. We extend these approaches via employing time-varying Copula functions 
and offer new evidence for non-linearities, fat tail bahaviour and extreme dependence for first 
time in the shipping market. We also extend Bakshi et. al., (2011), who examine if the 
shipping market is a good indicator to forecast cross asset movements. In particular, we show 
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that fluctuations in the shipping market commove over time with other financial assets and 
that during periods of shocks and slumps in the financial markets there is a contagion effect 
on the shipping market. Additionally, we identify the contagion channel variables that 
transfer risk to the shipping market, and whose extreme adverse realisations are associated 
with a slump of shipping indices, complementing the existing literature on spillovers and 
contagion in international markets (see also inter alia Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002; Yuan, 2005; Boyer et. al., 2006; Bubak et al., 2011; Jotikasthira et. al., 2012, 
Andreou et al., 2013; and Aloui et al., 2013).  
Finally, our study is related with Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), Goulas and 
Skiadopoulos (2012), and Tezuka et. al., (2012) who employ several trading strategies to 
identify cointegrating relationships in the second hand ship market, freight futures prices and 
optimal forward hedge ratios in the dry bulk shipping market, respectively. We extend their 
hedging strategies and their dynamic asset pricing, providing evidence that the Student-t 
copula can be used as a dynamic model to evaluate decisions that involve more than one risky 
asset in the shipping market and proposing the Volatility Index as a hedging instrument that 
captures variations in the shipping market during severe financial conditions. Additionally, 
we find that there is an increased likelihood of extreme joint losses during severe financial 
conditions, affecting the pricing of shipping assets. 
 
7.2 Methodology 
7.2.1 The Hypotheses 
The presence of risk in financial decision-making advances the importance of 
dependence in decisions involving more than one risky asset. The versatile nature of copulas 
makes them suitable to be used in a broad range of financial situations. For instance, the 
existence of co-movements implies that the variance of return on a risky asset depends on the 
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variances of another asset and on the degree of correlation between these assets in the 
portfolio. More generally, as described by Patton (2006), the distribution of return on a 
portfolio will depend on the univariate distributions of individual assets in the portfolio and 
on the dependence between each of the assets, which can be captured by a copula function. 
Copulas are tools to describe interrelations and model dependence of several random 
variables, independently of their marginal distributions. As described by Harvey (2010), 
copulas separate the marginal behaviour of variables from the dependence structure through 
the use of distribution functions. Thus, copula functions are more appropriate to adequately 
capture fat tails and higher moments than a bivariate normal distribution. A thorough review 
of copulas may be found in Patton and Sheppard (2009).  
In this study we analyse the dependence structure of the Shipping Indices against the 
following Indices: the S&P 500, the S&P GSCI, Banks’ Credit Default Swaps (B.C.D.S.) and 
the VIX. We first provide the theoretical framework, and then employ linear measures of 
interdependence (Kentall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ). Due to the drawbacks of linear measures, 
we then introduce three copula-GARCH approaches (Gaussian, Student – t, and Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton) in order to identify the marginal distributions of the variables, to control for 
heteroscedasticity and examine the nature of the dependence and tail risks during market 
tranquil and turmoil periods. Thus, we develop procedures to simulate and estimate the 
dependence structure similar to the approaches used by Genest et. al., (1995), Patton (2006), 
Kenourgios et al., (2011), and Aloui et al., (2013). Also, in order to gain an even deeper 
insight into parameter changes we follow Gregoire et al., (2008) and Aloui et al. (2013) and 
we build a rolling window with 90 days length ( i.e. one quarter of a trading year) to estimate 
the dependence parameter and the tail dependence coefficients.  
Particularly, we use the time-varying nature of the copula functions to describe the 
distribution and dependence structure between the shipping market (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic 
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Panamax Index, Baltic Capesize Index, Baltic Dirty Tanker Index), the financial market 
(S&P 500 Index), the commodity market (represented by the S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index) and the credit market represented by BCDS
53
 spreads and the Volatility 
Index
54
. Developments in the financial market reflect the global economic conditions 
(Markwat et. al., 2009). For instance, during periods of economic expansion the stock 
markets are expected to surge. Thus, following this rationale we expect the shipping market 
to be correlated to some extent with the movement of the stock market (at least for the pre-
crisis period), reflecting strong demand for shipping services. Furthermore, an increase in the 
commodities market reflects strong demand for raw materials, and consequently for 
transportation (see also Arezki et al., 2014, for informative readings on commodities price 
fluctuations). Hence, we expect to observe positive dependence between the commodity and 
the shipping indices. On the other hand, periods of economic development are usually 
supported by credit expansion (Covitz et. al., 2013). Thus, during these periods uncertainty 
and volatility tends to be small, and consequently Banks’ Credit Default Swaps spreads to be 
low and the Volatility Index to be near historical lows (Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Alexander 
and Kaeck, 2008). Based on this foundation, we expect a negative relationship between the 
shipping indices and the VIX. We can now formulate our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive dependence structure between shipping, stock markets and 
commodities. Positive (or negative) changes in stock market and commodity returns are 
followed by positive (or negative) changes in the shipping market. Accordingly, there is a 
negative dependence structure between the shipping market and changes in the Volatility 
Index.  
                                                          
53
 An increase in Credit Default Swaps spreads implies an increase in financial and credit risk for a 
firm/government. Similarly, an increase in BCDS implies a deterioration in markets’ credit condition (see also 
Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Alexander and Kaeck, 2008).  
54
 An increase in the Volatility Index indicates an increase in uncertainty and is associated with an increase in 
credit risk and vice versa similar to Alexander and Kaeck, (2008).  
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The investigation of dependence structure is crucial for risk management and 
portfolio diversification (Aloui et. al., 2011). An increase in cross-asset co-movements 
renders traditional diversification theory fruitless (Markowitz, 1952; and Solnik, 1974). 
Moreover, the literature notifies that contagion occurs when cross – market dependence 
increases over and above any macroeconomic fundamentals (Karolyi and Stulz, 1996; Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002, Bekaert et. al., 2005). Investors are not able to distinguish between 
selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks (Yuan, 2005). 
Thus, when confused investors suffer a large loss in an investment, they have to liquidate 
their positions in other investments using forced sales or “fire sales” (similar to Jotikasthira 
et. al., 2012, for fire sales in emerging markets). Forced sales cause cross-market portfolio 
rebalancing and liquidation (see also Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; and Boyer at. al., 2006), and 
thus lead to cross asset depreciation (similar to Kyle and Xiong, 2001). Additionally, Jorion 
and Zhang (2007), and Markwat et. al., (2009), observe that credit events and stock market 
crashes create domino and cross-market contagion effects. Similarly, we formulate our 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: During severe financial conditions co-movement increases, shocks and 
fluctuations in financial, commodity and credit markets perform as contagion channels whose 
extreme adverse realisations are associated with a slump of the shipping indices. 
Fluctuations and elevated volatility strengthens informational contents of stock, commodity 
and credit markets and raises uncertainty. The extreme value dependence is over and above 
what one would expect from economic fundamentals pointing to contagion. Consequently, 
investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in the Shipping Indexes, 
triggering deep sell offs of the shipping market. 
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Longin and Solnik, (2001), Ang and Bekaert, (2002), Ang and Chen, (2002), 
document that there is asymmetric correlation between financial markets in bear and bull 
periods, resembling to asymmetric contagion. Similarly, we formulate our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The dependence structure and contagion are asymmetric, upper and lower tail 
dependence coefficients are not exactly equal. During negative correlation regimes and 
severe financial conditions, lower tail dependence is higher than upper tail dependence. 
Furthermore, dependence and upper tail dependence are asymmetric for the shipping market 
in a positive correlation regime. In our approach, upper (lower) tail dependence measures the 
dependence between the shipping indices when these are appreciating (depreciating) against 
the financial, commodity and volatility indices. 
 
7.2.2 Marginal distributions 
Following Patton (2006), for a joint distribution function, the marginal distributions 
and the dependence structure can be separated as described below:  
                                     (           )       or    (1) 
                                                                            (2) 
The central result in copula theory states that any continuous N-dimensional cumulative 
distribution function   , evaluated at point            
    can be represented as: 
                               (3) 
where   is a copula function and           are the margins.  
Copulas are very flexible in analysing co-movement and modelling dependence. 
Various copulas represent different dependence structure between variables, a property which 
provide us with more options in model specification and estimation.  
Formally, a two – dimensional (bivariate) copula is a function   [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  such 
that: 
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(iv)                      is grounded), 
(v)          and           (consistent with margins) 
(vi) for any            [   ]with                   
                                      (2-increasing) 
Copulas are more informative measures of dependence between many variables than 
linear correlations, since they provide us with the degree of the dependence and the structure 
of the dependence. The copula function can directly model the tail dependence, while linear 
correlation does not provide information about tail dependence and the symmetry property of 
the dependence. Hence, any copula function has a lower and an upper bound,    and   , 
which are known as the minimum and the maximum copula, respectively. For any point 
(     [   ]  [   ] the copula must lie in the interval as follows: 
                                              
As with standard distribution functions, copulas have associated densities which exist 
in the interior domain as given by: 
       
        
    
          (4) 
The above permits the canonical representation of a bivariate density        as the product 
of the copula density and the density functions of the margins as given by: 
                                              (           )              (5) 
Equation (5) indicates how the product of two marginal distributions will fail to properly 
measure the joint distribution of two asset prices unless they are in fact independent. The 
dependence information captured by the copula density,  (           )  is normalised to 
unity and shows that copula functions are an alternative dependence measure that is reliable 
when correlation is not.  
Based on the work of Nelson (1991), and Bolleslev (1986), we estimate the 
dependence described above, with a GARCH type model. The daily return is expressed as: 
 231 
 
                ,    ~iid(0,1) 
  
         
       
 ,         (5) 
where    denotes the conditional mean and   
  is the conditional variance with parameter 
restrictions ω > 0, α >0, β >0, and α+β >1. We use the AIC and BIC criteria to determine the 
optimal lag length for the conditional mean process and these criteria select m=1 and n=1 for 
all variables. Given a time series   , the GARCH (1,1) model is described as: 
            
  
         
       
          (6) 
where     is an iid random variable with zero mean and variance of one.    
  is the conditional 
variable of return series at time t, with the same restrictions as noted in equation (5). 
 
7.2.3 Copula Models 
As noted by Patton (2006), Kenourgios et al. (2011) and Aloui et al. (2013) copula 
functions can be used to characterise the dependence in the tails of the distribution. Upper 
and lower tail dependence coefficients can be used to measure and capture booms and 
crashes.  
We assume that the variables of interest in our model are X and Y with marginal distribution 
functions F and G. Thus the coefficient of lower tail dependence    is represented as: 
             [   
              ]       (7) 
which quantifies the probability of observing a lower Y assuming that X is lower itself.  
Similarly, the coefficient for the upper tail dependence    is defined by: 
             [   
              ]       (8)    
Thus, symmetry occurs when the lower tail dependence equals the upper tail dependence 
coefficient, otherwise there is asymmetry. 
The Gaussian copula symmetry occurs when     . 
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As a result, the Gaussian normal copula can be expressed as: 
         ( 
            )  ∫ ∫
 
  √    
     
          
       
 
      
  
    
      
  
       (9) 
where     is the standard bivariate normal distribution with linear correlation coefficient θ 
restricted to the interval (-1,+1), and Φ represents the univariate standard normal distribution 
function. 
Similarly, the Student-t copula can be defined as: 
       ∫ ∫
 
  √    
      
          
       
  
   
 
  
     
  
    
  
     
  
                                 (10) 
where   
  (u) denotes the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
univariate Student-t distribution with u degrees of freedom. 
The co-movement between an asset and the shipping market could be positive or 
negative depending on the strength of the volatility chasing effect. Hence, the comovement 
between assets switches between positive and negative dependence regimes. To capture the 
above dependence switching, this study proposes the Symmetrized Joe-Clayton copula as 
proposed by Patton (2006), for the dependence structure since this copula allows for 
asymmetric tail dependence and nests symmetry as a special case. Therefore: 
    (    ⃓ 
    )             ⃓  
                   
           (11)  
where        is the Joe-Clayton function defined as: 
       ⃓ 
           {[        ]   [        ]    }           (12) 
where              
   
                      
   
and                                                                                                                     (13) 
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From equations (11) and (12) the Joe-Clayton copula has two parameters,          , which 
are measures of tail dependence
55
, as defined in Patton (2006). The Joe-Clayton copula 
symmetry occurs when       . 
 
7.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Using Bloomberg, Datastream and Clarksons databases we collected daily data 
observations for the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), the Baltic Panamax Index (B.P.I.), the Baltic 
Capesize Index (BCI), the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index (BDTI), the S&P 500 stock market 
index, the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P GSCI), the iTraxx Senior Financials 
(Banks’ Credit Default Swap spreads), and the Volatility Index (VIX). Our research deals 
with the recent financial crisis and identifies the time-varying dependence structure between 
different asset classes. Before the subprime mortgage crisis (i.e., before July 2007), the 
shipping market experienced low volatility, with the shipping indices moving upward. Since 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), the shipping indexes experienced an 
unprecedented increase in volatility. These developments are depicted in Figure 7.1.  
Credit default swap (CDS) contracts are derivative contracts that allow investors in an 
underlying debt instrument to protect themselves against a deterioration of credit quality or 
credit conditions. The iTraxx Senior Financials Index comprises the 25 largest banks, based 
on their capitalisation and represents the credit conditions in the financial sector. An increase 
in the price of Banks’ Credit Default Swaps indicates deterioration in credit market 
conditions. The volatility index (VIX) is a popular measure of the implied volatility of the 
S&P 500 index options for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index and 
represents a measure of the market’s expectation of stock market volatility. The S&P GSCI 
(formerly the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) is as a benchmark for investment in the 
                                                          
55
 For details and the mathematical representation, see Patton (2006) and Kenourgios et. al., (2011). 
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commodity market and a measure of commodity performance over time. It is a tradable index 
that is readily available to market participants of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The 
index comprises 24 commodities from all commodity sectors - energy products, industrial 
metals, agricultural products, livestock products and precious metals. The wide range of 
constituent commodities provides the S&P GSCI with a high level of diversification.  
 235 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Daily movements of shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets. 
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We present summary statistics in Table 7.1 (sample mean, median, maximum, 
minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and 
the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic). Over the sample period, the mean of 
the shipping indices is negative (i.e. BDI - 1.4649 basis points) reflecting greater risk for 
investments in the shipping market. The biggest risk is observed for the Baltic Capesize 
Index (-1.8871) and the less risk for the Tanker market (-0.4853). Moreover, all shipping 
indexes are negatively skewed (BDI: -1.072, BPI: -0.459, BCI: -2.008, BDTI: -1610) and 
highly leptokurtic (BDI: 16.309, BPI: 9.973, BCI: 37.623, BDTI: 36.779) implying that the 
distribution departs from symmetry. The resulting distribution is non-normal, since the 
normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. The shipping market experienced 
significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicated by the range of variation in the 
standard deviation. The latter indicates that the change in the BDI deviated from the mean on 
average by 2551 index points, in the BPI by 2507 index points, in the BCI by 3775 index 
points and in the tanker market by 405 basis points.  
Stock (S&P 500) and commodity (S&P GSCI) returns were less volatile, as suggested 
by the range of variation and the standard deviation. Daily percentage stock and commodity 
returns were positive during the sample period (S&P: +0.2251%, S&P GSCI: +0.0001%). 
Consistent with empirical evidence on skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively skewed 
and leptokurtic, suggesting that big negative events in the stock and commodity markets are 
more likely than big positive events and that the density of returns is greater the closer returns 
are to the sample median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal.  
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Table 7.1  
Summary Statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BDI 2153 -1.4649 2.501 11.793 647 2551.0 -1.072 16.309 24275 0.0000 
BPI 2153 -1.8086 2.400 11.713 418 2507.5 -0.459 9.973 8999 0.0000 
BCI 2153 -1.8871 3.459 19.867 830 3775.1 -2.008 37.623 128431 0.0000 
BDTI 2153 -0.4853 930 2.347 453 405.58 -1.610 36.779 122280 0.0000 
S&P 500 2153 0.2251 1.287 1.725 676 1984.9 -0.412 5.600 2874 0.0000 
S&P GSCI 2153 0.0001 5.111 10.898 3116 1399.0 -0.140 2.688 655 0.0000 
VIX 2153 0.0024 -0.0900 16.5400 -17.3600 1.9732 0.545 16.891 25702 0.0000 
BCDS 2153 106.8703 101.3290 353.0000 7.0000 81.9862 0.5518 2.5016 131.5949 0.0000 
Note. This table presents summary statistics (standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic) of the change in shipping indices (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic Capesize Index, Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, measured in basis points), the change 
in the financial market (S&P 500, measured in basis points), the change in the commodity market (S&P GSCI, measured in index points), the iTraxx Senior Financials Index 
(Banks’ Credit Default Swaps spreads or BCDS) and  the change in the Volatility Index, measured in percentage points.The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and 
contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Over the sample period, the mean of the BCDS spread (106.87 basis points) reflects 
an increasing credit default risk of the banking sector. BCDS also was very volatile, as 
witnessed by the range of variation of the data (the difference between the minimum and 
maximum values) and by the standard deviation. BCDS deviates from the mean on average 
by 81.99 basis points and is also positively skewed and leptokurtic. The resulting 
distributions are non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. 
The change in the volatility index VIX has a positive mean, suggesting that the 
expectations of market volatility were increasing over the sample period. It underwent 
significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicated by the range of variation in the 
standard deviation. The latter indicates that the change in the VIX index deviated from the 
mean on average by 1.97 index points. The change in the volatility index is also positively 
skewed and highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values.  
 
7.4. Empirical Findings 
 
7.4.1 Copula Functions 
We analyse dependence and tail dependence separately for the period from March 
2005 to August 2007 (Pre-crisis Period), for the period from August 2007 to September 2009 
(Crisis Period), and for the period from September 2009 to June 2013 (Post-crisis Period), as 
we follow the assumption made by Ozkan and Unsal (2012), that the global financial turmoil 
started in August 2007 and we find that the underlying return and volatility series behave 
differently across the three sample periods.  
We start by interpreting the results of the rank correlation coefficients (Table 7.2) as 
applied to the shipping market, financial market, commodity and volatility indices. We 
observe that for the overall sample period there is positive dependence and co-movement -
Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s ro statistics are positive- between the shipping indices, the 
stock market and the commodity index, indicating that the probability of concordance is 
 239 
 
significantly higher than the probability of discordance. On the other hand, as expected, there 
is negative dependence for all considered pairs with the BCDS (iTraxx Senior Financials) and 
the Volatility Index. The results also imply that the Dry Bulk Indices (BDI, BPI, BCI) 
experience higher dependence than the Tanker Index (BDTI), indicating that the response of 
the Dry Bulk market is significantly quicker to changes and fluctuations in other markets. 
The strongest relationship is observed between the shipping indices and the 
commodity index. The Kendall’s τ and the Spearman’s ρ are 0.153 and 0.195 accordingly for 
the Baltic Dry Index, 0.142 and 0.174 for the Baltic Capesize Index, 0.128 and 0.144 for the 
Baltic Panamax Index, 0.092 and 0.110 for the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index. Positive 
dependence indicates that the booming demand for commodities has underpinned the 
shipping market. During the crisis period the dependence increases substantially - Kendall’s τ 
and Spearman’s ρ rise to higher levels for all considered pairs-, implying that negative shocks 
in the stock market and the commodity index have a stronger effect on the shipping market. 
This finding indicates that the shipping indexes display a significant reversal, following 
shocks to financial and commodity markets. In the post crisis period the dependence structure 
weakens- Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ decrease for all considered pairs-, reflecting a 
structural break or a regime shift that divides the behaviour of the shipping market.  
Moreover, we find relatively smaller but also positive dependence between the 
shipping indices and the financial market. Again, this relationship becomes stronger during 
the crisis period. These results are in line with the findings of Bakshi et al. (2011), Bubak et 
al. (2011), Sirr et al. (2011), Ulku and Demirci (2012), Aloui et al. (2011 and 2013), and 
Andreou et al. (2013), who document directional spillovers between financial assets (i.e. 
stock and foreign exchange markets).  
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      Table 7.2  
      Correlation Estimates of shipping, stock market, commodity and volatility indices. 
Variables Overall Sample Pre- Crisis Period Crisis-Period Post-Crisis Period 
 Kendall-τ Spearman-ρ Kendall -τ Spearman-ρ Kendall –τ Spearman-ρ Kendall -τ Spearman-ρ 
BDI/S&P 500 0.149 0.173 0.152 0.179 0.226 0.285 0.061 0.077 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.153 0.195 0.160 0.187 0.230 0.306 0.110 0.113 
BDI/VIX -0.071 -0.029 -0.116 -0.062 0.056 0.070 -0.016 -0.004 
BDI/BCDS -0.053 -0.017 -0.094 -0.058 0.038 0.045 0.013 0.022 
BPI/S&P 500 0.116 0.120 0.127 0.129 0.173 0.189 0.028 0.035 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.128 0.144 0.142 0.157 0.180 0.203 0.057 0.066 
BPI/VIX -0.067 -0.021 -0.083 -0.076 0.017 0.034 -0.028 -0.021 
BPI/BCDS -0.049 -0.015 -0.072 -0.050 0.032 0.041 0.011 0.019 
BCI/S&P 500 0.128 0.137 0.136 0.151 0.203 0.228 0.047 0.062 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.142 0.174 0.149 0.171 0.209 0.245 0.050 0.061 
BCI/VIX -0.068 -0.023 -0.090 -0.072 0.033 0.052 -0.020 -0.016 
BCI/BCDS -0.050 -0.014 -0.095 -0.062 0.052 0.064 0.018 0.029 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.089 0.104 0.093 0.116 0.128 0.144 0.011 0.016 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.092 0.110 0.107 0.118 0.129 0.146 0.037 0.052 
BDTI/VIX -0.031 -0.019 -0.058 -0.047 0.022 0.036 -0.019 -0.012 
BDTI/BCDS -0.030 -0.017 -0.046 -0.032 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.004 
        Note: This table summarizes rank correlation estimates for shipping, financial, commodity and credit dependence for the overall period and three subperiods. 
        Positive significance implies increased correlation and dependence.  
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On the other hand, for the overall sample, both Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s ro 
statistics are negative between the Shipping Indexes, the Banks’ Credit Default Swaps spread 
and the Volatility Index, implying that there is no co-movement. However, during the crisis 
period the significantly negative response is reversed and the dependence becomes positive 
implying that during high volatility periods, where uncertainty increases and credit markets 
squeeze, changes in the BCDS spread and in the Volatility Index are followed by significant 
changes in the shipping market. Indeed, during the financial crisis the volatility index 
increased substantially while fluctuations soared in the shipping market. These relationships 
also indicate that the Volatility Index can be used as a hedging proxy for investments in the 
shipping market.  
We report the estimation results of the dependence parameters for the Shipping 
market in Table 7.3. The copula parameter estimates are significant, when the Gaussian, 
Student – t and Joe-Clayton copulas are applied. These findings support hypothesis 1 stating 
that there is a positive dependence structure between shipping, stock markets and 
commodities. Thus, positive (or negative) changes in stock market and commodity returns are 
followed by positive (or negative) changes in the shipping market. The strongest relationship 
is observed between the shipping indices and the commodity index. Again, the dependence 
for the Dry Bulk market is higher than the dependence for the Tanker Market. Indeed, the 
dependence structure between the Baltic Dry Index and the S&P GSCI is 0.249 when 
employing the Gaussian Copula, 0.277 when employing the Student- t Copula and 0.223 
when employing the Joe-Clayton Copula. On the other hand, the dependence structure 
between the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index and the S&P GSCI is 0.218 when employing the 
Gaussian Copula, 0.229 when employing the Student- t Copula and 0.216 when employing 
the Joe-Clayton Copula (see also Figure 7.2 for the estimated observations).  Accordingly, as 
expected, there is a negative dependence structure between the shipping market and changes 
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in the iTraxx Senior Financials Index (i.e. BCDS) and the Volatility Index. During periods of 
economic and credit expansion (i.e. BCDS spreads decrease), freight rates tend to rise and 
volatility tends to decline. 
The dependence during the crisis period increases substantially for the Shipping 
Indexes, supporting hypotheses 2. Indeed, during severe financial conditions co-movement 
increases, shocks and fluctuations in financial, commodity and credit markets perform as 
contagion channels whose extreme adverse realisations are associated with a slump of the 
shipping indices. Thus, we observe extreme value dependence over and above what one 
would expect from economic fundamentals pointing to contagion. Fluctuations and elevated 
volatility strengthens informational contents of stock, commodity and credit markets and 
raises uncertainty. Consequently, investors demand higher risk premium in order to invest in 
the Shipping Indexes, triggering deep sell offs of the shipping market. These results are in 
line to some extent with Kodres and Pritsker, (2002), Bekaert et. al., (2005), and Boyer at. al., 
(2006) who provide empirical evidence for contagion among asset holdings. 
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 Table 7.3  
      Estimates of Copula Dependence Parameters - overall sample. 
Variables Gaussian Standard Error Student – t Standard Error 
Symmetrised 
Joe-Clayton 
Standard Error 
BDI/S&P 500 0.244 0.021* 0.262 0.023* 0.215 0.019* 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.249 0.021* 0.277 0.024* 0.223 0.019* 
BDI/VIX -0.006 0.010 -0.002 0.010 -0.007 0.010 
BDI/BCDS -0.004 0.010 -0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.010 
BPI/S&P 500 0.213 0.019* 0.228 0.022* 0.211 0.019* 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.221 0.019* 0.236 0.021* 0.218 0.019* 
BPI/VIX -0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.011 -0.003 0.010 
BPI/BCDS -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
BCI/S&P 500 0.226 0.019* 0.253 0.022* 0.224 0.019* 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.230 0.020* 0.257 0.022* 0.233 0.020* 
BCI/VIX -0.004 0.010 -0.001 0.011 -0.004 0.010 
BCI/BCDS -0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.211 0.019* 0.224 0.019* 0.210 0.019* 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.218 0.019* 0.229 0.020* 0.216 0.019* 
BDTI/VIX -0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.010 
BDTI/BCDS -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.011 
 Note: This table presents the estimated copula dependence parameters for the Gaussian, Student-t and Joe-Clayton copula functions for the shipping indexes,  
 the financial index S&P 500, the commodity index S&P GSCI,  the credit market index iTraxx Senior Financials for Banks’ Credit Default Swaps and the Volatility 
Index for the overall sample period. * indicates significance of coefficients at the 5% level.  
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Figure 7.2 Scatterplot for the estimated Copula Dependence observations for the Overall Sample 
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Furthermore, Table 7.4 and Figure 7.3 show that the tail dependence when these 
markets are booming (upper and right tail) is not the same as that when markets are crashing 
(lower and left tail). Consequently, when lower tail dependence increases, co-movements 
increase under severe financial conditions causing asymmetry between upper and lower tails. 
These findings support hypothesis 3 which assumes asymmetric tail dependence and 
asymmetric contagion during high volatility periods, and are in line with Longin and Solnik 
(2001), Kyle and Xiong, (2001), Ang and Bekaert (2002), Ang and Chen (2002), and Yuan 
(2005) who document asymmetric contagion, that is stronger during market downturns for 
international markets. Moreover, the empirical results reported in Table 4 document 
significant and symmetric lower tail dependence during the financial crisis. This finding has 
important risk and asset pricing implications, since left tail dependence indicates the potential 
of simultaneous large losses and higher probability of extreme co-movements and contagion, 
supporting hypothesis 2. Tail dependence implies higher than normal joint risk, and thus, 
higher Value-at-Risk. Furthermore, the existence of joint tail risk alters the pricing of the 
shipping assets over time. 
Again, the dependence for the Baltic Dry Index is higher than the dependence for the 
Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, implying that the Dry Bulk market is more volatile and more 
vulnerable to downside risks from the Tanker market. Additionally, the dependence for the 
Baltic Capesize Index is higher than the dependence for the Baltic Panamax Index, implying 
that the category of vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) are more volatile and 
susceptible to downside risks than vessels of lower tonnage (i.e. Panamax vessels).  
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  Table 7.4  
              Estimates of Copula Dependence Parameters - crisis period.  
Variables Gaussian 
Standard 
Error 
Student – t 
Standard 
Error 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
Standard 
Error 
BDI/S&P 500 0.248 0.021* 0.267 0.023* 0.221 0.019* 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.254 0.022* 0.280 0.025* 0.226 0.019* 
BDI/VIX 0.258 0.022* 0.293 0.027* 0.244 0.021* 
BDI/BCDS 0.255 0.022* 0.284 0.026* 0.239 0.020* 
BPI/S&P 500 0.219 0.019* 0.234 0.020* 0.215 0.019* 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.225 0.019* 0.238 0.020* 0.221 0.019* 
BPI/VIX 0.230 0.020* 0.257 0.022* 0.228 0.019* 
BPI/BCDS 0.227 0.020* 0.251 0.022* 0.223 0.019* 
BCI/S&P 500 0.229 0.019* 0.258 0.022* 0.226 0.019* 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.233 0.020* 0.262 0.023* 0.237 0.020* 
BCI/VIX 0.235 0.020* 0.266 0.023* 0.238 0.020* 
BCI/BCDS 0.233 0.020* 0.264 0.023* 0.239 0.020* 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.218 0.019* 0.229 0.020* 0.216 0.019* 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.225 0.019* 0.230 0.020* 0.219 0.019* 
BDTI/VIX 0.217 0.019* 0.261 0.023* 0.229 0.020* 
BDTI/BCDS 0.216 0.019* 0.232 0.020* 0.220 0.019* 
Note: This table presents the estimated copula dependence parameters for the Gaussian, Student-t and Joe-Clayton copula functions for the shipping  
indexes, the financial index S&P 500, the commodity index S&P GSCI,  the credit market index iTraxx Senior Financials for Banks’ Credit Default Swaps and the 
Volatility Index for the crisis period. * indicates significance of coefficients at the 5% level.  
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Figure 7.3. Scatterplot for the estimated Copula Dependence observations for the Crisis Period 
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In addition, the results imply that accelerated decreases in the stock market, in the 
commodity index and large variations in credit markets (i.e. BCDS and Volatility Index) lead 
to accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in the shipping market. Furthermore, 
during the crisis period the stronger relationship is observed between the Shipping Indices 
and the Volatility Index. This finding confirms that the Volatility Index captures fluctuations 
and adverse behaviour of the shipping market and thus can be used as a hedging proxy, 
complimenting the works of Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012), 
and Tezuka et. al. (2012). These findings are also supported by the shipping market 
dependence profiles in Figure 1 where fluctuations in the Shipping Indices during the crisis 
period comove with stock, commodity and credit markets. 
Following Genest et al. (2009) we compare the distance of the goodness-of-fit test to 
select the most appropriate copula function. For this test, the null hypothesis states that the 
estimated copula provides the best fit to the data for the p-values that are higher than the 
conventional significance level (see also Appendix M, equations 3 and 4). The results 
presented in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.4 reveal that for all considered pairs, the Student-t Copula 
yields the smallest distance for the conducted goodness-of-fit test, indicating that the 
Gaussian and the Symmetrised Joe-Clayton copulas are not sufficient in modelling the tail 
dependence.  As described above, the Student – t copula assumes asymmetric tail 
dependence, implying that upper and lower tail dependence is not equal supporting 
hypothesis 3. These results are in line with the findings of Aloui et al. (2013), Wang et al. 
(2013) and Patton (2006) who employed copula functions to examine dependence between 
stock and currencies.  
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          Table 7.5  
          Distance between empirical and estimated copulas. 
Variables Gaussian P-Value Student-t P-Value 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
P-Value 
BDI/S&P 500 0.053 0.048 0.041 0.043 0.060 0.052* 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.047 0.046 0.032 0.039 0.051 0.045 
BDI/VIX 0.095 0.088* 0.058 0.050 0.103 0.091* 
BDI/BCDS 0.090 0.087* 0.050 0.049 0.087 0.089* 
BPI/S&P 500 0.057 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.065 0.058* 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.054 0.048 0.040 0.044 0.053 0.048 
BPI/VIX 0.101 0.090* 0.064 0.058* 0.109 0.093* 
BPI/BCDS 0.092 0.088* 0.057 0.050 0.090 0.087* 
BCI/S&P 500 0.055 0.049 0.043 0.046 0.062 0.056* 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.051 0.047 0.038 0.043 0.056 0.050 
BCI/VIX 0.098 0.089* 0.061 0.056* 0.106 0.092* 
BCI/BCDS 0.086 0.084* 0.053 0.049 0.095 0.088* 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.058 0.050 0.047 0.048 0.068 0.060* 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.056 0.049 0.042 0.046 0.054 0.049 
BDTI/VIX 0.102 0.091* 0.068 0.060* 0.110 0.095* 
BDTI/BCDS 0.090 0.087* 0.060 0.055* 0.099 0.090* 
Note: This table displays the distance between the empirical and the estimated copulas according to Cramer-Von Mises statistic.  
A small reported distance from zero, indicates good fit to the data.* indicates the rejection of the copula model at the 5% level. 
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Figure 7.4.  
Comparison between Symmetrized Joe-Clayton (green line) and t- Copula (red line) for the model that fits best the data (blue line, BDI 
observations). 
 
Panel A -Tail Dependence Observations for  the t- Copula, BDI, overall sample period. 
 
Panel B – Tail Dependence Observations for the t- Copula, BDI crisis period. 
 
Figure 7.5. Tail Dependence. 
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To capture upper and lower tail risks, we compute the tail dependence coefficients 
implied by the Student-t Copula which provides the best fit. Our empirical findings reported 
in Table 7.6 imply that the dependence structure is asymmetric, i.e. lower tail and upper tail 
dependence is not exactly equal λl ≠ λu (see also Figure 7.5 for graphical representation). 
Under symmetry, this difference would be equal or fairly closed to zero. However, the 
Student-t copula results suggest that in the pre and post crisis period the corresponding 
appreciation is not experienced with the similar magnitude, given that the shipping market 
was depreciated heavily during the recent financial crisis and never returned to the pre-crisis 
levels. In other words, the shipping market is more dependent at the time of crashing than 
booming. This points to structural breaks and statistically significant decreases in the tail 
indices after the beginning of the crisis. These results are also in line with Alizadeh and 
Nomikos (2011) who investigate the term structure and time-varying volatility of shipping 
freight rates and observe that when the freight market is in backwardation, volatility is higher 
compared to periods when the market is in contango. 
Indeed, in the post-crisis period, the smooth of the upper tail dependence (λu ) drops 
systematically, the dynamic of conditional dependence, and the dependence between 
structures is asymmetric. These findings confirm the co-movement patterns documented in 
Tables 7.3-7.5 and imply that the shipping market experienced a structural break caused by 
the financial meltdown. In particular, the spread of the financial crisis to the shipping market 
caused a permanent effect and changed its relationship with the financial, commodity and 
credit markets.  
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        Table 7.6  
        Tail dependence coefficients. 
Variables Overall Sample Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
λl λu λl λu λl λu λl λu 
BDI/S&P 500 0.056 0.054 0.032 0.067 0.055 0.039 0.060 0.038 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.058 0.053 0.039 0.067 0.055 0.041 0.062 0.045 
BDI/VIX 0.045 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.056 0.080 0.049 0.032 
BDI/BCDS 0.038 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.056 0.063 0.044 0.029 
BPI/S&P 500 0.053 0.050 0.026 0.058 0.054 0.032 0.055 0.031 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.055 0.051 0.029 0.062 0.055 0.037 0.056 0.033 
BPI/VIX 0.043 0.024 0.022 0.011 0.056 0.039 0.037 0.010 
BPI/BCDS 0.038 0.016 0.019 0.003 0.056 0.027 0.038 0.015 
BCI/S&P 500 0.053 0.050 0.031 0.062 0.055 0.036 0.057 0.035 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.057 0.052 0.034 0.063 0.055 0.040 0.058 0.039 
BCI/VIX 0.041 0.028 0.033 0.024 0.056 0.058 0.039 0.020 
BCI/BCDS 0.032 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.056 0.042 0.025 0.018 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.054 0.050 0.028 0.057 0.055 0.038 0.053 0.039 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.056 0.052 0.031 0.063 0.056 0.039 0.057 0.040 
BDTI/VIX 0.036 0.024 0.022 0.011 0.056 0.053 0.029 0.028 
BDTI/BCDS 0.030 0.018 0.019 0.008 0.056 0.041 0.028 0.021 
                      Note: The table presents the upper and lower tail dependence coefficients, estimated by the Student-t copula which provides the best fit  
          to the data. Symmetry occurs when the lower tail is equal or fairly closed to the upper tail (i.e. λl = λu). 
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On the other hand, during the crisis period we find evidence of symmetric lower tail 
dependence. Indeed, λl is between 0.55 and 0.56 for all considered pairs. We also note that 
with respect to the difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods, lower tail dependence 
increases substantially. This implies that the shipping market becomes more pronouncedly 
heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward moves. Furthermore, this finding indicates a 
structural break due to the recent financial crisis that corresponds to the increase in the 
likelihood of large fluctuations. As a result, on the post crisis period, the shipping market is 
more susceptible to crisis episodes and speculative attacks. Significant symmetric lower tail 
dependence indicates that during periods of shocks and slumps, co-movements and contagion 
from stock, commodity and credit markets to the shipping market increases significantly. The 
increased likelihood of extreme joint losses suggests a higher than normal Value at Risk. 
These results are in line with the findings of Wang et al. (2013) and Ibragimov et. al. (2013) 
who studied tail dependencies for emerging market foreign exchanges.  
 
7.4.2 Time –varying approach 
In order to gain an even deeper insight into parameter changes, we follow Aloui et al. 
(2013) and use a rolling window to examine the dependence parameters of the Student-t 
copula over time. To avoid collinearity issues, we proceed by taking into account only those 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level. The parameters of the copula 
function vary through time following certain evolution equations depending on their previous 
values. We set the window size fixed and equal to 90 days length which corresponds to 
approximately one quarter of a trading year. Thus, the point estimates for the window are t -
90. We construct a GARCH (1,1) model for each return series and extract the standardised 
residuals. Then, we apply the empirical cumulative distribution function for the standardised 
residuals and estimate the Student-t copula dependence parameters. In the course of 
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robustness checking, we try out different window sizes (see also section 6 with robustness 
checks). 
We observe that all estimated dependence parameters are not constant over time and 
exhibit a time-variation. Figure 7.6 shows that the tail dependence between the shipping 
market and the commodity market increases to a higher level in 2008 while decreases rapidly 
in the post-crisis period
56
, taking on values between 0.001, indicating that there is little or no 
relationship, and 2.000 indicating a higher probability of joint extreme losses. Moreover, the 
extreme tail dependence increases to a high level during the period of economic instability in 
the Eurozone, indicating a rise in the cross market comovement in 2010.  
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 Similar results are observed for the commodity index and the volatility index.  
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Figure 7.6.  
Time-varying dependence parameters of Student-t copula for the relationship between the shipping indexes and the commodity index 
with one-quarter trading rolling window. 
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7.5 Robustness check 
In order to check the sensitivity of our results, we employ alternative GARCH models 
and a different rolling window. In particular: (i) we expand the length of the rolling window 
to 125 trading days -which correspond to approximately six months of a trading year- to 
estimate the time-varying nature of the dependence parameters; (ii) we employ a non-linear 
extension of GARCH, the Exponential GARCH (1,1) model proposed by Nelson (1991) and 
(iii) the fractionally integrated GARCH (1,d,1) model proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and 
Baillie et. al. (1996), in order to approve the suitability of our proposed approach for 
modelling the relationships between shipping, financial, commodity and credit markets.  
 
7.5.1 Expanding the rolling window 
We expect the power of the significance tests to increase with bigger window sizes. 
However, Figure 7.7 shows the coefficients to balance themselves so that our conclusions are 
effectively the same, no matter the length of the window size. Indeed, the obtained results are 
not different from those of the 90 day rolling window. Again, the dependence parameters are 
not constant over time, exhibit time-varying patterns and experience a clear tendency of 
increased co-movement during periods of extreme losses. As a result, the forecast horizon 
does not play a significant role in terms of the level of spillovers.  
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Figure 7.7 
Time-varying dependence parameters of Student-t Copula for the relationship between the shipping indexes and the commodity index 
with six month trading rolling window.
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7.5.2 EGARCH approach 
The EGARCH model allows for testing asymmetries, captures volatility clustering 
and leptokurtosis. Indeed, Harris et al. (2004) employ the skewed generalised Student-t 
EGARCH distribution to capture the skewness and leverage effects into international equity 
markets. This checking procedure is very important as it allows us to confirm the suitability 
of our proposed approach for modelling the relationships between shipping, financial, 
commodity and credit markets.  
Table 7.7 presents the results for the dependence coefficients with respect to the 
EGARCH model. For the overall sample period we observe that there is positive dependence 
and comovement with the financial and commodity indexes supporting our proposed 
approach. Again, the strongest relationship is observed between the shipping indices and the 
commodity index.  Positive dependence indicates that a change in the commodity prices is 
followed by a significant change in the shipping market. Indeed, when economic recovery or 
expansion takes place, shipping rates tend to soar, as the demand for commodities increases 
and more commodities are imported. Thus, higher profitability is anticipated from 
investments in the shipping market. On the other hand, there is a negative dependence 
structure between the shipping market, changes in the iTraxx Senior Financials Index 
(BCDS) and changes in the Volatility Index. 
However, the pattern of comovement over the crisis period differs from the whole 
sample. Consistent with our initial results, during the crisis period the dependence increases 
substantially, implying that negative shocks in the stock market and the commodity index 
have a stronger effect on the shipping market. The strongest relationship during the crisis 
period is observed between the shipping indices and the Volatility Index. During high 
volatility periods, where uncertainty increases and credit markets squeeze, changes in the 
Volatility Index are followed by changes in the Shipping market. The lowest dependence is 
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observed for the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, indicating that the Tanker market is less volatile than the Dry Bulk market.   
      Table 7.7  
      Estimates of Copula Dependence Coefficients with EGARCH specification. 
Variables 
EGARCH – overall period EGARCH – crisis period 
Student – t 
Copula 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
Copula 
Student – t 
Copula 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
Copula 
BDI/S&P 500 0.156* 0.119* 0.208* 0.190* 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.164* 0.127* 0.229* 0.211* 
BDI/VIX -0.003 -0.006 0.251* 0.235* 
BDI/BCDS -0.004 -0.004 0.227* 0.223* 
BPI/S&P 500 0.128* 0.103* 0.186* 0.144* 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.143* 0.122* 0.203* 0.187* 
BPI/VIX -0.003 -0.006 0.247* 0.230* 
BPI/BCDS -0.003 -0.005 0.209* 0.195* 
BCI/S&P 500 0.140* 0.118* 0.209* 0.193* 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.159* 0.125* 0.264* 0.221* 
BCI/VIX -0.004 -0.008 0.281* 0.267* 
BCI/BCDS -0.005 -0.007 0.263* 0.228* 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.124* 0.101* 0.173* 0.136* 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.137* 0.115* 0.197* 0.192* 
BDTI/VIX -0.005 -0.009 0.231* 0.225* 
BDTI/BCDS -0.006 -0.010 0.202* 0.194* 
       Note: This table presents the estimated Student-t and Joe-Clayton dependence coefficients using the alternative EGARCH  
       specification. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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7.5.3 FIGARCH approach 
The FIGARCH model represents a flexible process for explaining and representing 
the observed temporal dependencies for the conditional variances. The model allows for long 
memory (d) in the conditional variance and provides the opportunity to describe the 
persistency and the structural behaviour of the shocks to the shipping market. Generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (FIGARCH) models, have a long memory nature 
which allows being a better candidate than other conditional heteroscedastic models for 
modelling volatility in asset prices. Under the ARCH framework, it is generally assumed that 
large shocks tend to follow large shocks and similarly, the small shocks tend to follow small 
shocks, phenomena known as volatility clustering. Although the ARCH model is simple, it 
often requires many parameters to adequately describe the volatility process of an asset 
return. In contrast, the FIGARCH model allows a more flexible class of processes for the 
conditional variance that are capable of explaining and representing the observed temporal 
dependencies in financial market volatility. In particular, the FIGARCH model allows only a 
slow hyperbolic rate of decay for the lagged squared or absolute innovations in the 
conditional variance function. This model can accommodate the time dependence of the 
variance and a leptokurtic unconditional distribution for the returns with a long memory 
behaviour for the conditional variances. In this research, we employ the FIGARCH approach 
as the most suitable for capturing the long memory in variance and asymmetry in financial 
markets. 
Table 7.8 presents the results for the dependence coefficients with respect to the 
FIGARCH model. For the overall sample period, we observe -similar to the results obtained 
from the EGARCH model- that there is positive dependence and comovement with the 
financial and commodity indexes. The long memory parameter, d, is significantly different 
from zero with high and increasing dependence structure in the crisis period when volatility 
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accelerates, indicating that there is strong evidence of long memory in the returns. The 
strongest relationship is observed again between the shipping indices and the commodity 
index. The results also indicate that the t-copula function fits best the data. On the other hand, 
there is a negative dependence structure between the shipping market, changes in the Banks’ 
Credit Default Swaps spread and changes in the Volatility Index. 
During the crisis period the dependence increases substantially, implying that 
negative shocks in the stock market and the commodity index have a stronger effect on the 
shipping market. Again, the strongest relationship during the crisis period is observed 
between the shipping indices and the Volatility Index.  
Not surprisingly, we also observe that the cross-market co-movement is stronger with the Dry 
Bulk Indices compared to the Tanker Index, indicating that the response of the Dry Bulk 
market is significantly faster to changes in other markets. Moreover, the results imply that the 
tail dependence when these markets are booming (upper and right tail) is not the same as 
when markets are crashing (lower and left tail), indicating a higher probability of extreme co-
movements (i.e. dependence increases during crisis periods). Consequently, when lower tail 
dependence increases, co-movements increase under severe financial conditions causing 
asymmetry between upper and lower tails. 
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     Table 7.8   
     Estimates of Copula Dependence Coefficients with FIGARCH specification. 
Variables 
FIGARCH (1,d,1) – overall period FIGARCH (1,d,1) – crisis period 
Student – t 
Copula 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
Copula 
Student – t 
Copula 
Symmetrized 
Joe-Clayton 
Copula 
BDI/S&P 500 0.132* 0.111* 0.202* 0.184* 
BDI/S&P GSCI 0.148* 0.122* 0.225* 0.207* 
BDI/VIX -0.005 -0.009 0.244* 0.230* 
BDI/BCDS -0.006 -0.011 0.221* 0.212* 
BPI/S&P 500 0.111* 0.092* 0.179* 0.141* 
BPI/S&P GSCI 0.134* 0.115* 0.195* 0.183* 
BPI/VIX -0.004 -0.006 0.238* 0.227* 
BPI/BCDS -0.006 -0.010 0.197* 0.184* 
BCI/S&P 500 0.136* 0.112* 0.205* 0.188* 
BCI/S&P GSCI 0.152* 0.119* 0.259* 0.213* 
BCI/VIX -0.005 -0.009 0.272* 0.265* 
BCI/BCDS -0.006 -0.012 0.257* 0.204* 
BDTI/S&P 500 0.107* 0.091* 0.166* 0.133* 
BDTI/S&P GSCI 0.132* 0.110* 0.190* 0.184* 
BDTI/VIX -0.004 -0.006 0.228* 0.222* 
BDTI/BCDS -0.005 -0.008 0.193* 0.179* 
       Note: This table presents the estimated Student-t and Joe-Clayton dependence coefficients using the alternative FIGARCH  
       specification. The long memory process is represented by d. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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7.6. Discussion 
7.6.1 What is the effect of the credit crisis on the shipping industry? 
The notable financial meltdown of 2008 which was launched by the subprime crisis 
and was quickly spread in shipping assets provoked the intention that correlated changes in 
fundamentals such as macroeconomic variables are an important part of the explanation, but 
are insufficient to explain the full magnitude and variation in international asset co-
movements. Indeed, the international literature notifies that for the recent crisis, non-
fundamental sources have been highlighted as important determinants of excess 
comovements among international markets and assets. During market tranquil periods, 
portrayed by easy credit (i.e. iTraxx Senior Financials Index is low) and low volatility (i.e. 
VIX in historical lows), the stock, commodity and shipping markets broaden. Our study 
shows that during the pre-crisis period comovements and dependencies are low among the 
assets, and thus, the tail risk is asymmetric. 
In contrast, during the turmoil period shocks in the stock, commodity and volatility 
indices transmit rapidly, like a domino effect to the shipping indices over and above what one 
would expect from economic fundamentals, consistent with contagion. Indeed, we document 
a significant increase in dependencies and comovements attributed by the contagion channel 
variables whose extreme realisations are associated with a slump of shipping indices. Also, 
we observe symmetric lower tail dependence during the financial crisis, implying that these 
assets tend to crash together with the same magnitude. This could be due to fire-sales in the 
contagion channels and portfolio re-allocations which engender large initial slump effects on 
the shipping market, which subsequently reverse downwards (see also Boyer et. al., 2006; 
and Jotikasthira et. al., 2012). In the post- crisis period we observe significant but lower co-
movement and asymmetric tail dependence, implying that these assets recover independently 
to some extent, pointing to asymmetric contagion.  
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7.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this research, we model and examine conditional dependence and tail dependence 
for the shipping market. In contrast to the majority of the existing empirical literature we 
employ Gaussian, Joe-Clayton and t- Copula functions in the shipping indices in order to 
identify comovements across markets of different asset types. In response to the questions 
raised in the introduction, the empirical results imply that: (i) the credit crisis caused 
accelerated decreases, increased fluctuations and contagion in the shipping market; (ii) tail 
dependence and contagion is asymmetric, since the variables crash together (i.e. pointing to 
extreme dependence) but recover independently; (iii) the Dry Bulk market is more volatile 
and susceptible to downside risks than the Tanker market. 
Particularly, we find that the crisis spreads in a domino fashion to the shipping 
market, over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals, advancing to 
contagion. The contagion variables (i.e. stock, commodity and credit markets) acted as 
transmission channels and transferred risk to the shipping market. Further results indicate the 
existence of significant and symmetric lower tail dependences during the financial crisis. We 
observe changes in the temporal dependence, showing that accelerated decreases in stock 
markets, commodities and large variations in credit markets lead to accelerated decreases and 
increased fluctuations in the shipping market. The significance of the tail dependence implies 
that these asset classes tend to experience concurrent extreme shocks. Therefore, this research 
captures the channel and the source which can amplify risks and lead to instability on the 
shipping market with important hedging, risk and asset pricing implications. 
Moreover we observe that, the co-movement becomes stronger during the crisis 
period, consistent with contagion between the asset prices when compared with tranquil 
periods. During the crisis period the Dry Bulk market is more volatile and more vulnerable to 
downside risks from the Tanker market and the category of vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. 
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Capesize vessels) are more volatile and susceptible to downside risks than vessels of medium 
range tonnage (i.e. Panamax vessels). Using trading rolling windows we observe that the 
cross – market dependence increases to a higher level during the financial meltdown, pointing 
to asymmetric contagion. This is due to the increased contemporaneous dependence of the 
realised volatility innovations.  
Furthermore, the dependence remains significant but weaker after the financial crisis 
and the shipping indices become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than 
in upward moves. These findings indicate that in the post crisis period the shipping market is 
more susceptible to financial crises and speculative attacks. The oversupply of vessels in 
most shipping services may be a reason for the structural change in the behaviour of the 
shipping indices during the post crisis period. Additionally, our results indicate that there is 
an asymmetry in upward moves for the pre-crisis period, indicating that markets tend to 
boom independently. Moreover, we observe that accelerated decreases in commodities and 
prompt variations in volatility, provoke accelerated decreases and function as a barometer for 
shipping market fluctuations. Finally, we identify that the Volatility Index can be used as a 
hedging proxy for investments in the shipping market.  
Notably, the Student-t copula provides the best fit to capture fluctuations in the 
shipping market. The model helps us to study both the qualitative and quantitative 
repercussions of short-term and long-term volatility components characterising the Shipping 
Indexes on the evolution of three other asset classes.  In periods characterised by increased 
uncertainty, the daily movement of the Shipping market can be captured by the t- copula 
which can also be used as a hedge proxy with decisions that involve more than one risky 
asset in the shipping market. Employing other copula functions and jump diffusion models to 
the shipping market would be an important direction for further research. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the credit crunch, the effects of credit squeeze, liquidity hoarding and 
contagion manifested themselves, global economies throttled with enormous market collapses 
and the financial industry engulfed in a plethora of defaults. The nesuing credit crunch 
triggered unprecedented volatility in global financial markets, whilst the effects are still 
rippling in global economies. Motivated by the widely accepted observation that the financial 
meltdown had multiple causes, the thesis sheds new light on: i) modeling systemic risk in 
banking networks; ii) addressing the role of derivatives (i.e. Credit Default Swaps) and 
Government Interventions; iii) documenting the symptoms of acute liquidity withdrawal and 
investor-induced contagion in emerging currency markets; iv) capturing the regime 
dependent behavior of the shipping market;  v) modeling tail risks and contagion channels in 
shipping and financial assets. This chapter discusses the most important findings, policy 
implications and limitations of the thesis and provides scope for further research. 
 
8.1 Systemic Risk and Financial Network  
8.1.1 Empirical Findings 
The thesis models systemic risk via employing the Maximum Entropy approach for 
the euro area banking industry, and by constructing a unique interconnected, dynamic and 
continuous-time financial network. In contrast to the existing literature, three independent 
channels of systemic risk are employed as counterfactual simulations to propagate systemic 
shocks: the interbank loan market, the sovereign credit risk market and the asset loan market. 
The findings provide novel evidence on the effects of shocks on financial institutions, the 
contagion path and the way euro area banks respond under severe financial conditions. 
In response to the issues raised in the introduction of the thesis, the findings have 
important implications for understanding systemic risk and for analysing policies designed to 
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mitigate financial contagion in the euro area. Specifically, at first glance the empirical results 
reveal that a shock in the interbank loan market triggers the highest expected losses in the 
banking systems. However, by modelling the contagion path the findings imply reveals that a 
shock in the sovereign credit risk channel transmits faster through the banking network and 
leads to a cascade of defaults. Thus, we conclude that the sovereign credit risk channel 
dominates systemic risks amplified in the euro area financial network, extending the work of 
Gai et al. (2011). Additionally, we document that the propagated losses vary across the 
national banking sectors depending on their sizes and interconnectiveness, while also there is 
a dramatic variation across northern and southern euro area countries in terms of their 
response to systemic risk. In particular, the speed of contagion and the expected bank failures 
are markedly more prominent in southern euro area banking systems. 
Moreover, by modelling the contagion path we observe that losses vary over time due 
to the post-crisis deleverage and to changes in the degree of interconnections among 
European banks. Interestingly, the findings reveal that the cross-border transmission of 
systemic shocks - and consequently the speed of contagion - depends on the size of the 
national banking sector, the initial location of the generated shock and the degree of 
interconnectedness, in line with the findings of Mistrulli (2011). Finally, it is evident from the 
results that the European banking system remains highly vulnerable and conducive to 
financial contagion, implying that the new capital rules have not substantially reduced 
systemic risks, and hence, there is a need for additional policies in order to increase the 
resilience of the sector.  
 
8.1.2 Policy Implications 
The thesis enlightens the nature of systemic risk and provides a new perspective on 
financial contagion and domino effects in the banking sector. Specifically, the role of  
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sovereign credit shocks –neglected by the international literature hitherto- trigger a cascade of 
defaults, while also a shock in the value of collaterals engender severe direct losses and 
defaults in the banking system. Moreover, the thesis offers new insights on the importance of 
interconnectedness in the banking network. Specifically, the structure of the network –created 
through mutual exposures between financial institutions- describes the links between banks 
and identifies that even domestic banks with small financial exposures in a foreign banking 
sector may be severely affected by a systemic shock provoked by same. Furthermore, the 
findings complement and extend existing works for macro-prudential policies who strive to 
ameliorate the degree of systemic risk in the banking industry. The network approach to 
financial systems, employed in the thesis is particularly important for assessing financial 
stability and is instrumental in capturing the externalities that the risk associated with a single 
institution may create for the entire system. The results on network externalities facilitate the 
adoption of a macro-prudential framework for financial supervision. Additionally, the thesis 
shows that a repetition of the recent financial crisis is highly possible in the euro area banking 
system. Thus, regulations that target individual institutions, must take into account the 
vulnerabilities that emerge from network interdependencies in the financial system to prevent 
a local crisis from becoming global.  
 
8.2 Banking Stability: The Role of Derivatives and Government Interventions 
8.2.1 Empirical Findings 
The thesis also examines the regime-dependent interdependence between euro area 
banks’ and sovereign credit default swap (BCDS and SCDS, respectively) spreads, stock and 
credit markets via using a state-of-art MSBVAR model. The model sheds light on a 
significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables, documenting that 
government interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer from the banking 
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to the public sector. Furthermore, the results assert the feedback hypothesis, while also imply 
that the expectation of support from national governments allows banks to be more leveraged, 
making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults, and thus, providing novel evidence that 
large-scale rescue packages do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by 
rising BCDS spreads. 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction of the thesis, the empirical 
results provide strong evidence that an unexpected positive change to BCDS and SCDS 
spreads causes an increase in investors’ expectations of stock market volatility, as measured 
by the change in the VSTOXX volatility index, and advances to a decrease in the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. In particular, there is a significant rise in co-movement in the 
post-bailout period between BCDS and SCDS and the VSTOXX volatility index. These 
findings are in line with Gennaioli et al. (2014) and resonate well with empirical evidence on 
the effects of changes in sovereign credit ratings on financial instability and stock market 
returns. Moreover, the effects of unexpected changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the 
VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and 
stronger in a more volatile regime, reflecting an increased incidence of contagion across 
financial markets, complimenting the work of Alexander and Kaeck (2008). Thus, the thesis 
provides also scope for hedging strategies for investments in the Euro Area credit default 
swap market. Indeed, stock market variables, such as the VSTOXX volatility index and the 
EUROSTOXX stock market index futures can be used to hedge against undesired 
developments in the BCDS and SCDS spreads.  
 
8.2.2 Policy Implications 
The transition from low to higher volatility regimes after 2007 indicates that the euro 
area switched from a period of low sovereign credit risk to that of unprecedented risk 
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disintegration, because the economic crisis affected disproportionally the ‘periphery’ 
economies, compared to the ‘core’ German economy, as directly implied by widening CDS 
spreads. The results suggest that CDS spreads’ elevated volatility induces higher investment 
uncertainty and, hence, companies prefer to postpone their investment projects. In turn, this 
deteriorates GDP growth and exacerbates CDS spreads. Given a lengthy period (six years, 
from 2007 to 2013) of the above mentioned risk disintegration, it is obvious that the 
macroeconomic policy imposed during the examined period (harsh austerity in periphery 
countries) resulted in higher economic disintegration in the euro area. 
Furthermore, the documented banking sector’s pro-cyclicality phenomenon can be 
ameliorated by macro-prudential policies involving counter-cyclical buffers (i.e., counter-
cyclical reserve requirements, leverage and dynamic provisioning) and, notably, caps on 
debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios. Also, the differential response of SCDS spreads 
across the three regimes may not be explained by fundamental factors but, rather, by 
persistent waves of optimism and pessimism of investors and financial contagion. On the 
other side, increasing sovereign credit risk affected negatively the banking sector for two 
reasons: first, due to the ‘balance sheet effect’ (banks hold a considerable share of 
government bonds) and second, an increase in sovereign credit risk leads to a decreasing 
ability of the state to bail out banks in the future. Therefore, EU policy makers should 
consider alternatives to the bail-out policy so as to offset the risk transmission from the 
banking sector to the public sector and vice versa. 
 
8.3 Emerging Currencies and Liquidity Shortage 
8.3.1 Empirical Findings  
Moreover, the thesis models and examines conditional and tail dependences for the 
most rapidly developed emerging market foreign exchanges. Four alternative measures to 
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investigate the transmission mechanism are used in order to explore how shocks propagate 
emerging currencies. In contrast to the majority of the existing empirical literature the thesis 
employs Gaussian, Joe-Clayton and t-Copula functions in order to identify spillovers across 
markets of different types. Furthermore, the thesis studies the extent to which shocks in stock, 
commodity, liquidity and credit channels are transmitted to fluctuations in emerging 
currencies. The empirical results provide strong evidence that cross-asset linkages during 
periods of high volatility are over and above any economic fundamentals. The thesis captures 
synchronically the behaviour of emerging currencies and the interactions with other assets 
and risk factors, and hence, provides novel evidence that large adverse shocks in the four 
channels described above, spill over to emerging market currencies, resembling to investor 
induced contagion and supporting the hypothesis that the recent credit crisis was spread 
through these contagion channels and cross-asset portfolio constraints. The explicit 
distinction between the four contagion channels and the modelling for the evolution of these 
crashes sheds new light on the propagation of large negative cross-asset returns.  
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the thesis documents that 
during the crisis period, there is a significant genuine increase in the cross-asset asymmetric 
synchronisation and the dependence with emerging currencies, advancing to asymmetric 
contagion. This result compliments the work of Jotikasthira et al. (2012). Additionally, the 
thesis finds that past occurrences of local crashes evolve via regional crashes into global 
crashes, indicating that the crisis was spread in a domino fashion into emerging market 
currencies. The empirical results document that during the financial crisis dependence among 
assets increased significantly, resembling to extreme tail dependence. This finding is in line 
with Ibragimov et al. (2013). The dependence in the extremes is generated by the 
idiosyncratic contagion channels, which are the outcome of several shocks and wealth 
constraints. The significance of the tail dependence implies that these asset classes tend to 
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experience concurrent extreme shocks. Moreover, the thesis observes that accelerated 
decreases and large variations in the domestic stock markets, in the growth (i.e. 
commodities), liquidity (BCDS) and credit channels (i.e. VIX) lead to accelerated decreases 
and increased fluctuations in the emerging market foreign exchanges. Finally, the thesis finds 
that in the post-crisis period, emerging market foreign exchanges are more susceptible to 
financial crises and speculative attacks, implying the existence of a structural shift in the 
transmission of shocks that divides the behaviour of these currencies. The importance that 
external shocks and liquidity hoarding have in shaping the movement of these emerging 
currencies is amplified and shows that the symptoms of liquidity withdrawal in the developed 
markets lead to a revaluation and a recalibration of the risk characteristics of emerging 
currencies.  
 
8.3.2 Policy Implications 
Apparently, these findings imply that emerging currencies display a significant 
reversal, following shocks to financial, commodity, liquidity and credit channels. The 
increase in cross-asset dependence diminishes rapidly diversification opportunities and 
renders traditional portfolio theory fruitless. Furthermore, the presence of risk spillovers 
among these asset classes, increases portfolio risk and magnifies the volatility of the expected 
returns in emerging market currencies.  
In the post-crisis period the existence of a structural shift in the transmission of shocks 
that divides the behaviour of these currencies is documented. Emerging market exchange 
rates become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in upward moves. As 
a result, on the post crisis period, emerging currencies are more susceptible to financial crisis 
and speculative attacks. These findings affect the pricing of emerging market currencies in 
the post-crisis period for safety-first investors, since risk-averse investors favour investments 
 275 
 
with low dependence which hedge portfolio risks. Emerging currencies benefited the most 
from the macroeconomic tailwinds that boosted growth in the pre-crisis period. However, it is 
evident that the credit crunch was the catalyst for the change in the structure of the 
transmission of shocks to emerging currencies and more concretely played a critical role for 
the reassessment of emerging market currencies which lead to a revaluation and a 
recalibration of their risk characteristics, indicating that this multi-year underperformance in 
emerging assets is not a cyclical downturn. Thus, less liquidity in the developed world affects 
severely emerging markets, leaving them to compete for scarce resources by offering cheaper 
currencies and more attractive asset valuations.  
 
8.4 Modelling the Behavior of Financial Assets with Bayesian Econometrics 
8.4.1 Empirical Findings 
In a similar vein, the thesis models spillover relationships and examines risk 
characteristics and the regime dependent behavior between shipping indexes, stock, 
commodity and credit markets via using a novel Markov-switching vector auto-regression 
(MSVAR) model. The results suggest that since July 2007, the shipping market switched 
from low risk regime to mainly intermediate risk regime and occasionally to high risk regime. 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction of the thesis, the findings document the 
existence of spillover effects where the stock, credit and commodity markets serve as a major 
source of risk to the shipping market, extending the work of Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007), 
and Goulas and Skiadopoulos (2012). Additionally, volatility spillovers are more prominent 
over turmoil periods, since shock effects accelerated mainly during intermediate (regime 2) 
and high risk regimes (regime 3). The higher the volatility regime the stronger is the effect. 
During market tranquil periods the commodity market affects the shipping market the most.  
Moreover, the thesis identifies that the shipping industry experienced a structural break in 
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2008, shifting its relationship with other asset classes. Thus, during turmoil periods (regime 
state three) the credit squeeze and the increased uncertainty for global economic growth 
distress the shipping market the most. 
 
8.4.2 Policy Implications 
During market tranquil periods, (before the subprime mortgage crisis), the shipping 
market experienced low-volatility regime. The global economic expansion, and the 
corresponding expectation for increased revenues (represented in our study by the S&P 500 
Index), the strong demand for commodities (represented by the S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index) and the corresponding expectation for increased transportation and the 
credit expansion (represented by the iTraxx Senior Financials Index and the Volatility 
Futures Index) which facilitated ship financing, advanced the shipping indexes to move 
upward and the shipping market to expand strongly.  
Following the collapse of the credit market, the financial and the commodity markets 
enter a period of turbulence, and global economic activity deteriorates. In the high volatility 
regime, these markets served as a major source of risk and acted as channels that amplify and 
transmit shocks to the shipping market. Thus, in the high-volatility regime, the BDI 
experienced an unprecedented drawdown that was followed again by a relatively calmer 
intermediate-volatility period with some tendency for the high-volatility state to recur shortly 
after the beginning of the Sovereign debt crisis in Europe, when Standard & Poor’s 
downgraded the rating of Greece’s –the forth larger shipping services exporter in the world- 
debt to junk bond status. 
The transition from low to higher volatility regime, changes the cyclicality of the 
shipping market. The existence of spillovers, changes the design of a well-diversified 
portfolio, the expected revenues and the asset pricing. Likewise, elevated volatility feeds into 
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higher uncertainty of investment and hence, investors prefer to postpone their investment 
projects in the shipping market driving higher the risk premium that is required for holding 
shipping assets. Thus, as a proactive risk management measure, the Volatility Index can be 
used as a hedging proxy during turbulent periods in the shipping market. Also, a company 
may opt to charter-rate vessels on long term bareboat charters or may choose to diversify 
their fleet in terms of type of vessel and tonnage.  
 
8.5 Tail Risk Management in Shipping and Financial Assets 
8.5.1 Empirical Findings 
In addition to the above, the thesis models and examines conditional dependence and 
tail dependence for shipping indices. In contrast to the majority of the existing empirical 
literature the thesis employs Gaussian, Joe-Clayton and t- Copula functions in the shipping 
indices in order to identify comovements across markets of different asset types. In response 
to the question raised in the introduction of the thesis, the empirical results suggest that the 
crisis spreads in a domino fashion to the shipping market, over and above what one would 
expect from economic fundamentals, advancing to contagion. The contagion variables (i.e. 
stock, commodity and credit markets) act as transmission channels and transferred risk to the 
shipping market. Further results indicate the existence of significant and symmetric lower tail 
dependences during the financial crisis, extending the work of Bubak et al. (2011). By 
observing changes in the temporal dependence, the thesis documents that accelerated 
decreases in stock markets, commodities and large variations in credit markets lead to 
accelerated decreases and increased fluctuations in the the shipping market. The significance 
of the tail dependence implies that these asset classes tend to experience concurrent extreme 
shocks, complimenting the work of Andreou et al. (2013). Therefore, the thesis captures the 
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channel and the source which can amplify risks and lead to instability on the shipping market 
with important hedging, risk and asset pricing implications. 
Moreover, the co-movement becomes stronger during the crisis period, consistent 
with contagion between the asset prices when compared with tranquil periods. During the 
crisis period the Dry Bulk market is more volatile and more vulnerable to downside risks 
from the Tanker market and the category of vessels of higher tonnage (i.e. Capesize vessels) 
are more volatile and susceptible to downside risks than vessels of medium range tonnage 
(i.e. Panamax vessels). Using trading rolling windows, the cross – market dependence 
increases to a higher level during the financial meltdown, pointing to asymmetric contagion. 
This is due to the increased contemporaneous dependence of the realised volatility 
innovations.  
Furthermore, the dependence remains significant but weaker after the financial crisis 
and the shipping market become more pronouncedly heavy-tailed in downward moves than in 
upward moves. These findings indicate that in the post crisis period the shipping market is 
more susceptible to financial crises and speculative attacks. The oversupply of vessels in 
most shipping services may be a reason for the structural change in the behaviour of the 
shipping indices during the post crisis period. Notably, the Student-t copula provides the best 
fit to capture fluctuations in the shipping market. The model is more suitable for examining 
the qualitative and quantitative repercussions of short-term and long-term volatility 
components characterising the shipping industry on the evolution of three financial asset 
classes. In periods characterised by increased uncertainty, the daily movement of the shipping 
market can be captured by the t- copula which can also be used as a hedge proxy with 
decisions that involve more than one risky asset in the shipping market.  
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8.5.2 Policy Implications 
The notable financial meltdown of 2008 which was launched by the subprime crisis 
and was quickly spread in shipping assets provoked the intention that correlated changes in 
fundamentals such as macroeconomic variables are an important part of the explanation, but 
are insufficient to explain the full magnitude and variation in international asset co-
movements. Indeed, the international literature notifies that for the recent crisis, non-
fundamental sources have been highlighted as important determinants of excess 
comovements among international markets and assets. During market tranquil periods, 
portrayed by easy credit (i.e. iTraxx Senior Financials Index is low) and low volatility (i.e. 
VIX in historical lows), the stock, commodity and shipping markets broaden. In the pre-crisis 
period, comovements and dependencies are low among these assets, and thus, the tail risk is 
asymmetric. 
In contrast, during the turmoil period shocks in the stock, commodity and volatility 
indices transmit rapidly, like a domino effect to the shipping indices over and above what one 
would expect from economic fundamentals, consistent with contagion. Indeed, a significant 
increase in dependencies and comovements is documented and attributed by the contagion 
channel variables whose extreme realisations are associated with a slump of shipping indices. 
Also, symmetric lower tail dependence during the financial crisis is observed, implying that 
these assets tend to crash together with the same magnitude. This could be due to fire-sales in 
the contagion channels and portfolio re-allocations which engender large initial slump effects 
on the shipping market, which subsequently reverse downwards (see also Boyer et. al., 2006; 
and Jotikasthira et. al., 2012). In the post- crisis period a significant but lower co-movement 
and asymmetric tail dependence is reported, implying that these assets recover independently 
to some extent, pointing to asymmetric contagion.  
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8.6 Limitations 
 Although the research presented in this thesis provides useful and novel evidence, 
there are some unavoidable limitations. First, had the dataset been extended further, the 
robustness of the results would be more cemented and upscaled. Second, the thesis relies on 
daily data in its empirical tests. It is well-known that daily data is noisy, and particularly so 
for testing regime switching models. Third, the thesis analyses systemic risk without 
addressing the role of central bank interventions and changes in monetary policy.  
Fourth, the maximum entropy method, proposed in the third chapter of the thesis has 
several limitations. More concretely, a network approach to financial systems is particularly 
important for assessing financial stability and can be instrumental in capturing the 
externalities that the risk associated with a single institution may create for the entire system. 
There are two key structural characteristics in a financial network: a market is complete if 
each bank lends to all the others. On the other hand, a market is perfectly interconnected if 
each bank is financially linked to all the others, regardless of the kind of linkage, which may 
be both direct and indirect. Alas, the maximum entropy method is not ideal for incomplete 
market structures, and hence, may significantly affect the assessment of financial contagion. 
One more shortcoming is that the maximum entropy tends to create complete networks which 
obscure the true structure of linkages in the original network, and thus, key factors in the 
network structure, such as the number of connections, become futile. 
Fifth, the thesis studies the linkages between sovereign and bank credit default swaps 
markets, stock market return and volatility without capturing macroeconomic fundamentals 
and other common factors, such as economic activity. By using a set of control variables, the 
robustness of the results would be cemented further. Sixth, the two Markov Switching 
Bayesian VAR models proposed in the fourth and sixth chapters of the thesis have a 
drawback. Particularly, the current regime switching models are not suitable for capturing 
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instability of dynamics since they assume a finite number of states and that the future is like 
the past, and hence they may incur a loss in the estimation precision because the past states 
cannot recur. An alternative to this limitation are the structural break models which capture 
dynamic instability by assuming an infinite or a much larger number of states at the cost of 
extra restrictions. Also, structural break models allow the dynamics to change over time. For 
instance, the approach proposed by Song (2014) with an infinite hidden Markov model to 
integrate the regime switching and structural break dynamics in a unified Bayesian 
framework, while also estimating the number of states automatically, may offer a 
parsimonious model and an improvement in the forecasts.  
 Seventh, the thesis examines contagion channels for emerging currencies and 
shipping assets, without taking into account any macroeconomic factors that may have 
affected the behavior of these assets in the long term. Eighth, in the fifth and seventh chapters 
of the thesis several copula functions are employed to test for the degree of dependence 
between emerging currencies and other financial assets. Although it is often assumed that 
returns follow the normal distribution, there is a lot of evidence that the empirical distribution 
of returns has fatter tails than those suggested by the normal distribution. The copula 
functions employed in the thesis connect the marginal distributions to restore the joint 
distribution and are very flexible in modelling dependence. By using copulas the thesis 
isolates the dependence structure from the marginal distributions and thereby allows to 
separately model the marginal behavior and the dependence structure. This property provides 
more options in model specification and estimation. However, the focus is solely on large 
price movements and their associated probabilities by directly studying the tails of probability 
distributions. Following recent research developed by Bollerslev et al. (2013), extreme 
financial returns can be more adequately described by the Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) 
distribution. In particular, the GEV and Generalised Pareto (GP) are the only distributions 
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fitted to the extremes while the most popular parameter estimation method is the maximum 
likelihood (ML). 
  
8.7 Directions for Future Research 
Supplementary research could overcome the boundaries which delimit the conducted 
research, and arrive at more robust conclusions. In particular, modern financial systems 
exhibit a high degree of interdependence, with connections between financial institutions 
stemming from both the asset and the liability sides of their balance sheets. The thesis models 
systemic risk for the Euro Area banking system, however, it is also feasible to model 
systemic risk in a dynamic network system for the U.S. and the U.K. financial institutions by 
employing entropy maximization or alternative methods. Second, there is a lot of room for 
improvement in the availability of the data on the cross-border interconnections beyond 
banking sectors. Third, a future research can develop more complex propagation algorithms 
that are capable of incorporating the central bank and government interventions and the 
behavioral responses of the different types of financial agents to the propagation of shocks.  
Fourth, there are other techniques commencing from network theory which offer 
several advantages and will be very suitable for similar research, such as the epidemiology 
approach, the minimum density and the Minimum Spanning Trees methods. Fifth, drawing 
on this context, a future research can also address other technical issues which are not 
discussed in the thesis, such as the way financial institutions form connections (i.e. network 
formation), the recently proposed “ring fencing” approach, the size and the complexity of 
banks, the way to prevent the moral hazard of “too big to fail”, and to revisit the link between 
bailouts and bank risk taking. Sixth, the network theory can also be applied on labor markets, 
and on risk-sharing arrangements.   
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Seventh, complementing the work on credit default swaps (CDS) presented in chapter 
four, interestingly, a network model approach could also be applied to study systemic risk for 
the CDS market. A network model identifies and measures systemic risk in a financial system 
which may have a high degree of interconnectedness and whose failures may result in further 
distress or breakdowns in the system. Thus, a future research can apply network models to a 
non-traditional insurance industry that experienced disaster stemming from systemic risk 
during the 2008 financial crisis: the credit default swap security industry. 
Additionally, nowadays the Eurozone faces a “lowflation” era, and thus by employing 
the Markov Switching VAR model presented in chapter four, a future research can examine 
the impact of quantitative easing (QE) in the U.S. and in the U.K., the way the QE changed 
investor’s behaviour and possible effects in the Eurozone. In a similar vein, by employing 
Bayesian econometrics, a future research can address the role of the Asset Backed Securities 
market in financial stability and what dictates bank lending. Ninth, extending the work on 
emerging currencies (chapter five) a future research can also examine the extent to which 
liquidity-induced growth put at risk future growth and the behaviour of and the information 
contained on emerging bond yields.  
Tenth, the global crisis and the sluggish recovery of 2009 challenged the functioning 
of financial markets, and constitute a reminder of the importance of understanding 
interconnections and risks in the global economy. The increasing trend in global trade, and 
even more significant, in cross-border financial activities, suggests that spillovers can take 
many different forms. The understanding of transmission channels of spillovers has become 
essential, not only from an academic perspective, but also policymaking. The challenges 
faced by policy coordination after the initial response to the crisis in 2009 introduce wide 
ranging issues on fiscal, monetary, and financial policies. Thus, extending the work on 
emerging currencies (chapter five) a future research can examine the impact of changes in US 
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monetary policy on foreign bond yields, and in a similar vein, to address the impact of 
government spending on the exchange rate. 
Finally, building on the work in shipping and financial assets (chapters six and seven) 
a future research can employ affine models and volatility strategies to price the value of 
derivative products (e.g. variance swaps) and hybrid securities, in order to hedge the risks of 
the financial system. In particular, building on the notion of generalized Poisson process, 
based on piecewise-gamma or scenario generated random intensity in the constituent Poisson 
processes while allowing for the possibility of more than one jump in small time intervals 
would be an appealing approach for the pricing of hybrid products. 
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Appendix A. Eurozone Banks. 
 
The appendix below presents the sample of banks used in the study with quarterly data and 
the banks’ place of origin. Our focus is the propagation of shocks in the Interbank, Asset-
Backed Loan and Sovereign Credit Risk channels. Analytical information for the actual 
exposure of the banks is collected via the euro area Balance Sheet Items statistics. Notably, 
the propagation of shocks is employed for the largest banks (based on actual assets) in the 
euro area. 
Bank Country Bank Country 
UniCredit Bank Austria AG-Bank Austria Austria Nordea Bank Finland Plc Finland 
Steiermärkische Bank und Sparkassen AG-Bank Styria Austria Danske Bank Plc Finland 
Raiffeisen Bausparkasse GmbH-Raiffeisen Wohn Bausparen Austria Aktia Bank Plc Finland 
Landes-Hypothekenbank Tirol-Hypo Tirol Bank Austria OP Mortgage Bank Finland 
Bausparkasse der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG Austria Helsinki OP Bank Plc Finland 
Bausparkasse Wuestenrot Austria Société Générale France 
Ageas Belgium BPCE Group France 
AXA Bank Europe SA/NV Belgium BPCE SA France 
BKCP scrl Belgium Credit Mutuel (Combined - IFRS) France 
RHJ International SA Belgium Fédération du Crédit Mutuel France 
Banque CPH Belgium Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel France 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC France 
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppen (Combined)-Sparkassen Germany HSBC France France 
DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank Germany La Banque Postale France 
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thuringen Germany Crédit Foncier de France France 
Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations-Groupe Caisse 
des Dépôts France 
FMS Wertmanagement  Anstalt Des Oeffentlichen Recht Germany Credit Mutuel Arkea France 
NRW.BANK Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Ile-de-France France 
Deutsche Bank Privat-und Geschaftskunden AG Germany Crédit du Nord France 
Wüstenrot & Württembergische Germany Crédit Mutuel Nord Europe France 
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg - Förderbank-L-
Bank Germany Crédit Immobilier de France Développement - CIFD France 
Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall AG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Rhône Alpes France 
Hamburger Sparkasse AG (HASPA) Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Provence Alpes 
Corse SA France 
HASPA Finanzholding Germany Lyonnaise de Banque France 
Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland AG Germany 
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance Bretagne-Pays de 
Loire France 
Santander Consumer Bank AG Germany 
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Nord France-
Europe France 
BHW Bausparkasse AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Normandie France 
Münchener Hypothekenbank eG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance de Midi-Pyrénées France 
Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank eG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance de Bourgogne France 
Sachsen-Finanzgruppe Germany Crédit Coopératif France 
SEB AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Côte d'Azur France 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft) Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance d'Auvergne et du 
Limousin France 
Sparkasse KölnBonn Germany Crédit Mutuel Océan France 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany Banque Palatine France 
Kreissparkasse Köln Germany Crédit Mutuel de Maine-Anjou et Basse-Normandie France 
Wüstenrot Bausparkasse AG Germany Banque populaire Lorraine Champagne France 
LFA Förderbank Bayern Germany Banque Populaire Aquitaine Centre Atlantique France 
BMW Bank GmbH Germany Banque Populaire Val de France France 
Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank AG Germany Banque Populaire des Alpes France 
Frankfurter Sparkasse Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance du Languedoc 
Roussillon France 
InvestitionsBank Schleswig-Holstein Germany Banque Européenne du Crédit Mutuel France 
Stadtsparkasse München Germany Casden Banque Populaire France 
Wuestenrot Bank AG Pfandbriefbank Germany National Bank of Greece SA Greece 
Sparkasse Hannover Germany Piraeus Bank SA Greece 
Sparda-Bank Baden-Württemberg eG Germany Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece 
Bayerische Landesbausparkasse LBS Germany Alpha Bank AE Greece 
Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf Germany Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank Ireland 
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of Ireland 
Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG Germany Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland 
Targobank AG & Co KGaA Germany Permanent TSB Plc Ireland 
Mittelbrandenburgische Sparkasse in Potsdam Germany Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank Ireland 
Die Sparkasse Bremen Germany AIB Mortgage Bank Ireland 
Nassauische Sparkasse Germany EBS Limited Ireland 
LBS Landesbausparkasse Baden- Württemberg Germany ICS Building Society Ireland 
Sparkasse Pforzheim Calw Germany Credito Emiliano Holding Italy 
LBS Westdeutsche Landesbausparkasse Germany Casse del Tirreno Italy 
InvestitionsBank des Landes Brandenburg Germany Bank Sepah Italy 
Berliner Volksbank eG Germany Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A. Luxembourj 
Kreissparkasse Ludwigsburg Germany Standard International Holdings S.A. Luxembourg 
Kreissparkasse Muenchen Starnberg Ebersberg Germany KBL European Private Bankers SA Luxembourg 
Sparkasse Nürnberg Germany Jsc Latvian Development Financial Institution Altum Latvia 
Sparda-Bank Südwest eG Germany GE Capital Latvia Latvia 
Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz (ISB) GmbH Germany Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal 
Debeka Bausparkasse AG, Sitz Koblenz am Rhein Germany Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp Portugal 
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG Germany Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal 
Sparkasse Leipzig Germany Banco BPI SA Portugal 
Sparkasse Münsterland Ost Germany Santander Totta SGPS Portugal 
Bank für Sozialwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft Germany Banco Santander Totta SA Portugal 
Sparda-Bank West eG Germany Caixa Economica Montepio Geral Portugal 
Landessparkasse zu Oldenburg Germany BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA Portugal 
Frankfurter Volksbank eG Germany Banco Popular Portugal SA Portugal 
Kreissparkasse Esslingen Nuertingen Germany Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. Slovakia 
Sparkasse Krefeld Germany Tatra Banka a.s. Slovakia 
Bethmann Bank Germany Sberbank Slovensko, as Slovakia 
Saechsische AufbauBank Forderbank Germany Prima banka Slovensko a.s. Slovakia 
Stadtsparkasse Essen-Sparkasse Essen Germany Banka Celje dd Slovakia 
BBBank eG Germany Banka Koper d.d. Slovenia 
LBS Norddeutsche Landesbausparkasse Berlin-Hannover Germany Banka Celje dd Slovenia 
Sparkasse Dortmund Germany Gorenjska Banka d.d. Kranj Slovenia 
DNB Pank AS Estonia Postna Banka Slovenije dd Slovenia 
AS LHV Pank Estonia   
Fund KredEx Estonia   
Tallinn Business Bank Ltd-Tallinna Äripanga AS Estonia   
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain   
Ibercaja Banco SAU Spain   
Catalunya Banc SA Spain   
Kutxabank SA Spain   
Liberbank SA Spain   
Caja Laboral Popular Coop de credito Spain   
Barclays Bank S.A. Spain   
Banco Grupo Cajatres SA-Caja 3 Spain   
Caja Rural De Castilla-La Mancha Spain   
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Appendix B. Modelling Financial Contagion 
We model contagion stemming from unexpected shocks in our financial network, 
with banks’ balance sheets57 being the conduits for the transmission of the shocks as losses 
propagate through the banking system. The simulations are employed quarter-by-quarter 
between the first quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2013. Specifically, we consider 
sixteen Eurozone based countries, each with an economic system formed by N banks. We 
consider a credit cycle which lasts for four dates (t = 0, 1, 2, 3). At the initial date (i.e. t = 0), 
each bank i holds sufficient capital that it can either lend it to other banks via the interbank 
loan channel (  
  ) and/or invest in Government Bonds (  
  ) via the Sovereign Credit Risk 
channel, and/or invest in asset-backed loans (  
  ) via the Asset Loan Risk channel. All 
projects described above, provide a sufficient profit if held to maturity, i.e. at t = 3. However, 
the bank has the choice to liquidate its project (fully or partially) at t = 2, but will only 
recover a fraction of the project’s full value.  
We propagate shocks triggered by each channel independently at time t  = 1. Then, we 
measure the losses realised for banks emanated from the shocks in each channel. Every bank 
has to meet interbank liabilities (  
  ) and thus, losses incurred by a shock in a channel (e.g. 
the asset loan risk channel   
  ) can be recovered by liquidating other projects (e.g. the 
Sovereign Debt holdings    
  ), at time t = 2.  Consequently, systemic shocks in one channel 
may trigger fire sales, and hence losses in other channels. Thus, our approach allows us to 
distinguish between losses incurred by the propagation of a shock and losses incurred by 
contagion and the spread of systemic risk.  
As a result, if there is a shock in the interbank loan channel, a bank i is solvent when: 
                                                          
57
 We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each bank has to deduct losses triggered 
by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply 
a deduction in the banking sector’s assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital 
inevitable.  
 
 289 
 
       
        
        
     
   CR      (1) 
where σ is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have suffered losses from the 
shock,     is the resale price of the Sovereign Bond,    is the resale price of the asset-backed 
loan, and CR is the bank’s tier-1 capital. Moreover, the values of     and     are always less 
than one in the event of asset sales, since there are fire sales with the propagation of the shock 
in order  a bank to meet its liabilities. 
As a result, when        
  , a bank has to liquidate other projects in order to be 
solvent: 
  
            
            
  
  
    for   
    .       (2) 
where      
     
     
      is the bank’s capital buffer which can be used in order 
to meet its liabilities.  
All banks are allowed to fail one at a time, if the amount of the losses is greater than 
lenders’ reported tier-1 capital (i.e. capital + reserves). Finally, we calculate the losses 
triggered in other banking systems from the initial shock. Notably, in this study we are 
interested in examining the effects of systemic risks in the euro area banking network and the 
resilience of the banking system. Thus, our financial network does not allow for a role of the 
central bank or for any government interventions in providing liquidity or rescue packages to 
the distressed banks which require exogenous responses and might follow different rules.  
Thus, a bank is insolvent in our financial network when: 
  
            
            
  
  
    for   
    .      (3) 
Contagion occurs in the network system when either a bank is insolvent (equation (3)) 
or when fire sales - triggered by the propagation of a shock – are spread to other banks. 
Therefore, the likelihood of contagion corresponds and is directly linked to the size of the 
bank, the size of losses, the degree of interconnectedness and the size of the capital buffer. 
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The same relationship holds when the shock is propagated through the Asset Loan 
Channel. However, a shock propagated within the Sovereign Debt channel implies that the 
interbank loan and the asset backed securities markets are illiquid, because sovereign debt 
represents economic performance and credit conditions for a country and thus a priori 
liquidity will freeze in the interbank market while synchronically the price of collaterals will 
be severely harmed. Hence, amid to the direct interlinkages and obligations, the possibility of 
indirect financial contagion increases significantly when the shocks are triggered by the 
sovereign debt risk channel, such that equation (3) becomes:  
  
  
  
    for   
             (4) 
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Appendix C. Network Measures 
 
In order to take into account the information provided by the Maximum Entropy 
method, we identify the appropriate quantities characterising the structure and organisation of 
our network at the statistical level. The appendix provides a general characterisation of the 
heterogenous statistical properties presents the number of sector-level nodes, the estimated 
degree, closeness, centrality, and the clustering coefficient. Degree is the sum of the direct 
links that each node has with other nodes. With closeness we capture the influence for each 
node. With centrality and betweenness we clarify the absolute position of the node in the 
banking network.  The clustering coefficient (CC) shows for a given node, the number of 
actual links to other nodes. 
Statistical properties of the Banking Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Measures 
Nodes            48 
Degree 1.54 
CC 0.42 
KIN  - KOUT  107,491 
  
  2.79 
  
  2.36 
 292 
 
Appendix D. Figures and Tables as supplement to Chapter 4 
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Panel C 
 
 
 
 
Panel D 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Regime-Dependent Impulse Response Functions 
 
Note: This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the 
MSBVAR in the low volatility, intermediate volatility and high volatility regimes (Regimes 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively). Panel A summarizes responses to a shock to BCDS spread. Panel B summarizes responses to 
SCDS spread. Panel C summarizes responses to a shock to VSTOXX volatility index. Panel D summarizes 
responses to a shock to EUROSTOXX stock market index. Confidence intervals show 2 standard deviations 
from the impulse responses. 
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TABLE 4.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel A. Variables in levels 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 106.8703 101.3290 353.0000 7.0000 81.9862 0.5518 2.5016 131.5949 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 91.7861 97.0300 215.9170 20.0940 49.5823 0.2272 2.0670 96.6516 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 24.7843 22.575 87.51 11.720 10.176 1.7307 7.2344 2684.62 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 296.161 276.90 442.9 169.39 64.489 0.5963 2.3358 167.2398 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 2.2545 1.7735 5.4790 0.1280 1.5541 0.4263 1.7779 199.2768 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 2.4926 2.1700 5.5130 0.3090 1.3919 0.2957 1.8584 148.3588 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 2.6351 2.4090 5.4450 0.4020 1.3142 0.1369 1.9218 111.0691 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 2.7796 2.6290 5.3610 0.5530 1.2373 0.0020 2.0013 89.5122 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 2.9166 2.8300 5.2810 0.7230 1.1627 -0.1050 2.0812 79.7167 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 3.0423 3.0125 5.2130 0.8880 1.0966 -0.1918 2.1502 78.0304 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 3.1545 3.1665 5.1650 1.0480 1.0415 -0.2608 2.2033 81.3919 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 3.2530 3.2945 5.1390 1.2000 0.9969 -0.3118 2.2377 87.0514 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 3.3397 3.3960 5.1260 1.3420 0.9612 -0.3492 2.2579 93.1922 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 3.4173 3.4875 5.1210 1.4670 0.9316 -0.3786 2.2721 99.0034 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 3.5496 3.6460 5.1330 1.6790 0.8850 -0.4275 2.2968 109.9771 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 3.6832 3.8150 5.1410 1.8310 0.8443 -0.4794 2.3053 125.8313 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 3.7614 3.9125 5.1150 1.8430 0.8284 -0.5225 2.2783 144.7544 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 3.7473 3.8925 5.0850 1.8130 0.8265 -0.4750 2.1892 139.9947 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 3.7082 3.8485 5.0690 1.7760 0.8281 -0.4024 2.0810 133.9404 0.0000 
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Panel B. Variables in first differences 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 0.0752 0.0000 52.4410 -63.1400 6.0316 -0.3859 17.0517 17775.6 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 0.0403 0.0000 22.8400 -39.4700 3.9713 -0.3527 12.8779 8801.83 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 0.0049 -0.0650 22.6400 -13.9800 1.9308 1.7316 27.5295 55078.9 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 -0.0032 0.0210 9.9621 -8.2498 1.4179 -0.0517 8.8382 3060.06 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2860 -0.2150 0.0333 0.0892 13.5738 10037.4 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.3280 -0.2820 0.0415 0.1286 8.8275 3053.84 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2910 -0.2950 0.0441 0.0841 7.2539 1626.62 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2290 -0.2640 0.0438 0.0602 5.9112 761.943 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2450 -0.2350 0.0437 0.0506 5.1904 431.506 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2770 -0.2040 0.0431 0.0726 5.1932 433.600 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3090 -0.1750 0.0428 0.1043 5.6372 628.111 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3330 -0.1880 0.0428 0.1184 6.2777 969.232 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3570 -0.2120 0.0430 0.1367 7.0433 1473.95 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3790 -0.2350 0.0434 0.1450 7.8730 2138.80 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.4390 -0.2970 0.0443 0.2401 10.5165 5091.32 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5060 -0.3560 0.0460 0.3823 14.4166 11750.3 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5610 -0.3620 0.0485 0.5185 17.2527 18328.2 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5960 -0.3440 0.0502 0.5622 18.7527 22384.7 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.6320 -0.3460 0.0522 0.5681 20.2324 26767.5 0.0000 
Note: This table summarizes descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, 
and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of the European banks’ credit default swap spread (BCDS, measured in basis points), the European sovereign 
credit default swap spread (SCDS, measured in basis points), the VSTOXX volatility index (VSTOXX, measured in index points), the EUROSTOXX stock index (STOXX, 
measured in percentage points), and the fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps (“you pay me a floating 3-month LIBOR interest rate, I pay you a fixed interest rate”) for 
maturities from 1 to 30 years (IRS_M, where “_M” denotes maturity, measured in annualized percentage points). The interest rate swaps are used to compute the first 
(“level”) and the second (“slope”) principal components. Panel A summarizes descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables measured in levels. Panel B summarizes 
descriptive statistics of the variables in first differences (STOXX is measured in percentage change). The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 
2154 daily observations. 
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TABLE 4.2 
UNIT ROOT TESTS 
VARIABLES OBS 
ADF TEST KPSS TEST PP TEST ZA TEST 
CONST TREND CONST TREND CONST TREND CONST BREAK TREND BREAK 
BCDS 2154 -1.6233 -2.9923 28.476* 1.1049* -1.7481 -3.2981 -3.1318 2010/04/14 -5.1498* 2011/07/27 
SCDS 2154 -1.8319 -2.4593 21.738* 1.9238* -1.9375 -2.6790 -3.4945 2008/01/02 -3.4844 2007/10/16 
VSTOXX 2154 -3.3764* -3.4380* 6.6455* 3.2586* -3.9574* -4.0875* -4.3282 2007/12/27 -5.1131* 2008/09/03 
STOXX 2154 -1.1942 -1.9697 17.524* 2.5179* -1.2585 -2.0443 -4.1126 2008/05/20 -3.8712 2008/01/02 
IRS_1 2154 0.0546 -1.6708 22.886* 3.6751* 0.1508 -1.6980 -6.3002* 2008/09/26 -8.4582* 2008/09/26 
IRS_2 2154 -0.1083 -1.7228 23.717* 3.9587* -0.0829 -1.7415 -4.4253 2008/09/26 -5.9085* 2008/09/26 
IRS_3 2154 -0.1968 -1.7666 24.479* 4.3434* -0.1933 -1.7916 -3.6160 2008/09/26 -5.0162 2008/09/26 
IRS_4 2154 -0.2338 -1.7734 24.645* 4.6910* -0.2361 -1.7973 -3.1363 2008/09/26 -4.4963 2008/09/26 
IRS_5 2154 -0.2711 -1.7700 24.551* 4.9764* -0.2800 -1.7929 -2.8091 2008/09/26 -4.1967 2008/09/26 
IRS_6 2154 -0.3032 -1.7662 24.396* 5.2328* -0.3118 -1.7867 -2.5628 2008/09/26 -4.0304 2008/09/26 
IRS_7 2154 -0.3419 -1.7679 24.249* 5.4532* -0.3495 -1.7862 -2.4693 2011/05/06 -3.9600 2008/09/26 
IRS_8 2154 -0.3866 -1.7766 24.126* 5.6319* -0.3969 -1.7959 -2.5539 2006/12/05 -3.9560 2008/09/25 
IRS_9 2154 -0.4369 -1.7893 24.018* 5.7744* -0.4519 -1.8119 -2.6946 2006/12/05 -3.9870 2008/09/25 
IRS_10 2154 -0.4865 -1.8053 23.883* 5.8928* -0.5084 -1.8323 -2.8156 2006/12/05 -4.0257 2008/09/25 
IRS_12 2154 -0.5773 -1.8376 23.518* 6.0721* -0.6090 -1.8743 -3.0184 2006/12/05 -4.0943 2008/09/25 
IRS_15 2154 -0.6945 -1.8985 23.183* 6.1974* -0.7339 -1.9438 -3.2193 2006/12/05 -4.1665 2007/03/22 
IRS_20 2154 -0.8193 -2.0098 23.654* 6.1367* -0.8636 -2.0639 -3.3791 2006/12/07 -4.2255 2007/03/22 
IRS_25 2154 -0.9605 -2.1798 24.577* 5.6992* -0.9834 -2.2151 -3.4893 2006/12/07 -4.3690 2008/09/24 
IRS_30 2154 -1.0914 -2.3495 25.378* 5.2379* -1.0979 -2.3686 -3.5871 2006/12/07 -4.6317 2008/09/24 
SLOPE 2154 -1.1993 -1.8883 15.677* 3.1574* -3.4145 -1.8959 -6.1667* 2008/10/02 -6.0387* 2008/10/02 
Note: This table summarizes results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Zivot-Andrews (ZA) 
tests for a unit root. Under the ADF, PP and ZA tests, the null hypothesis is that the series features a unit root. Under the KPSS test, the null is that the series is stationary. 
The ADF (KPSS and PP) test equations comprise a constant (CONST) and both a constant and a trend (TREND), the 5% critical values being -2.8634  and -3.4145 (0.4630 
and 0.1460, -2.8634 and -3.4145), respectively. The 5% critical values for the ZA test are -4.8000 and -5.0800 under the assumption of a break in the constant (CONST) and 
in both the constant and the trend (TREND), respectively. The ZA test comprises a constant and a trend, while allowing for a single break in the constant (CONST) and in 
both the constant and the trend (TREND). The ZA test also provides the estimated break date (BREAK). Asterisk (*) indicates coefficients significant at the 5% or higher 
level of significance. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. 
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TABLE 4.5 
GEWEKE’S TEST FOR CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS FOR THE MSBVAR MODEL 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates of the conditional mean 
State Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Equations (in 
columns), 
predictors (in 
rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
      1.588078 -0.121388 0.302845 -0.854201 0.195473 0.474492 -0.205195 -0.123615 -1.354168 -1.098942 -0.467640 0.116741 
        -0.514662 -1.949985 0.615100 -1.164118 -2.122899 -2.030775 1.230305 0.848046 -0.437183 1.065941 -0.107624 0.346869 
        1.898519 1.913460 0.555688 -0.356732 0.695109 1.508835 -1.102344 -0.094037 1.557627 -0.287325 -0.271169 -0.681326 
          -1.340192 0.444608 0.687256 -1.528116 0.142531 0.308209 0.981044 -0.909770 0.169732 1.282236 1.176771 -1.390332 
         0.579263 1.208924 1.412226 -1.576613 -0.337105 0.180561 0.484668 -0.144377 0.844522 1.064957 0.649835 -1.122415 
       1.108024 1.690854 0.111352 0.357669 0.627888 0.257798 0.120193 -0.764057 -2.435228 -2.141314 -1.082070 2.050298 
       -0.564224 1.492036 -0.434030 -0.688725 0.973561 0.464250 0.109763 -0.746655 2.401704 1.574654 0.858717 -1.912174 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates of the variance and covariance matrix 
State Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Variances and 
Covariances  
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS -0.181310    0.391166    -0.870456    
SCDS -1.290606 0.336606   1.178840 1.328869   -0.132640 0.096560   
VSTOXX -1.733400 -0.236674 -0.278135  0.454771 0.389028 -0.242417  -0.360529 0.545722 1.257695  
STOXX 1.651653 -0.139180 0.322103 0.002634 -0.753034 -0.577163 0.105807 0.020016 -0.021434 -1.017541 -1.758634 1.618755 
Panel C. Estimated Transition probabilities 
 Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility 
Low 0.967370  -1.912020 -0.519759 
Middle -0.722722 0.942298 0.845139 
High -1.093754 0.503790 -0.765985 
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TABLE 4.6 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates of exogenous variables (LEVEL = PC1, SLOPE = PC2) 
State Low  Volatility Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Equations (cols), 
predictors (rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
       -0.004308   
(0.003128) 
-0.022335*   
(0.006608) 
-0.035510* 
(0.012840) 
0.000180*   
(0.000051) 
-0.410049*   
(0.044823) 
-0.289575*   
(0.028660) 
-0.105170*   
(0.011928) 
0.000394*   
(0.000046) 
-0.695845*   
(0.122142) 
-0.476360*   
(0.082758) 
-0.208583*   
(0.042201) 
0.000629*   
(0.000121) 
       -0.001674   
(0.011769) 
0.075234*   
(0.026392) 
0.118808   
(0.050906) 
-0.000394*   
(0.000202) 
-0.292984*   
(0.109188) 
-0.121761   
(0.070261) 
-0.060787*   
(0.028938) 
0.000165   
(0.000110) 
-0.197803   
(0.342764) 
0.330842   
(0.233730) 
0.215780   
(0.120466) 
-0.000497   
(0.000342) 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates of the variance and covariance matrix 
State Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Variances and 
covariances  
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS 0.033311*   
(0.002406) 
   21.709597*   
(1.071273) 
   131.08600*  
(11.25193) 
   
SCDS 0.020444*   
(0.003767) 
0.163789*   
(0.010921) 
  11.632908*   
(0.623586) 
8.729875*   
(0.442355) 
  69.228344*   
(6.629798) 
59.745025*   
(5.041232) 
  
VSTOXX 0.010471*   
(0.006337) 
0.116196*   
(0.014912) 
0.621180*   
(0.037731) 
 2.926746*   
(0.212338) 
2.217390*   
(0.142085) 
1.559256*   
(0.073835) 
 18.921706*   
(2.826224) 
16.600610*   
(2.035725) 
15.892555*   
(1.380067) 
 
STOXX -0.000062*   
(0.000026) 
-0.000546*   
(0.000061) 
-0.002081*   
(0.000139) 
0.000010*   
(0.000001) 
-0.013011*   
(0.000834) 
-0.009970*   
(0.000562) 
-0.004851*   
(0.000246) 
0.000023*   
(0.000001) 
-0.076489*   
(0.008741) 
-0.058801*   
(0.006149) 
-0.035053*   
(0.003412) 
0.000128*   
(0.000011) 
Panel C. Estimated transition probabilities 
State Low  Volatility Middle Volatility  High Volatility State  
Low 0.917195* (0.013353) 0.035457* (0.006491) 0.016572* (0.008218) 
Middle 0.065859* (0.012212) 0.921021* (0.009767) 0.174433* (0.028154) 
High 0.016946* (0.006041) 0.043522* (0.007692) 0.808994* (0.028543) 
Panel D. Coefficient estimates of exogenous variables (LEVEL = IRS_5, SLOPE = IRS_10-IRS_2) 
State Low  Volatility Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Equations (cols), 
predictors (rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
       -0.271198   
(0.238971) 
-1.887857*   
(0.520544) 
-3.328470*   
(1.016210) 
0.016621*   
(0.004038) 
-26.55779*   
(3.486721) 
-20.11069*   
(2.234848) 
-7.147764*   
(0.927679) 
0.027714*   
(0.003540) 
-66.62242*  
(10.90962) 
-46.71224*   
(7.257398) 
-19.25354*   
(3.750212) 
0.062165*   
(0.010695) 
       0.010473   
(0.020078) 
0.044699 
(0.044886) 
0.013698   
(0.085252) 
0.000013   
(0.000339) 
-0.262120   
(0.228710) 
-0.382652*   
(0.147776) 
-0.065110   
(0.061742) 
0.000583*   
(0.000234) 
0.497042   
(1.270638) 
0.153603   
(0.854366) 
-0.332376   
(0.439728) 
0.001056   
(0.001252) 
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Appendix E. Credit Default Swaps 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivative contracts that allow investors in an 
underlying debt instrument to protect themselves against a deterioration of credit quality and 
even a default on debt. As its name suggests, the payoff on a CDS depends on the default of a 
specific borrower, such as a government or a firm, or of a specific security, such as a bond. 
The value of this instrument is especially sensitive to the state of the overall economy. For 
instance, if the economy moves toward a recession, the likelihood of defaults increases and 
the expected payoff on credit default swaps will rise quickly. The credit default swap was 
pioneered by JP Morgan in 1994. 
In addition to the above, a CDS can be viewed as an insurance contract that provides 
protection against a specific default. CDSs are not traded on an exchange, however most 
CDSs are documented using standard forms drafted by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). CDS contracts provide protection against the default of a 
corporation, sovereign nation, mortgage payers, and other borrowers. The buyer of protection 
makes periodic payments, analogous to insurance premiums, at the CDS rate specified in the 
contract. If the named borrower defaults, the seller of protection must pay the difference 
between the principal amount covered by the CDS and the market value of the debt. For 
instance, when Lehman Brothers defaulted, its debt was worth about eight cents on the dollar, 
hence sellers of protection had to pay about ninety-two cents for each notional dollar of debt 
they had guaranteed. Following a credit event in a constituent of the index, the ISDA 
Determinations Committee votes to decide if a credit event has occurred for the entity and if 
an auction for the defaulted entity is to be held. If the outcome of this vote is positive, Markit 
publishes a new version of the index annex zero weighting the relevant entity i.e. the 
“reduced” index. Recovery rates for the examined indices are 40%. The benchmark Markit 
iTraxx Senior Financials index consists of 25 equally-weighted European banks. 
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Although CDSs can be used as insurance against a default, the buyer of protection is not 
obliged or required to own the named borrower’s debt or to be otherwise exposed to the 
borrower’s default (i.e. “naked” position). 
After two counterparties agree on the terms of a CDS, they can “clear” the CDS by 
having the clearinghouse stand (e.g. the bank that issued the CDS or the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association) between them. Until recently, there was no central clearing 
house for CDSs. However, since April 2014, CDS trades will be cleared through London-
based Intercontinental Exchange Clear Europe unit (Stafford, Financial Times 04/14/2014). 
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Appendix F. Bayesian Updating and Gibbs Sampling 
B.1 Bayesian Updating 
The probability                       in Equation (7) can be updated recursively. The 
updating procedure involves the following computation: 
                
                                     
∑                   
 
                      
               (B1) 
Denoting  
                               ,                (B2) 
and collecting      in vector    (                ), Equation (7) can be written as  
          
         
                     (B3) 
After a sufficient number of iterations a Markov chain reaches an ergodic distribution   ,  
where the expected regime is independent from the initial condition, and which satisfies  
                           (B4) 
 
B.2 Gibbs sampling 
According to the Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of   conditional on the data is 
                                        (B5) 
The parameter matrix   is first partitioned into   blocks,               . Because of 
the analytical complexity of the posterior density                   , there is no 
analytical solution to                   , nor it is possible to simulate from its 
distribution. To this end, Sims and Zha (2004) suggest using the Gibbs sampler to obtain the 
joint density                      . We assume that the conditional posterior densities 
                     ,                      ,                      , … 
,                         are known. Then the Gibbs sampler starts from arbitrary values 
for      (  
      
        
   ) that may be determined randomly, and samples alternatively 
from the density of each parameter block, conditional on the values of the other parameter 
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blocks sampled in the previous iteration and the data. Thus, the following steps compose the 
algorithm for simulating draws from the posterior distribution of   (Waggoner and Zha 
2003): 
1. Choose the arbitrary values     (  
      
        
   ). 
2. For             and given  
      (  
        
          
     ), obtain      
(  
      
        
   ) by 
2.1. simulating  
   
 from the conditional density of   
      
        
          
     
, 
2.2. simulating  
   
 from the conditional density of   
      
      
          
     
, 
… 
2.H simulating  
   
 from the conditional density of   
      
      
          
     
. 
3. Collect the sequence   
      
        
        
          
            
        and keep only 
the last values    of the sequence. 
Step 3 concerns a choice of    and   . If the initial values   
      
        
   
 are random but 
are not drawn from the target distribution, the first    draws (the so-called “burn-in” period) 
are discarded. This is because (i) the first    draws may not accurately represent the desired 
distribution and (ii) successive samples are not independent upon each other but rather form a 
Markov chain with some degree of correlation. By contrast, the second    draws can be 
regarded as draws from the true posterior joint density. We set         and         . 
 
B.3 Priors 
In the Gibbs sampler, we use the following priors. For the MSBVAR coefficients    ,     and 
    we use flat priors. As suggested by Chib (1996), the prior of the transition matrix   is 
drawn from a Dirichlet distribution. For the k
th
 column of P, pk, the prior density is given by 
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     , where       for 
       . We use hierarchical priors for variance and covariance matrix. The regime-
invariant variance and covariance matrix is drawn from a Wishart distribution, 
   ([∑    (   )
   
      
]
  
 ∑    
 
      
), where the first element is a positive-definite 
     scale matrix and the second element is a prior degrees of freedom with        . 
The regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix     is drawn from an inverse-Wishart 
distribution,      
  ((    )
  
    ). 
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Appendix G. Tables as supplement to chapter 5. 
 
 
Table 5.1   
Summary Statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
Brazilian Real 2153 -0.0002 1.94 2.73 1.53 0.24 0.0435 20.77 38703 0.0000 
Russian Ruble 2153 0.0024 12.11 36.34 23.13 2.67 0.4873 9.25 7776 0.0000 
Indian Rupee 2153 0.0072 45.70 59.57 39.25 4.38 0.0207 4.29 1655 0.0000 
Mexican Peso 2153 0.0009 12.11 15.41 9.89 1.16 0.6730 11.42 11861 0.0000 
South African 
Rand 
2153 0.0019 7.40 11.37 5.96 0.98 0.4929 11.56 12086 0.0000 
Bovespa 2153 5.09 29056 44672 9496 9535 -0.3175 3.34 1037 0.0000 
RTS 2153 0.2691 1508 2487 498 430 -0.5233 5.84 3168 0.0000 
BSE Sensex 2153 0.0776 338 531 140 86.29 -0.0691 5.82 1337 0.0000 
ICP 2153 0.7812 2600 3680 1054 638 -0.3997 3.77 1337 0.0000 
JSE Top 40 2153 10.42 25257 37599 11242 5858 -0.1728 1.97 361 0.0000 
S&P GSCI 2153 -0.8204 5.15 10898 3116 1417 -0.2271 4.53 1865 0.0000 
VIX 2153 0.0021 18.36 80 9.89 10.47 0.5491 17.11 26389 0.0000 
BCDS 2153 106 101 353 7.0 81.98 0.5518 2.50 131 0.0000 
 
Note. This table presents summary statistics, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-values associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic of the change in emerging market 
foreign exchanges, the local stock markets, the commodity market index (S&P GSCI), the Volatility Index, and the Banks’ Credit Default Swaps (iTraxx Senior Financials). 
All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily 
observations. 
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Table 5.3  
Estimation of marginal models. 
Variables Intercept AR1 AR2 ARCH1 ARCH2 GARCH1 GARCH2 JB test DoF 
Brazilian Real 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.042 
(0.021) 
0.042 
(0.018) 
0.053 
(0.014) 
0.053 
(0.140) 
0.922 
(0.013) 
0.922 
(0.013) 
0.0000 7 
Russian Ruble 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.043 
(0.021) 
0.043 
(0.018) 
0.057 
(0.014) 
0.057 
(0.014) 
0.937 
(0.012) 
0.937 
(0.012) 
0.0000 5 
Indian Rupee 
0.003 
(0.106) 
0.043 
(0.021) 
0.043 
(0.018) 
0.041 
(0.010) 
0.041 
(0.011) 
0.928 
(0.013) 
0.092 
(0.013) 
0.0000 4 
Mexican Peso 
0.002 
(0.102) 
0.046 
(0.021) 
0.046 
(0.018) 
0.069 
(0.014) 
0.069 
(0.014) 
0.958 
(0.010) 
0.958 
(0.010) 
0.0000 7 
South African 
Rand 
0.003 
(0.104) 
0.047 
(0.020) 
0.047 
(0.019) 
0.068 
(0.013) 
0.067 
(0.013) 
0.959 
(0.010) 
0.958 
(0.010) 
0.0000 2 
Bovespa 
0.049 
(0.013) 
0.050 
(0.023) 
0.050 
(0.019) 
0.037 
(0.007) 
0.037 
(0.007) 
0.940 
(0.011) 
0.940 
(0.010) 
0.0000 6 
RTS 
0.061 
(0.013) 
0.051 
(0.023) 
0.051 
(0.019) 
0.043 
(0.008) 
0.043 
(0.080) 
0.958 
(0.010) 
0.957 
(0.010) 
0.0000 5 
BSE Sensex 
0.052 
(0.013) 
0.051 
(0.023) 
0.051 
(0.019) 
0.060 
(0.013) 
0.060 
(0.013) 
0.953 
(0.010) 
0.953 
(0.010) 
0.0000 4 
IPC 
0.073 
(0.014) 
0.053 
(0.023) 
0.053 
(0.019) 
0.073 
(0.013) 
0.072 
(0.013) 
0.963 
(0.010) 
0.963 
(0.010) 
0.0000 6 
JSE Top 40 
0.075 
(0.014) 
0.056 
(0.023) 
0.056 
(0.019) 
0.082 
(0.013) 
0.082 
(0.013) 
0.972 
(0.010) 
0.972 
(0.009) 
0.0000 2 
S&P GSCI 
0.048 
(0.013) 
0.051 
(0.023) 
0.050 
(0.192) 
0.042 
(0.008) 
0.041 
(0.078) 
0.962 
(0.010) 
0.961 
(0.010) 
0.0000 7 
VIX 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
0.043 
(0.020) 
0.043 
(0.185) 
0.036 
(0.007) 
0.036 
(0.006) 
0.914 
(0.013) 
0.914 
(0.013) 
0.0000 7 
BCDS 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
0.041 
(0.020) 
0.040 
(0.019) 
0.035 
(0.006) 
0.034 
(0.006) 
0.912 
(0.014) 
0.912 
(0.013) 
0.0000 6 
Note: This table presents the estimation of the AR(k)-t-GARCH (p,q) models for each foreign exchange return, with significant level at 5%. In parentheses are  
the standard errors. DoF refers to the degrees of freedom of T distributions. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in Appendix A.  
The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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    Table 5.7 
    Tail dependence coefficients. 
 Variables 
Overall Sample Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
λl λu λl λu λl λu λl λu 
Brazilian Real Bovespa 0.039 0.044 0.030 0.054 0.051 0.036 0.047 0.049 
 S&P GSCI 0.042 0.046 0.039 0.057 0.050 0.025 0.046 0.031 
 VIX 0.038 0.019 0.026 0.012 0.051 0.067 0.053 0.024 
 BCDS 0.029 0.012 0.023 0.008 0.049 0.028 0.036 0.021 
Russian Ruble RTS 0.042 0.045 0.037 0.059 0.051 0.039 0.042 0.044 
 S&P GSCI 0.046 0.049 0.042 0.067 0.052 0.037 0.045 0.036 
 VIX 0.037 0.018 0.029 0.008 0.050 0.053 0.041 0.021 
 BCDS 0.032 0.014 0.026 0.005 0.050 0.034 0.046 0.025 
Indian Rupee BSE Sensex 0.043 0.045 0.037 0.053 0.051 0.036 0.040 0.042 
 S&P GSCI 0.034 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.049 0.022 0.032 0.030 
 VIX 0.042 0.016 0.039 0.009 0.051 0.055 0.043 0.019 
 BCDS 0.029 0.010 0.021 0.004 0.048 0.030 0.030 0.013 
Mexican Peso IPC 0.049 0.048 0.046 0.055 0.050 0.041 0.049 0.045 
 S&P GSCI 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.048 0.018 0.024 0.028 
 VIX 0.048 0.037 0.045 0.013 0.051 0.058 0.047 0.034 
 BCDS 0.023 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.048 0.013 0.029 0.026 
South African JSE Top 40 0.050 0.051 0.048 0.061 0.051 0.043 0.049 0.053 
Rand S&P GSCI 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.032 0.048 0.027 0.026 0.029 
 VIX 0.039 0.018 0.030 0.010 0.049 0.040 0.033 0.035 
 BCDS 0.023 0.011 0.013 0.003 0.048 0.016 0.031 0.024 
     Note: This table presents the estimates of the lower and upper tail dependence parameters documented from the best fitting copula model for each currency pair.  
      The sample is divided into four categories: overall, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in order to provide a better description for the effects of the credit crunch and                                                      
      the change in the dependence in the pre and post-crisis periods. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollar terms and are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is  
      22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Appendix H: Variables Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable                                                                                      Definition  
Brazilian Real The local currency of Brazil. 
Russian Ruble      The local currency of Russia. 
Indian Rupee The local currency of India. 
Mexican Peso The local currency of Mexico. 
South African Rand The local currency of South Africa. 
Bovespa Stock Index The Bovespa stock exchange is located in Sao Paulo, Brazil. It is one of the thirteen 
largest stock exchanges in the world. The Index is the benchmark indicator for the 381 
companies traded in Bovespa. 
RTS Stock Index The Index consists of 50 Russian stocks with the largest capitalisation and is traded on 
the Moscow Exchange, Russia. 
BSE Sensex Stock Index The index consists of the 30 largest and most actively traded stocks listed on Bombay 
Stock Exchange, India. 
IPC Stock Index Is the main benchmark for the Mexican Stock Exchange. It is made up of a balanced 
weighted selection of shares based on market capitalisation. 
JSE Top 40 Stock Index It is the first equally weighted index and the benchmark index for the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. It consists of the 40 largest stocks by market capitalization. 
S&P GSCI The S&P GSCI (formerly the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) is a benchmark index 
for investments in the commodity market and a measure of commodity performance 
over time. It is a tradable index which is based on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
The index comprises 24 commodities from all commodity sectors. The wide range of 
constituent commodities provides the S&P GSCI with a high level of diversification, 
across subsectors and within each subsector.  
iTraxx Senior Financials 
(BCDS)  
The iTraxx Senior Financials Index comprises the 25 largest banks, based on their 
capitalization. It is a benchmark Index which offers protection in case a bank defaults 
and represents the credit conditions in the financial sector. Credit Default Swaps are 
derivative contracts that allow investors to protect themselves against a deterioration of 
credit quality and even a default. An increase in the price of Banks’ Credit Default 
Swaps indicates deterioration in liquidity and credit market conditions 
Volatility Index The volatility index (VIX) is a popular measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 
index options for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index and 
represents a measure of the market's expectation of stock market volatility. 
 308 
 
Appendix I. Linear Correlations 
It is very common with the Copula functions to employ also various other measures of 
dependence (see also Patton 2007, Ning 2010, Aloui et al. 2011). Our returns are not assumed 
to have an elliptical distribution, thus Pearson’s linear correlation is an inaccurate and 
misleading measure. In order to measure the association between two continuous random 
variables X and Y denoted (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) we assume that the pairs are concordant if (x1-
x2) has the same sign as (y1-y2). Hence, the pairs are concordant if: 
(x1-x2) (y1-y2) > 0         (b1) 
and discordant if: 
 (x1-x2) (y1-y2) > 0         (b2) 
In this study we develop Kendall’s t and Spearman’s ρ to measure the proportion of the 
concordant pairs. Both methods represent rank correlations (i.e. are non parametric measures 
of dependence), do not depend on marginal distributions and are the difference between the 
probability of the concordance and the probability of the discordance, so that: 
           [                ]                   ] (b3) 
for tαυ ∊ [-1,1].  
The higher the tαυ value, the stronger is the dependence. Thus: 
Similarly, we estimate the Spearman’s ρho rank correlation by: 
    
  
       
         (b4) 
Where n is the paired observations (xi,yi) and D is the sum of the squared differences between 
the ranks.  
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Appendix J. Figures and Tables to supplement chapter 6. 
 
Panel A – Low Volatility Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
Baltic Dry Index
BDI
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Probability of Low Volatility State
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Baltic Panamax Index
BPI
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Probability of Low Volatility State
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Baltic Capesize Index
BCI
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
Probability of Low Volatility State
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
 310 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – Intermediate Volatility Regime 
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Panel C – High Volatility Regime 
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Figure 6.2 – Regimes in the Shipping Market 
 
Note. Figure 6.2 identifies the Markov regimes, estimated using the MSVAR model. Panel A shows the low 
volatility regime. Panel B shows the intermediate volatility regime. Panel C shows the high volatility regime. 
Regime probabilities are given by the smoothed estimates. A regime is defined as a region (or polygon) where 
the smooth regime probability takes on value greater than 0.5. Regime 1 prevailed from the beginning of the 
sample till July 2007. In July 2007, the shipping market switched from regime 1 to regime 2. Regime 2 
dominated the rest of the sample period that started in July 2007 and was only occasionally interrupted by 
regime 3, when the shipping indices experienced a severe meltdown.  
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Panel A Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
 
Panel B Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
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Panel C Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
 
Panel D Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
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Panel E Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
 
Panel F Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
Figure 6.3 – Regime-Dependent Impulse Response Functions 
Note. This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the MSVAR in the low volatility, intermediate volatility and high 
volatility regimes (Regimes 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Panels A and B summarize responses to a shock to S&P 500 stock index. Panels C and D summarize responses to S&P 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. Panel E and F summarize responses to a shock to the BCDS and to the Volatility Index. Confidence intervals show 2 standard deviations 
from the impulse responses. 
Impulse Responses to BCDS Shock 
BDI 
BPI 
BCI 
BDTI 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
5 10 15 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
5 10 15 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
5 10 15 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
5 10 15 20 -7 
-6 -5 
-4 -3 
-2 -1 
0 
5 10 15 20 -7 
-6 -5 
-4 -3 
-2 -1 
0 
5 10 15 20 -7 
-6 -5 
-4 -3 
-2 -1 
0 
5 10 15 20 -4.0 
-3.5 -3.0 
-2.5 -2.0 
-1.5 -1.0 
-0.5 0.0 
5 10 15 20 -4.0 
-3.5 -3.0 
-2.5 -2.0 
-1.5 -1.0 
-0.5 0.0 
5 10 15 20 -4.0 
-3.5 -3.0 
-2.5 -2.0 
-1.5 -1.0 
-0.5 0.0 
5 10 15 20 0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
0.0125 
5 10 15 20 0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
0.0125 
5 10 15 20 0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
0.0125 
Impulse Responses to VIX Shock 
BCI 
BDI 
BPI 
BDTI 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
5 10 15 20 -1 
0 1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 7 
5 10 15 20 -1 
0 1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 7 
5 10 15 20 -1 
0 1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 7 
5 10 15 20 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 10 15 20 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 10 15 20 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 10 15 20 0.5 
1.0 1.5 
2.0 2.5 
3.0 3.5 
4.0 4.5 
5 10 15 20 0.5 
1.0 1.5 
2.0 2.5 
3.0 3.5 
4.0 4.5 
5 10 15 20 0.5 
1.0 1.5 
2.0 2.5 
3.0 3.5 
4.0 4.5 
5 10 15 20 -0.010 
-0.009 -0.008 
-0.007 -0.006 
-0.005 -0.004 
-0.003 -0.002 
5 10 15 20 -0.010 
-0.009 -0.008 
-0.007 -0.006 
-0.005 -0.004 
-0.003 -0.002 
5 10 15 20 -0.010 
-0.009 -0.008 
-0.007 -0.006 
-0.005 -0.004 
-0.003 -0.002 
Impulse Responses to VIX Shock 
S&P 500 
S&P GSCI 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -10.0 
-7.5 
-5.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
 316 
 
Table 6.1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
Baltic Dry Index 2153 -1.4649 2.501 11.793 647 2551.0 -1.072 16.309 24275.44 0.0000 
Baltic Panamax Index 2153 -1.8086 2.400 11.713 418 2507.5 -0.459 9.973 8999.40 0.0000 
Baltic Capesize Index 2153 -1.8871 3.459 19.867 830 3775.1 -2.008 37.623 128431.42 0.0000 
Baltic Dirty Tanker Index 2153 -0.4853 930 2.347 453 405.58 -1.610 36.779 122280.97 0.0000 
S&P 500 2153 0.2251 1.287 1.725 676 1984.9 -0.412 5.600 2874.77 0.0000 
S&P GSCI 2153 0.0001 5.111 10.898 3116 1399.0 -0.140 2.688 655.32 0.0000 
VIX 2153 0.0024 -0.0900 16.5400 -17.3600 1.9732 0.545 16.891 25702.70 0.0000 
BCDS 2153 106.8703 101.3290 353.0000 7.0000 81.9862 0.5518 2.5016 131.5949 0.0000 
USLIBOR_1 2153 2.2206 1.6029 5.6820 0.1241 1.5541 0.4263 1.7779 199.2768 0.0000 
USLIBOR _2 2153 2.3572 2.0027 5.4800 0.2926 1.3919 0.2957 1.8584 148.3588 0.0000 
USLIBOR _3 2153 2.5937 2.3440 5.3929 0.3833 1.3142 0.1369 1.9218 111.0691 0.0000 
USLIBOR _4 2153 2.6005 2.5779 5.3534 0.5160 1.2373 0.0020 2.0013 89.5122 0.0000 
USLIBOR _5 2153 2.8512 2.8024 5.2001 0.7185 1.1627 -0.1050 2.0812 79.7167 0.0000 
USLIBOR _6 2153 2.9963 3.0007 5.1009 0.8716 1.0966 -0.1918 2.1502 78.0304 0.0000 
USLIBOR _7 2153 3.1328 3.0816 5.1066 0.9930 1.0415 -0.2608 2.2033 81.3919 0.0000 
USLIBOR _8 2153 3.2420 3.2637 5.1187 1.1627 0.9969 -0.3118 2.2377 87.0514 0.0000 
USLIBOR _9 2153 3.3552 3.3627 5.1209 1.2855 0.9612 -0.3492 2.2579 93.1922 0.0000 
USLIBOR _10 2153 3.4928 3.4635 5.1284 1.4009 0.9316 -0.3786 2.2721 99.0034 0.0000 
USLIBOR _12 2153 3.5377 3.6116 5.1325 1.6631 0.8850 -0.4275 2.2968 109.9771 0.0000 
USLIBOR _15 2153 3.6608 3.8074 5.1339 1.8102 0.8443 -0.4794 2.3053 125.8313 0.0000 
USLIBOR _20 2153 3.7931 3.9004 5.1087 1.8498 0.8284 -0.5225 2.2783 144.7544 0.0000 
USLIBOR _25 2153 3.7390 3.8793 5.0822 1.8006 0.8265 -0.4750 2.1892 139.9947 0.0000 
USLIBOR _30 2153 3.7006 3.8411 5.0570 1.7658 0.8281 -0.4024 2.0810 133.9404 0.0000 
Note. This table presents summary statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of the change in 
shipping indices (Baltic Dry Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic Capesize Index, Baltic Dirty Tanker Index, measured in basis points), the change in the financial market (S&P 500, measured in basis points), the change in the commodity market 
(S&P GSCI, measured in index points), tthe change in credit markets (BCDS, measured in index points and VIX, measured in percentage points), and the fixed-for-floating interest rate for maturities from 1 to 30 years (USLIBOR_M, where “_M” 
denotes maturity, measured in annualized percentage points). The interest rate swaps are used to compute the first (“level”) and the second (“slope”) principal components. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 
daily observations. 
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Table 6.2. Unit Root Tests. 
VARIABLES OBS 
ADF TEST KPSS TEST PP TEST ZA TEST 
CV (5%) TSTAT CV (5%) TSTAT CV(5%) TSTAT CV (5%) TSTAT 
BDI 2153 -3.1658 -2.7729 0.1388 1.5766* -3.1658 -3.0147 -4.8821 -4.9578 
BPI 2153 -3.1658 -2.3109 0.1388 1.4588* -3.1658 -2.4584 -4.8821 -3.0229 
BCI 2153 -3.1658 -2.0091 0.1388 1.8051* -3.1658 -3.0773 -4.8821 -4.3892 
BDTI 2153 -3.1658 -2.7815 0.1388 1.3669* -3.1658 -2.3111 -4.8821 -3.0021 
VIX 2153 -3.1658 -3.4380* 0.1388 3.2586* -3.1658 -4.0875* -4.8821 -5.0327* 
BCDS 2153 -3.1658 -2.9923 0.1388 1.1049* -3.1658 -3.2981 -4.8821 -5.1498* 
S&P GSCI 2153 -3.1658 -1.9885 0.1388 2.0047* -3.1658 -2.1078 -4.8821 -3.7972 
S&P 500 2153 -3.1658 -1.9434 0.1388 2.1161* -3.1658 -2.0759 -4.8821 -3.7006 
USLIBOR _1 2153 -3.1658 -1.6708 0.1388 3.6751* -3.1658 -1.6980 -4.8821 -8.4582* 
USLIBOR _2 2153 -3.1658 -1.7228 0.1388 3.9587* -3.1658 -1.7415 -4.8821 -5.9085* 
USLIBOR _3 2153 -3.1658 -1.7666 0.1388 4.3434* -3.1658 -1.7916 -4.8821 -5.0162 
USLIBOR _4 2153 -3.1658 -1.7734 0.1388 4.6910* -3.1658 -1.7973 -4.8821 -4.4963 
USLIBOR _5 2153 -3.1658 -1.7700 0.1388 4.9764* -3.1658 -1.7929 -4.8821 -4.1967 
USLIBOR _6 2153 -3.1658 -1.7662 0.1388 5.2328* -3.1658 -1.7867 -4.8821 -4.0304 
USLIBOR _7 2153 -3.1658 -1.7679 0.1388 5.4532* -3.1658 -1.7862 -4.8821 -3.9600 
USLIBOR _8 2153 -3.1658 -1.7766 0.1388 5.6319* -3.1658 -1.7959 -4.8821 -3.9560 
USLIBOR _9 2153 -3.1658 -1.7893 0.1388 5.7744* -3.1658 -1.8119 -4.8821 -3.9870 
USLIBOR _10 2153 -3.1658 -1.8053 0.1388 5.8928* -3.1658 -1.8323 -4.8821 -4.0257 
USLIBOR _12 2153 -3.1658 -1.8376 0.1388 6.0721* -3.1658 -1.8743 -4.8821 -4.0943 
USLIBOR _15 2153 -3.1658 -1.8985 0.1388 6.1974* -3.1658 -1.9438 -4.8821 -4.1665 
USLIBOR _20 2153 -3.1658 -2.0098 0.1388 6.1367* -3.1658 -2.0639 -4.8821 -4.2255 
USLIBOR _25 2153 -3.1658 -2.1798 0.1388 5.6992* -3.1658 -2.2151 -4.8821 -4.3690 
USLIBOR _30 2153 -3.1658 -2.3495 0.1388 5.2379* -3.1658 -2.3686 -4.8821 -4.6317 
SLOPE 2153 -3.1658 -1.8883 0.1388 3.1574* -3.1658 -1.8959 -4.8821 -6.0387* 
This table summarizes results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Zivot-Andrews (ZA) tests for a 
unit root. Under the ADF, PP and ZA tests, the null hypothesis is that the series features a unit root. Under the KPSS test, the unit root is that the series is stationary. The test 
equations comprise a constant and a trend and 5 lags of the dependent variable in first differences. The ZA test allows for a single break in the intercept and the trend. This 
table provides the critical values at the 5% level of significance and the test statistics. Asterisk (*) indicates the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Table 6.6. Estimation Results for MS-VAR 
Panel A. Estimated Effects of Exogenous Variables 
State Low  Volatility State Middle Volatility State High Volatility State 
Dependent 
variables (in 
columns), 
explanatory 
variables (in 
rows) 
BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI 
     -0.0311 -0.0212 
-0.0327 
 
-0.0174 -0.2473 -0.2003 -0.2859 -0.1884 -0.6747 -0.4920 -0.6992 -0.4029 
     0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0019 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0008 0.0010 0.0006 0.0010 
 
 
Panel B. Residual Variance and Covariance Matrix 
State Low  Volatility State Middle Volatility State High Volatility State 
Variances and 
covariances in 
cells 
BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI BDI BPI BCI BDTI 
BDI 
0.1294   
0.0137 
   
14.3288   
1.9009 
   
30.0035  
4.0021 
   
BPI 
0.0226   
0.0131 
0.0455  
0.0209 
  
10.0277   
0.6892 
8.1934   
0.4205 
  
38.7750   
4.4759 
29.8920   
4.0001 
  
BCI 
0.0300   
0.0140 
0.0486   
0.0223 
0.6033   
0.0389 
 
14.9553   
1.9011 
10.0033   
0.6007 
14. 5235   
1.0048 
 
20.3526   
3.0096 
30.3633   
4.1035 
38.8997   
4.8894 
 
BDTI 
0.1200   
0.0130 
0.0400   
0.0173 
0.0424   
0.0183 
0.0001   
0.00002 
10.0003   
0.5799 
1.0096   
0.0002 
10.0026   
0.5282 
0.0014   
0.00008 
12.0044   
1.8055 
11.0027   
1.2041 
12.0735   
1.8403 
0.0443   
0.0018 
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Panel C. The Estimated Transition Probabilities 
 
   (
                                                 
                                                  
                                                    
) 
 
Note. Panel A summarizes the estimated effects of the exogenous variables in the Markov-switching vector autoregression (MSVAR) model. The Shipping Indexes are in 
first difference. PC1 and PC2 are the principal components on interest rate swaps in first differences. Panel B summarizes the estimated residual variance and covariance 
matrix. In Panels A and B, the estimated coefficient is provided by the upper number, whereas the estimated coefficient standard deviation is provided by the lower number. 
Panel C summarizes the estimated transition probabilities. The coefficient standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  The elements of the transition probabilities matrix are 
indexed according to    (
       
   
       
),  where                     and ∑    
 
      for all        . Significant coefficients (at 5% significance level) are 
highlighted in bold. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 and contains a total of 2153 daily observations. 
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Appendix K: Variables Definition 
 
 
Baltic Dry Index ($) The Baltic Dry Index is published daily by the London based Baltic Exchange, and 
tracks the average of the Baltic Supramax, Panamax and Capesize indices.  The 
Baltic Dry Index (B.D.I.) is usually referred as a barometer for shipping costs of dry 
bulk commodities like iron ore, coal and grain.   
  
Baltic Panamax Index 
($) 
The Baltic Panamax Index is released daily by the London based Baltic Exchange 
and represents the shipping costs of vessels that travel through the Panama canal 
(medium range vessels). 
  
Baltic Capesize Index 
($) 
The Baltic Capesize Index is reported daily by the London based Baltic Exchange 
and exhibits the shipping costs of cargo ships (large range vessels). 
  
Baltic Dirty Tanker 
Index ($) 
The Baltic Dirty Tanker Index is published daily by the London based Baltic 
Exchange and addresses the shipping costs of crude oil. 
  
S&P 500 Index ($) The Standard and Poors 500 Index records the market capitalisation of 500 large 
companies in the U.S., and is used as a reference benchmark and leading indicator 
of business cycles. 
  
S&P GSCI ($) 
 
 
 
 
 
iTraxx Senior 
Financials (BCDS) 
 
The S&P GSCI (formerly the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) is a benchmark 
index for investments in the commodity market and a measure of commodity 
performance over time. It is a tradable index which is based on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. The index comprises 24 commodities from all commodity 
sectors. The wide range of constituent commodities provides the S&P GSCI with a 
high level of diversification, across subsectors and within each subsector 
 
The iTraxx Senior Financials Index comprises the 25 largest banks, based on their 
capitalisation. It is a benchmark Index which offers protection in case a bank 
defaults and represents the credit conditions in the financial sector.. 
  
Volatility Index The volatility index (VIX) is a popular measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 
500 index options for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index 
and represents a measure of the market's expectation of stock market volatility. 
  
Fixed-for-Floating 
U.S. Libor Interest 
Rate Swaps 
The Interest Rate Swap Market is one of the largest and most liquid financial 
markets in the world. The swap curve is used as a benchmark yield curve in 
financial markets for the future movements of interest rates. 
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The Baltic dry index (BDI)
58
 is developed by the Baltic Exchange to reflect the overall 
fluctuation level in freight rates of the international dry bulk shipping market. It is also 
referred as a leading and benchmark economic indicator for the shipping industry. The dry 
bulk market, is the major component of the world shipping industry, and deals with the 
transportation of dry bulk cargoes. It is categorised either as major bulks or minor bulks. 
Major bulk cargoes constitute the vast majority of dry bulk cargoes by weight, and include 
iron ore, coal and grain, among others. Minor bulk cargoes include agricultural products, 
mineral cargoes, cement, forest products and steel products. 
The main contract types are period charters (contracts for a period of time charged in 
U.S. dollars /day), voyage charters (contracts for a particular voyage, charged in U.S. 
dollars/ton) and trip time charters (or T.T.C., which refers to a charter contract for one 
voyage but is again charged in U.S. dollars/day). In practice, under a period (and under a 
T.T.C.) contract, the charterer- and not the shipowner- conveys the costs of fuel. The primary 
mechanism that drives and leads all activities in the dry bulk market is the movement and the 
fluctuation in the freight market. For instance, when the freight market is in an upward trend, 
the effect will be transmitted into the new-building market, the generated cash flows will 
increase and the value of ships will rise too. On the contrary, when the freight market is in a 
downward trend, expected revenues decrease rapidly causing delay in delivery of new ships 
or even in some cases, order cancellations. Accordingly, any fluctuations and changes of time 
charter rates in the freight market have a strong impact in the prices of second-hand ships. 
Moreover, decisions to scrap ships are also affected by second-hand ship values. Indeed, if 
the scrapping value is higher than the second-hand value, old ships will be scrapped. 
Additionally, the new-building ship price or the second-hand ship price can be 
defined through a net present value relation, which is the sum of the expected future earnings, 
                                                          
58
 For more information on the characteristics of the shipping industry and on maritime economics please see 
Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009) and Stopford (2008). 
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the expected scrapped price plus a risk premium. Each of these central markets can also be 
subdivided into the following four size categories, based on the cargo carrying capacity: 
Handysize, Supramax, Panamax and Capesize. The Baltic Shipping Exchange issues the daily 
dry bulk shipping indexes of different ship sizes as Baltic Handy Size index (BHSI), Baltic 
Supramax index (BSI), Baltic Panamax index (BPI) and Baltic Capesize dry bulk shipping 
index (BCI). The dynamics in each market differ with each ship type. The Capesize sector 
focuses on the long haul iron ore and coal trade routes. Due to their size, Capesize vessels are 
only comparatively for small number of ports. Panamax vessels are between 60,000 dwt and 
100,000 dwt and are defined as those with the maximum beam (width) of 32.2 meters 
permitted to transit the Panama Canal. They mainly transport coal, grain, and iron ore. 
Handymax vessels are between 30,000 dwt and 60,000 dwt. The Handymax sector operates 
in a large number of geographically dispersed global trades, mainly transporting grains and 
minor bulks.  
The tanker market deals with the transportation of crude oil, refined petroleum 
products (clean and dirty products) and chemicals. Tanker trade is mainly defined by global 
energy production and aggregate demand, the world economy, and the geographic region of 
global energy surpluses and deficits. Similar to the dry bulk market, the sector was affected 
by a combination of factors leading to overall low freight rates, like slowing demand, slow 
imports growth, a change in the structure of tanker demand, new discoveries (e.g. the shale 
revolution in the United States), high oil prices, and high idle and tonnage capacity. Tankers 
are generally categorized by size, e.g., Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC, and ULCC. 
Tanker shipping provides an economical and convenient way to transport liquid bulk for 
international seaborne trade.  
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Appendix L. Simulating the conditional posterior density and the posterior distribution 
B.1 Posterior Distribution 
According to Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of Φ conditional on the data is 
  Φ         Φ        Φ                   (B1) 
The parameter matrix Φ is first partitioned into   blocks, Φ   Φ  Φ    Φ  . Because of 
the analytical complexity of the posterior density   Φ  Φ    Φ       , there is no analytical 
solution to   Φ  Φ    Φ       , nor it is possible to simulate from its distribution. To this 
end, Sims and Zha (2006) suggest using the Gibbs sampler to obtain the joint density 
  Φ  Φ    Φ          . We assume that the conditional posterior densities 
          Φ  Φ    Φ  ,   Φ          Φ    Φ  ,   Φ          Φ    Φ  , … 
,   Φ          Φ    Φ     are known. Then the Gibbs sampler starts from arbitrary values 
for Φ
    (Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
   ) that may be determined randomly, and samples alternatively 
from the density of each parameter block, conditional on the values of the other parameter 
blocks sampled in the previous iteration and the data. Thus, the following steps compose the 
algorithm for simulating draws from the posterior distribution of Φ (Waggoner and Zha 
2003): 
1. Choose the arbitrary values Φ
    (Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
   ). 
2. For             and given Φ
      (Φ 
      Φ 
        Φ 
     ), obtain Φ    
(Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
   ) by 
2.1. simulating Φ 
   
 from the conditional density of Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
        Φ 
     
, 
2.2. simulating Φ 
   
 from the conditional density of Φ 
    Φ 
    Φ 
        Φ 
     
, 
… 
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2.H simulating Φ 
   
 from the conditional density of Φ 
    Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ   
     
. 
3. Collect the sequence Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
      Φ 
        Φ 
          Φ 
        and keep only 
the last values    of the sequence. 
Step 3 concerns a choice of    and   . If the initial values Φ 
    Φ 
      Φ 
   
 are random but 
are not drawn from the target distribution, the first    draws (the so-called “burn-in” period) 
are discarded. This is because (i) the first    draws may not accurately represent the desired 
distribution and (ii) successive samples are not independent upon each other but rather form a 
Markov chain with some degree of correlation. By contrast, the second    draws can be 
regarded as draws from the true posterior joint density. As it is standard in the literature, we 
set         and         . 
In the Gibbs sampler, we use flat priors for the MSVAR coefficients    ,     and    . As 
suggested by Chib (1996), the prior of the transition matrix   takes a Dirichlet form. For the 
   column of    , the prior density is given by 
                                    
          
     , where       for   
     . 
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Appendix M. Estimation Method 
Following Cherubini and Luciano (2002) we estimate the parameters of the copula 
using Canonical Maximum Likelihood, which is a semi parametric two-step estimation 
method. First we estimate the marginals    and   nonparametrically via their empirical 
cumulative distribution functions   
  and   
  as: 
  
 
    
 
 
∑  {    
 
   } and   
 
    
 
 
∑  {    
 
   }   (1) 
To ensure that the first condition of the log likelihood function for the joint distribution is 
well defined, for all finite number of observations n,    
 
 and   
 
are rescaled by 
 
   
.  
Following Genest et al. (1995) we use the CML estimator     
 
to transform the 
observations into uniform variates using the empirical cumulative distribution function of 
each marginal distribution to estimate the unknown parameter θ of the copula as defined 
below: 
    
 
        ∑       
      
 
     
                      (2) 
Following Genest et al. (2009), in order to compare the copula models we use the 
goodness of fit test based on a comparison of the distance between the estimated and the 
empirical copulas. Therefore: 
   √                  (3) 
The test statistic considered is based on Cramer-Von Mises criterion which indicates that 
large values of the statistic    lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the copula C 
belongs to a class   . In particular, the Cramer-Von Mises criterion can be defined as: 
   ∫     
               (4)
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